Identifying who engages in inter-group conflict – and if they do so why – may help to predict and potentially prevent inter-group conflicts. Yet, little is known about the heterogeneity of individuals’ social preferences in inter-group conflict. We derive a typology and measure of group-dependent social preferences from a social preference model. We gather representative, incentivized field data before and after the heated 2016 Austrian presidential election. We find considerable heterogeneity in individuals’ social preferences. Out-group spitefulness is associated with higher age and group identity as well as lower education and in-group prosociality. Group-dependent social preferences predict voting decisions.
{"title":"Social Preferences in Inter-Group Conflict","authors":"Robert Böhm, Jürgen Fleiß, Robert Rybnicek","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3043163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3043163","url":null,"abstract":"Identifying who engages in inter-group conflict – and if they do so why – may help to predict and potentially prevent inter-group conflicts. Yet, little is known about the heterogeneity of individuals’ social preferences in inter-group conflict. We derive a typology and measure of group-dependent social preferences from a social preference model. We gather representative, incentivized field data before and after the heated 2016 Austrian presidential election. We find considerable heterogeneity in individuals’ social preferences. Out-group spitefulness is associated with higher age and group identity as well as lower education and in-group prosociality. Group-dependent social preferences predict voting decisions.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123067336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Russian Abstract: Целью работы является проверка гипотез о влиянии реального эффективного обменного курса рубля, уровня предпринимательской уверенности, цен на импортные и отечественные аналоги, доходов (валовой добавленной стоимости/выручки) российской промышленности, секторальных санкций ЕС и США на показатели инвестиционной динамики РФ на различных временных интервалах. Подробно исследуются факторы спроса российских предприятий на импорт инвестиционных товаров. English Abstract: The main purpose of the research is to test hypotheses about the impact of the real effective exchange rate, the level of business confidence, the prices of imported and domestic substitute investment goods, income (gross value added/revenue) of Russian industry, the EU and US sectoral sanctions on indicators of investment dynamics in Russia at different time intervals. Factors of demand of Russian companies on the import of capital goods were researched in detail.
{"title":"Импортозамещение Товаров Инвестиционного Назначения в России (Import Substitution of Investment Goods in Russia)","authors":"Georgy Idrisov, A. Kaukin, P. Pavlov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2983756","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2983756","url":null,"abstract":"Russian Abstract: Целью работы является проверка гипотез о влиянии реального эффективного обменного курса рубля, уровня предпринимательской уверенности, цен на импортные и отечественные аналоги, доходов (валовой добавленной стоимости/выручки) российской промышленности, секторальных санкций ЕС и США на показатели инвестиционной динамики РФ на различных временных интервалах. Подробно исследуются факторы спроса российских предприятий на импорт инвестиционных товаров. \u0000 \u0000English Abstract: The main purpose of the research is to test hypotheses about the impact of the real effective exchange rate, the level of business confidence, the prices of imported and domestic substitute investment goods, income (gross value added/revenue) of Russian industry, the EU and US sectoral sanctions on indicators of investment dynamics in Russia at different time intervals. Factors of demand of Russian companies on the import of capital goods were researched in detail.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127895060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-05-22DOI: 10.18601/01245996.V19N36.05
Gonzalo Cataño
Este ensayo expone las normas de las FARC y de su administracion de justicia, tal como aparecen en textos publicados bajo los titulos de estatuto, reglamento, normas, programas, plataformas y manuales de convivencia". A esos materiales se sumo un buen numero de entrevistas con desmovilizados -hombres y mujeres de diversas edades- para captar su vision de los procesos judiciales, cuya caracteristica es la intimidacion: el empleo de la amenaza y el ultimatum, que provocan temor, ansiedad y zozobra
{"title":"Justicia con Intimidación: El Caso de Las FARC (Justice with Intimidation: The Case of the FARC)","authors":"Gonzalo Cataño","doi":"10.18601/01245996.V19N36.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18601/01245996.V19N36.05","url":null,"abstract":"Este ensayo expone las normas de las FARC y de su administracion de justicia, tal como aparecen en textos publicados bajo los titulos de estatuto, reglamento, normas, programas, plataformas y manuales de convivencia\". A esos materiales se sumo un buen numero de entrevistas con desmovilizados -hombres y mujeres de diversas edades- para captar su vision de los procesos judiciales, cuya caracteristica es la intimidacion: el empleo de la amenaza y el ultimatum, que provocan temor, ansiedad y zozobra","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"221 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121464605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study a coordination game of incomplete information in which only a coordinated attack would succeed in toppling a regime. Without communication, efficient coordination is impossible in this environment. We study how communication between citizens can facilitate efficient coordination. We model communication that is frequent, non-binding, and may be censored (detected and punished) by the regime. Our main result is that communication with censorship is sufficient for almost efficient coordination, and perhaps surprisingly, it is also necessary.
{"title":"Communication, Censorship, and Coordination","authors":"Tetsuya Hoshino","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2879020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2879020","url":null,"abstract":"We study a coordination game of incomplete information in which only a coordinated attack would succeed in toppling a regime. Without communication, efficient coordination is impossible in this environment. We study how communication between citizens can facilitate efficient coordination. We model communication that is frequent, non-binding, and may be censored (detected and punished) by the regime. Our main result is that communication with censorship is sufficient for almost efficient coordination, and perhaps surprisingly, it is also necessary.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"279 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121501772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On 15 March, 2017 Russia was barred from importing products with zero duty rates, including grain, to Turkey, which became the next episode of “tomato war” with this country. This “war” vacated the niche of $0.5 billion in Russia for local tomato and cucumber producers, but also created problems for Russia’s exports of grain, vegetable oil, and food industry waste for fodder to Turkey amounting to $1.3–1.5 billion.
{"title":"‘Tomato War’ with Turkey: Interim Results","authors":"N. Shagaida","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2958323","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2958323","url":null,"abstract":"On 15 March, 2017 Russia was barred from importing products with zero duty rates, including grain, to Turkey, which became the next episode of “tomato war” with this country. This “war” vacated the niche of $0.5 billion in Russia for local tomato and cucumber producers, but also created problems for Russia’s exports of grain, vegetable oil, and food industry waste for fodder to Turkey amounting to $1.3–1.5 billion.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127675651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Decades of negotiation research suggest that deal-making negotiators and disputants achieve the best outcomes when they focus extensively on interests. However, research on whether and how they can actually do that is much more voluminous for deal-making negotiations than disputes. Integrating research on disputes and empathy gaps, we examine that possibility that disputants (naturally in a “hot state”) may have a distinctly hard time implementing their “cold state” intentions to focus on interests. After validating the importance of an interests focus in disputes, our second study documents the difficulty of implementing interest-focused intentions in disputes. Finally, we describe a third, planned study examining an intervention to help disputants implement their interest-focused intentions. These studies highlight a potential disconnect between disputants’ intentions and behavior, suggesting that disputing research may benefit from a new and unique set of theoretical assumptions.
{"title":"The Rights-Focused, Interests-Focused Disputant: Empathy Gaps in Disputing Strategy","authors":"Brian C. Gunia, Erik G. Helzer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2955269","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2955269","url":null,"abstract":"Decades of negotiation research suggest that deal-making negotiators and disputants achieve the best outcomes when they focus extensively on interests. However, research on whether and how they can actually do that is much more voluminous for deal-making negotiations than disputes. Integrating research on disputes and empathy gaps, we examine that possibility that disputants (naturally in a “hot state”) may have a distinctly hard time implementing their “cold state” intentions to focus on interests. After validating the importance of an interests focus in disputes, our second study documents the difficulty of implementing interest-focused intentions in disputes. Finally, we describe a third, planned study examining an intervention to help disputants implement their interest-focused intentions. These studies highlight a potential disconnect between disputants’ intentions and behavior, suggesting that disputing research may benefit from a new and unique set of theoretical assumptions.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123840181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michael Caldara, Michael McBride, M. McCarter, Roman M. Sheremeta
We study three triggers of conflict and explore their resultant emotional reactions in a laboratory experiment. Economists suggest that the primary trigger of conflict is monetary incentives. Social psychologists suggest that conflicts are often triggered by fear. Finally, evolutionary biologists suggest that a third trigger is uncertainty about opponent’s desire to cause harm. Consistent with the predictions from economics, social psychology, and evolutionary biology, we find that conflict originates from all three triggers. The three triggers differently impact the frequency of conflict, but not the intensity. Also, we find that the frequency and intensity of conflict decrease positive emotions and increase negative emotions, and that conflict impacts negative emotions more than positive emotions.
{"title":"A Study of the Triggers of Conflict and Emotional Reactions","authors":"Michael Caldara, Michael McBride, M. McCarter, Roman M. Sheremeta","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2943699","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2943699","url":null,"abstract":"We study three triggers of conflict and explore their resultant emotional reactions in a laboratory experiment. Economists suggest that the primary trigger of conflict is monetary incentives. Social psychologists suggest that conflicts are often triggered by fear. Finally, evolutionary biologists suggest that a third trigger is uncertainty about opponent’s desire to cause harm. Consistent with the predictions from economics, social psychology, and evolutionary biology, we find that conflict originates from all three triggers. The three triggers differently impact the frequency of conflict, but not the intensity. Also, we find that the frequency and intensity of conflict decrease positive emotions and increase negative emotions, and that conflict impacts negative emotions more than positive emotions.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123890095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article deals with the analyzes of economic diplomacy application in the area of innovations. The strategy of economic diplomacy by improving the efficiency in global value chain participation was considered. The main effects of commercial diplomacy using in the innovation area were identified. The world experience using economic diplomacy in the innovation sphere was considered.
{"title":"Economic Diplomacy in the Innovation Global Value Chains as the National Security Providing Strategy Component","authors":"V. Omelyanenko","doi":"10.22178/POS.20-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22178/POS.20-3","url":null,"abstract":"The article deals with the analyzes of economic diplomacy application in the area of innovations. The strategy of economic diplomacy by improving the efficiency in global value chain participation was considered. The main effects of commercial diplomacy using in the innovation area were identified. The world experience using economic diplomacy in the innovation sphere was considered.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"251 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121234529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study whether the spatial distribution of natural resources across different ethnic groups within countries impede spatial inequality, national economic performance, and the incidence of armed conflict. By providing a theoretical rent-seeking model and analysing a set of geocoded data for mines, night-time light emissions, local populations and ethnic homelands, we show that the distribution of resources is a major driving factor of ethnic income inequality and, thus, induces rent-seeking behaviour. Consequently, we extend the perspective of the resource curse to explain cross-country differences in economic performance and the onset of civil conflicts. We show that the inequality in the spatial distribution of resource endowments within countries drives the curse of natural resources, not the resources per se.
{"title":"The Geography of Natural Resources, Ethnic Inequality and Development","authors":"Christian Lessmann, Arne Steinkraus","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2917209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2917209","url":null,"abstract":"We study whether the spatial distribution of natural resources across different ethnic groups within countries impede spatial inequality, national economic performance, and the incidence of armed conflict. By providing a theoretical rent-seeking model and analysing a set of geocoded data for mines, night-time light emissions, local populations and ethnic homelands, we show that the distribution of resources is a major driving factor of ethnic income inequality and, thus, induces rent-seeking behaviour. Consequently, we extend the perspective of the resource curse to explain cross-country differences in economic performance and the onset of civil conflicts. We show that the inequality in the spatial distribution of resource endowments within countries drives the curse of natural resources, not the resources per se.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128341040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Do economic shocks cause civil conflict? Evidence at the country level is ambiguous. We study the impact of plausibly exogenous shocks to world food prices on civil conflict in Africa using panel data at the level of a 0.5 degree grid cell. We find that higher prices lead to fewer civil conflict battles in cells that produce food, and more civil conflict battles in cells that consume food. We interpret this as evidence that negative income shocks cause civil conflict, as rising prices increase income for producers and decrease income for consumers in real terms. The result is consistent with a model that allows for a distinction between two varieties of conflict. In food-producing cells, higher prices reduce civil conflict battles over the control of territory (what we call "factor conflict") and increase smaller-scale conflict over the appropriation of surplus ("output conflict"). This difference arises because higher prices raise the opportunity cost of soldiering for producers, while also inducing net consumers to appropriate increasingly valuable surplus as their real wages fall. In food-consuming cells, higher prices increase both forms of conflict, as poor consumers turn to soldiering and appropriation in order to maintain a minimum consumption target. We corroborate the model's predictions on output conflict using both cell-level data on violence and looting and geocoded survey data on theft and physical assault. Ignoring distinctions between consumer and producer effects leads to attenuated estimates. Projected price changes from 2010-2050 are expected to substantially increase both forms of conflict.
{"title":"Economic Shocks and Varieties of Conflict: Global Prices, Real Income and Local Violence in Africa","authors":"Eoin F. McGuirk, M. Burke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2776263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2776263","url":null,"abstract":"Do economic shocks cause civil conflict? Evidence at the country level is ambiguous. We study the impact of plausibly exogenous shocks to world food prices on civil conflict in Africa using panel data at the level of a 0.5 degree grid cell. We find that higher prices lead to fewer civil conflict battles in cells that produce food, and more civil conflict battles in cells that consume food. We interpret this as evidence that negative income shocks cause civil conflict, as rising prices increase income for producers and decrease income for consumers in real terms. The result is consistent with a model that allows for a distinction between two varieties of conflict. In food-producing cells, higher prices reduce civil conflict battles over the control of territory (what we call \"factor conflict\") and increase smaller-scale conflict over the appropriation of surplus (\"output conflict\"). This difference arises because higher prices raise the opportunity cost of soldiering for producers, while also inducing net consumers to appropriate increasingly valuable surplus as their real wages fall. In food-consuming cells, higher prices increase both forms of conflict, as poor consumers turn to soldiering and appropriation in order to maintain a minimum consumption target. We corroborate the model's predictions on output conflict using both cell-level data on violence and looting and geocoded survey data on theft and physical assault. Ignoring distinctions between consumer and producer effects leads to attenuated estimates. Projected price changes from 2010-2050 are expected to substantially increase both forms of conflict.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"401 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124379082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}