Pub Date : 2011-06-01DOI: 10.1016/J.WORLDDEV.2012.09.012
S. Bandyopadhyay, E. Green
{"title":"Nation-Building and Conflict in Modern Africa","authors":"S. Bandyopadhyay, E. Green","doi":"10.1016/J.WORLDDEV.2012.09.012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/J.WORLDDEV.2012.09.012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"26 70","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117392554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-06-01DOI: 10.5089/9781455269471.001
Marshall Mills, Antonio C. David, Fabiano Rodrigues Bastos
This paper identifies the factors linked to cross-country differentials in growth performance in the aftermath of social conflict for 30 sub-Saharan African countries using panel data techniques. Our results show that changes in the terms of trade are the most important correlate of economic performance in post-conflict environments. This variable is typically associated with an increase in the marginal probability of positive economic performance by about 30 percent. Institutional quality emerges as the second most important factor. Foreign aid is shown to have very limited ability to explain differentials in growth performance, and other policy variables such as trade openness are not found to have a statistically significant effect. The results suggest that exogenous factors ("luck") are an important factor in post-conflict recovery. They also highlight the importance in post-conflict settings of policies to mitigate the macroeconomic impact of terms of trade volatility (including countercyclical macroeconomic policies and innovative financing instruments) and of policies to promote export diversification.
{"title":"Post-Conflict Recovery: Institutions, Aid, or Luck?","authors":"Marshall Mills, Antonio C. David, Fabiano Rodrigues Bastos","doi":"10.5089/9781455269471.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781455269471.001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper identifies the factors linked to cross-country differentials in growth performance in the aftermath of social conflict for 30 sub-Saharan African countries using panel data techniques. Our results show that changes in the terms of trade are the most important correlate of economic performance in post-conflict environments. This variable is typically associated with an increase in the marginal probability of positive economic performance by about 30 percent. Institutional quality emerges as the second most important factor. Foreign aid is shown to have very limited ability to explain differentials in growth performance, and other policy variables such as trade openness are not found to have a statistically significant effect. The results suggest that exogenous factors (\"luck\") are an important factor in post-conflict recovery. They also highlight the importance in post-conflict settings of policies to mitigate the macroeconomic impact of terms of trade volatility (including countercyclical macroeconomic policies and innovative financing instruments) and of policies to promote export diversification.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"124 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128471447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine how the reputation concern of contracting parties affects contractual incentives if information is transmitted to the public through contract litigation. In a career concern framework, the performance of the long-lived seller is revealed to future buyers only if contractual disputes are litigated. We show that the seller's reputation concern acts like an additional legal cost which induces her to settle privately. A strong reputation concern effectively voids the incentive contract and eliminates all incentives. Finally, we apply the model to discuss the optimal information disclosure policy of courts.
{"title":"Contract Litigation as Information Revelation Channel and its Implications on Reputation (Dis)Incentives","authors":"F.L. Philip Tzang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1832385","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1832385","url":null,"abstract":"We examine how the reputation concern of contracting parties affects contractual incentives if information is transmitted to the public through contract litigation. In a career concern framework, the performance of the long-lived seller is revealed to future buyers only if contractual disputes are litigated. We show that the seller's reputation concern acts like an additional legal cost which induces her to settle privately. A strong reputation concern effectively voids the incentive contract and eliminates all incentives. Finally, we apply the model to discuss the optimal information disclosure policy of courts.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125728833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper compares two methods to encourage socially optimal provision of a public good. We compare the efficacy of vigilante justice, as represented by peer-to-peer punishment, to delegated policing, as represented by the "hired gun" mechanism, to deter free riding and improve group welfare. The "hired gun" mechanism (Andreoni and Gee, 2011) is an example of a low cost device that promotes complete compliances and minimal enforcement as the unique Nash equilibrium. We find that subjects are willing to pay to hire a delegated policing mechanism over 70% of the time, and that this mechanism increases welfare between 15% to 40%. Moreover, the lion's share of the welfare gain comes because the hired gun crowds out vigilante peer-to-peer punishments.
本文比较了鼓励社会最优提供公共产品的两种方法。我们比较了以点对点惩罚为代表的治安维持者司法与以“雇佣枪手”机制为代表的授权警务在阻止搭便车和改善群体福利方面的效力。“雇佣枪手”机制(Andreoni and Gee, 2011)是低成本机制的一个例子，它促进了完全的合规和最小的强制执行，作为独特的纳什均衡。我们发现，在超过70%的情况下，受试者愿意花钱聘请委托的监管机制，而这种机制能将福利提高15%至40%。此外，福利收益的最大份额来自于雇佣枪手挤掉了对等惩罚的义务警员。
{"title":"Gun for Hire: Does Delegated Enforcement Crowd Out Peer Punishment in Giving to Public Goods?","authors":"J. Andreoni, Laura K. Gee","doi":"10.3386/W17033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W17033","url":null,"abstract":"This paper compares two methods to encourage socially optimal provision of a public good. We compare the efficacy of vigilante justice, as represented by peer-to-peer punishment, to delegated policing, as represented by the \"hired gun\" mechanism, to deter free riding and improve group welfare. The \"hired gun\" mechanism (Andreoni and Gee, 2011) is an example of a low cost device that promotes complete compliances and minimal enforcement as the unique Nash equilibrium. We find that subjects are willing to pay to hire a delegated policing mechanism over 70% of the time, and that this mechanism increases welfare between 15% to 40%. Moreover, the lion's share of the welfare gain comes because the hired gun crowds out vigilante peer-to-peer punishments.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"70 10","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120910168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mediation is increasingly employed in the international and domestic context to support agreement-making and to manage and resolve conflict. Practitioners and participants in such processes may not have clearly defined obligations and may not be subject to any systemic or other controls. As a result, mediation can be conducted in a procedural manner that is offensive from the perspective of social or human norms and may also result in outcomes that are not transparent and may be unfair. This article proposes that a values-based approach be used by practitioners to assist to ensure that the processes and outcomes do not lack integrity. In addition, a values-based approach can inform the development of participant obligations, systemic approaches and objectives. To support a values-based approach an “ERSR” framework is proposed, focusing on education, recognition, support and resolution.
{"title":"Using a Values-Based Approach in Mediation","authors":"Lola Akin Ojelabi, Tania Sourdin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2721546","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2721546","url":null,"abstract":"Mediation is increasingly employed in the international and domestic context to support agreement-making and to manage and resolve conflict. Practitioners and participants in such processes may not have clearly defined obligations and may not be subject to any systemic or other controls. As a result, mediation can be conducted in a procedural manner that is offensive from the perspective of social or human norms and may also result in outcomes that are not transparent and may be unfair. This article proposes that a values-based approach be used by practitioners to assist to ensure that the processes and outcomes do not lack integrity. In addition, a values-based approach can inform the development of participant obligations, systemic approaches and objectives. To support a values-based approach an “ERSR” framework is proposed, focusing on education, recognition, support and resolution.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127047659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper highlights the conflict in benefit sharing among four different communities (hamlets) spread over different geographical areas in a conservation and development programme. All the four hamlets are expected to contribute equally to the conservation and management activities. In return, these hamlets are provided financial assistance to be utilised for development activities. Problem in the community arises when the grants under the development component are released – as to how the grants are to be shared among different hamlets? The paper seeks to understand how individuals/sections within groups use conflict as a tool or strategy to get benefits and how certain actors involved in the process attempt to minimize or resolve community/group conflict? How does the Managing Committee negotiate in the conflict situation with the beneficiaries and how such conflicts can have a negative impact on the conservation activities is also discussed.
{"title":"Social Capital and Conflict Resolution: Lessons from a Community Forestry Programme in Karnataka","authors":"Ozmond Roshan D'Souza","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1607413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1607413","url":null,"abstract":"The paper highlights the conflict in benefit sharing among four different communities (hamlets) spread over different geographical areas in a conservation and development programme. All the four hamlets are expected to contribute equally to the conservation and management activities. In return, these hamlets are provided financial assistance to be utilised for development activities. Problem in the community arises when the grants under the development component are released – as to how the grants are to be shared among different hamlets? The paper seeks to understand how individuals/sections within groups use conflict as a tool or strategy to get benefits and how certain actors involved in the process attempt to minimize or resolve community/group conflict? How does the Managing Committee negotiate in the conflict situation with the beneficiaries and how such conflicts can have a negative impact on the conservation activities is also discussed.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127691100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Does water scarcity induce conflict? And who would engage in a water scarcity conflict? In this paper we look for evidence of the relation between water scarcity and conflictive behavior. With a framed field experiment conducted with smallholder irrigators from semi-arid Tanzania that replicates appropriation from an occasionally scarce common water flow we assess what type of water users is more inclined to react in conflictive way to scarcity. On average, water scarcity induces selfish appropriation behavior in the experiment which is regarded conflictive in the Tanzanian irrigator communities where strong noncompetition norms regulate irrigation water distribution. But not all react to water scarcity in the same way. Poor, marginalized, dissocialized irrigators with low human capital and with higher stakes are most likely to react with conflictive appropriation behavior to water scarcity. Viewed a political ecology perspective we conclude that circumstances in Tanzania are conducive to resource scarcity conflicts. Water scarcity and water values are increasing. Water governance institutions entail exclusionary elements. Moreover, a higher likelihood to react in a conflictive way to water scarcity coincides with real economic and political inequalities which could form a basis for mobilization for more violent ways of competing for scarce resources.
{"title":"Who Engages in Water Scarcity Conflicts? A Field Experiment with Irrigators in Semi-Arid Africa","authors":"Els Lecoutere, Ben d’Exelle, Bjorn Van Campenhout","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1660491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1660491","url":null,"abstract":"Does water scarcity induce conflict? And who would engage in a water scarcity conflict? In this paper we look for evidence of the relation between water scarcity and conflictive behavior. With a framed field experiment conducted with smallholder irrigators from semi-arid Tanzania that replicates appropriation from an occasionally scarce common water flow we assess what type of water users is more inclined to react in conflictive way to scarcity. On average, water scarcity induces selfish appropriation behavior in the experiment which is regarded conflictive in the Tanzanian irrigator communities where strong noncompetition norms regulate irrigation water distribution. But not all react to water scarcity in the same way. Poor, marginalized, dissocialized irrigators with low human capital and with higher stakes are most likely to react with conflictive appropriation behavior to water scarcity. Viewed a political ecology perspective we conclude that circumstances in Tanzania are conducive to resource scarcity conflicts. Water scarcity and water values are increasing. Water governance institutions entail exclusionary elements. Moreover, a higher likelihood to react in a conflictive way to water scarcity coincides with real economic and political inequalities which could form a basis for mobilization for more violent ways of competing for scarce resources.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"235 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134022502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-07-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2230.2010.00807.x
Robin F. Hansen
Parallel investment treaty arbitrations present a demonstrated risk of inconsistent awards. This article examines several ameliorative responses to parallel investment treaty proceedings, executable by treaty-drafters, arbitrators and parties themselves. The unique jurisdiction mechanics and applicable law in investment treaty disputes frames the responses available. Despite the unique context within which parallel investment arbitrations occur, the challenges they pose to party interests, to principles including legal fairness and to the effective pursuit of dispute resolution closely resemble those posed by parallel proceedings in other domestic and international legal fora.
{"title":"Parallel Proceedings in Investor-State Treaty Arbitration: Responses for Treaty-Drafters, Arbitrators and Parties","authors":"Robin F. Hansen","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-2230.2010.00807.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2010.00807.x","url":null,"abstract":"Parallel investment treaty arbitrations present a demonstrated risk of inconsistent awards. This article examines several ameliorative responses to parallel investment treaty proceedings, executable by treaty-drafters, arbitrators and parties themselves. The unique jurisdiction mechanics and applicable law in investment treaty disputes frames the responses available. Despite the unique context within which parallel investment arbitrations occur, the challenges they pose to party interests, to principles including legal fairness and to the effective pursuit of dispute resolution closely resemble those posed by parallel proceedings in other domestic and international legal fora.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126668626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Given differing organizational needs and goals, underlying conflicts and tensions are an inherent part of buyer-seller relationships. This research presents and tests a conceptual framework examining the effect of the type of conflict (dysfunctional and functional) in the relationship, the conflict management approaches used by the salesperson, and the subsequent quality of the buyer-seller relationship. The framework is tested using surveys completed by 109 salespeople. The findings of this study are relevant to marketing practitioners and managers, particularly salespeople, sales managers, and purchasing managers. First, the most straightforward and obvious finding is that dysfunctional conflict is detrimental to relationship quality. Conversely, functional conflict showed no significant association with either trust or satisfaction. The only conflict management strategy that had a significant association with both functional and dysfunctional conflicts in this study was the confronting strategy.
{"title":"Dysfunctional and Functional Conflicts in Buyer-Seller Relationships","authors":"Lionel Bobot","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1611892","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1611892","url":null,"abstract":"Given differing organizational needs and goals, underlying conflicts and tensions are an inherent part of buyer-seller relationships. This research presents and tests a conceptual framework examining the effect of the type of conflict (dysfunctional and functional) in the relationship, the conflict management approaches used by the salesperson, and the subsequent quality of the buyer-seller relationship. The framework is tested using surveys completed by 109 salespeople. The findings of this study are relevant to marketing practitioners and managers, particularly salespeople, sales managers, and purchasing managers. First, the most straightforward and obvious finding is that dysfunctional conflict is detrimental to relationship quality. Conversely, functional conflict showed no significant association with either trust or satisfaction. The only conflict management strategy that had a significant association with both functional and dysfunctional conflicts in this study was the confronting strategy.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114828045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study a model of conflicts and wars in which the outcome is uncertain not because of luck on the battlefield as in standard models, but because countries lack information about their opponent. In this model expected resource levels and production and military technologies are common knowledge, but realized resource levels are private information. Each country decides how to allocate its resources to production and warfare. The country with the stronger military wins and receives aggregate production. In equilibrium both comparative and absolute advantages matter: a larger resource share is allocated to warfare by the country with a comparative advantage in warfare at relatively low realized resource levels, and by the country with an absolute disadvantage in warfare at relatively high realized resource levels. From an ex-ante perspective the country with a comparative advantage in warfare is more likely to win the war unless its military potential is much lower.
{"title":"All-Pay War","authors":"R. Hodler, Hadi Yektas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1594133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1594133","url":null,"abstract":"We study a model of conflicts and wars in which the outcome is uncertain not because of luck on the battlefield as in standard models, but because countries lack information about their opponent. In this model expected resource levels and production and military technologies are common knowledge, but realized resource levels are private information. Each country decides how to allocate its resources to production and warfare. The country with the stronger military wins and receives aggregate production. In equilibrium both comparative and absolute advantages matter: a larger resource share is allocated to warfare by the country with a comparative advantage in warfare at relatively low realized resource levels, and by the country with an absolute disadvantage in warfare at relatively high realized resource levels. From an ex-ante perspective the country with a comparative advantage in warfare is more likely to win the war unless its military potential is much lower.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117078600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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