Contracting parties sometimes have a claim to recover money paid in advance, or for reasonable payment for work done under the contract, commonly described as restitutionary remedies. This claim arising out of a contract is nowadays generally regarded as a non‐contractual, unjust enrichment claim governed by the modern law of unjust enrichment, by contrast with a contractual claim for damages or specific performance. The article argues that the claim is contractual, and that this is relevant to determining when it should be available and what the measure of recovery should be. In particular, it is argued that this follows from the proper understanding of the form of agreement made by contracting parties. The argument involves discussion of doctrinal categories such as contract and unjust enrichment, the relationship between primary and remedial rights in contract, the nature of contractual agreement, and the protection of reliance in contract.
{"title":"Restitutionary Remedies in the Contractual Context","authors":"Peter Jaffey","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12020","url":null,"abstract":"Contracting parties sometimes have a claim to recover money paid in advance, or for reasonable payment for work done under the contract, commonly described as restitutionary remedies. This claim arising out of a contract is nowadays generally regarded as a non‐contractual, unjust enrichment claim governed by the modern law of unjust enrichment, by contrast with a contractual claim for damages or specific performance. The article argues that the claim is contractual, and that this is relevant to determining when it should be available and what the measure of recovery should be. In particular, it is argued that this follows from the proper understanding of the form of agreement made by contracting parties. The argument involves discussion of doctrinal categories such as contract and unjust enrichment, the relationship between primary and remedial rights in contract, the nature of contractual agreement, and the protection of reliance in contract.","PeriodicalId":129207,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law - Contracts eJournal","volume":"113 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133243963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Article deals with the sources which guide English courts while determining international Commercial Contracts.
本文论述了指导英国法院裁定国际商事合同的渊源。
{"title":"Sources of Law Guiding English Court While Interpreting International Commercial Contracts","authors":"Khushi Pandya","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2247341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2247341","url":null,"abstract":"Article deals with the sources which guide English courts while determining international Commercial Contracts.","PeriodicalId":129207,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law - Contracts eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121215982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As international trade and commerce continues to grow and becomes more diverse and expansive in nature, enforcement of contracts for the international sales of good (CISG) increasingly throw up challenges especially in relation to enforcement of these contracts between parties from different national jurisdictions in cases where the agreement is silent on the applicable governing law and dispute resolution forum. This leads to forum shopping with its attendant consequences on prolonged litigation and even more complexity in the enforcement procedure. The aim of this research is to study the attitudes of national courts in the US, UK and selected European countries to enforcement of CISG in cases where the parties have failed to expressly choose an applicable governing law in their agreement and how this influences the outcome of such cases. The methodology adopted is a comparative analysis of the attitudes of national courts in the stated jurisdictions and an appraisal of its effects on the enforcement of CISG across these jurisdictions.The research finds that the difference in the legal and socio-political settings of these countries account for the variations in the attitudes of their national courts to enforcement of CISG in the absence of express choice of governing law and that generally, in such cases, the national courts of these countries tend to be influenced by local laws and practice in deciding the cases as they subject international transactions to domestic standards, with its unpleasant consequences. In this regard, forum shopping has its advantage as it enables the parties shop for national courts with more liberal approach to enforcement of CISG.
{"title":"A Comparative Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts to Choice of Law and Interpretation of Contracts for International Sale of Goods","authors":"Faizat Badmus-Busari","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2339963","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2339963","url":null,"abstract":"As international trade and commerce continues to grow and becomes more diverse and expansive in nature, enforcement of contracts for the international sales of good (CISG) increasingly throw up challenges especially in relation to enforcement of these contracts between parties from different national jurisdictions in cases where the agreement is silent on the applicable governing law and dispute resolution forum. This leads to forum shopping with its attendant consequences on prolonged litigation and even more complexity in the enforcement procedure. The aim of this research is to study the attitudes of national courts in the US, UK and selected European countries to enforcement of CISG in cases where the parties have failed to expressly choose an applicable governing law in their agreement and how this influences the outcome of such cases. The methodology adopted is a comparative analysis of the attitudes of national courts in the stated jurisdictions and an appraisal of its effects on the enforcement of CISG across these jurisdictions.The research finds that the difference in the legal and socio-political settings of these countries account for the variations in the attitudes of their national courts to enforcement of CISG in the absence of express choice of governing law and that generally, in such cases, the national courts of these countries tend to be influenced by local laws and practice in deciding the cases as they subject international transactions to domestic standards, with its unpleasant consequences. In this regard, forum shopping has its advantage as it enables the parties shop for national courts with more liberal approach to enforcement of CISG.","PeriodicalId":129207,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law - Contracts eJournal","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128093946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-05-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2230.2011.00850.x
S. Douglas
The article asks whether the tort of conversion should be expanded so as to protect contractual rights. The suggestion, found in recent case law and academic texts, that conversion should protect contractual rights because such rights belong to the law of property is rejected. It is argued that this approach is purely semantic and ignores the fact that contractual rights have different characteristics to other kinds of rights that we typically class as ‘property rights’. The better approach, it is argued, is to ask whether it is actually possible to protect contractual rights through the tort of conversion. The article attempts to show that the absence of certain features from contractual rights, in particular the fact that such rights do not relate to a physical object and are not exigible against the world, makes the expansion of conversion extremely difficult.
{"title":"The Scope of Conversion: Property and Contract","authors":"S. Douglas","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-2230.2011.00850.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2011.00850.x","url":null,"abstract":"The article asks whether the tort of conversion should be expanded so as to protect contractual rights. The suggestion, found in recent case law and academic texts, that conversion should protect contractual rights because such rights belong to the law of property is rejected. It is argued that this approach is purely semantic and ignores the fact that contractual rights have different characteristics to other kinds of rights that we typically class as ‘property rights’. The better approach, it is argued, is to ask whether it is actually possible to protect contractual rights through the tort of conversion. The article attempts to show that the absence of certain features from contractual rights, in particular the fact that such rights do not relate to a physical object and are not exigible against the world, makes the expansion of conversion extremely difficult.","PeriodicalId":129207,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law - Contracts eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128986759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When we are entering in shopping mall or commercial complex almost anywhere in the world, one encounters many familiar shops, fast-food restaurants, clothing retail stores, and service providers of different kinds, mostly with familiar brand names that have attained worldwide recognition. Many of these enterprises are not belongs to any of large multinational chains but are, in fact, independently owned businesses of local entrepreneurs. So, how is it that small entrepreneurs around the globe are able to sell the same products, use the same trademarks, and have the same shop decoration and have employees dressed almost identically same? How these local entrepreneurs are legally allowed to do this? The answer is through the franchising system.
{"title":"‘Franchises System – A New Business Model’ Analysis of Legal Issues Relating with Franchises","authors":"Vivek Pyasi","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1698487","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1698487","url":null,"abstract":"When we are entering in shopping mall or commercial complex almost anywhere in the world, one encounters many familiar shops, fast-food restaurants, clothing retail stores, and service providers of different kinds, mostly with familiar brand names that have attained worldwide recognition. Many of these enterprises are not belongs to any of large multinational chains but are, in fact, independently owned businesses of local entrepreneurs. So, how is it that small entrepreneurs around the globe are able to sell the same products, use the same trademarks, and have the same shop decoration and have employees dressed almost identically same? How these local entrepreneurs are legally allowed to do this? The answer is through the franchising system.","PeriodicalId":129207,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law - Contracts eJournal","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123814329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ukrainian Abstract: Емпіричне значення механізму цивільноправового регулювання випуску й обігу коносамента полягає в тому, що в процесі перевезення вантажу, його власник може розпоряджатися цим майном, шляхом відчуження коносамента іншій особі. Саме в такому разі розкривається правова сутність коносамента – як цінного паперу. Особливість коносаменту як цінного паперу полягає в тому, що він, будучи об’єктом речового права, сам по собі не становить будьякої цінності. Таку цінність мають саме ті майнові права, які засвідчені в ньому і які можуть бути реалізовані його володільцем шляхом пред’явлення коносамента. Так, розглядаючи зміст коносамента, треба розрізняти поняття “право на коносамент ”, яке має речовий характер і об’єктом якого є, власне цей документ, і “право з коносамент а”, якому притаманний зобов’язальний характер і об’єктом якого є майно, зазначене в цьому цінному папері. Інакше кажучи, структуру правовідносин за коносаментом, з одного боку, складають відносини між вантажоперевізником і відправником вантажу. Це правовідносини мають зобов’язальноправовий характер, відповідно до яких пред’явлення коносамента тягне за собою обов’язок з зобов’язальної за коносаментом особи здійснити передачу майна, вказаного в ньому. З іншого боку, коносамент підтверджує правовідносини власності на певне майно. Ці відносини мають речовий характер.
English Abstract: The empiric value of a mechanism for civil regulation of issue and circulation of the bill of lading is that during freight transportation its owner can dispose of such property by alienating the bill of lading to another person. In this case, the legal essence of the bill of lading as a security is revealed. Peculiarity of the bill of lading as a security is that being an object of the proprietary right the bill of lading has no value by itself. Those particular property rights certified in the bill of lading, which can be exercised by its owner by means of production of the bill of lading, have value.
Thus, considering the content of the bill of lading we must distinguish among concepts of “right to the bill of lading”, which has a proprietary nature and which object is the document itself, and the “right of the bill of lading”, which has a binding nature and which object is the property specified in the security. In other words, the structure of legal relations under the bill of lading, on the one hand, includes relations between the freight forwarder and the consignor. Such legal relations have a binding nature, according to which production of the bill of lading results in obligation of the person liable under the bill of lading to transfer the property specified therein. On the other hand, the bill of lading confirms legal ownership of a certain property. These relations have a proprietary nature.
{"title":"ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ПЕРЕДАЧІ МАЙНОВИХ ПРАВ, ЯКІ СТАНОВЛЯТЬ ЗМІСТ КОНОСАМЕНТУ, У ПРАВОВІДНОСИНАХ ПРО ПЕРЕДАЧУ МАЙНА У ВЛАСНІСТЬ (Particularities of Bill of lading. Theoretical Aspects)","authors":"Anatoliy Kostruba","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3534539","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3534539","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Ukrainian Abstract:</b> Емпіричне значення механізму цивільноправового регулювання випуску й обігу коносамента полягає в тому, що в процесі перевезення вантажу, його власник може розпоряджатися цим майном, шляхом відчуження коносамента іншій особі. Саме в такому разі розкривається правова сутність коносамента – як цінного паперу.<br>Особливість коносаменту як цінного паперу полягає в тому, що він, будучи об’єктом речового права, сам по собі не становить будьякої цінності. Таку цінність мають саме ті майнові права, які засвідчені в ньому і які можуть бути реалізовані його володільцем шляхом пред’явлення коносамента.<br>Так, розглядаючи зміст коносамента, треба розрізняти поняття “право на коносамент ”, яке має речовий характер і об’єктом якого є, власне цей документ, і “право з коносамент а”, якому притаманний зобов’язальний характер і об’єктом якого є майно, зазначене в цьому цінному папері. Інакше кажучи, структуру правовідносин за коносаментом, з одного боку, складають відносини між вантажоперевізником і відправником вантажу. Це правовідносини мають зобов’язальноправовий характер, відповідно до яких пред’явлення коносамента тягне за собою обов’язок з зобов’язальної за коносаментом особи здійснити передачу майна, вказаного в ньому. З іншого боку, коносамент підтверджує правовідносини власності на певне майно. Ці відносини мають речовий характер.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> The empiric value of a mechanism for civil regulation of issue and circulation of the bill of lading is that during freight transportation its owner can dispose of such property by alienating the bill of lading to another person. In this case, the legal essence of the bill of lading as a security is revealed. Peculiarity of the bill of lading as a security is that being an object of the proprietary right the bill of lading has no value by itself. Those particular property rights certified in the bill of lading, which can be exercised by its owner by means of production of the bill of lading, have value.<br><br>Thus, considering the content of the bill of lading we must distinguish among concepts of “right to the bill of lading”, which has a proprietary nature and which object is the document itself, and the “right of the bill of lading”, which has a binding nature and which object is the property specified in the security. In other words, the structure of legal relations under the bill of lading, on the one hand, includes relations between the freight forwarder and the consignor. Such legal relations have a binding nature, according to which production of the bill of lading results in obligation of the person liable under the bill of lading to transfer the property specified therein. On the other hand, the bill of lading confirms legal ownership of a certain property. These relations have a proprietary nature.","PeriodicalId":129207,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law - Contracts eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133927314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The title says it all - this article addresses a phenomenon all law school professors encounter in the courses in Contracts and Sales; it is also found in the courts and the profession. While the solution may partly be found by creating greater awareness of the problem, the article urges that it be addressed head-on through an express provision in Revised Article 2. This, alas, was not done.
{"title":"Why Do Law Students Insist that Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Applies Only to Merchants and What Can We Do About it?","authors":"S. Burnham","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1952929","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1952929","url":null,"abstract":"The title says it all - this article addresses a phenomenon all law school professors encounter in the courses in Contracts and Sales; it is also found in the courts and the profession. While the solution may partly be found by creating greater awareness of the problem, the article urges that it be addressed head-on through an express provision in Revised Article 2. This, alas, was not done.","PeriodicalId":129207,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law - Contracts eJournal","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132824145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1996-05-25DOI: 10.1111/J.1468-2230.1996.TB02073.X
Stephen Smith
This essay defends John Stuart Mill’s view that the law’s refusal to enforce self-enslavement contracts is justified on the ground that the ‘principle of freedom cannot require that he [the would-be slave] be free not to be free’. Moreover, the essay argues that a concern for future freedom justifies not only the courts’ approach to self-enslavement contracts, but also the courts’ scrutiny of a number of other ‘autonomy-endangering agreements’, specifically: (a) restrictive covenants, (b) ‘equitable relief’ clauses (clauses specifying specific or injunctive relief) and (c) stipulated damages clauses.
{"title":"Future Freedom and Freedom of Contract","authors":"Stephen Smith","doi":"10.1111/J.1468-2230.1996.TB02073.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1468-2230.1996.TB02073.X","url":null,"abstract":"This essay defends John Stuart Mill’s view that the law’s refusal to enforce self-enslavement contracts is justified on the ground that the ‘principle of freedom cannot require that he [the would-be slave] be free not to be free’. Moreover, the essay argues that a concern for future freedom justifies not only the courts’ approach to self-enslavement contracts, but also the courts’ scrutiny of a number of other ‘autonomy-endangering agreements’, specifically: (a) restrictive covenants, (b) ‘equitable relief’ clauses (clauses specifying specific or injunctive relief) and (c) stipulated damages clauses.","PeriodicalId":129207,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law - Contracts eJournal","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132121248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The writing requirement for non-possessory security interests has been a feature of PPSA legislation in common law Canada from its beginnings. For a non-possessory security interest to attach and become enforceable as against third parties, the debtor must have signed a secu- rity agreement containing a description of the collateral, l After several decades of judicial and scholarly scrutiny, the impact of the writing requirement ought to have been settled. However, in the second edition of their excellent handbooks on the Alberta and British Columbia Personal property Security Acts. Professors Cuming and Wood attribute a priority effect to the requirement which many observers are likely to find surprising. The comment shall take issue with the approach they advocate. The debate, however, raises the larger question of the function of a writing requirement for security agreements in a registry system which does not require registration of the security agreement but simply notice of the security interest created by the agreement. The conclusory portion of the comment will address this larger question.
{"title":"The PPSA Writing Requirement and Priority Among Competing Perfected Security Interests","authors":"C. Walsh","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2732728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2732728","url":null,"abstract":"The writing requirement for non-possessory security interests has been a feature of PPSA legislation in common law Canada from its beginnings. For a non-possessory security interest to attach and become enforceable as against third parties, the debtor must have signed a secu- rity agreement containing a description of the collateral, l After several decades of judicial and scholarly scrutiny, the impact of the writing requirement ought to have been settled. However, in the second edition of their excellent handbooks on the Alberta and British Columbia Personal property Security Acts. Professors Cuming and Wood attribute a priority effect to the requirement which many observers are likely to find surprising. The comment shall take issue with the approach they advocate. The debate, however, raises the larger question of the function of a writing requirement for security agreements in a registry system which does not require registration of the security agreement but simply notice of the security interest created by the agreement. The conclusory portion of the comment will address this larger question.","PeriodicalId":129207,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law - Contracts eJournal","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121146871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Consumers are drowning in a sea of one-sided fine print. To combat contractual overreach, consumers need an arsenal of effective remedies. To that end, the doctrine of unconscionability provides a crucial defense against the inequities of rigid contract enforcement. However, the prevailing view that unconscionability operates merely as a “shield” and not a “sword” leaves countless victims of oppressive contracts unable to assert the doctrine as an affirmative claim. This crippling interpretation betrays unconscionability’s equitable roots and absolves merchants who have already obtained their ill-gotten gains. But this need not be so.
Using California consumer credit law as a backdrop, this Note argues that the doctrine of unconscionability must be recrafted into an offensive sword that provides affirmative relief to victims of unconscionable contracts. While some consumers may already assert unconscionability under California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, courts have narrowly construed the Act to exempt many forms of consumer credit. As a result, thousands of debtors have remained powerless to challenge their credit terms as unconscionable unless first sued by a creditor. However, this Note explains how a recent landmark ruling by the California Supreme Court has confirmed a novel legal theory that broadly empowers consumers—including debtors—to assert unconscionability under the State’s Unfair Competition Law. Finally, this Note argues that unconscionability’s historical roots in courts of equity—as well as its treatment by the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatements—reveal that courts already possess an inherent equitable power to fashion affirmative remedies against unconscionable contracts under the common law, even absent statutory authorization.
{"title":"Unconscionability as a Sword: The Case for an Affirmative Cause of Action","authors":"B. Williams","doi":"10.15779/Z382B8VC3W","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z382B8VC3W","url":null,"abstract":"Consumers are drowning in a sea of one-sided fine print. To combat contractual overreach, consumers need an arsenal of effective remedies. To that end, the doctrine of unconscionability provides a crucial defense against the inequities of rigid contract enforcement. However, the prevailing view that unconscionability operates merely as a “shield” and not a “sword” leaves countless victims of oppressive contracts unable to assert the doctrine as an affirmative claim. This crippling interpretation betrays unconscionability’s equitable roots and absolves merchants who have already obtained their ill-gotten gains. But this need not be so. <br><br>Using California consumer credit law as a backdrop, this Note argues that the doctrine of unconscionability must be recrafted into an offensive sword that provides affirmative relief to victims of unconscionable contracts. While some consumers may already assert unconscionability under California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, courts have narrowly construed the Act to exempt many forms of consumer credit. As a result, thousands of debtors have remained powerless to challenge their credit terms as unconscionable unless first sued by a creditor. However, this Note explains how a recent landmark ruling by the California Supreme Court has confirmed a novel legal theory that broadly empowers consumers—including debtors—to assert unconscionability under the State’s Unfair Competition Law. Finally, this Note argues that unconscionability’s historical roots in courts of equity—as well as its treatment by the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatements—reveal that courts already possess an inherent equitable power to fashion affirmative remedies against unconscionable contracts under the common law, even absent statutory authorization.","PeriodicalId":129207,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law - Contracts eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114796669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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