Pub Date : 2023-09-01Epub Date: 2023-09-04DOI: 10.1089/hs.2023.0042
Christopher Hoff, Karla Combs-Black, Jennifer D Sorek, Carina Elsenboss, Misty M Robinson, Benjamin Robison
{"title":"Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response After COVID-19.","authors":"Christopher Hoff, Karla Combs-Black, Jennifer D Sorek, Carina Elsenboss, Misty M Robinson, Benjamin Robison","doi":"10.1089/hs.2023.0042","DOIUrl":"10.1089/hs.2023.0042","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":12955,"journal":{"name":"Health Security","volume":" ","pages":"S72-S78"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10211349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-01Epub Date: 2023-06-27DOI: 10.1089/hs.2022.0160
Siddhanth Sharma, Jaspreet Pannu, Sam Chorlton, Jacob L Swett, David J Ecker
Early detection of novel pathogens can prevent or substantially mitigate biological incidents, including pandemics. Metagenomic next-generation sequencing (mNGS) of symptomatic clinical samples may enable detection early enough to contain outbreaks, limit international spread, and expedite countermeasure development. In this article, we propose a clinical mNGS architecture we call "Threat Net," which focuses on the hospital emergency department as a high-yield surveillance location. We develop a susceptible-exposed-infected-removed (SEIR) simulation model to estimate the effectiveness of Threat Net in detecting novel respiratory pathogen outbreaks. Our analysis serves to quantify the value of routine clinical mNGS for respiratory pandemic detection by estimating the cost and epidemiological effectiveness at differing degrees of hospital coverage across the United States. We estimate that a biological threat detection network such as Threat Net could be deployed across hospitals covering 30% of the population in the United States. Threat Net would cost between $400 million and $800 million annually and have a 95% chance of detecting a novel respiratory pathogen with traits of SARS-CoV-2 after 10 emergency department presentations and 79 infections across the United States. Our analyses suggest that implementing Threat Net could help prevent or substantially mitigate the spread of a respiratory pandemic pathogen in the United States.
{"title":"Threat Net: A Metagenomic Surveillance Network for Biothreat Detection and Early Warning.","authors":"Siddhanth Sharma, Jaspreet Pannu, Sam Chorlton, Jacob L Swett, David J Ecker","doi":"10.1089/hs.2022.0160","DOIUrl":"10.1089/hs.2022.0160","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Early detection of novel pathogens can prevent or substantially mitigate biological incidents, including pandemics. Metagenomic next-generation sequencing (mNGS) of symptomatic clinical samples may enable detection early enough to contain outbreaks, limit international spread, and expedite countermeasure development. In this article, we propose a clinical mNGS architecture we call \"Threat Net,\" which focuses on the hospital emergency department as a high-yield surveillance location. We develop a susceptible-exposed-infected-removed (SEIR) simulation model to estimate the effectiveness of Threat Net in detecting novel respiratory pathogen outbreaks. Our analysis serves to quantify the value of routine clinical mNGS for respiratory pandemic detection by estimating the cost and epidemiological effectiveness at differing degrees of hospital coverage across the United States. We estimate that a biological threat detection network such as Threat Net could be deployed across hospitals covering 30% of the population in the United States. Threat Net would cost between $400 million and $800 million annually and have a 95% chance of detecting a novel respiratory pathogen with traits of SARS-CoV-2 after 10 emergency department presentations and 79 infections across the United States. Our analyses suggest that implementing Threat Net could help prevent or substantially mitigate the spread of a respiratory pandemic pathogen in the United States.</p>","PeriodicalId":12955,"journal":{"name":"Health Security","volume":" ","pages":"347-357"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9687152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-01Epub Date: 2023-08-01DOI: 10.1089/hs.2022.0144
Daniel Donachie, Fanny Ewann, Frédéric Poudevigne
The COVID-19 pandemic, suspected to have originated from spillover events, has significantly increased the visibility of biological threats, whether their origins are natural, accidental, or deliberate. The pandemic has also revealed vulnerabilities and gaps in emergency preparedness planning that were exploited by criminals during the crisis. However, how different would the pandemic have looked if it had been deliberately caused? In April 2020, the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres warned that ‘‘the weaknesses and lack of preparedness exposed by this pandemic provide a window onto how a bioterrorist attack might unfold.’’ Imagine the chaos that would have unfolded—how would we have recognized the signs of a deliberate biological event affecting animals and humans, and how would we have taken a One Health approach to such an event? The COVID-19 pandemic response was led by the public health community, but we also saw strong contributions from veterinary and law enforcement professionals. Veterinary professionals contributed to public health epidemiological investigations, laboratory testing of human specimens for the virus, and experimental infection of animals to further scientific evidence surrounding the virus, while simultaneously trying to maintain their critical functions in safeguarding animal health, welfare, and veterinary public health. Law enforcement officials also played an important role in the pandemic by supporting efforts to control the disease and handle criminals who took advantage of the situation, for example, through fraudulent activity, cyberattacks, and counterfeit medical supplies and medicine. In many countries, law enforcement officials took on new or unfamiliar duties that exposed them to infected people, often with minimal guidance and preparedness. Public health, law enforcement, and veterinary professionals faced significant pressures during this natural disease outbreak. However, what would the expectations have been if they were asked to respond to a deliberate biological event targeting governments and the public through livestock? Crime and terrorism surrounding animal health are often overlooked threats but can have substantial impacts on animal health and welfare, public health, food security, food authenticity, and even national security. Animal diseases can affect the animal and animal product trade, and
{"title":"Animal Agrocrime: An Overlooked Biological Threat.","authors":"Daniel Donachie, Fanny Ewann, Frédéric Poudevigne","doi":"10.1089/hs.2022.0144","DOIUrl":"10.1089/hs.2022.0144","url":null,"abstract":"The COVID-19 pandemic, suspected to have originated from spillover events, has significantly increased the visibility of biological threats, whether their origins are natural, accidental, or deliberate. The pandemic has also revealed vulnerabilities and gaps in emergency preparedness planning that were exploited by criminals during the crisis. However, how different would the pandemic have looked if it had been deliberately caused? In April 2020, the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres warned that ‘‘the weaknesses and lack of preparedness exposed by this pandemic provide a window onto how a bioterrorist attack might unfold.’’ Imagine the chaos that would have unfolded—how would we have recognized the signs of a deliberate biological event affecting animals and humans, and how would we have taken a One Health approach to such an event? The COVID-19 pandemic response was led by the public health community, but we also saw strong contributions from veterinary and law enforcement professionals. Veterinary professionals contributed to public health epidemiological investigations, laboratory testing of human specimens for the virus, and experimental infection of animals to further scientific evidence surrounding the virus, while simultaneously trying to maintain their critical functions in safeguarding animal health, welfare, and veterinary public health. Law enforcement officials also played an important role in the pandemic by supporting efforts to control the disease and handle criminals who took advantage of the situation, for example, through fraudulent activity, cyberattacks, and counterfeit medical supplies and medicine. In many countries, law enforcement officials took on new or unfamiliar duties that exposed them to infected people, often with minimal guidance and preparedness. Public health, law enforcement, and veterinary professionals faced significant pressures during this natural disease outbreak. However, what would the expectations have been if they were asked to respond to a deliberate biological event targeting governments and the public through livestock? Crime and terrorism surrounding animal health are often overlooked threats but can have substantial impacts on animal health and welfare, public health, food security, food authenticity, and even national security. Animal diseases can affect the animal and animal product trade, and","PeriodicalId":12955,"journal":{"name":"Health Security","volume":" ","pages":"415-420"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10541920/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9917155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-01Epub Date: 2023-09-07DOI: 10.1089/hs.2023.0010
Nancy V Burns, June Ellen Vutrano, Kyle J Willman, Matthew S Johnson
{"title":"Recognizing the Impact of Medical Reserve Corps Volunteers on the COVID-19 Pandemic Response.","authors":"Nancy V Burns, June Ellen Vutrano, Kyle J Willman, Matthew S Johnson","doi":"10.1089/hs.2023.0010","DOIUrl":"10.1089/hs.2023.0010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":12955,"journal":{"name":"Health Security","volume":" ","pages":"S60-S71"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10220525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed shortcomings in the US public health data system infrastructure, including incomplete or disparate processes related to data collection, management, sharing, and analysis. Public health data modernization is critical to ensure health equity is at the core of preparedness and response efforts and policies that prioritize equitable responses to health emergencies. To address the inequitable uptake and distribution of COVID-19 vaccinations in communities most disproportionately impacted by the pandemic, the CDC Foundation's Response Crisis and Preparedness Unit began partnering with community-based organizations in March 2021 to provide education and outreach and facilitate access to vaccines. These organizations engaged with partners and communities to address vaccine-related concerns, develop innovative and culturally appropriate communication strategies, and promote timely vaccination. Two grantees, Out Boulder County in Colorado and the Coalition of Asian American Leaders in Minnesota, experienced issues related to public health data collection standards and practices for COVID-19. Data collection tools often lack the appropriate or necessary demographic variables or level of disaggregation needed to be able to assess prioritization and disparities within racial and ethnic groups and across sexual orientation and gender identity categories. In this case study, both grantee organizations document their experiences, challenges, and strategies to overcome barriers to implementing their projects resulting from a lack of meaningful data. These examples identify inequities and systems-level changes related to data collection and surveillance, and they provide recommendations and lessons learned to improve data surveillance for more equitable public health responses.
{"title":"Importance of Public and Private Partnership Supporting Data Disaggregation to Measure Racial, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity Disparities in COVID-19.","authors":"Rachel Powell, Bruce Parker, Mardi Moore, ThaoMee Xiong, Dorothy Evans, Turquoise Sidibe","doi":"10.1089/hs.2023.0025","DOIUrl":"10.1089/hs.2023.0025","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed shortcomings in the US public health data system infrastructure, including incomplete or disparate processes related to data collection, management, sharing, and analysis. Public health data modernization is critical to ensure health equity is at the core of preparedness and response efforts and policies that prioritize equitable responses to health emergencies. To address the inequitable uptake and distribution of COVID-19 vaccinations in communities most disproportionately impacted by the pandemic, the CDC Foundation's Response Crisis and Preparedness Unit began partnering with community-based organizations in March 2021 to provide education and outreach and facilitate access to vaccines. These organizations engaged with partners and communities to address vaccine-related concerns, develop innovative and culturally appropriate communication strategies, and promote timely vaccination. Two grantees, Out Boulder County in Colorado and the Coalition of Asian American Leaders in Minnesota, experienced issues related to public health data collection standards and practices for COVID-19. Data collection tools often lack the appropriate or necessary demographic variables or level of disaggregation needed to be able to assess prioritization and disparities within racial and ethnic groups and across sexual orientation and gender identity categories. In this case study, both grantee organizations document their experiences, challenges, and strategies to overcome barriers to implementing their projects resulting from a lack of meaningful data. These examples identify inequities and systems-level changes related to data collection and surveillance, and they provide recommendations and lessons learned to improve data surveillance for more equitable public health responses.</p>","PeriodicalId":12955,"journal":{"name":"Health Security","volume":"21 S1","pages":"S35-S41"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41099121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-01Epub Date: 2023-06-08DOI: 10.1089/hs.2023.0021
Saskia V Popescu, Rebecca Leach
{"title":"Building Sustainable Infection Prevention in the Era of COVID-19.","authors":"Saskia V Popescu, Rebecca Leach","doi":"10.1089/hs.2023.0021","DOIUrl":"10.1089/hs.2023.0021","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":12955,"journal":{"name":"Health Security","volume":" ","pages":"379-383"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9595873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-01Epub Date: 2023-09-19DOI: 10.1089/hs.2023.0056
Kate C Noelte, Christine Kosmos, Amanda McWhorter
{"title":"New Challenges, Evolved Approach: The Public Health Response Readiness Framework.","authors":"Kate C Noelte, Christine Kosmos, Amanda McWhorter","doi":"10.1089/hs.2023.0056","DOIUrl":"10.1089/hs.2023.0056","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":12955,"journal":{"name":"Health Security","volume":"21 S1","pages":"S89-S94"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11389358/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41133468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-01Epub Date: 2023-08-08DOI: 10.1089/hs.2023.0094
Joanna E Cohen, Matthew L Myers, Indu B Ahluwalia
We are pleased that the World Health Organization (WHO) is developing a pandemic treaty to improve the global response to future pandemics. In their article, De Luca and Ramirez rightly argue that a pandemic treaty should be informed by experiences with WHO’s existing treaty, the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC), which came into force in 2005. However, the authors have mischaracterized the WHO FCTC and made criticisms that could hinder a productive discussion about a treaty for pandemics. The authors identify a limited emphasis on ‘‘harm reduction’’ as a key limitation of the WHO FCTC. However, the treaty itself includes ‘‘harm reduction strategies’’ in its definition of tobacco control. As the authors indicate, harm reduction encompasses actions ‘‘aimed at reducing the negative effects of health behaviors without necessarily extinguishing the problematic health behaviors completely or permanently.’’ The WHO FCTC and its guidelines for implementation—which include requiring smoke-free public places; banning tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship; and reducing the attractiveness of tobacco products by limiting flavoring agents—allow the continuation of product use, while reducing the negative effects. Further, the treaty applies to all tobacco products, including products beyond cigarettes. The Conference of the Parties to the WHO FCTC, the governing body of the Convention, has outlined measures that Parties should prioritize to address the challenge of tobacco products, such as heated tobacco products, as well as policy objectives and options for Parties to consider in regulating electronic nicotine delivery systems and electronic non-nicotine delivery systems. It is also crucial to point out that the relationship between the tobacco industry and tobacco-caused death and disease is very different than the relationship of pharmaceutical and other companies to an infectious disease pandemic. The tobacco industry’s own products are responsible for the deaths and diseases the treaty addresses. This is not the case with a pandemic caused by an infectious agent. Tobacco companies are driven to sell their products and find new users, which is a fundamental and irreconcilable conflict
{"title":"WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Learnings.","authors":"Joanna E Cohen, Matthew L Myers, Indu B Ahluwalia","doi":"10.1089/hs.2023.0094","DOIUrl":"10.1089/hs.2023.0094","url":null,"abstract":"We are pleased that the World Health Organization (WHO) is developing a pandemic treaty to improve the global response to future pandemics. In their article, De Luca and Ramirez rightly argue that a pandemic treaty should be informed by experiences with WHO’s existing treaty, the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC), which came into force in 2005. However, the authors have mischaracterized the WHO FCTC and made criticisms that could hinder a productive discussion about a treaty for pandemics. The authors identify a limited emphasis on ‘‘harm reduction’’ as a key limitation of the WHO FCTC. However, the treaty itself includes ‘‘harm reduction strategies’’ in its definition of tobacco control. As the authors indicate, harm reduction encompasses actions ‘‘aimed at reducing the negative effects of health behaviors without necessarily extinguishing the problematic health behaviors completely or permanently.’’ The WHO FCTC and its guidelines for implementation—which include requiring smoke-free public places; banning tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship; and reducing the attractiveness of tobacco products by limiting flavoring agents—allow the continuation of product use, while reducing the negative effects. Further, the treaty applies to all tobacco products, including products beyond cigarettes. The Conference of the Parties to the WHO FCTC, the governing body of the Convention, has outlined measures that Parties should prioritize to address the challenge of tobacco products, such as heated tobacco products, as well as policy objectives and options for Parties to consider in regulating electronic nicotine delivery systems and electronic non-nicotine delivery systems. It is also crucial to point out that the relationship between the tobacco industry and tobacco-caused death and disease is very different than the relationship of pharmaceutical and other companies to an infectious disease pandemic. The tobacco industry’s own products are responsible for the deaths and diseases the treaty addresses. This is not the case with a pandemic caused by an infectious agent. Tobacco companies are driven to sell their products and find new users, which is a fundamental and irreconcilable conflict","PeriodicalId":12955,"journal":{"name":"Health Security","volume":" ","pages":"428-429"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10541915/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10013569","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-01Epub Date: 2023-08-07DOI: 10.1089/hs.2023.0003
Ming-Jui Yeh, Po-Han Lee
Scholars have called for ethical preparedness for public health practice and research to address the challenges of special ethical considerations under time and resource pressure during emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic. We propose the idea of a rapid ethical assessment (REA) that aims to provide ethical justifications and policy recommendations for a specific public health policy, which is necessary for the ethical legitimacy of health policymaking and implementation. We suggest that an REA task force be established and incorporated into the administrative procedure to perform an REA in the early, middle, and terminal stages of a policy proposed by the health authority and to determine to what extent the tradeoffs between values and priorities required by the policy are ethically acceptable. The REA task force's role is consultative, with the final decisionmaking power and political responsibilities falling on the health authority. The REA task force should adopt 4 substantial ethical principles: utilitarianism, equity, human rights, and solidarity. The REA task force would consist of a multidisciplinary team of experts and a group of representatives from those who would be affected by the proposed policy. The REA task force would operate with a 5-step procedure of (1) convening, (2) investigation, (3) determination, (4) reporting and communication, and (5) decision and reassessment. We use 2 real incidents in Taiwan to demonstrate how the REA task force could work to enhance the ethical acceptance of a policy.
{"title":"Ethical Preparedness for Health Policymaking and Implementation During Public Health Emergencies: The Role of Rapid Ethical Assessment.","authors":"Ming-Jui Yeh, Po-Han Lee","doi":"10.1089/hs.2023.0003","DOIUrl":"10.1089/hs.2023.0003","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Scholars have called for ethical preparedness for public health practice and research to address the challenges of special ethical considerations under time and resource pressure during emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic. We propose the idea of a rapid ethical assessment (REA) that aims to provide ethical justifications and policy recommendations for a specific public health policy, which is necessary for the ethical legitimacy of health policymaking and implementation. We suggest that an REA task force be established and incorporated into the administrative procedure to perform an REA in the early, middle, and terminal stages of a policy proposed by the health authority and to determine to what extent the tradeoffs between values and priorities required by the policy are ethically acceptable. The REA task force's role is consultative, with the final decisionmaking power and political responsibilities falling on the health authority. The REA task force should adopt 4 substantial ethical principles: utilitarianism, equity, human rights, and solidarity. The REA task force would consist of a multidisciplinary team of experts and a group of representatives from those who would be affected by the proposed policy. The REA task force would operate with a 5-step procedure of (1) convening, (2) investigation, (3) determination, (4) reporting and communication, and (5) decision and reassessment. We use 2 real incidents in Taiwan to demonstrate how the REA task force could work to enhance the ethical acceptance of a policy.</p>","PeriodicalId":12955,"journal":{"name":"Health Security","volume":" ","pages":"371-378"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10316558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-01Epub Date: 2023-08-10DOI: 10.1089/hs.2023.0012
John Auerbach, Alice T Chen
{"title":"Strengthening the Partnerships That Promote Health Equity and Social Justice.","authors":"John Auerbach, Alice T Chen","doi":"10.1089/hs.2023.0012","DOIUrl":"10.1089/hs.2023.0012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":12955,"journal":{"name":"Health Security","volume":" ","pages":"S42-S46"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10818052/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9974416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}