Health Security最新文献

Veterinary personnel are an essential yet often underappreciated workforce, critical for zoonotic disease prevention and response efforts that impact human health. During the early COVID-19 pandemic, the veterinary workforce supported emergency responses by promoting zoonotic disease risk communication, sharing animal health expertise, and boosting laboratory surge capacity against SARS-CoV-2 in animals and people. However, small animal veterinary workers (SAVWs), similar to healthcare workers, faced organizational challenges in providing clinical care to family pets, including those susceptible to SARS-CoV-2. We analyzed a cross-sectional survey of 1,204 SAVWs in the United States to assess veterinary clinic adaptations and their associations with SAVWs' self-perceived readiness, willingness, and ability to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic as a workforce. SAVWs who worked fewer hours than before the pandemic (ready, OR 0.59; willing, OR 0.66; able, OR 0.52) or used personal protective equipment less frequently for protection in the clinic (ready, OR 0.69; willing, OR 0.69; able, OR 0.64) felt less ready, willing, and able to respond to COVID-19. SAVWs working remotely felt less ready (OR 0.46) but not less willing or able to respond to COVID-19. Lastly, SAVWs with dependents felt less ready (OR 0.67) and able (OR 0.49) to respond to COVID-19 than SAVWs without dependents. Our findings highlight the importance of proactively managing work schedules, having access to personal protective equipment, and addressing caregiving concerns to enhance SAVW preparedness and response outcomes. SAVWs are knowledgeable, motivated personnel who should be integrated into local public health emergency preparedness and response plans, supporting a One Health framework that unites multidisciplinary teams to respond to future zoonotic disease threats.

The COVID-19 pandemic illuminated the lack of resources available to US state and local public health agencies to respond to large-scale health events. Two response activities that were notably underresourced are case investigation and contact tracing (CI/CT), which health agencies routinely employ to control and prevent the transmission of infectious diseases. However, the scale of contact tracing required during the COVID-19 pandemic exceeded available resources, even in high-capacity public health agencies. For both routine outbreak response and epidemic preparedness, health agencies must have CI/CT program capacities in place prior to the detection of an outbreak to be ready to respond. Our research builds on previous work to identify the baseline CI/CT capacities needed in US state and local public health agencies to respond to any type of outbreak. Fifteen public health officials representing 10 public health agencies and 4 experts in CI/CT were interviewed about various aspects of their CI/CT program during the COVID-19 pandemic. The interviews coincided with the beginning of the 2022 mpox epidemic. Discussions on CI/CT during that response were collected to augment the interviews, where possible. Findings revealed that CI/CT capacities were underresourced prior to and during the pandemic, as well as during the mpox outbreak, even after substantial additional resourcing and efforts to scale up. Moreover, state and local health agencies encountered challenges in pivoting their COVID-19 CI/CT capacities for the mpox response, suggesting that CI/CT programs should either be designed with flexibility in mind, or should allow for specialization based on the pathogen's mode of transmission and the population at risk. Federal, state, and local health agency staff and officials should consider lessons learned from this research to plan for readily scalable and sustainable CI/CT programs to ensure readiness for future outbreaks.

Early detection of novel pathogens can prevent or substantially mitigate biological incidents, including pandemics. Metagenomic next-generation sequencing (mNGS) of symptomatic clinical samples may enable detection early enough to contain outbreaks, limit international spread, and expedite countermeasure development. In this article, we propose a clinical mNGS architecture we call "Threat Net," which focuses on the hospital emergency department as a high-yield surveillance location. We develop a susceptible-exposed-infected-removed (SEIR) simulation model to estimate the effectiveness of Threat Net in detecting novel respiratory pathogen outbreaks. Our analysis serves to quantify the value of routine clinical mNGS for respiratory pandemic detection by estimating the cost and epidemiological effectiveness at differing degrees of hospital coverage across the United States. We estimate that a biological threat detection network such as Threat Net could be deployed across hospitals covering 30% of the population in the United States. Threat Net would cost between $400 million and $800 million annually and have a 95% chance of detecting a novel respiratory pathogen with traits of SARS-CoV-2 after 10 emergency department presentations and 79 infections across the United States. Our analyses suggest that implementing Threat Net could help prevent or substantially mitigate the spread of a respiratory pandemic pathogen in the United States.

The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed shortcomings in the US public health data system infrastructure, including incomplete or disparate processes related to data collection, management, sharing, and analysis. Public health data modernization is critical to ensure health equity is at the core of preparedness and response efforts and policies that prioritize equitable responses to health emergencies. To address the inequitable uptake and distribution of COVID-19 vaccinations in communities most disproportionately impacted by the pandemic, the CDC Foundation's Response Crisis and Preparedness Unit began partnering with community-based organizations in March 2021 to provide education and outreach and facilitate access to vaccines. These organizations engaged with partners and communities to address vaccine-related concerns, develop innovative and culturally appropriate communication strategies, and promote timely vaccination. Two grantees, Out Boulder County in Colorado and the Coalition of Asian American Leaders in Minnesota, experienced issues related to public health data collection standards and practices for COVID-19. Data collection tools often lack the appropriate or necessary demographic variables or level of disaggregation needed to be able to assess prioritization and disparities within racial and ethnic groups and across sexual orientation and gender identity categories. In this case study, both grantee organizations document their experiences, challenges, and strategies to overcome barriers to implementing their projects resulting from a lack of meaningful data. These examples identify inequities and systems-level changes related to data collection and surveillance, and they provide recommendations and lessons learned to improve data surveillance for more equitable public health responses.