How can actors in a marketplace introduce mechanisms to overcome possible inefficiencies caused by adverse selection? Using a unique dataset that follows sellers on eBay over time, I show that reputation is a major determinant of variations in price. I develop a model of firm dynamics where firms have heterogeneous qualities unobservable by consumers. Reputation is used as a signal of private information. I structurally estimate the model to uncover buyers' utility and sellers' costs and qualities. Removing the reputation mechanism increases low-quality sellers' marketshare, lowers prices, and consequently reduces the market size by 61% and consumer surplus by 48%.
{"title":"Reputation and Adverse Selection, Theory and Evidence from eBay","authors":"M. Saeedi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2102948","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2102948","url":null,"abstract":"How can actors in a marketplace introduce mechanisms to overcome possible inefficiencies caused by adverse selection? Using a unique dataset that follows sellers on eBay over time, I show that reputation is a major determinant of variations in price. I develop a model of firm dynamics where firms have heterogeneous qualities unobservable by consumers. Reputation is used as a signal of private information. I structurally estimate the model to uncover buyers' utility and sellers' costs and qualities. Removing the reputation mechanism increases low-quality sellers' marketshare, lowers prices, and consequently reduces the market size by 61% and consumer surplus by 48%.","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133664833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Russian Abstract: В статье содержится анализ научных предпосылок становления конфликтологической парадигмы социального познания, содержащихся в разнообразных методологических и теоретических подходах к осмыслению конфликта как социального феномен. Обозначены этапы роста теоретического потенциала разнообразных социологических школ и направлений, имеющий отношение к конфликтологической проблематике. Показаны предпосылки для теоретически обоснованной возможности формирования целостной эпистемологической картины конфликтологического знания, выявления основных методологических подходов к построению единой теории конфликта.
Основная проблема, связанная со становлением конфликтологической парадигмы социального знания, понимается как практически отсутствующая единая и цельная теория конфликта, которая удовлетворяла бы потребностям и запросам всех специалистов, занимающихся его изучением. Единая теория конфликта создает основы новой парадигмы социальных наук, позволяет различным специалистам работать в одном и том же концептуальном и инструментальном поле; унифицирует и одновременно расширяет проблематику прикладных исследований, обеспечивает их надежными методологическими и теоретическими предпосылками; значительно ускоряет процесс теоретических и прикладных исследований по теории и практике конфликта; радикально изменяет привычные представления о конфликте как наименее желательном, а его отсутствии как наиболее желательном состоянии; тем самым освобождает эти представления от распространенных, но ошибочных ассоциаций.
English Abstract: The article contains an analysis of the scientific prerequisites for the development of the conflictological paradigm of social knowledge contained in various methodological and theoretical approaches to understanding the conflict as a social phenomenon. Stages of growth of the theoretical potential of various sociological schools and directions, related to conflictological problems, are outlined. The preconditions for a theoretically justified possibility of forming an integral epistemological picture of conflictological knowledge, revealing the main methodological approaches to the construction of a unified theory of conflict are shown.
The main problem associated with the formation of the conflictological paradigm of social knowledge is understood as a virtually unavailable single and integral theory of conflict that would satisfy the needs and requirements of all specialists engaged in its study. A unified conflict theory creates the basis for a new paradigm of the social sciences, allows different specialists to work in the same conceptual and instrumental field; unifies and simultaneously expands the problems of applied research, provides them with reliable methodological and theoretical prerequisites; greatly accelerates the process of theoretical and applied research on the theory and practice of conflict; radically changes the usual notions about the conflict as the least desir
{"title":"Феномен конфликта: в поисках единой теории для эффективного менеджмента (The Phenomenon of Conflict: In Search of a Unified Theory)","authors":"V. Semenov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3492663","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3492663","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Russian Abstract:</b> В статье содержится анализ научных предпосылок становления конфликтологической парадигмы социального познания, содержащихся в разнообразных методологических и теоретических подходах к осмыслению конфликта как социального феномен. Обозначены этапы роста теоретического потенциала разнообразных социологических школ и направлений, имеющий отношение к конфликтологической проблематике. Показаны предпосылки для теоретически обоснованной возможности формирования целостной эпистемологической картины конфликтологического знания, выявления основных методологических подходов к построению единой теории конфликта. <br><br>Основная проблема, связанная со становлением конфликтологической парадигмы социального знания, понимается как практически отсутствующая единая и цельная теория конфликта, которая удовлетворяла бы потребностям и запросам всех специалистов, занимающихся его изучением. Единая теория конфликта создает основы новой парадигмы социальных наук, позволяет различным специалистам работать в одном и том же концептуальном и инструментальном поле; унифицирует и одновременно расширяет проблематику прикладных исследований, обеспечивает их надежными методологическими и теоретическими предпосылками; значительно ускоряет процесс теоретических и прикладных исследований по теории и практике конфликта; радикально изменяет привычные представления о конфликте как наименее желательном, а его отсутствии как наиболее желательном состоянии; тем самым освобождает эти представления от распространенных, но ошибочных ассоциаций.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> The article contains an analysis of the scientific prerequisites for the development of the conflictological paradigm of social knowledge contained in various methodological and theoretical approaches to understanding the conflict as a social phenomenon. Stages of growth of the theoretical potential of various sociological schools and directions, related to conflictological problems, are outlined. The preconditions for a theoretically justified possibility of forming an integral epistemological picture of conflictological knowledge, revealing the main methodological approaches to the construction of a unified theory of conflict are shown.<br><br>The main problem associated with the formation of the conflictological paradigm of social knowledge is understood as a virtually unavailable single and integral theory of conflict that would satisfy the needs and requirements of all specialists engaged in its study. A unified conflict theory creates the basis for a new paradigm of the social sciences, allows different specialists to work in the same conceptual and instrumental field; unifies and simultaneously expands the problems of applied research, provides them with reliable methodological and theoretical prerequisites; greatly accelerates the process of theoretical and applied research on the theory and practice of conflict; radically changes the usual notions about the conflict as the least desir","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115640699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The authors analyze data from a donation-based crowdfunding platform and conduct four experiments to examine effects of facial attractiveness on online charitable giving. Results show that facial attractiveness of recipients affects charitable giving only toward female recipients but not toward male recipients. Importantly, donor gender affects the direction of responses to facial attractiveness of recipients: men tend to donate more to attractive than unattractive female Results further demonstrate different mechanisms of attractiveness effects for male versus female donors: male donors are more willing to donate to attractive female recipients because of an instinctive preference for beauty. By contrast, female donors are less willing to donate to attractive female recipients because they are perceived to be less needy. By illuminating beauty effects in the context of online charitable giving, the findings provide practical implications for charities, individual recipients, and platform operators, especially regarding the disclosure of recipients’ facial images.
{"title":"Beauty, Gender, and Online Charitable Giving","authors":"Jooyoung Park, Keongtae Kim, Ying-yi Hong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3405823","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3405823","url":null,"abstract":"The authors analyze data from a donation-based crowdfunding platform and conduct four experiments to examine effects of facial attractiveness on online charitable giving. Results show that facial attractiveness of recipients affects charitable giving only toward female recipients but not toward male recipients. Importantly, donor gender affects the direction of responses to facial attractiveness of recipients: men tend to donate more to attractive than unattractive female Results further demonstrate different mechanisms of attractiveness effects for male versus female donors: male donors are more willing to donate to attractive female recipients because of an instinctive preference for beauty. By contrast, female donors are less willing to donate to attractive female recipients because they are perceived to be less needy. By illuminating beauty effects in the context of online charitable giving, the findings provide practical implications for charities, individual recipients, and platform operators, especially regarding the disclosure of recipients’ facial images.","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114761735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
E. Bilancini, L. Boncinelli, V. Capraro, Tatiana Celadin, R. D. Paolo
In this paper we investigate the effect of moral suasion on ingroup favouritism. We report a well-powered, pre-registered, two-stage 2x2 mixed-design experiment. In the first stage, groups are formed on the basis of how participants answer to a set of questions, concerning non-morally relevant issues in one treatment (assortativity on non-moral preferences), and morally relevant issues in another treatment (assortativity on moral preferences). In the second stage, participants choose how to split a given amount of money between participants of their own group and participants of the other group, first in the baseline setting and then in a setting where they are told to do what they believe to be morally right (moral suasion). Our main results are: (i) in the baseline, participants tend to favour their own group to a greater extent when groups are assorted according to moral preferences, compared to when they are assorted according to non-moral preferences; (ii) the net effect of moral suasion is to decrease ingroup favouritism, but there is also a non-negligible proportion of participants for whom moral suasion increases ingroup favouritism; (iii) the effect of moral suasion is substantially stable across group assortativity and four pre-registered individual characteristics (gender, political orientation, religiosity, pro-life vs pro-choice ethical convictions).
{"title":"‘Do the Right Thing’ for Whom? An Experiment on Ingroup Favouritism, Group Assorting and Moral Suasion","authors":"E. Bilancini, L. Boncinelli, V. Capraro, Tatiana Celadin, R. D. Paolo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3486398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3486398","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we investigate the effect of moral suasion on ingroup favouritism. We report a well-powered, pre-registered, two-stage 2x2 mixed-design experiment. In the first stage, groups are formed on the basis of how participants answer to a set of questions, concerning non-morally relevant issues in one treatment (assortativity on non-moral preferences), and morally relevant issues in another treatment (assortativity on moral preferences). In the second stage, participants choose how to split a given amount of money between participants of their own group and participants of the other group, first in the baseline setting and then in a setting where they are told to do what they believe to be morally right (moral suasion). Our main results are: (i) in the baseline, participants tend to favour their own group to a greater extent when groups are assorted according to moral preferences, compared to when they are assorted according to non-moral preferences; (ii) the net effect of moral suasion is to decrease ingroup favouritism, but there is also a non-negligible proportion of participants for whom moral suasion increases ingroup favouritism; (iii) the effect of moral suasion is substantially stable across group assortativity and four pre-registered individual characteristics (gender, political orientation, religiosity, pro-life vs pro-choice ethical convictions).","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124512710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study investigates the relation between monetary policy and inequality by asking how one affects the other: the effect of monetary policy on inequality and the impact of the long-run level of inequality on the effectiveness of monetary policy. To this end, I incorporate nominal wage contracts and cash-in-advance constraints into a heterogeneous agent model economy with indivisible labor. I find that expansionary monetary policy reduces income, wealth, and consumption inequalities mainly due to a rise in employment from the bottom of the distributions. There are heterogeneous effects on income across the wealth distribution: in response to an unanticipated monetary easing, households in the bottom of the wealth distribution benefit from an increase in employment while rich households benefit from a rise in the real asset returns in a relative sense. An unexpected monetary expansion also has asymmetric responses of consumption between the poor and the rich: asset-poor households increase their consumption while it falls for wealthy households. This implies that inflation hurts the rich more. I also find that the long-run prevailing levels of inequality matter for the effectiveness of monetary policy by determining the shape of reservation wage distribution. All else being equal, a more equal economy is associated with more effective monetary policy in terms of output. I also provide empirical evidence for this model result using state-level panel data: the effects of monetary policy shocks on output are larger for low-inequality states.
{"title":"Monetary Policy and Inequality: How Does One Affect the Other?","authors":"Eunseong Ma","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3488931","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3488931","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the relation between monetary policy and inequality by asking how one affects the other: the effect of monetary policy on inequality and the impact of the long-run level of inequality on the effectiveness of monetary policy. To this end, I incorporate nominal wage contracts and cash-in-advance constraints into a heterogeneous agent model economy with indivisible labor. I find that expansionary monetary policy reduces income, wealth, and consumption inequalities mainly due to a rise in employment from the bottom of the distributions. There are heterogeneous effects on income across the wealth distribution: in response to an unanticipated monetary easing, households in the bottom of the wealth distribution benefit from an increase in employment while rich households benefit from a rise in the real asset returns in a relative sense. An unexpected monetary expansion also has asymmetric responses of consumption between the poor and the rich: asset-poor households increase their consumption while it falls for wealthy households. This implies that inflation hurts the rich more. I also find that the long-run prevailing levels of inequality matter for the effectiveness of monetary policy by determining the shape of reservation wage distribution. All else being equal, a more equal economy is associated with more effective monetary policy in terms of output. I also provide empirical evidence for this model result using state-level panel data: the effects of monetary policy shocks on output are larger for low-inequality states.","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130468466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines current open contracting narrative in the media in Kenya, Malawi and Tanzania. Of particular interest is whether the media can advance an understanding of contracting issues among various stakeholders, including citizens, businesspeople and organisations, and civil society in the countries. Unfortunately, the media in the three countries has hardly demonstrated serious engagement with issues relating to open contracting because of numerous factors including lack of information on, and sometimes interest in issues relating to public contracts. Commercial, ownership and sometimes political pressures, editorial policies, lack of financial and other support for investigative journalism, newsroom dynamics including targets, corruption, among other issues, also contribute to lack of media interest in public contracts and their contents. The study argues that the term open contracting is not globally understood, and the media has not offered the information necessary to enhance its understanding and how it is applied in the countries as they seek to promote openness, transparency, responsibility and accountability in public contracting and deal with corruption and abuse of public office, and misuse, misappropriation, theft and mismanagement of public resources, undue influence, cronyism, self-interest and rent-seeking.
{"title":"Media Landscape and Open Contracting Narrative in Kenya, Malawi and Tanzania","authors":"G. Nyabuga","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3484360","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3484360","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines current open contracting narrative in the media in Kenya, Malawi and Tanzania. Of particular interest is whether the media can advance an understanding of contracting issues among various stakeholders, including citizens, businesspeople and organisations, and civil society in the countries. Unfortunately, the media in the three countries has hardly demonstrated serious engagement with issues relating to open contracting because of numerous factors including lack of information on, and sometimes interest in issues relating to public contracts. Commercial, ownership and sometimes political pressures, editorial policies, lack of financial and other support for investigative journalism, newsroom dynamics including targets, corruption, among other issues, also contribute to lack of media interest in public contracts and their contents. The study argues that the term open contracting is not globally understood, and the media has not offered the information necessary to enhance its understanding and how it is applied in the countries as they seek to promote openness, transparency, responsibility and accountability in public contracting and deal with corruption and abuse of public office, and misuse, misappropriation, theft and mismanagement of public resources, undue influence, cronyism, self-interest and rent-seeking.","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133074276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Factors beyond a person’s control, such as demographic characteristics at birth, often influence the availability of rewards an individual can expect for their efforts. We know surprisingly little how such pay-gaps due to random differences in opportunities impact human motivation. To test this we designed a study in which we arbitrarly varied the reward offered to each participant in a group for performing the same task. Participants then had to decide whether or not they were willing to exert effort to receive their reward. Unfairness reduced participants’ motivation to pursue rewards even when their relative position in the distribution was high, despite the decision being of no benefit to others and reducing reward for oneself. This relationship was partially mediated by participants’ feelings. In particular, large disparity was associated with greater unhappiness, which was associated with lower willingness to work – even when controlling for absolute reward and its relative value, both of which also affected decisions to pursue rewards. Our findings suggest pay-gaps can trigger psychological dynamics that hurt productivity and well-being of all involved.
{"title":"The Motivational Cost of Inequality: Pay Gaps Reduce the Willingness to Pursue Rewards","authors":"Filip Gesiarz, J. De Neve, T. Sharot","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3484543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3484543","url":null,"abstract":"Factors beyond a person’s control, such as demographic characteristics at birth, often influence the availability of rewards an individual can expect for their efforts. We know surprisingly little how such pay-gaps due to random differences in opportunities impact human motivation. To test this we designed a study in which we arbitrarly varied the reward offered to each participant in a group for performing the same task. Participants then had to decide whether or not they were willing to exert effort to receive their reward. Unfairness reduced participants’ motivation to pursue rewards even when their relative position in the distribution was high, despite the decision being of no benefit to others and reducing reward for oneself. This relationship was partially mediated by participants’ feelings. In particular, large disparity was associated with greater unhappiness, which was associated with lower willingness to work – even when controlling for absolute reward and its relative value, both of which also affected decisions to pursue rewards. Our findings suggest pay-gaps can trigger psychological dynamics that hurt productivity and well-being of all involved.","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114693575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Benjamin Crost, Joseph H. Felter, Hani Mansour, D. Rees
Post-election violence is a common form of conflict, but its underlying mechanisms are not well understood. Using data from the 2007 Philippine mayoral elections, this paper provides evidence that post-election violence is particularly intense after narrow victories by incumbents. Using a density test, the study shows that incumbents were substantially more likely to win narrow victories than their challengers, a pattern consistent with electoral manipulation. There is no evidence that the increase in post-election violence is related to the incumbents’ political platform or their performance in past elections. These results provide support for the notion that post-election violence is triggered by election fraud or by the failure of democratic ways of removing unpopular incumbents from office.
{"title":"Narrow Incumbent Victories and Post-Election Conflict: Evidence from the Philippines","authors":"Benjamin Crost, Joseph H. Felter, Hani Mansour, D. Rees","doi":"10.1093/wber/lhz014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhz014","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Post-election violence is a common form of conflict, but its underlying mechanisms are not well understood. Using data from the 2007 Philippine mayoral elections, this paper provides evidence that post-election violence is particularly intense after narrow victories by incumbents. Using a density test, the study shows that incumbents were substantially more likely to win narrow victories than their challengers, a pattern consistent with electoral manipulation. There is no evidence that the increase in post-election violence is related to the incumbents’ political platform or their performance in past elections. These results provide support for the notion that post-election violence is triggered by election fraud or by the failure of democratic ways of removing unpopular incumbents from office.","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121498876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine whether the strategic delegation problem in interregional negotiations can be solved by a governmental policy. It is well known that when an interregional negotiation is delegated to representatives, each region elects its representative strategically, resulting in inefficient negotiation outcomes. Here, we focus on a cost-matching grant, which is frequently used as a subsidy policy in the real world. Our results show that there is not necessarily an optimal cost-matching grant that can restore the efficiency of negotiation outcomes, because the introduction of the grant generates a new kind of manipulation of negotiation-breakdown outcomes. Thus, we present an institutional procedure in which a new representative is elected after a negotiation breaks down, which negates this new manipulability. In this case, there is an optimal cost-matching grant that achieves an efficient allocation through negotiation.
{"title":"Interregional Negotiations and Strategic Delegation Under Government Subsidy Schemes","authors":"Ryusuke Shinohara","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3058517","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3058517","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether the strategic delegation problem in interregional negotiations can be solved by a governmental policy. It is well known that when an interregional negotiation is delegated to representatives, each region elects its representative strategically, resulting in inefficient negotiation outcomes. Here, we focus on a cost-matching grant, which is frequently used as a subsidy policy in the real world. Our results show that there is not necessarily an optimal cost-matching grant that can restore the efficiency of negotiation outcomes, because the introduction of the grant generates a new kind of manipulation of negotiation-breakdown outcomes. Thus, we present an institutional procedure in which a new representative is elected after a negotiation breaks down, which negates this new manipulability. In this case, there is an optimal cost-matching grant that achieves an efficient allocation through negotiation.","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132007635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What are the common characteristics among individuals who justify attacks on civilians? Using nationally representative Gallup World Poll surveys of 30,787 individuals from 27 developing countries in different parts of the world, this paper identifies the partial correlates of extremism. The results suggest that the typical extremist who supports attacks on civilians is more likely to be young, unemployed, and struggling to make ends meet, relatively uneducated, and not as religious as others, but more willing to sacrifice own life for his or her beliefs. Gender and marital status are not found to explain the individual‐level variation in attitudes toward extremism. These results are robust to various sensitivity analyses, although some of them vary in magnitude and significance across countries and geographic regions.
{"title":"Who Justifies Attacks on Civilians? Analysis of Attitudes Toward Terrorism Based on Value Surveys","authors":"Youssouf Kiendrebeogo, Elena Ianchovichina","doi":"10.1111/rode.12614","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12614","url":null,"abstract":"What are the common characteristics among individuals who justify attacks on civilians? Using nationally representative Gallup World Poll surveys of 30,787 individuals from 27 developing countries in different parts of the world, this paper identifies the partial correlates of extremism. The results suggest that the typical extremist who supports attacks on civilians is more likely to be young, unemployed, and struggling to make ends meet, relatively uneducated, and not as religious as others, but more willing to sacrifice own life for his or her beliefs. Gender and marital status are not found to explain the individual‐level variation in attitudes toward extremism. These results are robust to various sensitivity analyses, although some of them vary in magnitude and significance across countries and geographic regions.","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131308068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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