Pub Date : 2005-01-01DOI: 10.1111/J.1467-9957.2005.00421.X
Tarun Kabiraj
We study the question of optimal licensing contracts in a leadership structure and discuss the welfare implications. We assume that the size of the innovation is exogenous and the patent holder is a competitor in the product market. Then welfare depends on the types of contracts available and on the ownership of patents. In particular, we examine whether a leader's innovation is considered to be socially more valuable than a follower's innovation. We show that there are situations when a follower's innovation generates larger welfare. Given the private incentives for innovation, a licensing policy may induce the desired firm to win the patent race.
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Pub Date : 2004-07-01DOI: 10.1111/J.1467-9957.2004.00402.X
B. Crettez
This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations in order to analyse and to compare emissions taxes and tradeable emissions permits. Even in the context of a perfect environment, i.e. with perfect information, perfect competition…, it is shown that privately owned emissions permits have some disadvantages. An equilibrium with emissions permits would certainly be better than a laissez-faire equilibrium since it would entail a lower pollution level. However, it is far from clear that an economy with pollution permits would be preferable over an economy with emissions taxes. While in both cases pollution would be lower, growth would be higher in an economy with emissions taxes. This is because emissions permits divert saving from 'productive' resources and have a negative impact on capital accumulation. This happens whatever the way emissions taxes are redistributed. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester, 2004.
{"title":"Tradeable Emissions Permits, Emissions Taxes and Growth","authors":"B. Crettez","doi":"10.1111/J.1467-9957.2004.00402.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1467-9957.2004.00402.X","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations in order to analyse and to compare emissions taxes and tradeable emissions permits. Even in the context of a perfect environment, i.e. with perfect information, perfect competition…, it is shown that privately owned emissions permits have some disadvantages. An equilibrium with emissions permits would certainly be better than a laissez-faire equilibrium since it would entail a lower pollution level. However, it is far from clear that an economy with pollution permits would be preferable over an economy with emissions taxes. While in both cases pollution would be lower, growth would be higher in an economy with emissions taxes. This is because emissions permits divert saving from 'productive' resources and have a negative impact on capital accumulation. This happens whatever the way emissions taxes are redistributed. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester, 2004.","PeriodicalId":130467,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Manchester School","volume":"118 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124087868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-07-01DOI: 10.1111/J.1467-9957.2004.00403.X
A. Pozzolo
I present an endogenous growth model that studies the effects of local inter-industry and intra-industry knowledge spillovers in R&D on the allocation of economic activities between two regions. The equilibrium is the result of a tension between a centripetal force, the cost of transporting goods from one region to the other, and a centrifugal force, the cost increase associated with life in a more crowded area. The presence of local knowledge spillovers, which determines the concentration of the R&D activities within one region, also introduces a further centripetal force that makes a symmetric allocation of the economic activities impossible. The concentration of R&D fosters the equilibrium rate of growth of the economy with respect to the case of no-integration, by increasing the positive effect of local knowledge spillovers. Contrary to the findings of the majority of models in the new economic geography literature, within this framework a reduction in transport costs may be associated with a more even geographical distribution of economic activities.
{"title":"Research and Development, Regional Spillovers and the Location of Economic Activities","authors":"A. Pozzolo","doi":"10.1111/J.1467-9957.2004.00403.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1467-9957.2004.00403.X","url":null,"abstract":"I present an endogenous growth model that studies the effects of local inter-industry and intra-industry knowledge spillovers in R&D on the allocation of economic activities between two regions. The equilibrium is the result of a tension between a centripetal force, the cost of transporting goods from one region to the other, and a centrifugal force, the cost increase associated with life in a more crowded area. The presence of local knowledge spillovers, which determines the concentration of the R&D activities within one region, also introduces a further centripetal force that makes a symmetric allocation of the economic activities impossible. The concentration of R&D fosters the equilibrium rate of growth of the economy with respect to the case of no-integration, by increasing the positive effect of local knowledge spillovers. Contrary to the findings of the majority of models in the new economic geography literature, within this framework a reduction in transport costs may be associated with a more even geographical distribution of economic activities.","PeriodicalId":130467,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Manchester School","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133126824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine persistence in work hour constraints using subjective data from the British Household Panel Survey, and investigate the role of job and employer changes in alleviating these constraints. Evidence suggests that 40 per cent of employees prefer to work a different number of hours at their current wage, and the majority of these prefer to work fewer hours. Our estimates also indicate that, although these constraints persist over time, job and employer changes alleviate over-employment particularly among men. Work time preferences are determined by observed job and employer related characteristics, individual demographics, local labour demand and time-invariant unobserved individual-specific effects.
{"title":"Option or Obligation? The Determinants of Labour Supply Preferences in Britain","authors":"R. Böheim, Mark P. Taylor","doi":"10.1111/1467-9957.00339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9957.00339","url":null,"abstract":"We examine persistence in work hour constraints using subjective data from the British Household Panel Survey, and investigate the role of job and employer changes in alleviating these constraints. Evidence suggests that 40 per cent of employees prefer to work a different number of hours at their current wage, and the majority of these prefer to work fewer hours. Our estimates also indicate that, although these constraints persist over time, job and employer changes alleviate over-employment particularly among men. Work time preferences are determined by observed job and employer related characteristics, individual demographics, local labour demand and time-invariant unobserved individual-specific effects.","PeriodicalId":130467,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Manchester School","volume":"210 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"119869176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines a subgame perfect equilibrium when one of two duopolists executes a lifetime-employment-contract policy, which is a strategic commitment that generates kinks in the reaction curve, by using a two-stage quantity-setting model. The purpose of the paper is to show concretely in what kinds of cases the policy is effective. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester
{"title":"On the Effectiveness of the Lifetime-Employment-Contract Policy","authors":"K. Ohnishi","doi":"10.1111/1467-9957.00326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9957.00326","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines a subgame perfect equilibrium when one of two duopolists executes a lifetime-employment-contract policy, which is a strategic commitment that generates kinks in the reaction curve, by using a two-stage quantity-setting model. The purpose of the paper is to show concretely in what kinds of cases the policy is effective. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester","PeriodicalId":130467,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Manchester School","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123641714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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