A new formal classification for the largest genus of Perlinae, Neoperla, is introduced to replace the artificial split of the genus into two informal groups. Globally, there are close to 300 named species, with the number rising all the time. The monophyletic clymene-group is assigned to Neoperla (Neoperla) with ~ 140 species in North America, Africa and parts of Asia; its seven main subgroups are briefly characterized. The polyphyletic Asian montivaga-group is replaced by two monophyletic subgenera, N. (Borneella), new subgenus (six species), and N. (Formosita) Klaplek, new status (~125 species). Five species groups in N. (Formosita) are recognized and diagnosed. For 85% of the species known by mid-2023 (DeWalt et al. 2023), their assignment to supra-specific taxa is summarized in a table, while a further 40 species cannot be placed at present. Some additions, remarks and corrections to the phylogenetically oriented synopsis of Perlinae by Sivec, Stark & Uchida (1988) are made. The new species N.(F.) fasciata is named. Eighty-eight figures, including numerous new original photographs, are presented.
Database fingerprinting is widely adopted to prevent unauthorized data sharing and identify source of data leakages. Although existing schemes are robust against common attacks, their robustness degrades significantly if attackers utilize inherent correlations among database entries. In this paper, we demonstrate the vulnerability of existing schemes by identifying different correlation attacks: column-wise correlation attack, row-wise correlation attack, and their integration. We provide robust fingerprinting against these attacks by developing mitigation techniques, which can work as post-processing steps for any off-the-shelf database fingerprinting schemes and preserve the utility of databases. We investigate the impact of correlation attacks and the performance of mitigation techniques using a real-world database. Our results show (i) high success rates of correlation attacks against existing fingerprinting schemes (e.g., integrated correlation attack can distort 64.8% fingerprint bits by just modifying 14.2% entries in a fingerprinted database), and (ii) high robustness of mitigation techniques (e.g., after mitigation, integrated correlation attack can only distort 3% fingerprint bits). Additionally, the mitigation techniques effectively alleviate correlation attacks even if (i) attackers have access to correlation models directly computed from the original database, while the database owner uses inaccurate correlation models, (ii) or attackers utilizes higher order of correlations than the database owner.