In recent years, billions of dollars have been spent by both online and offline retailers on website design aimed at increasing consumers’ online engagement. We study the relationship between online engagement and offline sales, utilizing a quasi-experimental setting in which a leading premium automobile brand gradually launched a new interactive website across markets, allowing for a treatment-control comparison. This paper offers evidence of a causal effect of online engagement on offline sales, with the high-engagement website leading to a decline of approximately 12% in car sales. This negative effect is due to substitution between online and offline engagement; users of the high-engagement website exhibited a decreased tendency to seek out personal contact with a car dealer and proceed to offline engagement—a necessary stage in the car purchase funnel. We develop an analytical model of the online-to-offline sales funnel to generalize our findings and highlight the conditions under which online engagement substitutes for offline engagement and potentially decreases offline sales. Taken together, our findings suggest that while online engagement serves as a means for both product information provision and consumer persuasion, it may fall short in achieving the latter goal, as compared to the offline channel. For purely offline products, hands-on engagement is a necessary step toward purchase. Thus, increasing consumers’ online engagement may not be an optimal strategy if it has the potential to halt progression down the sales funnel and reduce offline engagement.
{"title":"Stuck Online: When Online Engagement Gets in the Way of Offline Sales","authors":"Sagit Bar-Gill, Shachar Reichman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2672067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2672067","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, billions of dollars have been spent by both online and offline retailers on website design aimed at increasing consumers’ online engagement. We study the relationship between online engagement and offline sales, utilizing a quasi-experimental setting in which a leading premium automobile brand gradually launched a new interactive website across markets, allowing for a treatment-control comparison. This paper offers evidence of a causal effect of online engagement on offline sales, with the high-engagement website leading to a decline of approximately 12% in car sales. This negative effect is due to substitution between online and offline engagement; users of the high-engagement website exhibited a decreased tendency to seek out personal contact with a car dealer and proceed to offline engagement—a necessary stage in the car purchase funnel. We develop an analytical model of the online-to-offline sales funnel to generalize our findings and highlight the conditions under which online engagement substitutes for offline engagement and potentially decreases offline sales. Taken together, our findings suggest that while online engagement serves as a means for both product information provision and consumer persuasion, it may fall short in achieving the latter goal, as compared to the offline channel. For purely offline products, hands-on engagement is a necessary step toward purchase. Thus, increasing consumers’ online engagement may not be an optimal strategy if it has the potential to halt progression down the sales funnel and reduce offline engagement.","PeriodicalId":13594,"journal":{"name":"Information Systems & Economics eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86166768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Li Liao, Zhengwei Wang, Hongjun Yan, Jun Yang, Congyi Zhou
We examine the consequences of an intrusive debt-collection tactic that targets delinquent borrowers’ social circles. Our identification strategy relies on the fact that a fraction of delinquent loans are not worked on due to collection agents’ excessive workload. We show that this tactic backfires and increases the borrowers’ default rate by 5.9 to 14.3 percentage points. Male borrowers and borrowers with better credit respond more strongly. Moreover, the effect is concentrated in the period when this collection practice was emerging and likely unexpected. These findings are consistent with the negative reciprocity interpretation: angered borrowers retaliate by defaulting on their loans.
{"title":"Angry Borrowers: Negative Reciprocity in a Financial Market","authors":"Li Liao, Zhengwei Wang, Hongjun Yan, Jun Yang, Congyi Zhou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3415808","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3415808","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the consequences of an intrusive debt-collection tactic that targets delinquent borrowers’ social circles. Our identification strategy relies on the fact that a fraction of delinquent loans are not worked on due to collection agents’ excessive workload. We show that this tactic backfires and increases the borrowers’ default rate by 5.9 to 14.3 percentage points. Male borrowers and borrowers with better credit respond more strongly. Moreover, the effect is concentrated in the period when this collection practice was emerging and likely unexpected. These findings are consistent with the negative reciprocity interpretation: angered borrowers retaliate by defaulting on their loans.","PeriodicalId":13594,"journal":{"name":"Information Systems & Economics eJournal","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75097740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Currency is a medium of exchange permitted by the government for goods and services. In other words, its money in the form of paper or coins usually issued by government and generally accepted for the purpose of payment. In order to validate this currency, various efficient systems have been proposed to differentiate between original and tampered .In this system the concepts of pattern recognition along with various significant operations like image acquisition ,image format conversion, image segmentation, pattern generation and recognition is used. The proposed system is designed to identify the coins and validate if tampered or original.
{"title":"A Review on System for Identification and Validation of Coin","authors":"Vishal V. Rathi, Sunil Kumar Birla","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3563829","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3563829","url":null,"abstract":"Currency is a medium of exchange permitted by the government for goods and services. In other words, its money in the form of paper or coins usually issued by government and generally accepted for the purpose of payment. In order to validate this currency, various efficient systems have been proposed to differentiate between original and tampered .In this system the concepts of pattern recognition along with various significant operations like image acquisition ,image format conversion, image segmentation, pattern generation and recognition is used. The proposed system is designed to identify the coins and validate if tampered or original.","PeriodicalId":13594,"journal":{"name":"Information Systems & Economics eJournal","volume":"57 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83266657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cellular network is a fundamental technology for mobile phones, personal communication systems, wireless networking etc. This technology is developed for mobile phone to replace high power transmitter/receiver systems. It use very low power with a short range and higher rate of data transmission. Cellular network is arranged into multiple low power transmitters with less than of each 100w. The Cellular network offer very high capacity in a limited spectrum. It has the feature of reusability of radio channel in different cells. It also enables a fixed number of channels to serve an arbitrarily large number of users by reusing the channel throughout the coverage region. In cellular network, the communication is always between mobile and base station (not directly between mobiles).
{"title":"Cellular Networks: An Underlying Technology for Mobile Phones, Communication System & Wireless Networking","authors":"Dr. Shashiraj Teotia, S. Panwar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3571508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3571508","url":null,"abstract":"Cellular network is a fundamental technology for mobile phones, personal communication systems, wireless networking etc. This technology is developed for mobile phone to replace high power transmitter/receiver systems. It use very low power with a short range and higher rate of data transmission. Cellular network is arranged into multiple low power transmitters with less than of each 100w. The Cellular network offer very high capacity in a limited spectrum. It has the feature of reusability of radio channel in different cells. It also enables a fixed number of channels to serve an arbitrarily large number of users by reusing the channel throughout the coverage region. In cellular network, the communication is always between mobile and base station (not directly between mobiles).","PeriodicalId":13594,"journal":{"name":"Information Systems & Economics eJournal","volume":"102 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73446924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As computer programs become more complex, the ability of non-specialists to understand how a given output has been reached diminishes. Opaqueness may also be built into programs to protect proprietary interests. Both types of systems are capable of being explained, either through recourse to experts or an order to produce information. Another class of system may be naturally opaque, however, using deep learning methods that are impossible to explain in a manner that humans can comprehend. An emerging literature describes these phenomena or specific problems to which they give rise, notably the potential for bias against specific groups. Drawing on examples from the United States, the European Union, and China, this Article develops a novel typology of three discrete regulatory challenges posed by opacity. First, it may encourage—or fail to discourage—inferior decisions by removing the potential for oversight and accountability. Second, it may allow impermissible decisions, notably those that explicitly or implicitly rely on protected categories such as gender or race in making a determination. Third, it may render illegitimate decisions in which the process by which an answer is reached is as important as the answer itself. The means of addressing some or all of these concerns is routinely said to be through transparency. Yet, while proprietary opacity can be dealt with by court order and complex opacity through recourse to experts, naturally opaque systems may require novel forms of “explanation” or an acceptance that some machine-made decisions cannot be explained—or, in the alternative, that some decisions should not be made by machine at all.
{"title":"Through a Glass, Darkly: Artificial Intelligence and the Problem of Opacity","authors":"S. Chesterman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3575534","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3575534","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 As computer programs become more complex, the ability of non-specialists to understand how a given output has been reached diminishes. Opaqueness may also be built into programs to protect proprietary interests. Both types of systems are capable of being explained, either through recourse to experts or an order to produce information. Another class of system may be naturally opaque, however, using deep learning methods that are impossible to explain in a manner that humans can comprehend. An emerging literature describes these phenomena or specific problems to which they give rise, notably the potential for bias against specific groups. Drawing on examples from the United States, the European Union, and China, this Article develops a novel typology of three discrete regulatory challenges posed by opacity. First, it may encourage—or fail to discourage—inferior decisions by removing the potential for oversight and accountability. Second, it may allow impermissible decisions, notably those that explicitly or implicitly rely on protected categories such as gender or race in making a determination. Third, it may render illegitimate decisions in which the process by which an answer is reached is as important as the answer itself. The means of addressing some or all of these concerns is routinely said to be through transparency. Yet, while proprietary opacity can be dealt with by court order and complex opacity through recourse to experts, naturally opaque systems may require novel forms of “explanation” or an acceptance that some machine-made decisions cannot be explained—or, in the alternative, that some decisions should not be made by machine at all.","PeriodicalId":13594,"journal":{"name":"Information Systems & Economics eJournal","volume":"103 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78408937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-31DOI: 10.5121/ijcnc.2020.12202
Loay F. Hussein, A. Hashim, M. H. Habaebi, W. H. Hassan
Network mobility basic support (NEMO BS) protocol (RFC 3963) is an extension of Mobile IPv6. The NEMO BS embraced by the IETF working group to permit any node in the portable network to be accessible to the Internet despite the fact the network itself is roaming. This protocol likewise Mobile IPv6 does not deliver any kind of Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees to its clients. It can barely offer the same level of services (i.e. Best-Effort) to all the users without obligation to the needs of applications. These propositions a challenge to real-time applications that demand a precise level of QoS pledge. The Differentiated Services have recently come to be the most widely used QoS support technology in IP networks due to its relative simplicity and scalability benefits. This paper proposes a new scheme to provide QoS to mobile network nodes within the NEMO context. The proposed scheme intends to reduce handover latency for the users of MNN as well as alleviates packet losses. The feasibility of the proposed enhancement is assessed by measuring its performance against the native NEMO BS standard protocol using the NS-2 simulator. The obtained results in the simulation study have demonstrated that the proposed scheme outperforms the standard NEMO BS protocol.
{"title":"An Adaptive DiffServ Approach to Support QoS in Network Mobility NEMO Environment","authors":"Loay F. Hussein, A. Hashim, M. H. Habaebi, W. H. Hassan","doi":"10.5121/ijcnc.2020.12202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5121/ijcnc.2020.12202","url":null,"abstract":"Network mobility basic support (NEMO BS) protocol (RFC 3963) is an extension of Mobile IPv6. The NEMO BS embraced by the IETF working group to permit any node in the portable network to be accessible to the Internet despite the fact the network itself is roaming. This protocol likewise Mobile IPv6 does not deliver any kind of Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees to its clients. It can barely offer the same level of services (i.e. Best-Effort) to all the users without obligation to the needs of applications. These propositions a challenge to real-time applications that demand a precise level of QoS pledge. The Differentiated Services have recently come to be the most widely used QoS support technology in IP networks due to its relative simplicity and scalability benefits. This paper proposes a new scheme to provide QoS to mobile network nodes within the NEMO context. The proposed scheme intends to reduce handover latency for the users of MNN as well as alleviates packet losses. The feasibility of the proposed enhancement is assessed by measuring its performance against the native NEMO BS standard protocol using the NS-2 simulator. The obtained results in the simulation study have demonstrated that the proposed scheme outperforms the standard NEMO BS protocol.","PeriodicalId":13594,"journal":{"name":"Information Systems & Economics eJournal","volume":"77 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86185221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The recent emergence of blockchains may be considered a critical turning point in organizing collaborations. We outline the historical background and the fundamental features of blockchains and pre...
最近出现的区块链可能被认为是组织合作的关键转折点。我们概述了区块链的历史背景和基本特征。
{"title":"Blockchain Governance — A New Way of Organizing Collaborations?","authors":"Fabrice Lumineau, Wenqian Wang, Oliver Schilke","doi":"10.1287/orsc.2020.1379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2020.1379","url":null,"abstract":"The recent emergence of blockchains may be considered a critical turning point in organizing collaborations. We outline the historical background and the fundamental features of blockchains and pre...","PeriodicalId":13594,"journal":{"name":"Information Systems & Economics eJournal","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79685722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes technology spillover through the licensing of an abatement technology under the Pigouvian taxation and emission trading schemes. We demonstrate that a firm with a better abatement technology sells a per unit royalty license to a competitor under both schemes, but it offers a higher royalty rate under the latter, which, unless the technology is perfectly transferrable, strictly outperforms the former in terms of social surplus and incentives for technology investment by inducing more (less) production by the licensor (licensee). These are reversals of the welfare implications suggested by the literature that assumes free technology transfer.
{"title":"Technology Licensing and Environmental Policy Instruments: Price Control versus Quantity Control","authors":"Seung-Gyu Sim, Sung-gyun Hong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2822784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2822784","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes technology spillover through the licensing of an abatement technology under the Pigouvian taxation and emission trading schemes. We demonstrate that a firm with a better abatement technology sells a per unit royalty license to a competitor under both schemes, but it offers a higher royalty rate under the latter, which, unless the technology is perfectly transferrable, strictly outperforms the former in terms of social surplus and incentives for technology investment by inducing more (less) production by the licensor (licensee). These are reversals of the welfare implications suggested by the literature that assumes free technology transfer.","PeriodicalId":13594,"journal":{"name":"Information Systems & Economics eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90338814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine coopetition between a ride-sharing platform and a car-rental firm. A distinctive aspect of this context is that the platform operates under the sharing-economy model where the supply is self-scheduled by drivers depending on the wage, whereas the car-rental firm operates under the traditional model with a fixed supply and cost structure. The platform and the car-rental firm compete for riders looking for transportation. If the platform and the rental firm choose to cooperate, they allow a (secondary) driver to rent from the rental firm and drive for the platform. In the absence of cooperation, only those with their own vehicles (i.e., primary drivers) are allowed to drive for the platform. We show that such supply-side (i.e., driver-side) cooperation intensifies the demand-side (i.e., rider-side) price competition and decreases total revenue. Therefore, coopetition is mutually beneficial only when it leads to a significant decrease in the supply or driver cost. Moreover, when coopetition is mutually beneficial, the benefit arises solely because of the improved profit margin from riders that switch from the rental firm to the platform and from those that are switched from primary to secondary drivers under cooperation. We find that cooperation is more likely to occur when the total rider market size is not high, the degree of rider substitutability between the platform and the rental firm is low, and the platform has a significant market-size advantage over the rental firm. Coopetition between the platform and the rental firm benefits the riders and hurts the drivers, but benefits society overall. The presence of cross-side network effects on the platform enhances the incentives to engage in coopetition.
{"title":"When Sharing Economy Meets Traditional Business: Coopetition between Ride-Sharing Platforms and Car-Rental","authors":"Chenglong Zhang, Jianqing Chen, Srinivasan Raghunathan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3659380","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3659380","url":null,"abstract":"We examine coopetition between a ride-sharing platform and a car-rental firm. A distinctive aspect of this context is that the platform operates under the sharing-economy model where the supply is self-scheduled by drivers depending on the wage, whereas the car-rental firm operates under the traditional model with a fixed supply and cost structure. The platform and the car-rental firm compete for riders looking for transportation. If the platform and the rental firm choose to cooperate, they allow a (secondary) driver to rent from the rental firm and drive for the platform. In the absence of cooperation, only those with their own vehicles (i.e., primary drivers) are allowed to drive for the platform. We show that such supply-side (i.e., driver-side) cooperation intensifies the demand-side (i.e., rider-side) price competition and decreases total revenue. Therefore, coopetition is mutually beneficial only when it leads to a significant decrease in the supply or driver cost. Moreover, when coopetition is mutually beneficial, the benefit arises solely because of the improved profit margin from riders that switch from the rental firm to the platform and from those that are switched from primary to secondary drivers under cooperation. We find that cooperation is more likely to occur when the total rider market size is not high, the degree of rider substitutability between the platform and the rental firm is low, and the platform has a significant market-size advantage over the rental firm. Coopetition between the platform and the rental firm benefits the riders and hurts the drivers, but benefits society overall. The presence of cross-side network effects on the platform enhances the incentives to engage in coopetition.","PeriodicalId":13594,"journal":{"name":"Information Systems & Economics eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86467825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article applies the quantile regression forest (QRF), which is an improved method for predicting future monetary policy and macroeconomic downside risks in China. The information used to forecast is derived from Chinese systemic risk. We construct two Chinese systemic risk information sets, one is the old information set with 12 indexes, the other is our information set with 19 indexes added. We also applied two methods to learn systemic risk information, including multiple regression and principal component analysis (PCA). We show that the multiple quantile regression forest (MQRF) and the principal component quantile regression forest (PCQRF) exhibit a superior out-of-sample forecasting ability when compared to alternative forecasting models, such as the multiple quantile regression (MQR) and the principal component quantile regression (PCQR). Furthermore, our systemic risk information set has good economic implications in predicting China’s monetary policy and macroeconomic downside risks.
{"title":"Does the Quantile Regression Forest Learn More Information on Chinese Systemic Risk?","authors":"Yuejiao Duan, Xiaoyun Fan, Haoran Li","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3556400","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3556400","url":null,"abstract":"This article applies the quantile regression forest (QRF), which is an improved method for predicting future monetary policy and macroeconomic downside risks in China. The information used to forecast is derived from Chinese systemic risk. We construct two Chinese systemic risk information sets, one is the old information set with 12 indexes, the other is our information set with 19 indexes added. We also applied two methods to learn systemic risk information, including multiple regression and principal component analysis (PCA). We show that the multiple quantile regression forest (MQRF) and the principal component quantile regression forest (PCQRF) exhibit a superior out-of-sample forecasting ability when compared to alternative forecasting models, such as the multiple quantile regression (MQR) and the principal component quantile regression (PCQR). Furthermore, our systemic risk information set has good economic implications in predicting China’s monetary policy and macroeconomic downside risks.","PeriodicalId":13594,"journal":{"name":"Information Systems & Economics eJournal","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82229203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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