Pub Date : 2023-05-02DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00844-5
Alberto Vesperoni, Paul Schweinzer
{"title":"A threshold model of urban development","authors":"Alberto Vesperoni, Paul Schweinzer","doi":"10.1007/s00182-023-00844-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00844-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"52 1","pages":"891 - 924"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46697790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-27DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00843-6
Jian Yang
{"title":"Nonatomic game with general preferences over returns","authors":"Jian Yang","doi":"10.1007/s00182-023-00843-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00843-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-29"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41687698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-27DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00853-4
Dong Liang, Yunlong Wang, Zhigang Cao, Xiaoguang Yang
{"title":"Discrete Colonel Blotto games with two battlefields","authors":"Dong Liang, Yunlong Wang, Zhigang Cao, Xiaoguang Yang","doi":"10.1007/s00182-023-00853-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00853-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"33 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136121821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-27DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00846-3
Jihwan Do
{"title":"Joint market dominance through exclusionary compatibility","authors":"Jihwan Do","doi":"10.1007/s00182-023-00846-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00846-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41562488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-27DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00849-0
Ville Korpela
Abstract Often preferences in a group of agents are such that any sensible goal must admit a tie between all alternatives. The standard formulation in mechanism design demands that in this case all alternatives must be equilibrium outcomes of the decision making mechanism. However, as far as the idea of an equilibrium is to predict the outcome, we could equally well require that there are no equilibria at all. Although this may seem innocent, it allows the mechanism designer to implement goals that are impossible to enforce with any other implementation concept, like mixed Nash implementation, subgame perfect implementation, or Nash implementation using undominated strategies.
{"title":"Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility","authors":"Ville Korpela","doi":"10.1007/s00182-023-00849-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00849-0","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Often preferences in a group of agents are such that any sensible goal must admit a tie between all alternatives. The standard formulation in mechanism design demands that in this case all alternatives must be equilibrium outcomes of the decision making mechanism. However, as far as the idea of an equilibrium is to predict the outcome, we could equally well require that there are no equilibria at all. Although this may seem innocent, it allows the mechanism designer to implement goals that are impossible to enforce with any other implementation concept, like mixed Nash implementation, subgame perfect implementation, or Nash implementation using undominated strategies.","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136120068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-27DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00842-7
J. Choi, Kookyoung Han
{"title":"Delegation of information acquisition, information asymmetry, and outside option","authors":"J. Choi, Kookyoung Han","doi":"10.1007/s00182-023-00842-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00842-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"52 1","pages":"833 - 860"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45706451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-27DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00817-0
Ö. Selçuk, Takamasa Suzuki
{"title":"Comparable axiomatizations of the average tree solution and the Myerson value","authors":"Ö. Selçuk, Takamasa Suzuki","doi":"10.1007/s00182-022-00817-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00817-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"52 1","pages":"333 - 362"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41733080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-11DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00839-2
Takaaki Abe, Satoshi Nakada
{"title":"Potentials and solutions of cooperative games with a fixed player set","authors":"Takaaki Abe, Satoshi Nakada","doi":"10.1007/s00182-023-00839-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00839-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-18"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46675602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-04DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00856-1
Qi-Qing Song
{"title":"On the structure of core solutions of discontinuous general cooperative games","authors":"Qi-Qing Song","doi":"10.1007/s00182-023-00856-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00856-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46175088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-31DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00848-1
Manuel Foerster
Abstract In our cheap-talk setting, an expert privately observes multiple binary signals, her soft evidence, about a continuous state of the world and then communicates with a decision-maker. While direct transmission of evidence entails communicating the underlying signals, indirect transmission of evidence entails communicating a summary statistic of her evidence. We first establish that fully informative equilibria exist if the conflict of interest is small. Otherwise, direct transmission of evidence is impossible, as withholding one part of the soft evidence in the communication necessarily induces incentives to manipulate the report on the other part. On the contrary, indirect transmission of evidence remains partially informative for intermediate conflicts of interest. Finally, we introduce the possibility of certification. We show that, if the costs of certification are low, the expert can fully reveal her evidence regardless of the conflict of interest.
{"title":"Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult","authors":"Manuel Foerster","doi":"10.1007/s00182-023-00848-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00848-1","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In our cheap-talk setting, an expert privately observes multiple binary signals, her soft evidence, about a continuous state of the world and then communicates with a decision-maker. While direct transmission of evidence entails communicating the underlying signals, indirect transmission of evidence entails communicating a summary statistic of her evidence. We first establish that fully informative equilibria exist if the conflict of interest is small. Otherwise, direct transmission of evidence is impossible, as withholding one part of the soft evidence in the communication necessarily induces incentives to manipulate the report on the other part. On the contrary, indirect transmission of evidence remains partially informative for intermediate conflicts of interest. Finally, we introduce the possibility of certification. We show that, if the costs of certification are low, the expert can fully reveal her evidence regardless of the conflict of interest.","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135733153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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