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International Journal of Game Theory最新文献

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Establishing human connections: experimental evidence from the helping game 建立人际关系:来自帮助游戏的实验证据
IF 0.6 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-03-31 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00841-8
Miriam Al Lily
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引用次数: 0
Continuous optimisation problem and game theory for multi-agent pathfinding 多智能体寻路的连续优化问题与博弈论
IF 0.6 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-03-29 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00851-6
A. Kuznetsov, A. Schumann, Małgorzata Rataj
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引用次数: 1
Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency 没有一致性的核心的公理化特征
IF 0.6 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-01-26 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00835-y
S. Béal, Stéphane Gonzalez, P. Solal, Peter Sudhölter
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引用次数: 0
Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation 自愿参与下的自愿捐款和帕累托有效机制比较
IF 0.6 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-01-05 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00828-x
Takuma Wakayama, T. Yamato
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引用次数: 1
Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games. 随机博弈中的最佳反应动力学、游戏序列和趋同均衡。
IF 0.6 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00837-4
Torsten Heinrich, Yoojin Jang, Luca Mungo, Marco Pangallo, Alex Scott, Bassel Tarbush, Samuel Wiese

We analyze the performance of the best-response dynamic across all normal-form games using a random games approach. The playing sequence-the order in which players update their actions-is essentially irrelevant in determining whether the dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium in certain classes of games (e.g. in potential games) but, when evaluated across all possible games, convergence to equilibrium depends on the playing sequence in an extreme way. Our main asymptotic result shows that the best-response dynamic converges to a pure Nash equilibrium in a vanishingly small fraction of all (large) games when players take turns according to a fixed cyclic order. By contrast, when the playing sequence is random, the dynamic converges to a pure Nash equilibrium if one exists in almost all (large) games.

我们使用随机博弈方法分析了所有正规博弈中最佳响应动态的表现。游戏顺序,即玩家更新行动的顺序,在决定动态是否在某些类型的游戏(如潜在游戏)中收敛到纳什均衡时,本质上是无关紧要的,但是,当评估所有可能的游戏时,收敛到均衡取决于极端的游戏顺序。我们的主要渐近结果表明,当参与者按照固定的循环顺序轮流时,在所有(大型)博弈的极小部分中,最佳响应动态收敛于纯纳什均衡。相比之下,当游戏序列是随机的,动态收敛到一个纯纳什均衡,如果一个存在于几乎所有(大型)博弈。
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引用次数: 5
Trilateral escalation in the dollar auction 三边美元拍卖升级
IF 0.6 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-12-30 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00815-2
Fredrik Ødegaard, C. Zheng
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引用次数: 0
Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry 参与成本高昂的所有薪酬竞赛的信息披露
IF 0.6 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-12-05 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00822-3
Xin Feng
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引用次数: 1
Collusion with capacity constraints under a sales maximization rationing rule 在销售最大化配给规则下与产能约束的合谋
IF 0.6 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-11-30 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00827-y
Takaomi Notsu
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引用次数: 0
Marginality and a Characterization of the Owen Graph value 边缘性与欧文图值的一种表征
IF 0.6 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-11-30 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00825-0
Erfang Shan
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引用次数: 0
Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous Bertrand games: a complete characterization 不连续Bertrand对策中纳什均衡的存在唯一性:一个完整的表征
IF 0.6 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-11-29 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00830-3
R. Edwards, R. Routledge
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引用次数: 0
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International Journal of Game Theory
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