Non-fungible tokens—or NFTs, as they are better known—have taken the world by storm. The idea behind an NFT is that by owning a certain thing (specifically, a digital token that is tracked on a blockchain), one can hold property rights in something else (either a real or intangible asset). In the early part of 2021, NFTs for items ranging from a gif of a pop-tart cat with a rainbow tail, to Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey’s first tweet, to a New York Times column (about NFTs!) have sold for millions of dollars over the internet. Promoters assert that NFTs are the “future of digital property,” and that they herald a day when “government will lose its unique power to mint currency and protect property.” And these promoters reach beyond the typical crypto crowd. Giants of finance and industry are promising to extend the use of NFTs to securities, industrial assets, and real estate in the coming years. Moreover, this crypto token craze comes at a time when the American Law Institute and the Uniform Law Commission are in the midst of recommending revisions to U.S. commercial law to accommodate the digital age. In this Article, we take a more sober look at the tokenization phenomenon and, in doing so, describe what exactly it means when it comes to property rights. What can a purchaser of a token expect? How is a token actually connected to the underlying asset, if at all? What does the law—not the hype—have to say about it? We show that tokenization under the law actually has a long history, backed by practical economic considerations and animated by strong theoretical underpinnings. We also show that NFTs have neither of these attributes. Additionally, our Article surveys a dataset of terms of service from the most prominent NFT platforms in order to exploit both their disconnect from real legal effects and their puzzlingly contradictory promises about the relationships between buyers, seller, and the platform. Our project aims not only to inform current commercial law reform efforts, but it also offers a policy prescription for policing the NFT market.
{"title":"The Property Law of Tokens","authors":"Juliet M. Moringiello, Christopher K. Odinet","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3928901","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3928901","url":null,"abstract":"Non-fungible tokens—or NFTs, as they are better known—have taken the world by storm. The idea behind an NFT is that by owning a certain thing (specifically, a digital token that is tracked on a blockchain), one can hold property rights in something else (either a real or intangible asset). In the early part of 2021, NFTs for items ranging from a gif of a pop-tart cat with a rainbow tail, to Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey’s first tweet, to a New York Times column (about NFTs!) have sold for millions of dollars over the internet. Promoters assert that NFTs are the “future of digital property,” and that they herald a day when “government will lose its unique power to mint currency and protect property.” And these promoters reach beyond the typical crypto crowd. Giants of finance and industry are promising to extend the use of NFTs to securities, industrial assets, and real estate in the coming years. Moreover, this crypto token craze comes at a time when the American Law Institute and the Uniform Law Commission are in the midst of recommending revisions to U.S. commercial law to accommodate the digital age. In this Article, we take a more sober look at the tokenization phenomenon and, in doing so, describe what exactly it means when it comes to property rights. What can a purchaser of a token expect? How is a token actually connected to the underlying asset, if at all? What does the law—not the hype—have to say about it? We show that tokenization under the law actually has a long history, backed by practical economic considerations and animated by strong theoretical underpinnings. We also show that NFTs have neither of these attributes. Additionally, our Article surveys a dataset of terms of service from the most prominent NFT platforms in order to exploit both their disconnect from real legal effects and their puzzlingly contradictory promises about the relationships between buyers, seller, and the platform. Our project aims not only to inform current commercial law reform efforts, but it also offers a policy prescription for policing the NFT market.","PeriodicalId":142664,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Regulation that Pertains to Consumer Markets (Sub-Topic)","volume":"313 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123633590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Competition law curricula pay scant, if any, attention to gender. This paper argues in favour of integrating gender throughout the curricula in a wide range of law modules/courses. It weaves selected threads from feminist legal scholarship into a framework for appraising the gender neutrality of competition law. The selected threads from feminist enquiry unmask assumptions and highlight gendered impact which, combine, to perpetuate or exacerbate existing socio-economic divisions. In order to offer illustrations of assumed gender neutrality, this paper looks at economic research on, firstly, competition agencies’ selection of enforcement projects and, secondly, the definition of markets. This paper hopes to draw attention to the fledgling topic of competition law and gender in the hope of raising its visibility among competition law academics.
{"title":"Gender in the Competition Law Curriculum?","authors":"M. Lucey","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3650374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3650374","url":null,"abstract":"Competition law curricula pay scant, if any, attention to gender. This paper argues in favour of integrating gender throughout the curricula in a wide range of law modules/courses. It weaves selected threads from feminist legal scholarship into a framework for appraising the gender neutrality of competition law. The selected threads from feminist enquiry unmask assumptions and highlight gendered impact which, combine, to perpetuate or exacerbate existing socio-economic divisions. In order to offer illustrations of assumed gender neutrality, this paper looks at economic research on, firstly, competition agencies’ selection of enforcement projects and, secondly, the definition of markets. This paper hopes to draw attention to the fledgling topic of competition law and gender in the hope of raising its visibility among competition law academics.","PeriodicalId":142664,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Regulation that Pertains to Consumer Markets (Sub-Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128950866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Korean Abstract: 본 연구는 한국소비자원의 대규모 소비자조사인 ｢2017 소비자시장평가지표｣ 원자료 (N=1,000)를 활용하여 생명보험과 손해보험 시장의 거래구조 문제와 소비자보호제도에 대해 소비자가 어떻게 평가하고 있는지 살펴보고, 이들 간의 관계를 규명한 것이다. 주요 연구결과는 다음과 같다. 먼저 생명보험과 손해보험 모두에 있어 정보비대칭에 대한 문제인식, 교섭력차이에 대한 문제인식 그리고 이해상충에 대한 문제인식 각각의 평균점수는 큰 차이가 없었다. 그리고 보험소비자보호제도에 대한 소비자평가는 생명보 험 및 손해보험에 있어 각 10점 만점에 평균 8.19점과 8.25점으로 나타났다. 다음으로 거래구조 문제에 대한 소비자인식이 소비자보호제도에 대한 소비자의 평가 에 미치는 영향을 분석한 결과, 생명보험과 손해보험 모두에서 정보비대칭에 대한 문제 인식의 영향력이 가장 크게 나타났으며, 교섭력차이에 대한 문제인식, 그리고 이해상충 에 대한 문제인식이 그 뒤를 잇는 것으로 나타났다. 이상의 분석 결과는 소비자의 시각과 눈높이에서 보험시장에 대한 소비자보호제도를 평가한 결과를 분석한 것으로, 보험시장에서의 소비자지향성을 향상시키기 위해서는 거 래구조 문제 중 정보비대칭 문제가 가장 우선적으로 해소되어야 함을 시사한다. 본 연구 의 결과는 보험시장에서의 소비자보호제도를 소비자가 희망하는 방향으로 추진하기 위 해 필요한 보완책을 마련하는데 기여할 수 있다.
English Abstract: It is well-known that the transaction structure of insurance markets includes three types of consumer issues: information asymmetry, differences in bargaining power, and conflicts of interest. Using the data from “Consumer Markets Evaluation Indicators in Korea” generated by the Korea Consumer Agency in 2017, this study aimed to examine the relationship between consumers’ evaluation of transaction structure and consumers’ evaluation of consumer protection systems, with respect to life and non-life insurance markets. First, in both life and non-life insurance markets, no significant differences were exhibited amongst the levels of consumer evaluation of the three types of consumer issues. Moreover, the average consumer evaluation of the consumer protection system was 8.19/10 for the life insurance market and 8.25/10 for the non-life insurance market. Second, the results of the regression analyses of factors affecting consumer evaluation of the consumer protection system in life and non-life insurance markets reveal that information asymmetry had the highest impact among the three types of consumer issues. In other words, policy makers should reduce the level of information asymmetry with priority, in order to enhance the consumer evaluation level of consumer protection systems in life and non-life insurance markets. This study can provide valuable insights for policy makers who want to develop consumer-oriented consumer protection strategies in insurance markets.
korean abstract:本研究是韩国消费者院大规模소비자조사《2017消费者市场评价指标》原始材料(n = 1 000),利用人寿保险和财产保险市场的交易结构问题和对소비자보호제도消费者如何评价是否查明,这之间的关系的。主要研究结果是:首先，生命保险和损害保险对信息不对称的问题认识、对交涉能力差异的问题认识以及对利害冲突的问题认识各自的平均分数没有太大差异。而且，对保险消费者保护制度的消费者评价在生命保险及损害保险各10分满分中，平均得到了8.19分和8.25分。其次,对交易结构问题的消费者对消费者仪式소비자보호제도的评价产生的影响进行了分析,结果显示,在人寿保险和财产保险都对信息不对称的问题认识的影响力最大幅出现,交涉问题对历史差异的认识,以及对이해상충问题认识他的相继进行显示。以上分析结果在消费者的视角和眼光,保险市场对소비자보호제도将评价的结果进行了分析,在保险市场上的消费者为了提高定向结构交易中的信息不对称问题必须得到最优先的缓解,暗示。本研究的结果将对制定必要的补救措施做出贡献，以便向消费者希望的方向推进保险市场的消费者保护制度。English Abstract:It is well-known that the transaction structure of insurance markets includes three types of consumer:information asymmetry, differences in bargaining power, and conflicts of interest。2017年，《韩国消费者对数据的关注》this study aimed to examine the relationship between consumers ' evaluation of transaction structure and consumers ' evaluation of consumer protection systems，with respect to life and non-life insurance markets。First, in both life and non-life insurance markets, no significant differences were exhibited amongst the levels of consumer evaluation of the three types of consumer issues。Moreover, the average consumer evaluation of the consumer protection system was 8.19/10 for the life insurance market and 8.25/10 for the non-life insurance market。second,factors affecting consumer evaluation of the consumer protection system in life and non-life insurance markets reveal that information asymmetry had the hadhighest impact among the three types of consumer issues。In other words, policy makers should reduce the level of information asymmetry with priority;in order to enhance the consumer evaluation level of consumer protection systems in life and非life insurance markets。This study can provide valuable insights for policy makers who want to develop consumer-oriented consumer protection strategies in insurance markets。
{"title":"보험시장에서의 거래구조 문제와 소비자보호제도에 대한 소비자평가 연구(Consumer Evaluation of Transaction Structure and Consumer Protection System on Life and Non-Life Insurance Markets in Korea)","authors":"Hyunjin Baek","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3631691","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3631691","url":null,"abstract":"Korean Abstract:<br>본 연구는 한국소비자원의 대규모 소비자조사인 ｢2017 소비자시장평가지표｣ 원자료 (N=1,000)를 활용하여 생명보험과 손해보험 시장의 거래구조 문제와 소비자보호제도에 대해 소비자가 어떻게 평가하고 있는지 살펴보고, 이들 간의 관계를 규명한 것이다. 주요 연구결과는 다음과 같다. 먼저 생명보험과 손해보험 모두에 있어 정보비대칭에 대한 문제인식, 교섭력차이에 대한 문제인식 그리고 이해상충에 대한 문제인식 각각의 평균점수는 큰 차이가 없었다. 그리고 보험소비자보호제도에 대한 소비자평가는 생명보 험 및 손해보험에 있어 각 10점 만점에 평균 8.19점과 8.25점으로 나타났다.<br>다음으로 거래구조 문제에 대한 소비자인식이 소비자보호제도에 대한 소비자의 평가 에 미치는 영향을 분석한 결과, 생명보험과 손해보험 모두에서 정보비대칭에 대한 문제 인식의 영향력이 가장 크게 나타났으며, 교섭력차이에 대한 문제인식, 그리고 이해상충 에 대한 문제인식이 그 뒤를 잇는 것으로 나타났다. 이상의 분석 결과는 소비자의 시각과 눈높이에서 보험시장에 대한 소비자보호제도를 평가한 결과를 분석한 것으로, 보험시장에서의 소비자지향성을 향상시키기 위해서는 거 래구조 문제 중 정보비대칭 문제가 가장 우선적으로 해소되어야 함을 시사한다. 본 연구 의 결과는 보험시장에서의 소비자보호제도를 소비자가 희망하는 방향으로 추진하기 위 해 필요한 보완책을 마련하는데 기여할 수 있다.<br><br>English Abstract:<br>It is well-known that the transaction structure of insurance markets includes three types of consumer issues: information asymmetry, differences in bargaining power, and conflicts of interest. Using the data from “Consumer Markets Evaluation Indicators in Korea” generated by the Korea Consumer Agency in 2017, this study aimed to examine the relationship between consumers’ evaluation of transaction structure and consumers’ evaluation of consumer protection systems, with respect to life and non-life insurance markets. First, in both life and non-life insurance markets, no significant differences were exhibited amongst the levels of consumer evaluation of the three types of consumer issues. Moreover, the average consumer evaluation of the consumer protection system was 8.19/10 for the life insurance market and 8.25/10 for the non-life insurance market. Second, the results of the regression analyses of factors affecting consumer evaluation of the consumer protection system in life and non-life insurance markets reveal that information asymmetry had the highest impact among the three types of consumer issues. In other words, policy makers should reduce the level of information asymmetry with priority, in order to enhance the consumer evaluation level of consumer protection systems in life and non-life insurance markets. This study can provide valuable insights for policy makers who want to develop consumer-oriented consumer protection strategies in insurance markets.","PeriodicalId":142664,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Regulation that Pertains to Consumer Markets (Sub-Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125046887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Everyone has seen many products or services on which there is a huge discount which is offered by a large number of players. It is unbelievable to see how these products and services are offered at throwaway prices. Predatory pricing is a strategy whereby a powerful organization with deep pockets, prices its goods or services at rock-bottom levels so that no rivals can compete with them. The researcher in this paper will analyse the impact of predatory pricing upon the consumer as well as upon the business organization. Further, the researcher will also see the legal position under the Indian Competition Law. Also, the researcher will cover the OLA & JIO case.
{"title":"Predatory Pricing in India","authors":"Kamshad Mohsin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3552135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3552135","url":null,"abstract":"Everyone has seen many products or services on which there is a huge discount which is offered by a large number of players. It is unbelievable to see how these products and services are offered at throwaway prices. Predatory pricing is a strategy whereby a powerful organization with deep pockets, prices its goods or services at rock-bottom levels so that no rivals can compete with them. The researcher in this paper will analyse the impact of predatory pricing upon the consumer as well as upon the business organization. Further, the researcher will also see the legal position under the Indian Competition Law. Also, the researcher will cover the OLA & JIO case.<br>","PeriodicalId":142664,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Regulation that Pertains to Consumer Markets (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129250267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Personalized choice of private law is a novel framework for designing the legal rules that govern transactions and interactions between private parties. It addresses a pervasive theoretical and practical problem in private law: Private ordering is supposed to enable parties to choose the terms of their transactions, but under modern commercial conditions, many people do not actually consent to important terms of their contracts and other interactions with firms. Personalized choice of private law responds to that failure by empowering individuals to choose, from a government- authored, centralized catalogue of options, the private law rule that will apply to them. Through that choice, it grants people a greater say in crafting their transactions and interactions with powerful private parties who would otherwise dictate the terms of engagement. This Article offers a synoptic view of personalized choice of private law, addressing questions of scope, design, and justification. It first situates the framework within the theoretical and doctrinal landscape of existing approaches to private law and analyzes important scope and design choices facing lawmakers in its implementation. It then offers twin justifications grounded in foundational norms of private law: autonomy and economic efficiency. It proceeds to consider how the framework should be crafted to account for concerns about the unequal distribution or the improper commodification of legal rights and rules that personalization might entail. The Article concludes by offering a proof of concept of personalized choice of private law by sketching its implementation in two contexts: arbitration and data privacy. A Do Not Arbitrate List could render arbitration clauses unenforceable against you. A Digital Data Privacy Registry could empower you to choose a legal rule that prohibits any company from collecting, using, or selling data about you. These two potential implementations of personalized choice of private law illustrate its promise as a new tool for the design of private law.
{"title":"Personalized Choice of Private Law","authors":"M. Seligman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3493093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3493093","url":null,"abstract":"Personalized choice of private law is a novel framework for designing the legal rules that govern transactions and interactions between private parties. It addresses a pervasive theoretical and practical problem in private law: Private ordering is supposed to enable parties to choose the terms of their transactions, but under modern commercial conditions, many people do not actually consent to important terms of their contracts and other interactions with firms. Personalized choice of private law responds to that failure by empowering individuals to choose, from a government- authored, centralized catalogue of options, the private law rule that will apply to them. Through that choice, it grants people a greater say in crafting their transactions and interactions with powerful private parties who would otherwise dictate the terms of engagement. \u0000 \u0000This Article offers a synoptic view of personalized choice of private law, addressing questions of scope, design, and justification. It first situates the framework within the theoretical and doctrinal landscape of existing approaches to private law and analyzes important scope and design choices facing lawmakers in its implementation. It then offers twin justifications grounded in foundational norms of private law: autonomy and economic efficiency. It proceeds to consider how the framework should be crafted to account for concerns about the unequal distribution or the improper commodification of legal rights and rules that personalization might entail. \u0000 \u0000The Article concludes by offering a proof of concept of personalized choice of private law by sketching its implementation in two contexts: arbitration and data privacy. A Do Not Arbitrate List could render arbitration clauses unenforceable against you. A Digital Data Privacy Registry could empower you to choose a legal rule that prohibits any company from collecting, using, or selling data about you. These two potential implementations of personalized choice of private law illustrate its promise as a new tool for the design of private law.","PeriodicalId":142664,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Regulation that Pertains to Consumer Markets (Sub-Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132585539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Elizaveta Dobronravova, Yury Perevyshin, K. Shemyakina
Russian Abstract: В исследовании протестировано выполнение закона единой цены для отдельных товаров в российских регионах, выделены факторы, влияющие на различия региональных уровней цен и причины дифференциации темпов инфляции в субъектах Российской Федерации. Определены пороговые уровни региональных цен, достижение которых приводит в действие рыночные силы, вызывающие выравнивание региональных цен. Показано, что закон единой цены в абсолютной формулировке в российских регионах не выполняется для большинства товаров. English Abstract: We examined the implementation of the law of one price in Russian regions, highlighted the factors affecting the differences in regional price levels and identified the causes of inflation differentiation across different regions. We also defined threshold of regional prices, which triggers market forces, causing the alignment of regional prices. The study shows that the law of one price in Russian regions fails for most goods.
{"title":"Закон единой цены и различия инфляции в российских регионах (The Law of a Single Price and Inflation Differences in Russian Regions)","authors":"Elizaveta Dobronravova, Yury Perevyshin, K. Shemyakina","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3391122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3391122","url":null,"abstract":"Russian Abstract: В исследовании протестировано выполнение закона единой цены для отдельных товаров в российских регионах, выделены факторы, влияющие на различия региональных уровней цен и причины дифференциации темпов инфляции в субъектах Российской Федерации. Определены пороговые уровни региональных цен, достижение которых приводит в действие рыночные силы, вызывающие выравнивание региональных цен. Показано, что закон единой цены в абсолютной формулировке в российских регионах не выполняется для большинства товаров. \u0000 \u0000English Abstract: We examined the implementation of the law of one price in Russian regions, highlighted the factors affecting the differences in regional price levels and identified the causes of inflation differentiation across different regions. We also defined threshold of regional prices, which triggers market forces, causing the alignment of regional prices. The study shows that the law of one price in Russian regions fails for most goods.","PeriodicalId":142664,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Regulation that Pertains to Consumer Markets (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123173883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-02DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-11611-8_15
J. Coleman
{"title":"Energy Competition: From Commodity to Boutique & Back","authors":"J. Coleman","doi":"10.1007/978-3-030-11611-8_15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11611-8_15","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":142664,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Regulation that Pertains to Consumer Markets (Sub-Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129963402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Amicus Brief submitted to the California Supreme Court in De La Torre v CashCall Inc., 5 Cal.5th 966 (Cal. 2018): The Ninth Circuit has asked this Court whether the interest rate on consumer loans of $2,500 or more can render the loans unconscionable under section 22302 of the California Financial Code. The answer – with the proviso that any unconscionability determination must be made in the context of the terms and circumstances of the loans in question – is yes. . . .
When the legislature removed the interest rate cap on loans above $2,500, it did not impliedly repeal the historic principle that courts may intervene where a contract or provision is unduly oppressive or unconscionable. Rather, the legislature recognized that the statute’s unconscionability provision would remain a safeguard against the excesses of an unfettered free market. The doctrine of unconscionability, a “principle of equity applicable to all contracts generally,” applies to all provisions of all contracts. (See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807, 820.) A loan’s interest rate, whether governed by a statutory rate cap or not, is no exception. The incorporation of Civil Code section 1670.5 into Financial Code section 22302 evinces a clear legislative intent that courts should police the consumer credit market for unduly oppressive contract terms. The legislative mandate of Finance Code section 22302 is clear: where the market for consumer loans fails to produce socially tolerable terms, the courts may step in.
The attributes of the loans at issue in this case – their relatively large size, the length of the repayment period and, notably, their high interest rates – provide ample foundation for a finding that the loans are in fact unconscionable. For the current proceeding, however, it is enough to say this: The interest rate on consumer loans of $2,500 or more can – in the context of the other terms and circumstances of the loans – render the loans unconscionable under section 22302 of the California Financial Code.
{"title":"Application to File Brief and Brief of Amici Curiae, Center for Responsible Lending, National Association of Consumer Advocates, Public Citizen, Inc., and Public Good Law Center in Support of Appellants","authors":"B. Williams, T. Mermin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3282750","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3282750","url":null,"abstract":"Amicus Brief submitted to the California Supreme Court in De La Torre v CashCall Inc., 5 Cal.5th 966 (Cal. 2018): The Ninth Circuit has asked this Court whether the interest rate on consumer loans of $2,500 or more can render the loans unconscionable under section 22302 of the California Financial Code. The answer – with the proviso that any unconscionability determination must be made in the context of the terms and circumstances of the loans in question – is yes. . . .<br><br>When the legislature removed the interest rate cap on loans above $2,500, it did not impliedly repeal the historic principle that courts may intervene where a contract or provision is unduly oppressive or unconscionable. Rather, the legislature recognized that the statute’s unconscionability provision would remain a safeguard against the excesses of an unfettered free market. The doctrine of unconscionability, a “principle of equity applicable to all contracts generally,” applies to all provisions of all contracts. (See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807, 820.) A loan’s interest rate, whether governed by a statutory rate cap or not, is no exception. The incorporation of Civil Code section 1670.5 into Financial Code section 22302 evinces a clear legislative intent that courts should police the consumer credit market for unduly oppressive contract terms. The legislative mandate of Finance Code section 22302 is clear: where the market for consumer loans fails to produce socially tolerable terms, the courts may step in. <br><br>The attributes of the loans at issue in this case – their relatively large size, the length of the repayment period and, notably, their high interest rates – provide ample foundation for a finding that the loans are in fact unconscionable. For the current proceeding, however, it is enough to say this: The interest rate on consumer loans of $2,500 or more can – in the context of the other terms and circumstances of the loans – render the loans unconscionable under section 22302 of the California Financial Code.","PeriodicalId":142664,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Regulation that Pertains to Consumer Markets (Sub-Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126958059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-24DOI: 10.1007/978-981-10-8441-6_2
A. Schmulow, J. O’Hara
{"title":"Protection of Financial Consumers in Australia","authors":"A. Schmulow, J. O’Hara","doi":"10.1007/978-981-10-8441-6_2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8441-6_2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":142664,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Regulation that Pertains to Consumer Markets (Sub-Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128030182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Policymakers and scholars have in distributional conversations traditionally ignored consumer laws. Tax law dominates distributional conversations partly because legal rules are seen as less efficient and partly because consumer law research speaks to narrow and siloed contexts. Even millions of dollars in reduced credit card fees seem trivial compared to the trillion-dollar growth in income inequality that has sparked concern in recent decades. This Article is the first to synthesize the fragmented studies quantifying inefficiently higher consumer prices across diverse markets — called overcharge. These studies indicate that laws reducing overcharge could make a substantial reduction in inequality. Moreover, this massive redistribution would be driven by laws making markets more competitive, rather than tax increases that distort markets. If the empirical literature currently available is right, consumer law — defined more broadly as including antitrust and consumer protection — merits serious consideration as an alternative to tax.
{"title":"Consumer Law As Tax Alternative","authors":"","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3090800","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3090800","url":null,"abstract":"Policymakers and scholars have in distributional conversations traditionally ignored consumer laws. Tax law dominates distributional conversations partly because legal rules are seen as less efficient and partly because consumer law research speaks to narrow and siloed contexts. Even millions of dollars in reduced credit card fees seem trivial compared to the trillion-dollar growth in income inequality that has sparked concern in recent decades. This Article is the first to synthesize the fragmented studies quantifying inefficiently higher consumer prices across diverse markets — called overcharge. These studies indicate that laws reducing overcharge could make a substantial reduction in inequality. Moreover, this massive redistribution would be driven by laws making markets more competitive, rather than tax increases that distort markets. If the empirical literature currently available is right, consumer law — defined more broadly as including antitrust and consumer protection — merits serious consideration as an alternative to tax.","PeriodicalId":142664,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Regulation that Pertains to Consumer Markets (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132455389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：