This article examines various aspects of Teubner's theory of societal constitutionalism using the lex sportiva as an empirical terrain. The case study focuses on the operation of the Olympic Charter as a transnational constitution of the Olympic movement. It shows that recourse to a constitutional vocabulary is not out of place in qualifying the function and authority of the Charter inside and outside the Olympic movement. Yet, the findings of the case study also nuance some of Teubner's descriptive claims and question his normative strategy.
{"title":"The Olympic Charter: A Transnational Constitution Without a State?","authors":"A. Duval","doi":"10.1111/JOLS.12112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/JOLS.12112","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines various aspects of Teubner's theory of societal constitutionalism using the lex sportiva as an empirical terrain. The case study focuses on the operation of the Olympic Charter as a transnational constitution of the Olympic movement. It shows that recourse to a constitutional vocabulary is not out of place in qualifying the function and authority of the Charter inside and outside the Olympic movement. Yet, the findings of the case study also nuance some of Teubner's descriptive claims and question his normative strategy.","PeriodicalId":142986,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law eJournal","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114716535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article reviews the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ report on Non‐Invasive Prenatal Testing (NIPT); and introduces two general questions provoked by the report – concerning, respectively, the nature and extent of the informational interests that are to be recognised in today's ‘information societies’ and the membership of today's ‘genetic societies’. The article also considers the role and nature of the Nuffield Council. While the Council's report identifies a range of individual and collective interests that are relevant to determining the legitimate uses of NIPT, we argue that it should put these interests into an order of importance; we sketch how this might be done; and we suggest that, failing such a prioritisation of interests, the Council should present its reflections in a way that engages public debate around a number of options rather than making firm recommendations
{"title":"Testing Times Ahead: Non‐Invasive Prenatal Testing and the Kind of Community We Want to Be","authors":"R. Brownsword, Jeffrey Wale","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12355","url":null,"abstract":"This article reviews the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ report on Non‐Invasive Prenatal Testing (NIPT); and introduces two general questions provoked by the report – concerning, respectively, the nature and extent of the informational interests that are to be recognised in today's ‘information societies’ and the membership of today's ‘genetic societies’. The article also considers the role and nature of the Nuffield Council. While the Council's report identifies a range of individual and collective interests that are relevant to determining the legitimate uses of NIPT, we argue that it should put these interests into an order of importance; we sketch how this might be done; and we suggest that, failing such a prioritisation of interests, the Council should present its reflections in a way that engages public debate around a number of options rather than making firm recommendations","PeriodicalId":142986,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124084817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article re‐examines what constitutes genuine sharing in peer‐to‐peer collaborative transactions by contrasting a pet owner‐borrower matching initiative to other enterprises such as Uber and Airbnb. It argues that aims of public spiritedness and community building through interactions are essential for sustaining peer‐to‐peer collaborations. When money is the focal point of exchange, the collaborative relationship is motivated by profit making rather than goals of sustainability, well‐being or good citizenship. Interactions that create new kinds of connections within communities (rather than replacing traditional connections with cheaper or more accessible ones) are more likely to generate a genuine sharing ethos. The chief implication of the case study is that collaborators need to think carefully about objectives and means of exchange. Capturing new kinds of productive relationships, which are not overly reliant on the exchange of money, may contribute to genuine exchange and enhance community relations, leading to greater cultural citizenship.
{"title":"‘BorrowMyDoggy.com’: Rethinking Peer‐To‐Peer Exchange for Genuine Sharing","authors":"Devyani Prabhat","doi":"10.1111/jols.12080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jols.12080","url":null,"abstract":"This article re‐examines what constitutes genuine sharing in peer‐to‐peer collaborative transactions by contrasting a pet owner‐borrower matching initiative to other enterprises such as Uber and Airbnb. It argues that aims of public spiritedness and community building through interactions are essential for sustaining peer‐to‐peer collaborations. When money is the focal point of exchange, the collaborative relationship is motivated by profit making rather than goals of sustainability, well‐being or good citizenship. Interactions that create new kinds of connections within communities (rather than replacing traditional connections with cheaper or more accessible ones) are more likely to generate a genuine sharing ethos. The chief implication of the case study is that collaborators need to think carefully about objectives and means of exchange. Capturing new kinds of productive relationships, which are not overly reliant on the exchange of money, may contribute to genuine exchange and enhance community relations, leading to greater cultural citizenship.","PeriodicalId":142986,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law eJournal","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117967604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) increasingly faces societal value‐conflicts in EU law disputes. For example, in EU copyright law, in the digital age, diverse fundamental values, as well as cultural and societal developments, are at stake. This article discusses the role of the CJEU in the European value discourse, using copyright law as a case study. The methodological approach used, critical discourse analysis, is seldom applied in jurisprudential studies, but is well suited for teasing out value‐related aspects of case law. Exploratory research of seminal copyright cases suggests that the CJEU's discourse of the various values seems unnecessarily one‐sided and shallow. A lack of discursiveness in the jurisprudence would diminish the legitimacy of the Court's decisions, and would not offer adequate guidance to national courts or private decision‐makers, to whom the Court at the same time may be leaving more of the task of value reconciliation.
{"title":"Of Values and Legitimacy – Discourse Analytical Insights on the Copyright Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union","authors":"H. Kalimo, Trisha Meyer, Tuomas Mylly","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12329","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12329","url":null,"abstract":"The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) increasingly faces societal value‐conflicts in EU law disputes. For example, in EU copyright law, in the digital age, diverse fundamental values, as well as cultural and societal developments, are at stake. This article discusses the role of the CJEU in the European value discourse, using copyright law as a case study. The methodological approach used, critical discourse analysis, is seldom applied in jurisprudential studies, but is well suited for teasing out value‐related aspects of case law. Exploratory research of seminal copyright cases suggests that the CJEU's discourse of the various values seems unnecessarily one‐sided and shallow. A lack of discursiveness in the jurisprudence would diminish the legitimacy of the Court's decisions, and would not offer adequate guidance to national courts or private decision‐makers, to whom the Court at the same time may be leaving more of the task of value reconciliation.","PeriodicalId":142986,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law eJournal","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131378259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article addresses a little discussed yet fundamentally important aspect of legal technological transformation: the rise of digital justice in the courtroom. Against the backdrop of the government's current programme of digital court modernisation in England and Wales, it examines the implications of advances in courtroom technology for fair and equitable public participation, and access to justice. The article contends that legal reforms have omitted any detailed consideration of the type and quality of citizen participation in newly digitised court processes which have fundamental implications for the legitimacy and substantive outcomes of court‐based processes; and for enhancing democratic procedure through improved access to justice. It is argued that although digital court tools and systems offer great promise for enhancing efficiency, participation and accessibility, they simultaneously have the potential to amplify the scope for injustice, and to attenuate central principles of the legal system, including somewhat paradoxically, access to justice.
{"title":"The Rise of Digital Justice: Courtroom Technology, Public Participation and Access to Justice","authors":"J. Donoghue","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12300","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12300","url":null,"abstract":"This article addresses a little discussed yet fundamentally important aspect of legal technological transformation: the rise of digital justice in the courtroom. Against the backdrop of the government's current programme of digital court modernisation in England and Wales, it examines the implications of advances in courtroom technology for fair and equitable public participation, and access to justice. The article contends that legal reforms have omitted any detailed consideration of the type and quality of citizen participation in newly digitised court processes which have fundamental implications for the legitimacy and substantive outcomes of court‐based processes; and for enhancing democratic procedure through improved access to justice. It is argued that although digital court tools and systems offer great promise for enhancing efficiency, participation and accessibility, they simultaneously have the potential to amplify the scope for injustice, and to attenuate central principles of the legal system, including somewhat paradoxically, access to justice.","PeriodicalId":142986,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law eJournal","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121802159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What is the relationship between the right to life and criminal liability, and what should it be, given the significance we rightly attribute both to human life and to human freedom? This article explores the circumstances in which the European Court of Human Rights imposes a positive obligation to criminalise and pursue criminal forms of redress, and concludes that the Court's doctrine carries the potential of both coercive overreach and dilution of the right to life itself. These problems are compounded by opacity in the Court's doctrine. I propose a way forward that takes both the right to life and human freedom seriously.
{"title":"Taking Life and Liberty Seriously: Reconsidering Criminal Liability Under Article 2 of the ECHR","authors":"Natasa Mavronicola","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12301","url":null,"abstract":"What is the relationship between the right to life and criminal liability, and what should it be, given the significance we rightly attribute both to human life and to human freedom? This article explores the circumstances in which the European Court of Human Rights imposes a positive obligation to criminalise and pursue criminal forms of redress, and concludes that the Court's doctrine carries the potential of both coercive overreach and dilution of the right to life itself. These problems are compounded by opacity in the Court's doctrine. I propose a way forward that takes both the right to life and human freedom seriously.","PeriodicalId":142986,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law eJournal","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121774988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In May 2016 the Housing and Planning Act 2016 became law, the first purely Conservative government intervention on housing in England since the 1990s. This article examines the Act's key provisions pertaining to social housing and the government's stated aim of increasing rates of homeownership. The Act, through the Starter Homes Scheme, extension of the right to buy to housing association tenants and changes to security of tenure in the social sector, has been heralded as a ‘landmark’ piece of legislation. This article scrutinises these policy measures and assesses their effectiveness and likely impact. It is contended that the Act exposes the government's promotion of homeownership above all other housing tenures. The article further explores the deep moralisation at the heart of the homeownership narrative and the intensification in the residualisation of social housing in England which, it is argued, is the inevitable consequence of the reforms.
{"title":"The Housing and Planning Act 2016: Rewarding the Aspiration of Homeownership?","authors":"Chris Bevan, E. Laurie","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12278","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12278","url":null,"abstract":"In May 2016 the Housing and Planning Act 2016 became law, the first purely Conservative government intervention on housing in England since the 1990s. This article examines the Act's key provisions pertaining to social housing and the government's stated aim of increasing rates of homeownership. The Act, through the Starter Homes Scheme, extension of the right to buy to housing association tenants and changes to security of tenure in the social sector, has been heralded as a ‘landmark’ piece of legislation. This article scrutinises these policy measures and assesses their effectiveness and likely impact. It is contended that the Act exposes the government's promotion of homeownership above all other housing tenures. The article further explores the deep moralisation at the heart of the homeownership narrative and the intensification in the residualisation of social housing in England which, it is argued, is the inevitable consequence of the reforms.","PeriodicalId":142986,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law eJournal","volume":"72 12","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120926596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines concern for fairness in the way in which loss is distributed when a company or financial institution facing financial difficulties is restructured. It shows how this concern is often grounded in loose notions of fairness, or generalisations from one situation to another, rather than in detailed analysis. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, it builds an analytical frame for the fairness debate in debt restructuring. It shows why rigour is important in identifying fairness concerns, in weighing them against other considerations, and in applying concerns which arise in one scenario to another, and illustrates the types of policy mistake or policy incoherence which can arise if this is not done.
{"title":"Debt Restructuring and Notions of Fairness","authors":"Sarah Paterson","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12276","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12276","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines concern for fairness in the way in which loss is distributed when a company or financial institution facing financial difficulties is restructured. It shows how this concern is often grounded in loose notions of fairness, or generalisations from one situation to another, rather than in detailed analysis. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, it builds an analytical frame for the fairness debate in debt restructuring. It shows why rigour is important in identifying fairness concerns, in weighing them against other considerations, and in applying concerns which arise in one scenario to another, and illustrates the types of policy mistake or policy incoherence which can arise if this is not done.","PeriodicalId":142986,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law eJournal","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123420833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Prohibiting indirect discrimination has been hailed as guaranteeing substantive equality by addressing issues of structural discrimination and inequalities in a way that direct discrimination cannot and will not. However, Article 14, the ECHR's non‐discrimination provision, does not distinguish between direct and indirect discrimination. Only in 2007 the European Court of Human Rights explicitly included the notion of indirect (race) discrimination under Article 14 in DH and Others v Czech Republic, its famous judgment on Roma education segregation. Since then it has applied the prohibition of indirect race discrimination in a limited manner to similar education cases. However, in its recent Grand Chamber decision, Biao v Denmark, the Strasbourg Court started clarifying some unsolved issues in the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination in its case law and finally applied the concept to the much broader area of immigration and citizenship.
{"title":"The Strasbourg Court and Indirect Race Discrimination: Going Beyond the Education Domain","authors":"M. Möschel","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12245","url":null,"abstract":"Prohibiting indirect discrimination has been hailed as guaranteeing substantive equality by addressing issues of structural discrimination and inequalities in a way that direct discrimination cannot and will not. However, Article 14, the ECHR's non‐discrimination provision, does not distinguish between direct and indirect discrimination. Only in 2007 the European Court of Human Rights explicitly included the notion of indirect (race) discrimination under Article 14 in DH and Others v Czech Republic, its famous judgment on Roma education segregation. Since then it has applied the prohibition of indirect race discrimination in a limited manner to similar education cases. However, in its recent Grand Chamber decision, Biao v Denmark, the Strasbourg Court started clarifying some unsolved issues in the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination in its case law and finally applied the concept to the much broader area of immigration and citizenship.","PeriodicalId":142986,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law eJournal","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115817437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As jurisdictions reform gender identity laws to accommodate transgender and intersex people, this article speculatively explores a more fundamental shift: eliminating state law’s role in determining and assigning gender status altogether. Adopting a feminist perspective, we explore what the meaning and effects of comprehensively reforming legal gender might be in terms of gender’s constitution as a socio-legal property, differentially recognised and protected by diverse but unequal bodies. Our discussion proceeds along two intersecting paths. The first concerns the different classificatory methods which could enable state law, without assigning gender, to continue to regulate gender identity decisions, thereby allowing state law to remain involved in tackling gender discrimination. The second concerns the changing form gender might take in conditions where state law withdraws its allocative function. These paths converge in a final discussion which considers what legal and political effects might follow from gender becoming a property that is individually and collectively cultivated.
{"title":"If the State Decertified Gender, What Might Happen to its Meaning and Value?","authors":"Davina Cooper, Flora Renz","doi":"10.1111/jols.12000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jols.12000","url":null,"abstract":"As jurisdictions reform gender identity laws to accommodate transgender and intersex people, this article speculatively explores a more fundamental shift: eliminating state law’s role in determining and assigning gender status altogether. Adopting a feminist perspective, we explore what the meaning and effects of comprehensively reforming legal gender might be in terms of gender’s constitution as a socio-legal property, differentially recognised and protected by diverse but unequal bodies. Our discussion proceeds along two intersecting paths. The first concerns the different classificatory methods which could enable state law, without assigning gender, to continue to regulate gender identity decisions, thereby allowing state law to remain involved in tackling gender discrimination. The second concerns the changing form gender might take in conditions where state law withdraws its allocative function. These paths converge in a final discussion which considers what legal and political effects might follow from gender becoming a property that is individually and collectively cultivated.","PeriodicalId":142986,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law eJournal","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124105268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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