The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) has been suspected of carrying out a harmonising agenda over and beyond the conventional law-interpreting function of the judiciary. This study aims to investigate empirically two theories in relation to the development of EU copyright law: (i) that the Court has failed to develop a coherent copyright jurisprudence (lacking domain expertise, copyright specific reasoning, and predictability); (ii) that the Court has pursued an activist, harmonising agenda (resorting to teleological interpretation of European law rather than – less discretionary – semantic and systematic legal approaches). We have collected two data sets relating to all ECJ copyright and database cases up to Svensson (February 2014): (1) Statistics about the allocation of cases to chambers, the composition of chambers, the Judge Rapporteur, and Advocate General (including coding of the professional background of the personnel); (2) Content analysis of argumentative patterns in the decisions themselves, using a qualitative coding technique. Studying the relationship between (1) and (2) allows us to identify links between certain Chambers/ Court members and legal approaches, over time, and by subject. These shed light on the internal workings of the court, and also enable us to explore theories about the nature of ECJ jurisprudence. The analysis shows that private law and in particular intellectual property law expertise is almost entirely missing from the Court. However, we find that the Court has developed a mechanism for enabling judicial learning through the systematic assignment of cases to certain Judges and AGs. We also find that the Court has developed a “fair balance” topos linked to Judge Malenovský (rapporteur on 24 out of 40 copyright cases) that does not predict an agenda of upward harmonisation, with about half of judgments narrowing rather than widening the scope of copyright protection.
{"title":"Is There an EU Copyright Jurisprudence? An Empirical Analysis of the Workings of the European Court of Justice","authors":"M. Favale, M. Kretschmer, Paul Torremans","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12166","url":null,"abstract":"The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) has been suspected of carrying out a harmonising agenda over and beyond the conventional law-interpreting function of the judiciary. This study aims to investigate empirically two theories in relation to the development of EU copyright law: (i) that the Court has failed to develop a coherent copyright jurisprudence (lacking domain expertise, copyright specific reasoning, and predictability); (ii) that the Court has pursued an activist, harmonising agenda (resorting to teleological interpretation of European law rather than – less discretionary – semantic and systematic legal approaches). \u0000 \u0000We have collected two data sets relating to all ECJ copyright and database cases up to Svensson (February 2014): (1) Statistics about the allocation of cases to chambers, the composition of chambers, the Judge Rapporteur, and Advocate General (including coding of the professional background of the personnel); (2) Content analysis of argumentative patterns in the decisions themselves, using a qualitative coding technique. Studying the relationship between (1) and (2) allows us to identify links between certain Chambers/ Court members and legal approaches, over time, and by subject. These shed light on the internal workings of the court, and also enable us to explore theories about the nature of ECJ jurisprudence. \u0000 \u0000The analysis shows that private law and in particular intellectual property law expertise is almost entirely missing from the Court. However, we find that the Court has developed a mechanism for enabling judicial learning through the systematic assignment of cases to certain Judges and AGs. We also find that the Court has developed a “fair balance” topos linked to Judge Malenovský (rapporteur on 24 out of 40 copyright cases) that does not predict an agenda of upward harmonisation, with about half of judgments narrowing rather than widening the scope of copyright protection.","PeriodicalId":142986,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law eJournal","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134250042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
By the nature of Insurance Contracts, the insurer undertakes to indemnify the insured in the event of the happening of unforeseen occurrences. For liability Insurance contracts, the insurer undertakes to indemnify the insured in case of liability to a third party, thus the insurance contract is taken for the benefit of the third party. The critically question then arises, can the third party sue the insurer directly for the liability guaranteed under the contract of insurance? The long established common law doctrine of privity of contract answers this question in the negative, however statutory provisions has modified the applicability of this principle in relation to insurance contracts in Nigeria. The aim of this Article is to examine the statutory provisions that whittled down the effect of the doctrine of privity of contract to insurance contract in Nigeria and the judicial interpretation given by the Courts to these provisions to determine how well there have protected third parties.
{"title":"The Application of the Doctrine of Privity of Contract to Insurance Contract in Nigeria","authors":"O. Oke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2641551","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2641551","url":null,"abstract":"By the nature of Insurance Contracts, the insurer undertakes to indemnify the insured in the event of the happening of unforeseen occurrences. For liability Insurance contracts, the insurer undertakes to indemnify the insured in case of liability to a third party, thus the insurance contract is taken for the benefit of the third party. The critically question then arises, can the third party sue the insurer directly for the liability guaranteed under the contract of insurance? The long established common law doctrine of privity of contract answers this question in the negative, however statutory provisions has modified the applicability of this principle in relation to insurance contracts in Nigeria. The aim of this Article is to examine the statutory provisions that whittled down the effect of the doctrine of privity of contract to insurance contract in Nigeria and the judicial interpretation given by the Courts to these provisions to determine how well there have protected third parties.","PeriodicalId":142986,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law eJournal","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127836266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We write to express our continued concerns about the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) and our willingness to assist you in determining how best to improve enforcement of legitimate trade secret rights. Unfortunately, the new DTSA appears to simply combine many of the provisions of the two pieces of legislation that were introduced in 2014 (S. 2267 and H.R. 5233). As a result, it addresses few of the concerns raised in the January 2015 article and the August 2014 letter. Moreover, the sponsors have failed to explain how the DTSA improves existing trade secret law, nor how it will specifically address the harms that it purports to mitigate. Thus, the August 2014 letter and January 2015 article remain highly relevant to an analysis of the DTSA’s benefits and drawbacks.
{"title":"An Open Letter to the Sponsors of the Revised Defend Trade Secrets Act","authors":"David S. Levine, Sharon K. Sandeen","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2699763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2699763","url":null,"abstract":"We write to express our continued concerns about the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) and our willingness to assist you in determining how best to improve enforcement of legitimate trade secret rights. Unfortunately, the new DTSA appears to simply combine many of the provisions of the two pieces of legislation that were introduced in 2014 (S. 2267 and H.R. 5233). As a result, it addresses few of the concerns raised in the January 2015 article and the August 2014 letter. Moreover, the sponsors have failed to explain how the DTSA improves existing trade secret law, nor how it will specifically address the harms that it purports to mitigate. Thus, the August 2014 letter and January 2015 article remain highly relevant to an analysis of the DTSA’s benefits and drawbacks.","PeriodicalId":142986,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121762927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is reasonably well settled in Canadian common law that governments cannot bring defamation actions against citizens. That said, uncertainty remains about the scope of the rule (i.e, what counts as government for the purposes of the rule) because of a lack of case law, and because cases rely on different rationales, including the chilling effect of defamation actions on democratic discourse, the public nature of a government’s reputation and the fact that governments generally have the ability to speak out to try to correct misinformation about them.This article examines the law in other common law countries and Canada with two goals in mind: first, to understand the current Canadian law with regard to governments’ and other public bodies’ ability to sue in defamation; and second, to ground a normative analysis. Specifically, I assess how the rule against government defamation actions should be applied to public institutions such as school boards, police forces and crown corporations. I propose that like governments, public institutions should be prohibited from suing in defamation. As a starting point, public institutions are institutions subject to access to information requests under federal and provincial law. I justify this admittedly broad prohibition with regard to the nature of public institutions’ interest in reputation, the importance of speech about such institutions, the limitations of defamation defences in protecting speech on matters of public interest, and the ability of public institutions to communicate with citizens to try to correct misinformation.
{"title":"Public Institutions as Defamation Plaintiffs","authors":"Hilary Young","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2651146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2651146","url":null,"abstract":"It is reasonably well settled in Canadian common law that governments cannot bring defamation actions against citizens. That said, uncertainty remains about the scope of the rule (i.e, what counts as government for the purposes of the rule) because of a lack of case law, and because cases rely on different rationales, including the chilling effect of defamation actions on democratic discourse, the public nature of a government’s reputation and the fact that governments generally have the ability to speak out to try to correct misinformation about them.This article examines the law in other common law countries and Canada with two goals in mind: first, to understand the current Canadian law with regard to governments’ and other public bodies’ ability to sue in defamation; and second, to ground a normative analysis. Specifically, I assess how the rule against government defamation actions should be applied to public institutions such as school boards, police forces and crown corporations. I propose that like governments, public institutions should be prohibited from suing in defamation. As a starting point, public institutions are institutions subject to access to information requests under federal and provincial law. I justify this admittedly broad prohibition with regard to the nature of public institutions’ interest in reputation, the importance of speech about such institutions, the limitations of defamation defences in protecting speech on matters of public interest, and the ability of public institutions to communicate with citizens to try to correct misinformation.","PeriodicalId":142986,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law eJournal","volume":"110 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130082937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that liability on the part of a person of unsound mind in respect of an act committed by that person does not alter incentives to act by reason of the fact that when this person commits the unlawful act, he is not in possession of all their faculties. Regulations providing for liability on the part of the person of unsound mind in the choice of the activity level when he is in possession of all the faculties would have the effect of acting as a disincentive to conduct which is inefficiently harmful, as the person, when choosing his level of activity, would take into account the risk of liability in cases where he commits an unlawful act. Liability linked to the choice of level of activity would act as a disincentive to excessive risks of harmful events.The proposal made by some academic researchers whereby indemnification must take into account the age and the severity of the incapacitation would induce people who are not, in a certain moment, of unsound mind to choose their level of activity, taking into account liabilities they may face. A law which links the indemnification that injurer must pay when he is of unsound mind to age and severity of incapacitation acts as a disincentive to the choice of excessively high levels of activity and therefore excessive risks, and favours efficiency.
{"title":"Liability of Persons of Unsound Mind: Incentives for Choosing Activity Level. An Economic Analysis of the Law","authors":"Enrico Baffi, D. Nardi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2635869","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2635869","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that liability on the part of a person of unsound mind in respect of an act committed by that person does not alter incentives to act by reason of the fact that when this person commits the unlawful act, he is not in possession of all their faculties. Regulations providing for liability on the part of the person of unsound mind in the choice of the activity level when he is in possession of all the faculties would have the effect of acting as a disincentive to conduct which is inefficiently harmful, as the person, when choosing his level of activity, would take into account the risk of liability in cases where he commits an unlawful act. Liability linked to the choice of level of activity would act as a disincentive to excessive risks of harmful events.The proposal made by some academic researchers whereby indemnification must take into account the age and the severity of the incapacitation would induce people who are not, in a certain moment, of unsound mind to choose their level of activity, taking into account liabilities they may face. A law which links the indemnification that injurer must pay when he is of unsound mind to age and severity of incapacitation acts as a disincentive to the choice of excessively high levels of activity and therefore excessive risks, and favours efficiency.","PeriodicalId":142986,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law eJournal","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124684054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The focus of this working paper is the drafting of guarantees. In discussing the topic from the perspective of drafting, we attempt to achieve familiarity with some key issues and risks in drafting guarantees and bonds. We have also set out the law in relation to guarantee including the essentials of contract, types, rights and obligations of guarantors, including several key drafting risks that must be avoided by practitioners.
{"title":"Key Considerations in the Drafting of Guarantees and Bonds","authors":"O. Osinubi, Ihenetu-Geoffrey Chibueze Chinedu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2684027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2684027","url":null,"abstract":"The focus of this working paper is the drafting of guarantees. In discussing the topic from the perspective of drafting, we attempt to achieve familiarity with some key issues and risks in drafting guarantees and bonds. We have also set out the law in relation to guarantee including the essentials of contract, types, rights and obligations of guarantors, including several key drafting risks that must be avoided by practitioners.","PeriodicalId":142986,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127700271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recently, shareholders of the insurance giant AIG, which received billions of dollars in bailout funds from the federal government at the height of the 2008 financial crisis, filed suit against the United States government for $40 billion. One might think that this claim would be absurd on its face. Commentators – legal and otherwise – appeared to have been caught off guard as to how this could be a plausible legal case. If the government simply offers you a deal, which you can take or leave, how can you sue – later – if you don’t like its terms? This might sound astounding, but it is not. To understand the theory of the AIG litigation, one must go to its deeper, festering root in American takings law. In a series of “exactions” cases, the United States Supreme Court has held that when government offers something (which it has no obligation to offer), in exchange for value of some sort, courts must ensure that this is “fair” – even though the offeree is under no obligation to take it. In short, we should not be surprised by AIG. It is simply Nollan/Dolan’s progeny.
{"title":"From Bailouts to Bogs -- Shaking the Takings Money Tree","authors":"Laura S. Underkuffler","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2628344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2628344","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, shareholders of the insurance giant AIG, which received billions of dollars in bailout funds from the federal government at the height of the 2008 financial crisis, filed suit against the United States government for $40 billion. One might think that this claim would be absurd on its face. Commentators – legal and otherwise – appeared to have been caught off guard as to how this could be a plausible legal case. If the government simply offers you a deal, which you can take or leave, how can you sue – later – if you don’t like its terms? This might sound astounding, but it is not. To understand the theory of the AIG litigation, one must go to its deeper, festering root in American takings law. In a series of “exactions” cases, the United States Supreme Court has held that when government offers something (which it has no obligation to offer), in exchange for value of some sort, courts must ensure that this is “fair” – even though the offeree is under no obligation to take it. In short, we should not be surprised by AIG. It is simply Nollan/Dolan’s progeny.","PeriodicalId":142986,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law eJournal","volume":"362 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115985369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Koushal v Naz the Indian Supreme Court overturned a High Court judgment which had declared unconstitutional section 377 of the Indian Penal Code criminalising ‘carnal intercourse against the order of nature’. In doing so, it has rebranded gay and transgendered Indians as criminals. This case note explores some of the structural problems that led to this judgment. The first problem is the transformation of the Indian Supreme Court into a populist, quasi‐legislative, institution that sees itself as a tool of governance. This has put significant pressure on its counter‐majoritarian role. The second relates to the sheer size of the Court's docket (given its wide jurisdiction and lax standing rules), coupled with the Indian legal academy's inability and unwillingness to continuously demand judicial fidelity to the law. These factors have led to the normalisation of unreasoned or poorly‐reasoned judgments and a breakdown of stare decisis.
在Koushal v Naz案中，印度最高法院推翻了高等法院的判决，该判决宣布印度刑法第377条将“违反自然秩序的性交”定为犯罪是违宪的。在这样做的过程中，印度将同性恋和变性人重新定义为罪犯。本案例说明探讨了导致这一判决的一些结构性问题。第一个问题是，印度最高法院正在转变为一个民粹主义的、准立法的机构，将自己视为治理的工具。这给其反多数主义的角色带来了巨大压力。第二个问题与法院案件的庞大规模有关(考虑到其广泛的管辖权和宽松的常设规则)，再加上印度法律学院没有能力也不愿意继续要求司法忠于法律。这些因素导致了不合理或不合理判断的正常化，以及凝视决策的崩溃。
{"title":"Koushal v Naz: Judges Vote to Recriminalise Homosexuality","authors":"Tarunabh Khaitan","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12133","url":null,"abstract":"In Koushal v Naz the Indian Supreme Court overturned a High Court judgment which had declared unconstitutional section 377 of the Indian Penal Code criminalising ‘carnal intercourse against the order of nature’. In doing so, it has rebranded gay and transgendered Indians as criminals. This case note explores some of the structural problems that led to this judgment. The first problem is the transformation of the Indian Supreme Court into a populist, quasi‐legislative, institution that sees itself as a tool of governance. This has put significant pressure on its counter‐majoritarian role. The second relates to the sheer size of the Court's docket (given its wide jurisdiction and lax standing rules), coupled with the Indian legal academy's inability and unwillingness to continuously demand judicial fidelity to the law. These factors have led to the normalisation of unreasoned or poorly‐reasoned judgments and a breakdown of stare decisis.","PeriodicalId":142986,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law eJournal","volume":"708 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132947694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using several new datasets, I document the role of legal risk premia in bond yields during the Euro-crisis. I find evidence of a rising premium especially in late 2011 and mid-2012 on bonds with foreign governing law relative to those with local governing law (and otherwise similar characteristics). The results illustrate that legal risk premia spiked at the height of the crisis in the Eurozone, when investors were willing to pay a premium for the additional protection offered by foreign law bonds. I show that this governing law premium can be linked to both credit risk (expected haircuts) and redenomination risk (expected currency depreciation). This paper is the first to empirically link the governing law premium to redenomination risk. I find evidence that redenomination risk is an independent driving force of governing law spreads over and above credit risk, although it is analytically challenging to separate the two risk factors. My findings, while not conclusive, are consistent with the consensus in the literature on contract law, which argues that local law financial instruments should be more susceptible to redenomination in a scenario of a country exiting the Eurozone.
{"title":"Legal Risk Premia During the Euro-Crisis: The Role of Credit and Redenomination Risk","authors":"Jens Nordvig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2608852","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2608852","url":null,"abstract":"Using several new datasets, I document the role of legal risk premia in bond yields during the Euro-crisis. I find evidence of a rising premium especially in late 2011 and mid-2012 on bonds with foreign governing law relative to those with local governing law (and otherwise similar characteristics). The results illustrate that legal risk premia spiked at the height of the crisis in the Eurozone, when investors were willing to pay a premium for the additional protection offered by foreign law bonds. I show that this governing law premium can be linked to both credit risk (expected haircuts) and redenomination risk (expected currency depreciation). This paper is the first to empirically link the governing law premium to redenomination risk. I find evidence that redenomination risk is an independent driving force of governing law spreads over and above credit risk, although it is analytically challenging to separate the two risk factors. My findings, while not conclusive, are consistent with the consensus in the literature on contract law, which argues that local law financial instruments should be more susceptible to redenomination in a scenario of a country exiting the Eurozone.","PeriodicalId":142986,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121129840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In May, the following amendments were introduced in the legislation: from September 2013 amendments to Cl.4 and Cl.5 of Section I of Part I and Article 1153 of Part III of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation will be in effect; the specifics of carrying out of labor activities by high-skilled experts-foreign nationals was updated; procedure for identification of a foreign national who has no valid document was specified and definition of “the state support of innovation activities” was provided.
{"title":"The Review of the Economic Legislation in May 2015","authors":"I. Tolmacheva, Julia Grunina","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2620709","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2620709","url":null,"abstract":"In May, the following amendments were introduced in the legislation: from September 2013 amendments to Cl.4 and Cl.5 of Section I of Part I and Article 1153 of Part III of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation will be in effect; the specifics of carrying out of labor activities by high-skilled experts-foreign nationals was updated; procedure for identification of a foreign national who has no valid document was specified and definition of “the state support of innovation activities” was provided.","PeriodicalId":142986,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129818204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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