Pub Date : 2022-08-01DOI: 10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.kuk.441-456
Ilija Kukobat
Air transport between Yugoslavia and the United States was one of the defining aspects of Yugoslav civil aviation after the Second World War. Cooperation between the two countries developed in several fields. Early attempts to regulate civil air transport by the means of a bilateral agreement were made as early as 1945, but without success. Three agreements on air transport were eventually signed in 1949, 1973 and 1977. Pan American World Airways started overflying Yugoslav territory in 1950 on its international routes between North America and the Middle East and started landing at Belgrade in 1963, thus providing a true connection between the two countries. From 1970, Yugoslav Airlines operated charter flights between Yugoslavia and USA, followed by the introduction of a regular service between Belgrade, Zagreb, and New York in 1976. From 1964 to 1966 and during 1972, another Yugoslav air operator, (Inex) Adria Airways also flew charter flights between Yugoslavia and the United States. Apart from this, most passenger airplanes used in Yugoslavia were made in the United States, while some Yugoslav factories manufactured components for American aircraft producers. Yugoslav airmen and other aviation experts undertook training in America, greatly improving the functioning and safety of Yugoslav civil aviation in general. The disintegration of Socialist Yugoslavia and international sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992 also led to a ban on air traffic between Yugoslavia and the rest of the world. The United States introduced this ban several days before the sanctions came into force, ending all air transport services between the two countries.
{"title":"DEVELOPMENT OF AIR TRANSPORT BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1945-1992","authors":"Ilija Kukobat","doi":"10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.kuk.441-456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.kuk.441-456","url":null,"abstract":"Air transport between Yugoslavia and the United States was one of the defining aspects of Yugoslav civil aviation after the Second World War. Cooperation between the two countries developed in several fields. Early attempts to regulate civil air transport by the means of a bilateral agreement were made as early as 1945, but without success. Three agreements on air transport were eventually signed in 1949, 1973 and 1977. Pan American World Airways started overflying Yugoslav territory in 1950 on its international routes between North America and the Middle East and started landing at Belgrade in 1963, thus providing a true connection between the two countries. From 1970, Yugoslav Airlines operated charter flights between Yugoslavia and USA, followed by the introduction of a regular service between Belgrade, Zagreb, and New York in 1976. From 1964 to 1966 and during 1972, another Yugoslav air operator, (Inex) Adria Airways also flew charter flights between Yugoslavia and the United States. Apart from this, most passenger airplanes used in Yugoslavia were made in the United States, while some Yugoslav factories manufactured components for American aircraft producers. Yugoslav airmen and other aviation experts undertook training in America, greatly improving the functioning and safety of Yugoslav civil aviation in general. The disintegration of Socialist Yugoslavia and international sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992 also led to a ban on air traffic between Yugoslavia and the rest of the world. The United States introduced this ban several days before the sanctions came into force, ending all air transport services between the two countries.","PeriodicalId":14520,"journal":{"name":"Istorija 20. veka","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45123907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-01DOI: 10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.mis.457-475
Saša Mišić
After the breakup of relations with the Soviet Union and its satellites in 1948, Yugoslavia began to turn to Western countries, seeking not only formal but also informal ties for connecting with them, especially in the economic field. Italian financier Camillo Castiglioni seemed like a good choice for the role of unofficial mediator, especially because of the contacts he had with US financial circles. During 1949, the Yugoslavs hired him as an informal mediator for negotiations with the Export-Import Bank of the United States, in order to obtain a loan from this banking institution. An agreement was signed with him, in which he was promised an adequate reward for mediation. Since at the same time the official representatives of Yugoslavia and the United States were involved in the loan negotiations, and because of the indignation of the Americans over Castiglioni’s role, Belgrade quickly gave up his services. For his engagement, Castiglioni received compensation from Yugoslavia in the form of money and goods (hemp), which referred only to the costs of mediation, but did not include the promised commission. Taking advantage of the fact that he could not get the promised amount of money from the sale of hemp, Castiglioni initiated a lawsuit against Yugoslavia in an Italian court in 1951 and demanded that he be paid the difference in money, and also the amount of the promised commission. Although the court ruled in his favor that same year, Yugoslavia did not recognize the court’s decision. The next few years passed on the one hand in Castiglioni’s efforts to execute the court verdict and collect the claims, and on the other hand in the attempts of state officials in Belgrade and Rome to find a compromise solution that would satisfy the Yugoslavs. This included offers for a settlement, proposals for arbitration of an international court, and the like. The trial and the execution of the verdict took place at a time when Italy and Yugoslavia were trying to unravel the complicated knot of Trieste, so the Castiglioni case was also influenced by the situation in bilateral relations. Finally, in 1955, Castiglioni managed to collect the requested amount, which was paid off by the Italian state as a part of a broader Yugoslav-Italian agreement on war reparations.
{"title":"SOCIJALISTIČKA JUGOSLAVIJA I KAMILO KASTILJONI","authors":"Saša Mišić","doi":"10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.mis.457-475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.mis.457-475","url":null,"abstract":"After the breakup of relations with the Soviet Union and its satellites in 1948, Yugoslavia began to turn to Western countries, seeking not only formal but also informal ties for connecting with them, especially in the economic field. Italian financier Camillo Castiglioni seemed like a good choice for the role of unofficial mediator, especially because of the contacts he had with US financial circles. During 1949, the Yugoslavs hired him as an informal mediator for negotiations with the Export-Import Bank of the United States, in order to obtain a loan from this banking institution. An agreement was signed with him, in which he was promised an adequate reward for mediation. Since at the same time the official representatives of Yugoslavia and the United States were involved in the loan negotiations, and because of the indignation of the Americans over Castiglioni’s role, Belgrade quickly gave up his services. For his engagement, Castiglioni received compensation from Yugoslavia in the form of money and goods (hemp), which referred only to the costs of mediation, but did not include the promised commission. Taking advantage of the fact that he could not get the promised amount of money from the sale of hemp, Castiglioni initiated a lawsuit against Yugoslavia in an Italian court in 1951 and demanded that he be paid the difference in money, and also the amount of the promised commission. Although the court ruled in his favor that same year, Yugoslavia did not recognize the court’s decision. The next few years passed on the one hand in Castiglioni’s efforts to execute the court verdict and collect the claims, and on the other hand in the attempts of state officials in Belgrade and Rome to find a compromise solution that would satisfy the Yugoslavs. This included offers for a settlement, proposals for arbitration of an international court, and the like. The trial and the execution of the verdict took place at a time when Italy and Yugoslavia were trying to unravel the complicated knot of Trieste, so the Castiglioni case was also influenced by the situation in bilateral relations. Finally, in 1955, Castiglioni managed to collect the requested amount, which was paid off by the Italian state as a part of a broader Yugoslav-Italian agreement on war reparations.","PeriodicalId":14520,"journal":{"name":"Istorija 20. veka","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47711779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-01DOI: 10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.sta.301-322
A. Stamenković
Exploring the context of constructing the Yugoslav national pavilions at international exhibitions in the period between the Two World Wars implies the analysis of the used architectural styles, also certain political ideologies that find their expression in architecture (thus lending it a role of social engagement). The parallel flows of socio-political discourses and architecture also require resolving the following dilemma: was the architect selected based on his or her education, sensibility and experience for a particular project, or forced to conform to the demands of the political authorities. The heritage, status of the nation, the architect, furthermore numerous social, cultural and, above all, political factors influence the variations in the art programs showcased in the pavilions. One such factor – the ideal of cultural connection and political cooperation among the South Slavs, supported by King Alexander Karadjordjević – plays an important role in defining the program and stylistic characteristics of the pavilions because it suggests a specific artistic expression. Attempts to develop this ideal into the ideology of Yugoslavism, that in certain respects sought to establish itself as the national identity, marked the period between 1918 and 1941. Such attempts represented both a prerequisite and a directive in the representative programs of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
{"title":"YUGOSLAV PAVILIONS AT INTERNATIONAL EXHIBITIONS IN ARTISTIC AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE 1918–1941","authors":"A. Stamenković","doi":"10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.sta.301-322","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.sta.301-322","url":null,"abstract":"Exploring the context of constructing the Yugoslav national pavilions at international exhibitions in the period between the Two World Wars implies the analysis of the used architectural styles, also certain political ideologies that find their expression in architecture (thus lending it a role of social engagement). The parallel flows of socio-political discourses and architecture also require resolving the following dilemma: was the architect selected based on his or her education, sensibility and experience for a particular project, or forced to conform to the demands of the political authorities. The heritage, status of the nation, the architect, furthermore numerous social, cultural and, above all, political factors influence the variations in the art programs showcased in the pavilions. One such factor – the ideal of cultural connection and political cooperation among the South Slavs, supported by King Alexander Karadjordjević – plays an important role in defining the program and stylistic characteristics of the pavilions because it suggests a specific artistic expression. Attempts to develop this ideal into the ideology of Yugoslavism, that in certain respects sought to establish itself as the national identity, marked the period between 1918 and 1941. Such attempts represented both a prerequisite and a directive in the representative programs of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Kingdom of Yugoslavia.","PeriodicalId":14520,"journal":{"name":"Istorija 20. veka","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43377874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-01DOI: 10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.oze.495-512
Nikola Ožegović
Banja Luka and 14 other municipalities of Bosnian Krajina (western Bosnia and Herzegovina) were hit by a series of strong earthquakes on October 26 and 27, 1969. The quake area had a population of over 750,000 in 803 settlements. The total estimated damage in the entire area affected by the earthquake amounted to 7,150 million dinars and there were also human losses. Assistance to the affected area came from all over the country and from abroad. Western countries (mostly the USA, Switzerland, Italy and FR Germany) sent money and goods of five times higher value than the socialist countries. The structure of international aid shows that it was almost exclusively conditioned by the prevailing political relations. Until 1974, the question of the amount of financial resources needed for reconstruction caused a political crisis in the relations between the Prime Minister Mitja Ribičič and the leadership of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also within the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where important personnel changes took place. Under pressure from the Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s leadership has agreed to reduce the funds originally earmarked for reconstruction by one-third. This was opposed by old wartime communist cadre. This served the new, young leadership to remove Osman Karabegović, Avdo Humo, Hajro Kapetanović and Čedo Kapor from the political life. These officials opposed the confederalization of Yugoslavia and the strengthening of the statehood of the republics, which was insisted on by the new leadership, led by Branko Mikulić. The greatest intensity of reconstruction was immediately after the earthquake. At the beginning of 1976, the state settled its obligations to Bosnian Krajina.
{"title":"ZEMLJOTRES U BANJALUCI I BOSANSKOJ KRAJINI 1969. GODINE","authors":"Nikola Ožegović","doi":"10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.oze.495-512","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.oze.495-512","url":null,"abstract":"Banja Luka and 14 other municipalities of Bosnian Krajina (western Bosnia and Herzegovina) were hit by a series of strong earthquakes on October 26 and 27, 1969. The quake area had a population of over 750,000 in 803 settlements. The total estimated damage in the entire area affected by the earthquake amounted to 7,150 million dinars and there were also human losses. Assistance to the affected area came from all over the country and from abroad. Western countries (mostly the USA, Switzerland, Italy and FR Germany) sent money and goods of five times higher value than the socialist countries. The structure of international aid shows that it was almost exclusively conditioned by the prevailing political relations. Until 1974, the question of the amount of financial resources needed for reconstruction caused a political crisis in the relations between the Prime Minister Mitja Ribičič and the leadership of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also within the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where important personnel changes took place. Under pressure from the Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s leadership has agreed to reduce the funds originally earmarked for reconstruction by one-third. This was opposed by old wartime communist cadre. This served the new, young leadership to remove Osman Karabegović, Avdo Humo, Hajro Kapetanović and Čedo Kapor from the political life. These officials opposed the confederalization of Yugoslavia and the strengthening of the statehood of the republics, which was insisted on by the new leadership, led by Branko Mikulić. The greatest intensity of reconstruction was immediately after the earthquake. At the beginning of 1976, the state settled its obligations to Bosnian Krajina.","PeriodicalId":14520,"journal":{"name":"Istorija 20. veka","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45120906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-01DOI: 10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.sta.323-344
Nebojša Stambolija
The subject of this article is the Serbian State Guard – an armed formation created in occupied Serbia in early March 1942. It arose out of the need of the occupiers and collaborators for a stronger and more organized unit that would more successfully confront the insurgent forces in the territory of Serbia. The primary objective of our research was the reconstruction of its creation, organization, mode of operation, combat activities, and make-up XXX. Created on the basis of the pre-war gendarmerie, in the specific conditions of wartime chaos in Serbia, it retained its primarily police character, although it formed larger and more mobile military units when needed. Finally, the fate of this formation after its inclusion in the ranks of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland (i.e., the Chetniks of Draža Mihailović) and its going into exile was presented. The source-materials used for this paper are kept mostly in the Military Archive in Belgrade. We have also used documents kept in the Belgrade Historical Archives, the State Archives of Serbia, as well as in the local historical archives in Niš.
{"title":"SERBIAN STATE GUARD IN OCCUPIED SERBIA 1942-1944","authors":"Nebojša Stambolija","doi":"10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.sta.323-344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.sta.323-344","url":null,"abstract":"The subject of this article is the Serbian State Guard – an armed formation created in occupied Serbia in early March 1942. It arose out of the need of the occupiers and collaborators for a stronger and more organized unit that would more successfully confront the insurgent forces in the territory of Serbia. The primary objective of our research was the reconstruction of its creation, organization, mode of operation, combat activities, and make-up XXX. Created on the basis of the pre-war gendarmerie, in the specific conditions of wartime chaos in Serbia, it retained its primarily police character, although it formed larger and more mobile military units when needed. Finally, the fate of this formation after its inclusion in the ranks of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland (i.e., the Chetniks of Draža Mihailović) and its going into exile was presented. The source-materials used for this paper are kept mostly in the Military Archive in Belgrade. We have also used documents kept in the Belgrade Historical Archives, the State Archives of Serbia, as well as in the local historical archives in Niš.","PeriodicalId":14520,"journal":{"name":"Istorija 20. veka","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43758982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-01DOI: 10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.rak.405-422
Aleksandar Rakonjac
This article aims to shed light on how the Yugoslav motor industry in the first post-war years sought to overcome the difficulties of mastering the technology of motor vehicle production on a modern industrial basis. During this period, gigantic efforts were made to get the country out of economic backwardness in the shortest possible time. The motor industry had one of the key roles on the path of modernization of the economy, and the state accordingly paid special attention to the construction of factories in this branch of industry. Reliance on pre-war pioneering moves of truck fabrication based on a license purchased in Czechoslovakia was the main capital with which began the process of emancipation of the domestic motor industry. Due to the impossibility to independently solve the issue of construction of all types of motor vehicles, help was sought abroad. Negotiations with the USSR and Hungary were started first, but even before the severance of all relations caused by the conflict between the Yugoslav and Soviet leadership, this attempt to establish cooperation failed. In the following years, after the failure in the East, the state concentrated all its efforts on establishing strong economic ties with the West. Thanks to favorable foreign policy circumstances, the reorientation of state policy had achieved great economic benefits for the further construction of the motor industry. Licenses for the fabrication of the “Ansaldo TCA/60” tractor were purchased, thus resolving the production of all heavy types of vehicles, as well as the production of oil-powered engines. By the early 1950s, cooperation had been established with several renowned companies from Germany, Italy and Switzerland, which provided opportunities for the Yugoslav engine industry to keep pace with the latest technological solutions. However, despite the transfer of technology that played a dominant role in raising the national car and tractor industry, domestic forces played a significant role in the production of the first air-cooled engine, a light wheeled tractor with a gasoline engine and the “Prvenac” truck. The Yugoslav example has shown that reliance on one’s own strength and international cooperation are two inextricably important factors in overcoming all the difficulties that come with the forced industrialization.
{"title":"IZMEĐU TRANSFERA TEHNOLOGIJA I DOMAĆIH REŠENJA: IZGRADNJA MOTORNE INDUSTRIJE U JUGOSLAVIJI 1945−1952.","authors":"Aleksandar Rakonjac","doi":"10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.rak.405-422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.rak.405-422","url":null,"abstract":"This article aims to shed light on how the Yugoslav motor industry in the first post-war years sought to overcome the difficulties of mastering the technology of motor vehicle production on a modern industrial basis. During this period, gigantic efforts were made to get the country out of economic backwardness in the shortest possible time. The motor industry had one of the key roles on the path of modernization of the economy, and the state accordingly paid special attention to the construction of factories in this branch of industry. Reliance on pre-war pioneering moves of truck fabrication based on a license purchased in Czechoslovakia was the main capital with which began the process of emancipation of the domestic motor industry. Due to the impossibility to independently solve the issue of construction of all types of motor vehicles, help was sought abroad. Negotiations with the USSR and Hungary were started first, but even before the severance of all relations caused by the conflict between the Yugoslav and Soviet leadership, this attempt to establish cooperation failed. In the following years, after the failure in the East, the state concentrated all its efforts on establishing strong economic ties with the West. Thanks to favorable foreign policy circumstances, the reorientation of state policy had achieved great economic benefits for the further construction of the motor industry. Licenses for the fabrication of the “Ansaldo TCA/60” tractor were purchased, thus resolving the production of all heavy types of vehicles, as well as the production of oil-powered engines. By the early 1950s, cooperation had been established with several renowned companies from Germany, Italy and Switzerland, which provided opportunities for the Yugoslav engine industry to keep pace with the latest technological solutions. However, despite the transfer of technology that played a dominant role in raising the national car and tractor industry, domestic forces played a significant role in the production of the first air-cooled engine, a light wheeled tractor with a gasoline engine and the “Prvenac” truck. The Yugoslav example has shown that reliance on one’s own strength and international cooperation are two inextricably important factors in overcoming all the difficulties that come with the forced industrialization.","PeriodicalId":14520,"journal":{"name":"Istorija 20. veka","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41790373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-01DOI: 10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.laz.513-528
Radojica Lazić, Mirko Kulić
The foreign policy orientation of the Former Social Federative Republic of Yugoslavia relied mostly on “third world” countries or the so-called Non-Aligned Movement. In line with the politically proclaimed principles, the cooperation was based on “active peaceful coexistence”, equality, independence, and staying out of inner problems of other countries, as well as mutual respect and solidarity. To strengthen and improve the safety interests and the leadership position within the Non-Aligned Movement, Yugoslavia wholeheartedly supported a variety of liberation movements. As a transit country with an extremely liberal visa regime, it was exposed to potential dangers to be a hideout for certain criminal, terrorist, and other groups. This was more than enough of a reason for trying to establish a “background base” of the “Carlos” terrorist organization in Belgrade. The security issue in the country was more complicated by the fact that in that period, there were around 12,500 different people from various Arab countries (not counting over 2,000 officers and non-commissioned officers trained in military schools) who were mostly students. Those persons belonged to numerous groups and organizations, all with their own conceptual, political and religious beliefs. They acted under different international influences. The security organizations and services had an obligation to carefully track their behavior and take certain measurements against individuals, groups, and organizations, to prevent their secret and illicit activities aimed against the interests of the state. In this sense, it is perfectly understandable that when the activities of the “Carlos” terrorist group were discovered, the problem had to be solved in order not to harm the international position and the credibility of Yugoslavia. The most powerful countries in the West (primarily the USA) have openly resented the benevolent attitude of the Yugoslavia authorities towards members of certain groups and organizations that have used terrorist methods in their acts. One of those cases was Abu el Abas, the senior executive of a fraction of the Palestine Liberation Organization. After unexplained circumstances after a hostage crisis in the Middle East, el Abas found himself in Belgrade.
前南斯拉夫社会联邦共和国的外交政策取向主要依靠“第三世界”国家或所谓的不结盟运动。根据政治上宣布的原则，合作的基础是“积极和平共处”，平等，独立，不干涉别国内部问题，以及相互尊重和团结。为了加强和改善安全利益和在不结盟运动中的领导地位，南斯拉夫全心全意地支持各种解放运动。作为一个签证制度极其宽松的过境国，它面临着成为某些犯罪分子、恐怖分子和其他组织藏身处的潜在危险。这是试图在贝尔格莱德建立“卡洛斯”恐怖主义组织“背景基地”的充分理由。该国的安全问题更为复杂，因为在那个时期，来自各个阿拉伯国家的大约12,500名不同的人(不包括在军事学校受过训练的2,000多名军官和士官)，其中大多数是学生。这些人属于许多团体和组织，他们都有自己的观念、政治和宗教信仰。他们在不同的国际影响下行动。安全组织和部门有义务仔细跟踪他们的行为，并对个人、团体和组织采取一定的措施，防止他们从事危害国家利益的秘密和非法活动。从这个意义上讲，完全可以理解的是，当“卡洛斯”恐怖主义集团的活动被发现时，必须解决这个问题，以免损害南斯拉夫的国际地位和信誉。西方最强大的国家(主要是美国)对南斯拉夫当局对某些团体和组织成员采取的仁慈态度公开表示不满，这些团体和组织在行动中使用恐怖主义方法。阿巴斯(Abu el abbas)就是其中之一，他是巴勒斯坦解放组织(Palestine Liberation Organization)一个分支机构的高级主管。在中东人质危机之后的不明情况下，阿巴斯来到了贝尔格莱德。
{"title":"DELOVANJE TERORISTIČKIH ORGANIZACIJA OSAMDESETIH GODINA 20. VEKA U JUGOSLAVIJI – SA POSEBNIM OSVRTOM NA „KARLOSOVU“ ORGANIZACIJU","authors":"Radojica Lazić, Mirko Kulić","doi":"10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.laz.513-528","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.laz.513-528","url":null,"abstract":"The foreign policy orientation of the Former Social Federative Republic of Yugoslavia relied mostly on “third world” countries or the so-called Non-Aligned Movement. In line with the politically proclaimed principles, the cooperation was based on “active peaceful coexistence”, equality, independence, and staying out of inner problems of other countries, as well as mutual respect and solidarity. To strengthen and improve the safety interests and the leadership position within the Non-Aligned Movement, Yugoslavia wholeheartedly supported a variety of liberation movements. As a transit country with an extremely liberal visa regime, it was exposed to potential dangers to be a hideout for certain criminal, terrorist, and other groups. This was more than enough of a reason for trying to establish a “background base” of the “Carlos” terrorist organization in Belgrade. The security issue in the country was more complicated by the fact that in that period, there were around 12,500 different people from various Arab countries (not counting over 2,000 officers and non-commissioned officers trained in military schools) who were mostly students. Those persons belonged to numerous groups and organizations, all with their own conceptual, political and religious beliefs. They acted under different international influences. The security organizations and services had an obligation to carefully track their behavior and take certain measurements against individuals, groups, and organizations, to prevent their secret and illicit activities aimed against the interests of the state. In this sense, it is perfectly understandable that when the activities of the “Carlos” terrorist group were discovered, the problem had to be solved in order not to harm the international position and the credibility of Yugoslavia. The most powerful countries in the West (primarily the USA) have openly resented the benevolent attitude of the Yugoslavia authorities towards members of certain groups and organizations that have used terrorist methods in their acts. One of those cases was Abu el Abas, the senior executive of a fraction of the Palestine Liberation Organization. After unexplained circumstances after a hostage crisis in the Middle East, el Abas found himself in Belgrade.","PeriodicalId":14520,"journal":{"name":"Istorija 20. veka","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48624269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-01DOI: 10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.ant.277-300
Michael Antolović
This study examines the phenomenon of the so-called ‘Vojvodinian historiography’ which flourished in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina from the late 1960s until the early 1990s as a special kind of party historiography. The paper focuses on the ‘Vojvodinian historiography’s’ institutional framework, theoretical and methodological features and general ideological profile as well as its outcomes. As a result of its close ties with the ruling Communist League of Vojvodina, the political collapse of the Vojvodinian communists marked the disappearance of this extremely ideological kind of historiography.
{"title":"‘ONLY THOSE WHO HAVE SHOWN IN DEED THAT THEY ARE IN FAVOR OF SOCIALIST SELF-GOVERNANCE CAN ENGAGE IN WRITING AND TEACHING OF HISTORY’ – THE RISE AND FALL OF ‘VOJVODINIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY’ (1968-1993)","authors":"Michael Antolović","doi":"10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.ant.277-300","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.ant.277-300","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the phenomenon of the so-called ‘Vojvodinian historiography’ which flourished in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina from the late 1960s until the early 1990s as a special kind of party historiography. The paper focuses on the ‘Vojvodinian historiography’s’ institutional framework, theoretical and methodological features and general ideological profile as well as its outcomes. As a result of its close ties with the ruling Communist League of Vojvodina, the political collapse of the Vojvodinian communists marked the disappearance of this extremely ideological kind of historiography.","PeriodicalId":14520,"journal":{"name":"Istorija 20. veka","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48096863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-01DOI: 10.29362/ist20veka.2022.1.kad.17-38
Sali Kadria
This scientific article aims to reflect some of the aspects of Albanian-Yugoslav relations in the years 1922-1923. During this period, there were two options facing the political leaders in Albania: Orienting their country toward Italy or the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as the two countries that were interested the most on the Albanian issue. Albanian-Yugoslav relations during these years were affected by several factors, such as: the Albanian issue in Kosovo and other ethnic areas located within the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes; the Italo-Yugoslav rivalry in Albania, as well as the orientation of the various Albanian political groups in Albania in relation to its neighboring countries.
{"title":"A VIEW ON ALBANIAN-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS DURING 1922-1923","authors":"Sali Kadria","doi":"10.29362/ist20veka.2022.1.kad.17-38","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2022.1.kad.17-38","url":null,"abstract":"This scientific article aims to reflect some of the aspects of Albanian-Yugoslav relations in the years 1922-1923. During this period, there were two options facing the political leaders in Albania: Orienting their country toward Italy or the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as the two countries that were interested the most on the Albanian issue. Albanian-Yugoslav relations during these years were affected by several factors, such as: the Albanian issue in Kosovo and other ethnic areas located within the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes; the Italo-Yugoslav rivalry in Albania, as well as the orientation of the various Albanian political groups in Albania in relation to its neighboring countries.","PeriodicalId":14520,"journal":{"name":"Istorija 20. veka","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42878780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-01DOI: 10.29362/ist20veka.2022.1.kov.233-251
Danilo Kovač
The aim of this study is to analyze good practice in teaching about the Holocaust, comparing the use of pedagogical resources in Republika Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and England (United Kingdom). The paper compares the use of three types of pedagogical resources used in history classes: fictional films, documentaries, and photographs of Holocaust atrocities. Comparison is drawn between a developing and post-conflict society (Republika Srpska) and the well-established and reputable English educational system. By cross-referencing teachers’ and students’ answers, the paper attempts to identify good practice of notable value to be shared and exchanged. The research method firstly incorporated questionnaires, followed by interviews and then lesson observation. Data revealed that teachers in both education systems do not appear to consider all the educational benefits of film screening. The way teachers from England use pictures of Holocaust atrocities and organization of school trips seem to be applicable to the context of Republika Srpska, as well as being useful for classroom practitioners beyond these two education systems.
{"title":"A CASE STUDY COMPARING GOOD PRACTICE IN THE USE OF PEDAGOGICAL RESOURCES IN HOLOCAUST EDUCATION IN ENGLAND AND REPUBLIKA SRPSKA","authors":"Danilo Kovač","doi":"10.29362/ist20veka.2022.1.kov.233-251","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2022.1.kov.233-251","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this study is to analyze good practice in teaching about the Holocaust, comparing the use of pedagogical resources in Republika Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and England (United Kingdom). The paper compares the use of three types of pedagogical resources used in history classes: fictional films, documentaries, and photographs of Holocaust atrocities. Comparison is drawn between a developing and post-conflict society (Republika Srpska) and the well-established and reputable English educational system. By cross-referencing teachers’ and students’ answers, the paper attempts to identify good practice of notable value to be shared and exchanged. The research method firstly incorporated questionnaires, followed by interviews and then lesson observation. Data revealed that teachers in both education systems do not appear to consider all the educational benefits of film screening. The way teachers from England use pictures of Holocaust atrocities and organization of school trips seem to be applicable to the context of Republika Srpska, as well as being useful for classroom practitioners beyond these two education systems.","PeriodicalId":14520,"journal":{"name":"Istorija 20. veka","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43953660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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