Pub Date : 2022-02-01DOI: 10.29362/ist20veka.2022.1.laj.39-54
Siniša Lajnert
This paper deals with the structure, activity, and liquidation of the Danube-Sava Vicinal Railway Stock Company during the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes/Yugoslavia. The company, founded in 1912, was based in Budapest and constructed the following railway lines: Vukovar-Ilača and Šid-Sremska Rača-Sava. These private railway lines were exploited by the state. The stock company was solvent. After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the company’s headquarters moved from Budapest to Zagreb. Shortly after the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovens/Yugoslavia, the railway lines were exploited by the Directorate of State Railways in Zagreb, but after 1921 they came under the jurisdiction of the Directorate of State Railways in Belgrade. According to the Agreement of February 7, 1931, the state redeemed the railway lines of the abovementioned company and thus the company ceased to exist. The company went into liquidation in 1932 and was shut down on April 12, 1933.
{"title":"THE STRUCTURE, ACTIVITY AND LIQUIDATION OF THE DANUBE-SAVA VICINAL RAILWAY STOCK COMPANY DURING THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES/YUGOSLAVIA","authors":"Siniša Lajnert","doi":"10.29362/ist20veka.2022.1.laj.39-54","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2022.1.laj.39-54","url":null,"abstract":"This paper deals with the structure, activity, and liquidation of the Danube-Sava Vicinal Railway Stock Company during the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes/Yugoslavia. The company, founded in 1912, was based in Budapest and constructed the following railway lines: Vukovar-Ilača and Šid-Sremska Rača-Sava. These private railway lines were exploited by the state. The stock company was solvent. After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the company’s headquarters moved from Budapest to Zagreb. Shortly after the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovens/Yugoslavia, the railway lines were exploited by the Directorate of State Railways in Zagreb, but after 1921 they came under the jurisdiction of the Directorate of State Railways in Belgrade. According to the Agreement of February 7, 1931, the state redeemed the railway lines of the abovementioned company and thus the company ceased to exist. The company went into liquidation in 1932 and was shut down on April 12, 1933.","PeriodicalId":14520,"journal":{"name":"Istorija 20. veka","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43971456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-01DOI: 10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.pet.435-460
Vladimir Petrović
The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia was created in London in August of 1992 as an instrument for the negotiations conducted by the United Nations and the European Community, represented by Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen. Until the end of the year, they developed a detailed proposal to settle the Bosnian conflict, known as the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP). The VOPP was presented to the leaders of the warring factions in Geneva during the first session of talks in January of 1993. On the basis of archive material, judicial records, published documents, and memoirs of the participants, this article aims to reconstruct the dramatic negotiation process, which consisted of several rounds. An analysis of the declared Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian positions during the negotiations, as well as the interactions among the delegations and relations within them, reveals that all the parties were had been deeply engaged in double dealing. The Croatian side was seemingly ready to sign the VOPP but was undermining it by launching a conflict in the field at the same time. The Serbian side was escalating as well, the Bosnian Serb leaders were not ready to accept the plan, despite the suggestions they had received from Belgrade. Sarajevo was procrastinating, hoping for a direct US involvement in the crisis following the inauguration of the new Clinton Administration. That administration did undermine the plan, which damaged the credibility of the international negotiators. In such circumstances, the plan had slim chances of succeeding. Although a ceasefire would have shortened the Bosnian war by almost three years and cut human losses by at least half, the main negotiators found a compromise solution to be unacceptable. As they defined and propagated maximalist goals, acceptance of a compromise was both damaging their grip on power and defying their worldview.
{"title":"NEUSPEH ŽENEVSKIH PREGOVORA O PREKIDU RATA U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI JANUARA 1993.","authors":"Vladimir Petrović","doi":"10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.pet.435-460","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.pet.435-460","url":null,"abstract":"The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia was created in London in August of 1992 as an instrument for the negotiations conducted by the United Nations and the European Community, represented by Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen. Until the end of the year, they developed a detailed proposal to settle the Bosnian conflict, known as the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP). The VOPP was presented to the leaders of the warring factions in Geneva during the first session of talks in January of 1993. On the basis of archive material, judicial records, published documents, and memoirs of the participants, this article aims to reconstruct the dramatic negotiation process, which consisted of several rounds. An analysis of the declared Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian positions during the negotiations, as well as the interactions among the delegations and relations within them, reveals that all the parties were had been deeply engaged in double dealing. The Croatian side was seemingly ready to sign the VOPP but was undermining it by launching a conflict in the field at the same time. The Serbian side was escalating as well, the Bosnian Serb leaders were not ready to accept the plan, despite the suggestions they had received from Belgrade. Sarajevo was procrastinating, hoping for a direct US involvement in the crisis following the inauguration of the new Clinton Administration. That administration did undermine the plan, which damaged the credibility of the international negotiators. In such circumstances, the plan had slim chances of succeeding. Although a ceasefire would have shortened the Bosnian war by almost three years and cut human losses by at least half, the main negotiators found a compromise solution to be unacceptable. As they defined and propagated maximalist goals, acceptance of a compromise was both damaging their grip on power and defying their worldview.","PeriodicalId":14520,"journal":{"name":"Istorija 20. veka","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48849605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-01DOI: 10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.sil.261-278
Aleksandar Aleksandrovič Silkin
U članku se razmatra delatnost Centralnog jugoslovenskog biroa pri Centralnom komitetu Ruske komunističke partije (boljševika) u završnoj fazi Građanskog rata u Rusiji. Prema tvrđenjima sovjetske i jugoslovenske istoriografije socijalističkog perioda, jugoslovenske komunističke organizacije su se 1920–1921. godine uglavnom bavile omogućavanjem povratka u domovinu Jugoslovena koji su učestvovali u Građanskom ratu na strani kako crvenih, tako i belih. Dokumenti korišćeni u članku omogućavaju da se tvrdi da ove organizacije nisu toliko doprinele repatrijaciji sunarodnika, koliko su pokušavale da po svom nahođenju odlučuju ko je od Jugoslovena „proleterski element“ i kao takav može računati na povratak, a ko, poput „svih bivših srpskih i crnogorskih podanika bez izuzetka“, podleže zatvaranju u koncentracioni logor, kako bi kasnije mogli da posluže i kao taoci. U zaključku, autor nudi svoje viđenje razloga za ukidanje ovih organizacija jugoslovenskih komunista.
Učlanku se razmatra delatnost Centralnog jugolovenskog biroa pri Centralnom komitetu Ruske komunitičke partije（boljševika）U završnoj fazi Grařanskog rata U Rusiji。根据苏联和南斯拉夫社会主义时期的历史，南斯拉夫共产主义组织在1920年至1921年间成立。他们主要能够返回南斯拉夫，该国参加了内战，同时站在红白双方一边。文章中使用的文件可以声称，这些组织对遣返盟友没有做出太大贡献，他们试图决定南斯拉夫的“无产者分子”中的哪一个可以追溯多久了，以及谁，像“所有前塞尔维亚和黑山企业一样，无一例外，作者的结论是，他对南斯拉夫共产党人的这些组织被取消的原因提出了自己的看法。
{"title":"DELATNOST CENTRALNOG JUGOSLOVENSKOG BIROA PRI CK RKP(b) U MOSKVI 1920–1921.","authors":"Aleksandar Aleksandrovič Silkin","doi":"10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.sil.261-278","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.sil.261-278","url":null,"abstract":"U članku se razmatra delatnost Centralnog jugoslovenskog biroa pri Centralnom komitetu Ruske komunističke partije (boljševika) u završnoj fazi Građanskog rata u Rusiji. Prema tvrđenjima sovjetske i jugoslovenske istoriografije socijalističkog perioda, jugoslovenske komunističke organizacije su se 1920–1921. godine uglavnom bavile omogućavanjem povratka u domovinu Jugoslovena koji su učestvovali u Građanskom ratu na strani kako crvenih, tako i belih. Dokumenti korišćeni u članku omogućavaju da se tvrdi da ove organizacije nisu toliko doprinele repatrijaciji sunarodnika, koliko su pokušavale da po svom nahođenju odlučuju ko je od Jugoslovena „proleterski element“ i kao takav može računati na povratak, a ko, poput „svih bivših srpskih i crnogorskih podanika bez izuzetka“, podleže zatvaranju u koncentracioni logor, kako bi kasnije mogli da posluže i kao taoci. U zaključku, autor nudi svoje viđenje razloga za ukidanje ovih organizacija jugoslovenskih komunista.","PeriodicalId":14520,"journal":{"name":"Istorija 20. veka","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41789065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-01DOI: 10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.vel.279-294
Dalibor Velojić
The formation of engineer units in the Royal Yugoslav Army during the 1920s and 1930s developed in two phases. The first was its engagement within the army divisions and in the second phase was the establishment of a unique engineering command, including pioneer, pontoon, and military traffic commands. Considering their different specialized activities, planned complex training demanded certain financial resources as well as an adequately qualified command staff. The lack of engineering officers and non-commissioned officers was one of the reasons why the recruits did not have regular lectures. Also, whole units were often sent out of their garrisons, especially for the purpose of strengthening the country’s borders, which posed a serious problem, which was not solved during the entire interwar period. Another problem was a small number of recruits, which is why they had to be taken over from other military units, plus the fact that they were mostly technically inexperienced and frequently even illiterate. In addition, modern equipment was scarce, all of which made good quality training impossible.
{"title":"INŽINJERIJSKE JEDINICE U VOJSCI KRALJEVINE SHS/JUGOSLAVIJE 1918–1941.","authors":"Dalibor Velojić","doi":"10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.vel.279-294","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.vel.279-294","url":null,"abstract":"The formation of engineer units in the Royal Yugoslav Army during the 1920s and 1930s developed in two phases. The first was its engagement within the army divisions and in the second phase was the establishment of a unique engineering command, including pioneer, pontoon, and military traffic commands. Considering their different specialized activities, planned complex training demanded certain financial resources as well as an adequately qualified command staff. The lack of engineering officers and non-commissioned officers was one of the reasons why the recruits did not have regular lectures. Also, whole units were often sent out of their garrisons, especially for the purpose of strengthening the country’s borders, which posed a serious problem, which was not solved during the entire interwar period. Another problem was a small number of recruits, which is why they had to be taken over from other military units, plus the fact that they were mostly technically inexperienced and frequently even illiterate. In addition, modern equipment was scarce, all of which made good quality training impossible.","PeriodicalId":14520,"journal":{"name":"Istorija 20. veka","volume":"734 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41283298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-01DOI: 10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.vuk.375-396
Igor Vukadinović
Major changes in the position of Kosovo and Metohija’s autonomy in the late 1960s affected the province’s relations with Albania. In 1967, the Yugoslav State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs and the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council began to encourage cultural and economic ties between Kosovo and Metohija and Albania, justifying this as a strategy for the normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and Albania. Following the joint commemorations of the anniversary of Skanderbeg’s death in Priština and Tirana, an agreement was reached on the use of textbooks from Albania in the Kosovo and Metohija school system. The two sides organized mutual visits of folklore and art groups, as well as friendly matches of soccer teams. Kosovo companies were allowed small border traffic with Albania without any prior interstate agreements between Belgrade and Tirana. Constitutional changes in Serbia in 1969 enabled the expansion of economic and cultural cooperation between Kosovo and Albania. The University of Priština and the University of Tirana signed an agreement to hire professors from Tirana as lecturers at Priština faculties. In 1971, scientists from Tirana participated in the work of the Kosovo Archives, the Provincial Library, and the Priština Museum, while 41 Albanian professors gave lectures at the University of Priština. Reports by Albanian lecturers from Kosovo enabled the Albanian state leadership to be acquainted in detail with the political situation in Yugoslavia.
{"title":"KULTURNO I EKONOMSKO POVEZIVANJE ALBANIJE I KOSOVA I METOHIJE 1967–1971.","authors":"Igor Vukadinović","doi":"10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.vuk.375-396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.vuk.375-396","url":null,"abstract":"Major changes in the position of Kosovo and Metohija’s autonomy in the late 1960s affected the province’s relations with Albania. In 1967, the Yugoslav State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs and the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council began to encourage cultural and economic ties between Kosovo and Metohija and Albania, justifying this as a strategy for the normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and Albania. Following the joint commemorations of the anniversary of Skanderbeg’s death in Priština and Tirana, an agreement was reached on the use of textbooks from Albania in the Kosovo and Metohija school system. The two sides organized mutual visits of folklore and art groups, as well as friendly matches of soccer teams. Kosovo companies were allowed small border traffic with Albania without any prior interstate agreements between Belgrade and Tirana. Constitutional changes in Serbia in 1969 enabled the expansion of economic and cultural cooperation between Kosovo and Albania. The University of Priština and the University of Tirana signed an agreement to hire professors from Tirana as lecturers at Priština faculties. In 1971, scientists from Tirana participated in the work of the Kosovo Archives, the Provincial Library, and the Priština Museum, while 41 Albanian professors gave lectures at the University of Priština. Reports by Albanian lecturers from Kosovo enabled the Albanian state leadership to be acquainted in detail with the political situation in Yugoslavia.","PeriodicalId":14520,"journal":{"name":"Istorija 20. veka","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45017200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-01DOI: 10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.sel.415-434
Slobodan Selinić
Serbia’s political status after the death of Josip Broz was determined by two kinds of efforts by the state. Firstly, the Serbian leaders aimed to change its unequal status in federal Yugoslavia. Secondly, they aimed to stop fragmentation within Serbia, which grew steadily after the 1974 Constitution. Political relations between Serbian leaders on the one hand, and some political circles and leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the autonomous provinces on the other, were strained. They worsened even more after several clashes in 1983. Despite the opposition of politicians in Bosnia, Croatia, and Vojvodina to Dragoslav Marković (who was described as a strong advocate of Serbian political unity), he was elected as chairman of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (CK SKJ) in 1983. Serbo-Croatian relationships were further damaged after the publication of the book Enigma Kopinič in Belgrade. The Croatian leaders were against this publication because it revealed – as far as the Party was concerned – undesirable information about the interwar years and the period during World War II. The major confrontation came over the interpretation of events that occurred at the funeral of Aleksandar Ranković (mainly over who was responsible for the mass gathering and the respectful attitude toward the deceased). Federal party units, as well as those from the Yugoslav republics and from Belgrade, jointly condemned those events as a political rally against the government. However, they disagreed over who was responsible for the incident and what had caused the public outcry. The CK SKJ chairmanship members from the autonomous provinces, Croatia, and Bosnia accused Serbia and the Serbian Communist Party for the display of nationalism. They also held the Belgrade City Party Committee responsible for letting the rally happen. Contrary to this, the Belgrade City Committee led by Ivan Stambolić, whom the Serbian leadership supported, felt that the uproar was caused by the overall political, economic, and social crisis, for which the Federal government was to blame.
Josip Broz去世后，塞尔维亚的政治地位是由国家的两种努力决定的。首先，塞尔维亚领导人旨在改变其在南斯拉夫联邦的不平等地位。其次，他们旨在阻止塞尔维亚内部的分裂，1974年《宪法》颁布后，这种分裂稳步发展。塞尔维亚领导人与波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那、克罗地亚和自治省的一些政界和领导人之间的政治关系紧张。在1983年的几次冲突之后，情况更加恶化。尽管波斯尼亚、克罗地亚和伏伊伏丁那的政治家反对德拉戈斯拉夫·马科维奇（被描述为塞尔维亚政治团结的坚定倡导者），他还是在1983年当选为南斯拉夫共产党联盟（CK SKJ）中央委员会主席。塞尔维亚和克罗地亚的关系在贝尔格莱德出版《科皮尼奇之谜》一书后进一步受损。克罗地亚领导人反对这份出版物，因为它揭示了——就该党而言——关于两次世界大战期间和二战期间的不良信息。主要的对抗来自对Aleksandar Ranković葬礼上发生的事件的解释（主要是关于谁应对大规模集会负责以及对死者的尊重态度）。联邦政党以及南斯拉夫各共和国和贝尔格莱德的政党联合谴责这些事件是反对政府的政治集会。然而，他们对谁应对这起事件负责以及是什么引起了公众的强烈抗议意见不一。来自自治省、克罗地亚和波斯尼亚的CK SKJ主席指责塞尔维亚和塞尔维亚共产党表现出民族主义。他们还要求贝尔格莱德市委为集会的举行负责。与此相反，塞尔维亚领导层支持的伊万·斯塔姆博利奇领导的贝尔格莱德市委员会认为，骚乱是由整体政治、经济和社会危机引起的，而联邦政府对此负有责任。
{"title":"SRBIJA I POLITIČKI ODNOSI U JUGOSLAVIJI U VREME SAHRANE ALEKSANDRA RANKOVIĆA 1983: TAČKE SUKOBA","authors":"Slobodan Selinić","doi":"10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.sel.415-434","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.sel.415-434","url":null,"abstract":"Serbia’s political status after the death of Josip Broz was determined by two kinds of efforts by the state. Firstly, the Serbian leaders aimed to change its unequal status in federal Yugoslavia. Secondly, they aimed to stop fragmentation within Serbia, which grew steadily after the 1974 Constitution. Political relations between Serbian leaders on the one hand, and some political circles and leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the autonomous provinces on the other, were strained. They worsened even more after several clashes in 1983. Despite the opposition of politicians in Bosnia, Croatia, and Vojvodina to Dragoslav Marković (who was described as a strong advocate of Serbian political unity), he was elected as chairman of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (CK SKJ) in 1983. Serbo-Croatian relationships were further damaged after the publication of the book Enigma Kopinič in Belgrade. The Croatian leaders were against this publication because it revealed – as far as the Party was concerned – undesirable information about the interwar years and the period during World War II. The major confrontation came over the interpretation of events that occurred at the funeral of Aleksandar Ranković (mainly over who was responsible for the mass gathering and the respectful attitude toward the deceased). Federal party units, as well as those from the Yugoslav republics and from Belgrade, jointly condemned those events as a political rally against the government. However, they disagreed over who was responsible for the incident and what had caused the public outcry. The CK SKJ chairmanship members from the autonomous provinces, Croatia, and Bosnia accused Serbia and the Serbian Communist Party for the display of nationalism. They also held the Belgrade City Party Committee responsible for letting the rally happen. Contrary to this, the Belgrade City Committee led by Ivan Stambolić, whom the Serbian leadership supported, felt that the uproar was caused by the overall political, economic, and social crisis, for which the Federal government was to blame.","PeriodicalId":14520,"journal":{"name":"Istorija 20. veka","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48586748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-01DOI: 10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.cav.353-374
Jovan Čavoški
This article is dedicated to the first crisis period in the history of global non-alignment, when in the latter half of the 1960s, a time when a number of leading non-aligned leaders had finally left the historical scene, mostly under the pressure of army coups or war defeats, there were no summits or other multilateral non-aligned meetings being held, with the first significant gatherings taking place only at the very end of this period, thus opening a historical stage marked by a paralysis of action on behalf of many countries adhering to this foreign policy course. These were also years when global non-alignment was facing a mounting challenge of becoming increasingly irrelevant in world affairs, since none of the great powers seriously took into consideration their opinion, while the number of crisis situations all around the non-aligned world had been steadily on the rise. This evident lack of capability of leading non-aligned countries to act in a coordinated and timely fashion proved to many worldwide observers that global non-alignment had finally reached its limit and could not be resuscitated again to exercise a proactive and dynamic role in international politics as had been the case in the early 1960s. Facing such a complex situation, often bordering on desperate, while being especially well aware that without this global non-aligned framework Yugoslavia was facing isolation and serious political constraints in Europe, Tito and other Yugoslav officials decided to undertake a number of diplomatic initiatives to re-galvanize the non-aligned group, tighten the ranks between some of the leading non-aligned countries, with the aim of reinventing the meaning and role of non-alignment in world politics, while setting up a more permanent mechanism for cooperation that could transform all non-bloc factors into a more relevant and widespread international movement ready to set off a constructive dialogue with the great powers over the major international issues of security and development. In spite of many ups and downs in these endeavors, as this article scrupulously analyzed them, eventually Yugoslavia did manage to reignite the spirit of cooperation and collective action among the various non-aligned countries, which finally led to the formal establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement at the Third Summit in Lusaka in September 1970.
{"title":"U POTRAZI ZA NOVIM SMISLOM: JUGOSLAVIJA I KRIZA GLOBALNE NESVRSTANOSTI 1965–1970.","authors":"Jovan Čavoški","doi":"10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.cav.353-374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.cav.353-374","url":null,"abstract":"This article is dedicated to the first crisis period in the history of global non-alignment, when in the latter half of the 1960s, a time when a number of leading non-aligned leaders had finally left the historical scene, mostly under the pressure of army coups or war defeats, there were no summits or other multilateral non-aligned meetings being held, with the first significant gatherings taking place only at the very end of this period, thus opening a historical stage marked by a paralysis of action on behalf of many countries adhering to this foreign policy course. These were also years when global non-alignment was facing a mounting challenge of becoming increasingly irrelevant in world affairs, since none of the great powers seriously took into consideration their opinion, while the number of crisis situations all around the non-aligned world had been steadily on the rise. This evident lack of capability of leading non-aligned countries to act in a coordinated and timely fashion proved to many worldwide observers that global non-alignment had finally reached its limit and could not be resuscitated again to exercise a proactive and dynamic role in international politics as had been the case in the early 1960s. Facing such a complex situation, often bordering on desperate, while being especially well aware that without this global non-aligned framework Yugoslavia was facing isolation and serious political constraints in Europe, Tito and other Yugoslav officials decided to undertake a number of diplomatic initiatives to re-galvanize the non-aligned group, tighten the ranks between some of the leading non-aligned countries, with the aim of reinventing the meaning and role of non-alignment in world politics, while setting up a more permanent mechanism for cooperation that could transform all non-bloc factors into a more relevant and widespread international movement ready to set off a constructive dialogue with the great powers over the major international issues of security and development. In spite of many ups and downs in these endeavors, as this article scrupulously analyzed them, eventually Yugoslavia did manage to reignite the spirit of cooperation and collective action among the various non-aligned countries, which finally led to the formal establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement at the Third Summit in Lusaka in September 1970.","PeriodicalId":14520,"journal":{"name":"Istorija 20. veka","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44692897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-01DOI: 10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.dim.333-352
Natalija Dimić
After repatriations were officially over in January of 1949, around 1,400 German prisoners remained in Yugoslavia on charges of war crimes. Yugoslavia’s foreign political shift westward following the Cominform Resolution of 1948, paved the way for establishing productive economic, as well as political and cultural cooperation with West Germany. The first trade agreement between the two states was signed in December of 1949. In the next four months, the West German Government attempted to pressure the Yugoslav side to release the remaining German prisoners by not ratifying the agreement. Eventually, in April of 1950, the two sides reached an unofficial agreement, according to which the Yugoslav side would release its prisoners gradually and improve their living conditions, while the West Germans would ratify the trade agreement and agree to negotiate long-term economic cooperation. The last transport of German prisoners arrived from Yugoslavia in March of 1953.
{"title":"CONNECTING TRADE AND POLITICS: NEGOTIATIONS ON THE RELEASE OF THE GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE FIRST WEST GERMAN-YUGOSLAV TRADE AGREEMENT OF 1949/1950","authors":"Natalija Dimić","doi":"10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.dim.333-352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.dim.333-352","url":null,"abstract":"After repatriations were officially over in January of 1949, around 1,400 German prisoners remained in Yugoslavia on charges of war crimes. Yugoslavia’s foreign political shift westward following the Cominform Resolution of 1948, paved the way for establishing productive economic, as well as political and cultural cooperation with West Germany. The first trade agreement between the two states was signed in December of 1949. In the next four months, the West German Government attempted to pressure the Yugoslav side to release the remaining German prisoners by not ratifying the agreement. Eventually, in April of 1950, the two sides reached an unofficial agreement, according to which the Yugoslav side would release its prisoners gradually and improve their living conditions, while the West Germans would ratify the trade agreement and agree to negotiate long-term economic cooperation. The last transport of German prisoners arrived from Yugoslavia in March of 1953.","PeriodicalId":14520,"journal":{"name":"Istorija 20. veka","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41741966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-01DOI: 10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.mar.461-478
Predrag Marković, Luka Filipović
Quantifying citations as a measure of academic achievement has been a disputed tool, not only within the Serbian academic community. Nature Magazine published “The Leiden Manifesto”, advocating harmonization between quantitative and qualitative criteria. As a contribution to such efforts, this paper examines the production of the researchers of the Institute for Contemporary History in Belgrade. The Institute has been chosen as the most productive institution in Serbia in terms of the number of publications. Proportionally to the number of published works in a certain language, the most frequently quoted papers have been written in German, then in French. The reason for that is the particular interest of some big academic communities for certain issues. For example, the German academic community’s curiosity for socialism derives from its interest in the German Democratic Republic, its history and its society. Papers dealing with foreign workers also address some German internal issues. Publications in French have been more often quoted if they addressed World War I topics. And last but not least, works on the Yugoslav wars of the 1990’s reflects the political and academic interest of the international community. Thus, the most quoted works often respond to the requirements of some foreign factors, such as the international community or some big national academic circles (German and French). These papers sometimes fail to address certain local educational and cultural needs. It is important to combine broader regional and international interests with internal cultural needs. Therefore, more papers should be written in foreign languages, especially in English, which is the primary language of international academic exchange.
{"title":"KVANTIFIKACIJA REZULTATA U DRUŠTVENIM I HUMANISTIČKIM NAUKAMA – CITIRANOST KAO MERILO ISTORIOGRAFSKOG DOSTIGNUĆA U SLUČAJU INSTITUTA ZA SAVREMENU ISTORIJU","authors":"Predrag Marković, Luka Filipović","doi":"10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.mar.461-478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.mar.461-478","url":null,"abstract":"Quantifying citations as a measure of academic achievement has been a disputed tool, not only within the Serbian academic community. Nature Magazine published “The Leiden Manifesto”, advocating harmonization between quantitative and qualitative criteria. As a contribution to such efforts, this paper examines the production of the researchers of the Institute for Contemporary History in Belgrade. The Institute has been chosen as the most productive institution in Serbia in terms of the number of publications. Proportionally to the number of published works in a certain language, the most frequently quoted papers have been written in German, then in French. The reason for that is the particular interest of some big academic communities for certain issues. For example, the German academic community’s curiosity for socialism derives from its interest in the German Democratic Republic, its history and its society. Papers dealing with foreign workers also address some German internal issues. Publications in French have been more often quoted if they addressed World War I topics. And last but not least, works on the Yugoslav wars of the 1990’s reflects the political and academic interest of the international community. Thus, the most quoted works often respond to the requirements of some foreign factors, such as the international community or some big national academic circles (German and French). These papers sometimes fail to address certain local educational and cultural needs. It is important to combine broader regional and international interests with internal cultural needs. Therefore, more papers should be written in foreign languages, especially in English, which is the primary language of international academic exchange.","PeriodicalId":14520,"journal":{"name":"Istorija 20. veka","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45313361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-01DOI: 10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.mih.479-500
J. Mihaljević, Goran Miljan
This paper is a response to the article “What Typological Appellation is Suitable for Tito’s Yugoslavia” published by Sergej Flere and Rudi Klanjšek in Istorija 20. veka, in which the two authors responded to our criticism of their previously published article. Unfortunately, the two authors saw our paper as an attack, either on them personally or on their academic merits and research, which was neither the aim nor desire of our response. In this article, we contest and dispute the arguments and claims made by Flere and Klanjšek, and especially their attempt to discredit us by actually fabricating our words. Instead of engaging in an open academic debate, Flere and Klanjšek attempt to derail this debate from its core by focusing solely on some minor mistakes, thus trying to show that we were superficial and counter-factual. Our decision to reflect on some of their statements served the purpose of demonstrating that Flere and Klanjšek’s response was far from an expected academic debate. In fact, in their response Flere and Klanjšek avoided addressing the crucial issues pertaining to the question of totalitarianism and the occurring dynamics of the Yugoslav communists’ idea on how to structure, rule, and supervise Yugoslav society. On the contrary, they decided to resolve this issue by introducing new views on the subject and new “solutions,” which deliver little substance to the key issues of this debate. However, our article reveals that the majority of their arguments is questionable or can be outright refuted by taking into consideration contemporary views on totalitarianism and the existing empirical data. This is evident with regard to the questions of historical dynamism, secret services, unified foreign policy, the role and position of the individual, Tito’s role and power, and Flere and Klanjšek’s distorted view of communist legitimacy. In our conclusion we point to the key aspects that need to be taken into consideration when discussing the nature of Tito’s Yugoslavia. Namely: (i) citizens were unable to cast their votes in free elections and were thus denied the opportunity to have any impact on the political, social, or economic politics that influenced their lives; (ii) the only “legitimate” way to exert individual influence in the political, social or economic area was to conform to and accept the prevalent idea of the communist interpretation of Marxism, the communist worldview, and the political power of the communist party; (iii) any attempt to openly oppose and/or criticize the regime was met with repercussions and punishment; (iv) any such activities were suppressed by the state apparatus on the republic and federal levels; (v) every individual or group active within the political structures was aware of Tito’s power to remove whomever he and his closest associates deemed “dangerous” or “destructive” elements; (vi) the communist leadership in the federal republics was faced with forceful removal and suppression when their policie
{"title":"“HUMANIST” MARXISM AND THE COMMUNIST REGIME WITH “SPARKLES” OF TOTALITARIANISM: THE YUGOSLAV COMMUNIST TOTALITARIAN EXPERIMENT (RESPONSE TO FLERE AND KLANJŠEK)","authors":"J. Mihaljević, Goran Miljan","doi":"10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.mih.479-500","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.mih.479-500","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is a response to the article “What Typological Appellation is Suitable for Tito’s Yugoslavia” published by Sergej Flere and Rudi Klanjšek in Istorija 20. veka, in which the two authors responded to our criticism of their previously published article. Unfortunately, the two authors saw our paper as an attack, either on them personally or on their academic merits and research, which was neither the aim nor desire of our response. In this article, we contest and dispute the arguments and claims made by Flere and Klanjšek, and especially their attempt to discredit us by actually fabricating our words. Instead of engaging in an open academic debate, Flere and Klanjšek attempt to derail this debate from its core by focusing solely on some minor mistakes, thus trying to show that we were superficial and counter-factual. Our decision to reflect on some of their statements served the purpose of demonstrating that Flere and Klanjšek’s response was far from an expected academic debate. In fact, in their response Flere and Klanjšek avoided addressing the crucial issues pertaining to the question of totalitarianism and the occurring dynamics of the Yugoslav communists’ idea on how to structure, rule, and supervise Yugoslav society. On the contrary, they decided to resolve this issue by introducing new views on the subject and new “solutions,” which deliver little substance to the key issues of this debate. However, our article reveals that the majority of their arguments is questionable or can be outright refuted by taking into consideration contemporary views on totalitarianism and the existing empirical data. This is evident with regard to the questions of historical dynamism, secret services, unified foreign policy, the role and position of the individual, Tito’s role and power, and Flere and Klanjšek’s distorted view of communist legitimacy. In our conclusion we point to the key aspects that need to be taken into consideration when discussing the nature of Tito’s Yugoslavia. Namely: (i) citizens were unable to cast their votes in free elections and were thus denied the opportunity to have any impact on the political, social, or economic politics that influenced their lives; (ii) the only “legitimate” way to exert individual influence in the political, social or economic area was to conform to and accept the prevalent idea of the communist interpretation of Marxism, the communist worldview, and the political power of the communist party; (iii) any attempt to openly oppose and/or criticize the regime was met with repercussions and punishment; (iv) any such activities were suppressed by the state apparatus on the republic and federal levels; (v) every individual or group active within the political structures was aware of Tito’s power to remove whomever he and his closest associates deemed “dangerous” or “destructive” elements; (vi) the communist leadership in the federal republics was faced with forceful removal and suppression when their policie","PeriodicalId":14520,"journal":{"name":"Istorija 20. veka","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45712889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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