Pub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1163/21967415-BJA10025
E. Rousseau, Thierry Braspenning-Balzacq
On various occasions, states have condemned other nations or groups for mass atrocities they commit; but this rarely leads to any step to redress the untoward situation. This article therefore asks: What functions does blame serve when the blamers lack – or are reluctant to use – the power or authority to punish transgressors? Unlike approaches that focus on the effects of blaming on the wrongdoer, we argue that openly attributing responsibility for wrongdoings to another state or non-state actor has become a normative strategy to shape the way a government is perceived domestically and abroad. Specifically, international blame serves two main objectives: an immediate, communicative function, that is, to express moral protest, and a future-oriented purpose, that is, to dispel future indictment of complicity. We suggest that a corollary of this normative strategy is to make non-intervention morally acceptable. Thus, while in principle the blamer might stand up for the violated norm and value the victims, the strategic use of blame tends to legitimate inaction, by diverting attention away from blaming’s deontic commitments. The article therefore warns against the instrumental use of blame as an act of supererogation (that is, an act that is not compulsory but whose performance is praiseworthy), and as a form of moral clearance (whereby the blamer acknowledges the issue but leaves responsibility for finding solution to the international society). Rather, while blaming ascribes responsibility for the act to an agent, we argue, it also puts the blamer in a specific moral situation: the necessity to take measures that interrupt the unfolding action. Our analysis leads us to put forward a plausible norm that broadens the scope of complicity in international politics: states become complicit in the wrongdoing of other actors (states or non-states) whenever they violate moral obligations that blaming demands. In other words, to blame is to commit oneself to act, though the exact nature of this action varies.
{"title":"Blame and Complicity in International Relations: Making Non-intervention Morally Bearable","authors":"E. Rousseau, Thierry Braspenning-Balzacq","doi":"10.1163/21967415-BJA10025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/21967415-BJA10025","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000On various occasions, states have condemned other nations or groups for mass atrocities they commit; but this rarely leads to any step to redress the untoward situation. This article therefore asks: What functions does blame serve when the blamers lack – or are reluctant to use – the power or authority to punish transgressors? Unlike approaches that focus on the effects of blaming on the wrongdoer, we argue that openly attributing responsibility for wrongdoings to another state or non-state actor has become a normative strategy to shape the way a government is perceived domestically and abroad. Specifically, international blame serves two main objectives: an immediate, communicative function, that is, to express moral protest, and a future-oriented purpose, that is, to dispel future indictment of complicity. We suggest that a corollary of this normative strategy is to make non-intervention morally acceptable. Thus, while in principle the blamer might stand up for the violated norm and value the victims, the strategic use of blame tends to legitimate inaction, by diverting attention away from blaming’s deontic commitments. The article therefore warns against the instrumental use of blame as an act of supererogation (that is, an act that is not compulsory but whose performance is praiseworthy), and as a form of moral clearance (whereby the blamer acknowledges the issue but leaves responsibility for finding solution to the international society). Rather, while blaming ascribes responsibility for the act to an agent, we argue, it also puts the blamer in a specific moral situation: the necessity to take measures that interrupt the unfolding action. Our analysis leads us to put forward a plausible norm that broadens the scope of complicity in international politics: states become complicit in the wrongdoing of other actors (states or non-states) whenever they violate moral obligations that blaming demands. In other words, to blame is to commit oneself to act, though the exact nature of this action varies.","PeriodicalId":145597,"journal":{"name":"European Review of International Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116492708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1163/21967415-BJA10027
Ariel Colonomos, Richard Beardsworth
This special issue argues in favor of a new approach to the study of norms of warfare, which combines a normative analysis of ethical problems arising in war with an explanatory analysis of the use of force. Norms of warfare go as far back as Antiquity, and their study has followed a long historical path. In recent years, the ethics of war, mostly grounded in philosophy, has considerably expanded as a field. Notwithstanding such efforts to refine our normative knowledge of what should be just norms for the use of force, we argue that a more interdisciplinary approach is required to orient the study of the laws of war. In this Special Issue, proposals are made that, along with normative analysis, bring to the discussion not only disciplines such as political science and international relations, but also social theory, psychology and the neurosciences. We argue from a non-ideal perspective, that in order for norms to be just, they need to be ‘plausible’ for those who should abide by them. They also need to make sense in the context of democratic societies that favor a pluralistic debate on justice and ethics. Epistemically, we argue that, in order to understand if norms are plausible and just, reducing the gap between the normative and the empirical is required.
{"title":"Introduction – Plausible, Norms of Warfare: Reducing the Gap Between the Normative and the Empirical","authors":"Ariel Colonomos, Richard Beardsworth","doi":"10.1163/21967415-BJA10027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/21967415-BJA10027","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This special issue argues in favor of a new approach to the study of norms of warfare, which combines a normative analysis of ethical problems arising in war with an explanatory analysis of the use of force. Norms of warfare go as far back as Antiquity, and their study has followed a long historical path. In recent years, the ethics of war, mostly grounded in philosophy, has considerably expanded as a field. Notwithstanding such efforts to refine our normative knowledge of what should be just norms for the use of force, we argue that a more interdisciplinary approach is required to orient the study of the laws of war. In this Special Issue, proposals are made that, along with normative analysis, bring to the discussion not only disciplines such as political science and international relations, but also social theory, psychology and the neurosciences. We argue from a non-ideal perspective, that in order for norms to be just, they need to be ‘plausible’ for those who should abide by them. They also need to make sense in the context of democratic societies that favor a pluralistic debate on justice and ethics. Epistemically, we argue that, in order to understand if norms are plausible and just, reducing the gap between the normative and the empirical is required.","PeriodicalId":145597,"journal":{"name":"European Review of International Studies","volume":"482 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127567179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1163/21967415-BJA10028
Renaud-Philippe Garner
This article argues that Fabre’s cosmopolitan war is implausible because it ignores the psychological realities of war. Building on J.L. Mackie’s notion of an ‘ethics of fantasy’ – a morality reduced to lip-service and incapable of action-guiding – I argue that a view based on a flawed view of either human agency or the context in which it is exercised is doomed to practical irrelevance. In rejecting patriotism and advancing a highly individualistic view of war, Fabre relies upon a highly flawed view of human agency, ignoring the psychological mechanism of depersonalisation essential to large-scale cooperation and the practice of war. In Part i, I offer an initial account of what an ‘ethics of fantasy’ is and offer one major reason why certain moralities fail as practical guidance. In Part ii, I contrast Fabre’s moral cosmopolitanism with ancient cosmopolitanism; I focus on her rejection of patriotism and other identity-based forms of partiality. In Part iii, I summarise key findings, mostly in social psychology, on how large-scale social cooperation is achieved. I highlight the central role of depersonalisation and its felicity conditions. In Part iv, I argue that Fabre’s view faces a dilemma. Either her cosmopolitanism is compatible with identity-based partiality, or it is not. If not, then she does not even have a view of war given that large-scale cooperation requires it. If her view is compatible, then she needs a functional replacement for patriotism. I conclude by showing that the alternatives fail to satisfy the felicity conditions of depersonalisation which war requires.
{"title":"Why cosmopolitan war is an ethics of fantasy?","authors":"Renaud-Philippe Garner","doi":"10.1163/21967415-BJA10028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/21967415-BJA10028","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This article argues that Fabre’s cosmopolitan war is implausible because it ignores the psychological realities of war. Building on J.L. Mackie’s notion of an ‘ethics of fantasy’ – a morality reduced to lip-service and incapable of action-guiding – I argue that a view based on a flawed view of either human agency or the context in which it is exercised is doomed to practical irrelevance. In rejecting patriotism and advancing a highly individualistic view of war, Fabre relies upon a highly flawed view of human agency, ignoring the psychological mechanism of depersonalisation essential to large-scale cooperation and the practice of war.\u0000In Part i, I offer an initial account of what an ‘ethics of fantasy’ is and offer one major reason why certain moralities fail as practical guidance. In Part ii, I contrast Fabre’s moral cosmopolitanism with ancient cosmopolitanism; I focus on her rejection of patriotism and other identity-based forms of partiality. In Part iii, I summarise key findings, mostly in social psychology, on how large-scale social cooperation is achieved. I highlight the central role of depersonalisation and its felicity conditions. In Part iv, I argue that Fabre’s view faces a dilemma. Either her cosmopolitanism is compatible with identity-based partiality, or it is not. If not, then she does not even have a view of war given that large-scale cooperation requires it. If her view is compatible, then she needs a functional replacement for patriotism. I conclude by showing that the alternatives fail to satisfy the felicity conditions of depersonalisation which war requires.","PeriodicalId":145597,"journal":{"name":"European Review of International Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114636306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1163/21967415-BJA10026
Pablo Kalmanovitz
Over the past 25 years, criminal prosecutions for war crimes have become a central element in the long-standing project of governing hostilities in international law. According to many, the threat of criminal prosecutions can be a general deterrent against violations of the laws of war, and can contribute more broadly to the diffusion and domestic appropriation of humanitarian norms. This article discusses some unintended effects of this “anti-impunity turn” in the laws of war in the context of non-international armed conflicts. Specifically, it examines the consequences of the fact that states typically have a monopoly over the means of legitimate criminal investigation for alleged crimes committed in their territory. Far from operating on a level playing field, criminal investigations in war contexts must be undertaken under institutional conditions that tend to favor state agents over non-state opposition groups. The article spells out some implications of this form of state bias and argues that it can contribute to exacerbate conflict and prolong violence in war.
{"title":"From Reprisals to Criminal Accountability: State Bias and the Prospects of Limiting War Through Law","authors":"Pablo Kalmanovitz","doi":"10.1163/21967415-BJA10026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/21967415-BJA10026","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Over the past 25 years, criminal prosecutions for war crimes have become a central element in the long-standing project of governing hostilities in international law. According to many, the threat of criminal prosecutions can be a general deterrent against violations of the laws of war, and can contribute more broadly to the diffusion and domestic appropriation of humanitarian norms. This article discusses some unintended effects of this “anti-impunity turn” in the laws of war in the context of non-international armed conflicts. Specifically, it examines the consequences of the fact that states typically have a monopoly over the means of legitimate criminal investigation for alleged crimes committed in their territory. Far from operating on a level playing field, criminal investigations in war contexts must be undertaken under institutional conditions that tend to favor state agents over non-state opposition groups. The article spells out some implications of this form of state bias and argues that it can contribute to exacerbate conflict and prolong violence in war.","PeriodicalId":145597,"journal":{"name":"European Review of International Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129001758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-25DOI: 10.1163/21967415-BJA10008
David Cadier
This collections of essays engages with the special issue on politicisation that has been prevoiusly published in this journal. It highlights the contribution for the contemporary debate on security studies. The contributions furthermore point out several lines of further research.
{"title":"The Politicisation of Security: Controversy, Mobilisation, Arena Shifting","authors":"David Cadier","doi":"10.1163/21967415-BJA10008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/21967415-BJA10008","url":null,"abstract":"This collections of essays engages with the special issue on politicisation that has been prevoiusly published in this journal. It highlights the contribution for the contemporary debate on security studies. The contributions furthermore point out several lines of further research.","PeriodicalId":145597,"journal":{"name":"European Review of International Studies","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122055896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-25DOI: 10.1163/21967415-00701001
Christopher Hill, Christian Lequesne
{"title":"Editors’ Foreword∵","authors":"Christopher Hill, Christian Lequesne","doi":"10.1163/21967415-00701001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/21967415-00701001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":145597,"journal":{"name":"European Review of International Studies","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122496550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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