Pub Date : 2019-02-28DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.42
Christopher Hare, K. Poole
In this chapter, the authors survey the empirical success of the spatial (or geometric) theory of voting. Empirical work lagged behind the development of theory until about 30 years ago and since then has exploded, with ideal-point estimation emerging as an important methodological subfield in political science. Empirical applications of spatial theory are now legion, and the basic news is that the spatial model has been enormously successful in explaining observed political choices and outcomes at both the elite and mass levels. In the United States, empirical estimates of the spatial model also help to explain incongruities between the median voter theorem and party polarization. These empirical estimates have demonstrated that the theory is extremely powerful on a number of levels—indeed, that it is one of the most successful mathematical theories in the social sciences.
{"title":"Estimates of the Spatial Voting Model","authors":"Christopher Hare, K. Poole","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.42","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.42","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, the authors survey the empirical success of the spatial (or geometric) theory of voting. Empirical work lagged behind the development of theory until about 30 years ago and since then has exploded, with ideal-point estimation emerging as an important methodological subfield in political science. Empirical applications of spatial theory are now legion, and the basic news is that the spatial model has been enormously successful in explaining observed political choices and outcomes at both the elite and mass levels. In the United States, empirical estimates of the spatial model also help to explain incongruities between the median voter theorem and party polarization. These empirical estimates have demonstrated that the theory is extremely powerful on a number of levels—indeed, that it is one of the most successful mathematical theories in the social sciences.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125351319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-28DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.45
Susumu Shikano, Verena Mack
While election fraud is mostly detected and reported by real political actors like election observers, academic research can contribute through systematic analysis of previous information in determining when fraud has occurred and estimating how many votes were affected. This chapter presents social science research, based on the idea that election fraud is conceived as an intervention in random processes that generate fraud-free “normal votes.” The authors discuss two points: first, which fraudulent acts exist and how they intervene in fraud-free election processes; second, which assumptions enable random fraud-free election processes. They distinguish among several approaches in existing research: those that set up a fraud-free random process in a theory-guided way, which requires some predictors of normal votes; natural- or field-experimental approaches that exploit existing random processes; and models that capture the random process in a single election result.
{"title":"Detection of Election Fraud","authors":"Susumu Shikano, Verena Mack","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.45","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.45","url":null,"abstract":"While election fraud is mostly detected and reported by real political actors like election observers, academic research can contribute through systematic analysis of previous information in determining when fraud has occurred and estimating how many votes were affected. This chapter presents social science research, based on the idea that election fraud is conceived as an intervention in random processes that generate fraud-free “normal votes.” The authors discuss two points: first, which fraudulent acts exist and how they intervene in fraud-free election processes; second, which assumptions enable random fraud-free election processes. They distinguish among several approaches in existing research: those that set up a fraud-free random process in a theory-guided way, which requires some predictors of normal votes; natural- or field-experimental approaches that exploit existing random processes; and models that capture the random process in a single election result.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"305 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123624559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-28DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.17
J. Matsusaka
An extensive literature seeks to measure the effect of the initiative and referendum on public policies. Several conclusions emerge: The initiative and referendum have different effects on policy. Requiring popular approval of fiscal policies (mandatory referendums) results in lower expenditure, taxes, and debt. The initiative process gives voters more power and results in policies closer to the median voter preference; this often has reduced spending (American states, Swiss cantons), but sometimes has increased spending (cities). The initiative is associated with more socially conservative policy choices. Spurious correlation is a concern in many studies, and more research on causality is needed.
{"title":"Direct Democracy and Public Policy","authors":"J. Matsusaka","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.17","url":null,"abstract":"An extensive literature seeks to measure the effect of the initiative and referendum on public policies. Several conclusions emerge: The initiative and referendum have different effects on policy. Requiring popular approval of fiscal policies (mandatory referendums) results in lower expenditure, taxes, and debt. The initiative process gives voters more power and results in policies closer to the median voter preference; this often has reduced spending (American states, Swiss cantons), but sometimes has increased spending (cities). The initiative is associated with more socially conservative policy choices. Spurious correlation is a concern in many studies, and more research on causality is needed.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"130 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114314075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-28DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.9
D. Bochsler
Most research on electoral systems deals with the effects of institutions on political representation. However, political parties design the electoral systems, and thereby navigate between self-interest and multiple, often nonreconcilable normative ideals. This chapter reviews the growing literature on the choice of electoral systems from different perspectives. Structural theories explain that the choice of electoral systems is closely linked to the history of suffrage extensions, cultural heterogeneity and the organization of the economy. Agency-based theories highlight how parliamentary majorities strategically pass electoral reforms in order to consolidate their power in the long run—for instance, in order to avoid future losses in elections. However, often lawmakers fail to predict their electoral fortunes and therefore pass reforms that turn out not to be in their favor, or they even contribute to undermining their own reforms later with strategic maneuvers. Finally, the chapter analyzes the choice of electoral system in the context of transitions toward democracies and in former colonies.
{"title":"Electoral Systems in the Making","authors":"D. Bochsler","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.9","url":null,"abstract":"Most research on electoral systems deals with the effects of institutions on political representation. However, political parties design the electoral systems, and thereby navigate between self-interest and multiple, often nonreconcilable normative ideals. This chapter reviews the growing literature on the choice of electoral systems from different perspectives. Structural theories explain that the choice of electoral systems is closely linked to the history of suffrage extensions, cultural heterogeneity and the organization of the economy. Agency-based theories highlight how parliamentary majorities strategically pass electoral reforms in order to consolidate their power in the long run—for instance, in order to avoid future losses in elections. However, often lawmakers fail to predict their electoral fortunes and therefore pass reforms that turn out not to be in their favor, or they even contribute to undermining their own reforms later with strategic maneuvers. Finally, the chapter analyzes the choice of electoral system in the context of transitions toward democracies and in former colonies.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"326 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129436883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-28DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.39
Keith L. Dougherty
This chapter describes how the public-choice perspective has provided new insights into the U.S. Constitutional Convention of 1787. It reviews articles on the impact of the rules of the Convention, attempts to infer delegate votes, and reviews how public choice has helped us understand the adoption of various clauses in the Constitution and studies of the Beard thesis.
{"title":"Voting at the U.S. Constitutional Convention","authors":"Keith L. Dougherty","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.39","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter describes how the public-choice perspective has provided new insights into the U.S. Constitutional Convention of 1787. It reviews articles on the impact of the rules of the Convention, attempts to infer delegate votes, and reviews how public choice has helped us understand the adoption of various clauses in the Constitution and studies of the Beard thesis.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129947646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-28DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.16
T. Kuran, Diego Romero
However easily explicable in hindsight, revolutions are typically unforeseeable, because key determinants of individual decisions to join protests are unobservable. Coupled with the interdependence of individual choices, unobservability ensures that many revolutions occur through cascades. Surveying research on the dynamics of revolutions, this article evaluates insights into the connections between the likelihood of protests and individual freedoms. Other findings include: that network structure shapes motivations to participate in collective action; that social media facilitate mobilization and also quicken the diffusion of information through pre-established networks; that using social media as a mobilization tool poses growing personal risks as regimes learn to monitor the internet; and that a revolution may trigger other revolutions by altering individuals’ expected payoffs around the world.
{"title":"The Logic of Revolutions","authors":"T. Kuran, Diego Romero","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.16","url":null,"abstract":"However easily explicable in hindsight, revolutions are typically unforeseeable, because key determinants of individual decisions to join protests are unobservable. Coupled with the interdependence of individual choices, unobservability ensures that many revolutions occur through cascades. Surveying research on the dynamics of revolutions, this article evaluates insights into the connections between the likelihood of protests and individual freedoms. Other findings include: that network structure shapes motivations to participate in collective action; that social media facilitate mobilization and also quicken the diffusion of information through pre-established networks; that using social media as a mobilization tool poses growing personal risks as regimes learn to monitor the internet; and that a revolution may trigger other revolutions by altering individuals’ expected payoffs around the world.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130675030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-28DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.1
N. Tideman
This chapter evaluates extensions of majority rule for elections with multiple candidates, based on a judgment that the question should not be approached predominantly in terms of logical criteria, for no rule satisfies all desirable criteria and logical criteria take no account of the frequency with which conditions are violated. Instead, the question is explored in terms of a combination of three statistical frequencies with which rules achieve desirable conditions (identifying the highest-value candidate when voters vote sincerely, resistance to strategy, and resistance to tying), one two-stage logical criterion (resistance to clones), and three criteria of simplicity (ease of voting, ease of counting votes, and ease of understanding the vote-counting process). Eighteen rules selected from previous inquiries are evaluated in terms of these criteria. A winnowing process is recommended for identifying the rule that a group finds most attractive. The Condorcet-Hare rule is likely to be most attractive.
{"title":"How Should Votes Be Cast and Counted?","authors":"N. Tideman","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.1","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter evaluates extensions of majority rule for elections with multiple candidates, based on a judgment that the question should not be approached predominantly in terms of logical criteria, for no rule satisfies all desirable criteria and logical criteria take no account of the frequency with which conditions are violated. Instead, the question is explored in terms of a combination of three statistical frequencies with which rules achieve desirable conditions (identifying the highest-value candidate when voters vote sincerely, resistance to strategy, and resistance to tying), one two-stage logical criterion (resistance to clones), and three criteria of simplicity (ease of voting, ease of counting votes, and ease of understanding the vote-counting process). Eighteen rules selected from previous inquiries are evaluated in terms of these criteria. A winnowing process is recommended for identifying the rule that a group finds most attractive. The Condorcet-Hare rule is likely to be most attractive.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130695703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-28DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.40
C. Bucur, B. Rasch
This chapter focuses on the link between amendment institutions and formal constitutional changes. The authors’ survey of the extensive literature on constitutional amendment procedures and their consequences for constitutional adjustment highlights the lack of agreement about key mechanisms of constitutional change. Despite the increase in the availability of data on constitutions and the continuing sophistication of research methods and measures, there is still no consensus on the extent to which amendment procedures influence the pace of formal constitutional change. The authors argue that amendment institutions provide only a partial explanation of constitutional change, which also needs to take into account a number of additional political, economic, and social factors.
{"title":"Institutions for Amending Constitutions","authors":"C. Bucur, B. Rasch","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.40","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.40","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter focuses on the link between amendment institutions and formal constitutional changes. The authors’ survey of the extensive literature on constitutional amendment procedures and their consequences for constitutional adjustment highlights the lack of agreement about key mechanisms of constitutional change. Despite the increase in the availability of data on constitutions and the continuing sophistication of research methods and measures, there is still no consensus on the extent to which amendment procedures influence the pace of formal constitutional change. The authors argue that amendment institutions provide only a partial explanation of constitutional change, which also needs to take into account a number of additional political, economic, and social factors.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126511176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-28DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.12
G. Brennan, H. Kliemt
This chapter restates the basic logic of constitutional restrictions on the government’s power to tax. It then examines an important proviso to that basic logic—namely, that if, as seems plausible, regulations are a substitute for fiscal measures as a mechanism for pursuing government objectives, then restrictions on the power to tax may give rise to worse interventions than taxes represent. Moreover, the discipline on foolish regulations seems likely to be more effective the higher the aggregate tax take.
{"title":"Fiscal Powers Revisited","authors":"G. Brennan, H. Kliemt","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.12","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter restates the basic logic of constitutional restrictions on the government’s power to tax. It then examines an important proviso to that basic logic—namely, that if, as seems plausible, regulations are a substitute for fiscal measures as a mechanism for pursuing government objectives, then restrictions on the power to tax may give rise to worse interventions than taxes represent. Moreover, the discipline on foolish regulations seems likely to be more effective the higher the aggregate tax take.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130176109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-28DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.21
S. Voigt, Jerg Gutmann
Empirical constitutional economics has made great progress since the beginning of the millennium. Numerous important insights into the effects of constitutions have been uncovered. Rather than just summarizing the state of the art, this chapter identifies some of the most important challenges and pressing questions to be addressed by constitutional economics scholars. It further discusses the possible role of different empirical methods in this field of research. In spite of the progress that has been achieved, much work is left to be done and some of the early empirical findings might easily be overturned based on new and more reliable empirical evidence.
{"title":"Challenges in Estimating the Effects of Constitutional Design on Public Policy","authors":"S. Voigt, Jerg Gutmann","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.21","url":null,"abstract":"Empirical constitutional economics has made great progress since the beginning of the millennium. Numerous important insights into the effects of constitutions have been uncovered. Rather than just summarizing the state of the art, this chapter identifies some of the most important challenges and pressing questions to be addressed by constitutional economics scholars. It further discusses the possible role of different empirical methods in this field of research. In spite of the progress that has been achieved, much work is left to be done and some of the early empirical findings might easily be overturned based on new and more reliable empirical evidence.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133441337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：