Pub Date : 2019-02-28DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.29
I. Somin
Rational ignorance is a ubiquitous aspect of our lives. In many situations, it is completely unproblematic, or even beneficial. But public-choice theory shows how it can often cause serious harm in the world of politics. The first part of this chapter briefly explains the logic of rational ignorance and why many people may deliberately choose to remain ignorant about political issues. In the second part, I survey evidence and research supporting the theory of rational ignorance in politics, including the related problem of “rational irrationality.” The third part outlines the potential dangers of rational ignorance and irrationality, especially how it can contribute to the enactment of flawed government policies. It also summarizes the literature arguing that widespread political ignorance is not a major problem. The final part briefly discusses potential strategies for mitigating the dangers of rational ignorance.
{"title":"Rational Ignorance and Public Choice","authors":"I. Somin","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.29","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.29","url":null,"abstract":"Rational ignorance is a ubiquitous aspect of our lives. In many situations, it is completely unproblematic, or even beneficial. But public-choice theory shows how it can often cause serious harm in the world of politics. The first part of this chapter briefly explains the logic of rational ignorance and why many people may deliberately choose to remain ignorant about political issues. In the second part, I survey evidence and research supporting the theory of rational ignorance in politics, including the related problem of “rational irrationality.” The third part outlines the potential dangers of rational ignorance and irrationality, especially how it can contribute to the enactment of flawed government policies. It also summarizes the literature arguing that widespread political ignorance is not a major problem. The final part briefly discusses potential strategies for mitigating the dangers of rational ignorance.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116181346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-28DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.43
K. Poole
The chapter discusses different ways to estimate the dimensionality of roll-call voting data. These methods use data from the U.S. House of Representatives, and the author shows that there were periods when a two-dimensional representation was necessary and others when a one-dimensional representation captures all but a relatively small percentage of the variance. The author then considers data from the UN General Assembly from before the fall of the Berlin Wall, finding a communist vs. anti-communist dimension and a pro- and anti-Israel dimension, as well as data from the French National Assembly early in the 5th Republic that finds a one-dimensional representation fits nearly perfectly. The author then considers some more technical issues about best methods, concluding that there is no foolproof way of determining the “true” dimensionality of a roll-call matrix, and no substitute for substantive understanding of the politics and policy shaping the roll calls.
{"title":"The Dimensionality of Parliamentary Voting","authors":"K. Poole","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.43","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.43","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter discusses different ways to estimate the dimensionality of roll-call voting data. These methods use data from the U.S. House of Representatives, and the author shows that there were periods when a two-dimensional representation was necessary and others when a one-dimensional representation captures all but a relatively small percentage of the variance. The author then considers data from the UN General Assembly from before the fall of the Berlin Wall, finding a communist vs. anti-communist dimension and a pro- and anti-Israel dimension, as well as data from the French National Assembly early in the 5th Republic that finds a one-dimensional representation fits nearly perfectly. The author then considers some more technical issues about best methods, concluding that there is no foolproof way of determining the “true” dimensionality of a roll-call matrix, and no substitute for substantive understanding of the politics and policy shaping the roll calls.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131899005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-28DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.2
Thomas Braendle, A. Stutzer
Institutions systematically affect which individuals gain positions in the different branches of democratic government. Given agents’ discretion in decision-making, their characteristics matter for policy choices. This perspective on political selection replaces the representative political agent with a heterogeneous set of political decision-makers having different skills and motivations. Selecting political agents becomes a means to align the interests of the elected delegates with those of the citizens. The chapter’s comparative analysis reviews demand- and supply-side conditions in the market for competent and honest politicians. On the demand side, parties and electoral rules (including reservations and quotas) play an important role in determining who is recruited, nominated, and finally elected. On the supply side, various types of compensations are associated with political office. Finally, institutions affecting the attractiveness of a political mandate for people with a specific professional background are considered and related to policy outcomes.
{"title":"Voters and Representatives","authors":"Thomas Braendle, A. Stutzer","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.2","url":null,"abstract":"Institutions systematically affect which individuals gain positions in the different branches of democratic government. Given agents’ discretion in decision-making, their characteristics matter for policy choices. This perspective on political selection replaces the representative political agent with a heterogeneous set of political decision-makers having different skills and motivations. Selecting political agents becomes a means to align the interests of the elected delegates with those of the citizens. The chapter’s comparative analysis reviews demand- and supply-side conditions in the market for competent and honest politicians. On the demand side, parties and electoral rules (including reservations and quotas) play an important role in determining who is recruited, nominated, and finally elected. On the supply side, various types of compensations are associated with political office. Finally, institutions affecting the attractiveness of a political mandate for people with a specific professional background are considered and related to policy outcomes.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133479196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-28DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.28
P. Aligica, Michael E. Cox
The public-choice–inspired research program associated with Elinor Ostrom and her collaborators identified eight design principles, noting that they characterize robust institutions for communities managing common-pool resources such as forests or fisheries. Ostrom’s principles for sustainable community-based natural resource management have emerged as an important contribution to applied research on governance in general. Since then, many studies have explicitly or implicitly assessed these design principles. This chapter reviews the principles, surveys the studies that have revisited and evaluated them, and discusses some of the implications of this line of research, at both the theoretical-methodological level and the applied level.
{"title":"Institutions for Solving Commons Problems","authors":"P. Aligica, Michael E. Cox","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.28","url":null,"abstract":"The public-choice–inspired research program associated with Elinor Ostrom and her collaborators identified eight design principles, noting that they characterize robust institutions for communities managing common-pool resources such as forests or fisheries. Ostrom’s principles for sustainable community-based natural resource management have emerged as an important contribution to applied research on governance in general. Since then, many studies have explicitly or implicitly assessed these design principles. This chapter reviews the principles, surveys the studies that have revisited and evaluated them, and discusses some of the implications of this line of research, at both the theoretical-methodological level and the applied level.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114465993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-28DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.11
M. McGuire
In the context of the rationale and structure of group formation, Mancur Olson drew attention to the fact that despite problems of inefficiency in public- goods provision, and irregularity in pricing and burden sharing, individuals voluntarily form groups to provide themselves with public goods. This preoccupation with the economic incentives in groups that led him to imagine the origin of the state as an economic group with beginnings in anarchy distinguished by and plagued by roving banditry, with its random disorder and erratic tax theft. The roving bandit who had settled down to become a king or stationary bandit would become the next stage, succeeding anarchy and improving upon life for both bandit and subjects. This chapter recounts the main elements in the stationary bandit theory, together with a view of the economic structure of governance and its reciprocal relations with the social economy, and suggests routes for further application.
{"title":"Leviathan, Taxation, and Public Goods","authors":"M. McGuire","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.11","url":null,"abstract":"In the context of the rationale and structure of group formation, Mancur Olson drew attention to the fact that despite problems of inefficiency in public- goods provision, and irregularity in pricing and burden sharing, individuals voluntarily form groups to provide themselves with public goods. This preoccupation with the economic incentives in groups that led him to imagine the origin of the state as an economic group with beginnings in anarchy distinguished by and plagued by roving banditry, with its random disorder and erratic tax theft. The roving bandit who had settled down to become a king or stationary bandit would become the next stage, succeeding anarchy and improving upon life for both bandit and subjects. This chapter recounts the main elements in the stationary bandit theory, together with a view of the economic structure of governance and its reciprocal relations with the social economy, and suggests routes for further application.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117211732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-28DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.14
Alejandro Quiroz Flores
Selectorate theory explains variation in political leaders’ tenure in office. More specifically, it explains why leaders who produce “good” policies stay in office for short periods of time while leaders who deliver “bad” policy can hold on to power for decades. This chapter presents an overview of selectorate theory, discusses the political institutions that lie at the center of it, including the selectorate and the winning coalition, and elaborates on the place that authoritarian governance has in it. In particular, the chapter uses selectorate theory to analyze autocracies and explains why autocratic leaders implement different sets of policies to obtain and keep the political support necessary to maximize tenure in office.
{"title":"Are There Really Dictatorships?","authors":"Alejandro Quiroz Flores","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.14","url":null,"abstract":"Selectorate theory explains variation in political leaders’ tenure in office. More specifically, it explains why leaders who produce “good” policies stay in office for short periods of time while leaders who deliver “bad” policy can hold on to power for decades. This chapter presents an overview of selectorate theory, discusses the political institutions that lie at the center of it, including the selectorate and the winning coalition, and elaborates on the place that authoritarian governance has in it. In particular, the chapter uses selectorate theory to analyze autocracies and explains why autocratic leaders implement different sets of policies to obtain and keep the political support necessary to maximize tenure in office.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125059658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-11DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.7
Nuno Garoupa
Constitutional review has been studied by legal scholars, economists, political scientists, and other social scientists. In this chapter, the author reviews the theory and practice of constitutional review around the world, taking into account institutional variations, judicial politics, and recent empirical evidence. Ideology plays an important role in constitutional interpretation. However, constitutional judges face a multiplicity of additional goals that dilute their party alignment. Current empirical work on constitutional review seems to confirm such a theory. Understanding the politicization of the courts usually follows a more complex framework than a simple conservative–progressive division.
{"title":"Constitutional Review","authors":"Nuno Garoupa","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.7","url":null,"abstract":"Constitutional review has been studied by legal scholars, economists, political scientists, and other social scientists. In this chapter, the author reviews the theory and practice of constitutional review around the world, taking into account institutional variations, judicial politics, and recent empirical evidence. Ideology plays an important role in constitutional interpretation. However, constitutional judges face a multiplicity of additional goals that dilute their party alignment. Current empirical work on constitutional review seems to confirm such a theory. Understanding the politicization of the courts usually follows a more complex framework than a simple conservative–progressive division.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122908047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-11DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.8
Zachary Elkins
In most countries, constitutions come and go more often than one might expect or prefer. In recent years, scholars have begun to advance theories to understand the life expectancy of these important documents. This chapter distills and reports on a set of theoretical and empirical insights derived from an historical investigation of constitutional transitions. Specifically, the chapter addresses four sets of questions regarding such transitions. The first set of questions is conceptual (transitions of what, exactly?), the second descriptive (transitions when, where, and how often?), the third explanatory (why and how?), and the fourth is normative (transitions with what consequences?). A background implication of frequent constitutional turnover is that the business of constitutional advising is more relevant than one may expect, and probably deserves more consideration.
{"title":"Constitutional Transition","authors":"Zachary Elkins","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.8","url":null,"abstract":"In most countries, constitutions come and go more often than one might expect or prefer. In recent years, scholars have begun to advance theories to understand the life expectancy of these important documents. This chapter distills and reports on a set of theoretical and empirical insights derived from an historical investigation of constitutional transitions. Specifically, the chapter addresses four sets of questions regarding such transitions. The first set of questions is conceptual (transitions of what, exactly?), the second descriptive (transitions when, where, and how often?), the third explanatory (why and how?), and the fourth is normative (transitions with what consequences?). A background implication of frequent constitutional turnover is that the business of constitutional advising is more relevant than one may expect, and probably deserves more consideration.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133455669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-11DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.15
Toke S. Aidt, G. Leon
Coups, understood as attempts to overthrow the sitting executive government by a group inside the state apparatus that includes part of the military, shape competition for office in authoritarian regimes. They do that both directly through actual coups and indirectly through the threat of a coup, which forces incumbent autocrats to balance loyalty and repression to pre-empt being overthrown. The chapter presents a framework for the study of coups and uses it to examine how coups can help select autocrats and to some extent keep them accountable. It presents a number of stylized facts about coups and summarizes the theoretical and empirical literature on the role of coups in autocracies.
{"title":"The Coup","authors":"Toke S. Aidt, G. Leon","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.15","url":null,"abstract":"Coups, understood as attempts to overthrow the sitting executive government by a group inside the state apparatus that includes part of the military, shape competition for office in authoritarian regimes. They do that both directly through actual coups and indirectly through the threat of a coup, which forces incumbent autocrats to balance loyalty and repression to pre-empt being overthrown. The chapter presents a framework for the study of coups and uses it to examine how coups can help select autocrats and to some extent keep them accountable. It presents a number of stylized facts about coups and summarizes the theoretical and empirical literature on the role of coups in autocracies.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"338 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133118990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-11DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.5
Jarosław Kantorowicz
Federalism is a governance structure that enables the aggregation of mass areas under one government. Federalism is a more complex form of governance than a unitary system. Under a federal structure of government, the activities are constitutionally divided (or shared) between constituent governments and a central government, implying a permanent coexistence and bargaining between participating governments and the center or among participating governments themselves. This chapter delineates the current state of knowledge regarding federalism and its twin concept of decentralization from the public-choice perspective. First, the chapter looks at federalism as an explanatory variable by examining how it shapes various outcomes ranging from economic growth to incidence of terrorism. Second, it deals with endogenous federalism and thus factors that explain how it emerges, survives, and changes. In the last part, the chapter summarizes several potential avenues for future research on federalism.
{"title":"Federalism","authors":"Jarosław Kantorowicz","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.5","url":null,"abstract":"Federalism is a governance structure that enables the aggregation of mass areas under one government. Federalism is a more complex form of governance than a unitary system. Under a federal structure of government, the activities are constitutionally divided (or shared) between constituent governments and a central government, implying a permanent coexistence and bargaining between participating governments and the center or among participating governments themselves. This chapter delineates the current state of knowledge regarding federalism and its twin concept of decentralization from the public-choice perspective. First, the chapter looks at federalism as an explanatory variable by examining how it shapes various outcomes ranging from economic growth to incidence of terrorism. Second, it deals with endogenous federalism and thus factors that explain how it emerges, survives, and changes. In the last part, the chapter summarizes several potential avenues for future research on federalism.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123873580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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