In this paper, authors offer one novel mathematical model of credit lending to customers based on evolutionary game theory, and the model presents an efficient and realistic approach. The purpose of the article is to examine the evolutionary game between banks and customers for granting facilities and credit. Authors assumed that customers are divided into two types. The first type of customers includes individuals or small and medium enterprises (SME), applying for microloans from the bank. The second type of customers includes corporate banking or large enterprises, applying for large loans from the bank. The relationship between the bank and the customers is a double-sided problem. Banks and customers may trust each other or want to behave opportunistically. The results show that the game has two equilibriums, and the optimal equilibrium, which is the best-case scenario, occurs when customers and bank players tending to keep “honest” and to “credit,” respectively. Authors used the evolutionary stable strategy to express the parameters that affect these interactions, and by adjusting some of these parameters, authors move the equilibrium towards the optimal solution of the game. Also, by adjusting these parameters, banks can gain more profitability.
{"title":"A New Credit and Loan Lending Strategy and Credit in Banking Systems: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach","authors":"Zohreh Lashgari, Alireza Bahiraie, M. Gordji","doi":"10.1155/2022/3400319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/3400319","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, authors offer one novel mathematical model of credit lending to customers based on evolutionary game theory, and the model presents an efficient and realistic approach. The purpose of the article is to examine the evolutionary game between banks and customers for granting facilities and credit. Authors assumed that customers are divided into two types. The first type of customers includes individuals or small and medium enterprises (SME), applying for microloans from the bank. The second type of customers includes corporate banking or large enterprises, applying for large loans from the bank. The relationship between the bank and the customers is a double-sided problem. Banks and customers may trust each other or want to behave opportunistically. The results show that the game has two equilibriums, and the optimal equilibrium, which is the best-case scenario, occurs when customers and bank players tending to keep “honest” and to “credit,” respectively. Authors used the evolutionary stable strategy to express the parameters that affect these interactions, and by adjusting some of these parameters, authors move the equilibrium towards the optimal solution of the game. Also, by adjusting these parameters, banks can gain more profitability.","PeriodicalId":14766,"journal":{"name":"J. Appl. Math.","volume":"26 1","pages":"3400319:1-3400319:12"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78117730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nowadays, skin cancer is a worldwide panic. It is related to ultraviolet radiation. In this paper, we have formulated a SIRS type mathematical model to show the effects of ultraviolet radiation on skin cancer. At first, we have showed the boundedness and positivity of the model solutions to verify the model’s existence and uniqueness. The boundedness and positivity gave the solutions of our model bounded and positive, which was very important for real-world situation because in real world, population cannot be negative. Then, we have popped out all the equilibrium points of our model and verified the stability of the equilibrium points. This stability test expressed some physical situation of our model. The disease-free equilibrium point is locally asymptotically stable if R 0 <