Pub Date : 2020-07-29DOI: 10.1177/1868103420930022
M. Ismail, Nor Azila Mohd Noor
Malaysia has not invited International Election Monitoring Organisations (IEMOs) for any of its general elections (GEs) since 1990 and so is numbered among those states that defy this international norm. Although the elections under the Barisan Nasional (BN) regime displayed a wide variety of manipulative practices, the BN was able, due to its position as a semi-authoritarian nature, its strategic importance and its lack of dependence on foreign aid, to successfully resist demands for the presence of IEMOs. The prospects for IEMOs has been further reduced, since the GE 2013, by the Election Commission’s “election visit programme” (EVP), adopted to compensate for the absence of IEMOs. Following Malaysia’s historic GE 2018, a widespread consensus has developed that though Malaysia should not abandon its own EVP programme, it should readopt this international norm by inviting IEMOs. This is especially needed considering the amateurish state of domestic election monitoring in Malaysia.
{"title":"Resisting International Election Observation Through Election Visit Programmes: The Case of Malaysia","authors":"M. Ismail, Nor Azila Mohd Noor","doi":"10.1177/1868103420930022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103420930022","url":null,"abstract":"Malaysia has not invited International Election Monitoring Organisations (IEMOs) for any of its general elections (GEs) since 1990 and so is numbered among those states that defy this international norm. Although the elections under the Barisan Nasional (BN) regime displayed a wide variety of manipulative practices, the BN was able, due to its position as a semi-authoritarian nature, its strategic importance and its lack of dependence on foreign aid, to successfully resist demands for the presence of IEMOs. The prospects for IEMOs has been further reduced, since the GE 2013, by the Election Commission’s “election visit programme” (EVP), adopted to compensate for the absence of IEMOs. Following Malaysia’s historic GE 2018, a widespread consensus has developed that though Malaysia should not abandon its own EVP programme, it should readopt this international norm by inviting IEMOs. This is especially needed considering the amateurish state of domestic election monitoring in Malaysia.","PeriodicalId":15424,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs","volume":"39 1","pages":"310 - 331"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2020-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1868103420930022","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41423462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-23DOI: 10.1177/1868103420935562
R. D. de Castro
Focusing on the Philippines’ changing foreign policy agendas on the South China Sea dispute, this article examines the limitations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) intergovernmental approach in addressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. It contends that former President Benigno Aquino III tried to harness this regional organisation in his balancing policy vis-à-vis China’s maritime expansion in the South China Sea. On the contrary, President Rodrigo Duterte promoted his appeasement policy on China when he became the ASEAN’s chairperson in 2017, and pushed for the elusive passage of the ASEAN–China Code of Conduct in 2019. In conclusion, the article scrutinises the implications of this shift in the Philippines’ foreign policy for the ASEAN, and raises the need for this regional organisation to rethink its intergovernmental approach to the security challenges posed by the changing geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region.
{"title":"The Limits of Intergovernmentalism: The Philippines’ Changing Strategy in the South China Sea Dispute and Its Impact on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)","authors":"R. D. de Castro","doi":"10.1177/1868103420935562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103420935562","url":null,"abstract":"Focusing on the Philippines’ changing foreign policy agendas on the South China Sea dispute, this article examines the limitations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) intergovernmental approach in addressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. It contends that former President Benigno Aquino III tried to harness this regional organisation in his balancing policy vis-à-vis China’s maritime expansion in the South China Sea. On the contrary, President Rodrigo Duterte promoted his appeasement policy on China when he became the ASEAN’s chairperson in 2017, and pushed for the elusive passage of the ASEAN–China Code of Conduct in 2019. In conclusion, the article scrutinises the implications of this shift in the Philippines’ foreign policy for the ASEAN, and raises the need for this regional organisation to rethink its intergovernmental approach to the security challenges posed by the changing geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region.","PeriodicalId":15424,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs","volume":"46 197","pages":"335 - 358"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2020-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1868103420935562","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41259664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-23DOI: 10.1177/1868103420935555
M. Weiss
Politics in Malaysia seems ripe for a populist upsurge. Parties assume fairly exclusive, ethnic boundaries, inviting insider–outsider pandering. Personalities loom large. Economic inequality is among the highest in the region. Regardless, the extent to which Malaysian politics might be understood as “populist” rather than merely polarised, illiberal, and prone to particularism is dubious. I argue that Malaysian politics is neither populist nor likely to veer that way. However, the case offers a useful test of the boundaries between populism and personalisation of politics, the extent to which appeals designed to maximise popular support suffice to code a polity as populist, and which specific illiberal features facilitate or preclude populism. This examination thus clarifies a messy concept by exploring how populism might develop or falter in a multi-party, parliamentary, and hybrid rather than democratic regime – suggesting the relative reach of institutional rather than personalistic or zeitgeist-related explanations.
{"title":"The Limits of “Populism”: How Malaysia Misses the Mark and Why That Matters","authors":"M. Weiss","doi":"10.1177/1868103420935555","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103420935555","url":null,"abstract":"Politics in Malaysia seems ripe for a populist upsurge. Parties assume fairly exclusive, ethnic boundaries, inviting insider–outsider pandering. Personalities loom large. Economic inequality is among the highest in the region. Regardless, the extent to which Malaysian politics might be understood as “populist” rather than merely polarised, illiberal, and prone to particularism is dubious. I argue that Malaysian politics is neither populist nor likely to veer that way. However, the case offers a useful test of the boundaries between populism and personalisation of politics, the extent to which appeals designed to maximise popular support suffice to code a polity as populist, and which specific illiberal features facilitate or preclude populism. This examination thus clarifies a messy concept by exploring how populism might develop or falter in a multi-party, parliamentary, and hybrid rather than democratic regime – suggesting the relative reach of institutional rather than personalistic or zeitgeist-related explanations.","PeriodicalId":15424,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs","volume":"39 1","pages":"207 - 226"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2020-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1868103420935555","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47857899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-15DOI: 10.1177/1868103420935556
Rakhmat Syarip
Scholars have devoted little attention to foreign policy motive of Indonesia’s free trade agreement (FTA) policy. This article finds that, under competitive international pressure, Indonesia has instrumentalised some FTAs to serve its “Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-first” foreign policy, specifically to ensure the geopolitical and geoeconomic relevance of ASEAN. Three FTAs display this motive: the ASEAN Free Trade Area, later extended to the ASEAN Economic Community, the ASEAN–China FTA, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Domestically, the pro-ASEAN group has supported this motive against other influential domestic actors, especially the nationalist and the pro-liberalisation groups. However, diffused political authority has led to an inconsistent FTA policy across various trade policymaking phases. The “pro-ASEAN” FTA policy has been relatively stronger in both the negotiation and ratification, but substantially weaker in the implementation phases.
{"title":"Defending Foreign Policy at Home: Indonesia and the ASEAN-Based Free Trade Agreements","authors":"Rakhmat Syarip","doi":"10.1177/1868103420935556","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103420935556","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars have devoted little attention to foreign policy motive of Indonesia’s free trade agreement (FTA) policy. This article finds that, under competitive international pressure, Indonesia has instrumentalised some FTAs to serve its “Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-first” foreign policy, specifically to ensure the geopolitical and geoeconomic relevance of ASEAN. Three FTAs display this motive: the ASEAN Free Trade Area, later extended to the ASEAN Economic Community, the ASEAN–China FTA, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Domestically, the pro-ASEAN group has supported this motive against other influential domestic actors, especially the nationalist and the pro-liberalisation groups. However, diffused political authority has led to an inconsistent FTA policy across various trade policymaking phases. The “pro-ASEAN” FTA policy has been relatively stronger in both the negotiation and ratification, but substantially weaker in the implementation phases.","PeriodicalId":15424,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs","volume":"39 1","pages":"405 - 427"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2020-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1868103420935556","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48136426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-11DOI: 10.1177/1868103420910514
H. Latief, Haedar Nashir
This article examines the engagement of Indonesian Islamic civil society organisations in the international arena by paying particular attention to the role of the Islamic modernist movement, Muhammadiyah. Beyond its vibrant religious and social activism in the domestic context of Indonesia, Muhammadiyah has, in the past thirty years, engaged in various international affairs such as peacekeeping operations, humanitarian activities, and politics. This engagement indicates that Muhammadiyah has attempted to strengthen its international exposure and contribute to the global community. By examining Muhammadiyah’s vision and activism, both discursively and practically, this article seeks to know why it is so essential for Indonesian Islamic civil society organisations, such as Muhammadiyah, to be involved in the international arena, and what Muhammadiyah engagement means for the global picture of Islam in the Muslim world.
{"title":"Local Dynamics and Global Engagements of the Islamic Modernist Movement in Contemporary Indonesia: The Case of Muhammadiyah (2000-2020)","authors":"H. Latief, Haedar Nashir","doi":"10.1177/1868103420910514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103420910514","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the engagement of Indonesian Islamic civil society organisations in the international arena by paying particular attention to the role of the Islamic modernist movement, Muhammadiyah. Beyond its vibrant religious and social activism in the domestic context of Indonesia, Muhammadiyah has, in the past thirty years, engaged in various international affairs such as peacekeeping operations, humanitarian activities, and politics. This engagement indicates that Muhammadiyah has attempted to strengthen its international exposure and contribute to the global community. By examining Muhammadiyah’s vision and activism, both discursively and practically, this article seeks to know why it is so essential for Indonesian Islamic civil society organisations, such as Muhammadiyah, to be involved in the international arena, and what Muhammadiyah engagement means for the global picture of Islam in the Muslim world.","PeriodicalId":15424,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs","volume":"39 1","pages":"290 - 309"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2020-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1868103420910514","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48997594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1868103420932684
Netina Tan
Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP) is one of the longest ruling parties in the world. The PAP’s ability to avoid overt factionalism over the years is exceptional, especially compared to the region’s personalistic or cadre parties. In recent years, the defection of former PAP cadre Dr. Tan Cheng Bock and the formation of the Progress Singapore Party (PSP) and PM Lee Hsien Loong’s family rivalry, which involved PAP elites, have challenged the cohesion of the PAP. This study examines a set of incentives and constraints institutionalised at the party and national levels to foster elite cohesion. It is argued that the critical junctures in the PAP’s early years led to the adoption of a cadre party model and a centralised candidate selection process that co-opts like-minded elites into a core that promotes elite unity. Nationally, party switching and factional alignments based on ethnicity or ideology have been systematically banned. Given the lack of credible alternatives that seriously challenge the incumbent PAP, ambitious party cadres would do better toeing the party line and staying loyal.
{"title":"Minimal Factionalism in Singapore’s People’s Action Party","authors":"Netina Tan","doi":"10.1177/1868103420932684","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103420932684","url":null,"abstract":"Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP) is one of the longest ruling parties in the world. The PAP’s ability to avoid overt factionalism over the years is exceptional, especially compared to the region’s personalistic or cadre parties. In recent years, the defection of former PAP cadre Dr. Tan Cheng Bock and the formation of the Progress Singapore Party (PSP) and PM Lee Hsien Loong’s family rivalry, which involved PAP elites, have challenged the cohesion of the PAP. This study examines a set of incentives and constraints institutionalised at the party and national levels to foster elite cohesion. It is argued that the critical junctures in the PAP’s early years led to the adoption of a cadre party model and a centralised candidate selection process that co-opts like-minded elites into a core that promotes elite unity. Nationally, party switching and factional alignments based on ethnicity or ideology have been systematically banned. Given the lack of credible alternatives that seriously challenge the incumbent PAP, ambitious party cadres would do better toeing the party line and staying loyal.","PeriodicalId":15424,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs","volume":"39 1","pages":"124 - 143"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1868103420932684","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41698803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1868103420906023
Sorpong Peou
Cambodia’s hegemonic party system that emerged after the violent removal of First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh early in July 1997 has now given way to a one-party state, which still remains prone to tension and instability. The party system has become less factionalised and can be characterised as moving from high to medium factionalism. This development resulted from the growing domination of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and the weakening of the opposition parties, such as National United Front for an Independent, Netural, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia, which splintered and become almost irrelevant in Cambodian politics. The Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) emerged as the main opposition party after the 2013 election but was then banned from competing in the 2018 election. Although the CNRP remains united by its anti-CPP position, it is still fractured along political lines between two former opposition parties – the Sam Rainsy Party and the Human Rights Party. Historical institutionalism sheds some new light on the variation of political developments among political parties and within them, but does not supplant the fact that party leaders are rational to the extent that they select strategies in pursuit of their interests defined as power or security under specific institutional constraints or the lack thereof.
1997年7月初第一任首相诺罗敦·拉那烈被暴力罢免后，柬埔寨出现了霸权主义的政党制度，现在已经让位给一党制国家，这个国家仍然容易出现紧张和不稳定。党的制度已经减少了派系斗争，可以说是从高级派系斗争转向中级派系斗争。这一发展是由于柬埔寨人民党（CPP）的统治地位不断增强，反对党，如独立、网络、和平与合作柬埔寨民族联合阵线（National United Front for a Independent，Netural，Peace and Cooperative Cambodia）的削弱，这些政党分裂，在柬埔寨政治中几乎无关紧要。柬埔寨国家救援党（CNRP）在2013年大选后成为主要反对党，但随后被禁止参加2018年大选。尽管全国大会党仍然因其反人民党的立场而团结一致，但它仍然在两个前反对党——桑兰西党和人权党之间沿着政治路线分裂。历史制度主义为政党之间及其内部政治发展的变化提供了一些新的视角，但并不能取代这样一个事实，即政党领导人在特定的制度约束或缺乏权力或安全的情况下，为了追求自己的利益而选择战略是理性的。
{"title":"Interparty and Intraparty Factionalism in Cambodian Politics","authors":"Sorpong Peou","doi":"10.1177/1868103420906023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103420906023","url":null,"abstract":"Cambodia’s hegemonic party system that emerged after the violent removal of First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh early in July 1997 has now given way to a one-party state, which still remains prone to tension and instability. The party system has become less factionalised and can be characterised as moving from high to medium factionalism. This development resulted from the growing domination of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and the weakening of the opposition parties, such as National United Front for an Independent, Netural, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia, which splintered and become almost irrelevant in Cambodian politics. The Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) emerged as the main opposition party after the 2013 election but was then banned from competing in the 2018 election. Although the CNRP remains united by its anti-CPP position, it is still fractured along political lines between two former opposition parties – the Sam Rainsy Party and the Human Rights Party. Historical institutionalism sheds some new light on the variation of political developments among political parties and within them, but does not supplant the fact that party leaders are rational to the extent that they select strategies in pursuit of their interests defined as power or security under specific institutional constraints or the lack thereof.","PeriodicalId":15424,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs","volume":"39 1","pages":"17 - 38"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1868103420906023","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41979550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1868103420906020
P. Chambers, Napisa Waitoolkiat
Though dominated by the monarchy and military, Thailand in 2020 has a highly factionalised, political party system ensconced within a defective democracy. When not under military rule, such a situation has been common. The country’s excessive level of factionalism across parties and over time is due to a long history of regionalised and decentralised parties that have invariably been dependent upon finance from faction leaders who have rarely been reined in by laws to limit factionalism. Only under Thaksin Shinawatra (2001–2006), did factionalism diminish in importance on the national level owing partly to 1997 constitutional alterations. Following a 2006 coup and the 2007 adoption of a military-endorsed constitution, a high level of intra-party factionalism returned across parties. Though the 2014 coup again ended the country’s faction-ridden democracy, the 2019 general election resurrected factionalism, which guaranteed weakness for party politics while benefiting the aristocracy and military.
{"title":"Faction Politics in an Interrupted Democracy: the Case of Thailand","authors":"P. Chambers, Napisa Waitoolkiat","doi":"10.1177/1868103420906020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103420906020","url":null,"abstract":"Though dominated by the monarchy and military, Thailand in 2020 has a highly factionalised, political party system ensconced within a defective democracy. When not under military rule, such a situation has been common. The country’s excessive level of factionalism across parties and over time is due to a long history of regionalised and decentralised parties that have invariably been dependent upon finance from faction leaders who have rarely been reined in by laws to limit factionalism. Only under Thaksin Shinawatra (2001–2006), did factionalism diminish in importance on the national level owing partly to 1997 constitutional alterations. Following a 2006 coup and the 2007 adoption of a military-endorsed constitution, a high level of intra-party factionalism returned across parties. Though the 2014 coup again ended the country’s faction-ridden democracy, the 2019 general election resurrected factionalism, which guaranteed weakness for party politics while benefiting the aristocracy and military.","PeriodicalId":15424,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs","volume":"39 1","pages":"144 - 166"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1868103420906020","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44380831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1868103420916044
P. Chambers, Andreas Ufen
This paper is the introduction for a special issue which examines intra-party factions and factionalism in competitive party systems of Southeast Asia, looking at the cases of Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Timor-Leste, in that order and rounding up with a comparative conclusion. The study centres primarily upon one query: in competitive party systems of Southeast Asia, what accounts for the rise of factionalism in some party systems relative to others? The paper at hand frames this special issue, reviewing the literature and examining the causes, effects and forms of factionalism in general and more specifically in Southeast Asia.
{"title":"Causes, Effects, and Forms of Factionalism in Southeast Asia 1","authors":"P. Chambers, Andreas Ufen","doi":"10.1177/1868103420916044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103420916044","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is the introduction for a special issue which examines intra-party factions and factionalism in competitive party systems of Southeast Asia, looking at the cases of Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Timor-Leste, in that order and rounding up with a comparative conclusion. The study centres primarily upon one query: in competitive party systems of Southeast Asia, what accounts for the rise of factionalism in some party systems relative to others? The paper at hand frames this special issue, reviewing the literature and examining the causes, effects and forms of factionalism in general and more specifically in Southeast Asia.","PeriodicalId":15424,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs","volume":"39 1","pages":"16 - 3"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1868103420916044","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46065072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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