Journal of Corporate Finance最新文献

We find that director pay, especially the equity-based portion, is positively related to peer firms' director pay, suggesting boards benchmark when establishing their own compensation. Such benchmarking is distinct from peer benchmarking in CEO pay. We also find a significant bias in peer selection towards peers with relatively high director pay, which helps increase board pay. Peer benchmarking of director compensation is more (less) pronounced in firms with low (high) involvement by institutional investors and firms with declining (increasing) profitability. Overall, our results are consistent with directors engaging in self-dealing when selecting compensation peers, without clear benefits to the firm.

Carbon trading is an important market mechanism to achieve carbon neutrality. This study explores the possible impact of carbon markets on the stock market performance of listed companies using data from 2013 to 2022 in China's carbon trading pilot regions. Using the event shock of delayed trading in the Chinese carbon market, we attempt to answer the question of the role of green innovation hidden under the compliance event. Results show that a 1% increase in carbon market turnover leads to an average decrease of CNY 0.123 in the company's stock price. Large-scale companies that have been listed for a short time and have poor green innovation capabilities are more vulnerable to the carbon market. Under delayed trading, firms with high green innovation capability will be profitable. By contrast, profitability is not reflected in low green innovation firms. Companies with low green innovation can reduce stock market performance owing to the carbon market's undersupply situation. Our study reveals the stock performance of different carbon trading entities under delayed trading, providing a realistic basis for firms to choose green innovation while helping to improve carbon trading market dynamics.

Economic, political, and public policy uncertainty affect merger and acquisition (M&A) activity. In this paper, we use Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) interventions in the M&A market to investigate whether regulatory interventions also matter. Our results support this conjecture. Using the Hoberg and Phillips (2010) similarity scores to identify product market competitors, we confirm a clear and significant DOJ/FTC regulatory enforcements' deterrence effect on future M&A transaction activity, a result robust to many alternative specifications. Additional evidence indicates that this deterrence effect is (at least partly) driven by both regulatory outcome uncertainty and regulatory intervention probability channels. Our results identify an (un)intended consequence of antitrust regulation that affects M&A activity.

Using Iran’s unexpected flood in April 2019 as a natural experiment, we show that local branches bridge the time gap between the disaster and governmental aids by immediately increasing their lending for two months following the flood. Analyzing proprietary information on more than 53,000 farmers, we find that farmers with a stronger relationship with their branch – particularly younger and females – are more likely to receive a recovery loan. Our findings underscore that despite recent technological advancements, relationship-based branch banking is still important for agrarian societies during catastrophic events.

We explore equilibrium allocation and efficiency when private firms are listed by merging with a Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC), compared with when they are listed through a traditional initial public offering (IPO). We show that a traditional IPO is more informationally efficient than a SPAC, except if the traditional IPO process is significantly long and costly. We also suggest that if the average quality of firms willing to go public decreases, SPAC acquisitions are more likely to occur than traditional IPOs. Our results hold, regardless of whether the measures of underwriters and sponsors are exogenously or endogenously determined.

Are the professional networks of directors valuable? To separate the effect of director networks on firm value from the effect of other value-relevant director attributes, we use the unexpected deaths of directors as a shock to the director networks of interlocked directors. By studying the announcement returns and using a difference-in-differences methodology, we find the negative shock to director networks reduces the value of interlocked firms – a result that is stronger for firms that are more likely to benefit from access to information from board connections. This evidence is consistent with director networks being valuable and improving access to information.

Using a novel hand-collected dataset on leveraged buyouts, this study tests non-mutually exclusive hypotheses for club formation: collusion; financial resource pooling, either due to the riskiness of the target firm or to the fund’s investment limits; and experience. Results of the empirical analysis support the resource pooling motivation: club deals allow their members to buy larger targets and to reduce their equity commitment compared to solo deals. As the amount of equity they should commit to a deal increases, private equity buyers’ preference for club deals becomes stronger. Evidence also demonstrates that club deals do not harm competition, in that they are associated with a higher level of competition occurring in the private phase of deal negotiations. Targets’ stock price reactions around the acquisition announcements and takeover premiums are similar in solo deals and club deals. Finally, club deals are more likely created when private equity funds are less experienced.

We use unique features of the private credit market to examine if and how currency risk impacts firms' financing and whether currency risk is a priced systematic risk at the firm level. We find that currency exposure has a large impact on loan spreads. Decomposing loan spreads, we find that exposure increases the expected default loss premium and that internationalization, growth opportunities, and relationship intensify exposure's impact. Further, exposure exacerbates firms' financing risk by increasing the need for collateral, reducing loan maturity, inducing monitoring and covenant intensity, and influencing syndicate structure. However, exposure does not affect the expected return premium in loan spreads; hence, currency risk does not appear priced in the classical sense and, therefore, should not affect the “true” cost of debt. Our findings imply that while managers should be concerned about exposure's impact on their access to, and terms of, bank financing, they should not adjust hurdle rates on account of exposure when assessing investment projects.

This paper investigates the effects of a comprehensive insolvency regulation reform in Colombia, focusing on strengthening secured creditor rights, expanding the collateral menu, and establishing a national collateral registry. Leveraging a difference-in-difference design, the study examines the impact on firms with varying levels of movable assets. The reform significantly increased debt usage for firms with high movable assets, indicating a positive effect on financing. The national collateral registry played a pivotal role, benefiting firms in less financially developed regions. Furthermore, the analysis reveals nuanced interactions between the reform, firm size, and movable assets, suggesting differential effects on large and small enterprises. The study extends the Law and Finance literature, offering firm-level insights into the intricate dynamics between institutional changes and access to debt financing.

Using a sample of A-listed companies from 2010 to 2020, this paper investigates how investor–firm interactions on Easy Interaction and E-interaction affect corporate investment efficiency measured as investment-to-Tobin's Q sensitivity. The empirical results show that investor–firm interactions are positively correlated with corporate investment efficiency. Possible economic channels include information asymmetry and corporate governance channels. Moreover, investor–firm interactions have a greater impact on firms with fewer financial constraints, higher stock price efficiency, higher media coverage, and higher analyst coverage. When interaction sentiment is more positive, interaction quality is higher, and the topic pertains to technology research and development, the impact of investor–firm interactions is also more pronounced. The main conclusion still holds after adopting a series of endogeneity tests and robustness tests.