Journal of Corporate Finance最新文献

By using institutional trading data in a sample of US IPOs, I provide evidence that IPO syndicate banks use their affiliated institutional investors to build a relationship with IPO lead underwriters and boost their underwriting business. First, I show that investment managers provide unprofitable price support in the aftermarket of IPOs in which their parent banks are non-lead syndicate members. This costly support is concentrated in cold IPOs and IPOs net sold by independent institutions. Second, I show that lead underwriters are more likely to select in the IPO syndicate the banks whose affiliated institutional investors support IPO prices. I discuss and document evidence of the incentives of underwriters and affiliated institutions that make price support emerge in equilibrium.

This paper examines the impact of the local opioid epidemic on corporate innovation. Utilizing a large sample of U.S. public firms from 2003 to 2017, we find that firms located in counties with higher death rates caused by opioid overdoses are significantly less innovative as measured by their patenting activities. To establish causality, we exploit the state implementations of the Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) as quasi-experiments and an instrumented variable approach. We find suggestive evidence that the opioid epidemic hinders local firms' innovation by increasing healthcare costs, decreasing productivity, and through the exodus of local inventors.

This paper examines how environmental and social (ES) performance, proxied by related incidents, affect the managerial and analyst tones in quarterly earnings conference calls and its incremental effect on post-earnings call returns. We document that firms experiencing poor ES performance in the quarter prior to the earnings call exhibit more negative management tone after controlling for quarterly financial performance metrics. Tone difference in conference calls between managers and analysts predicts negative abnormal returns in the three-day window around the call. In the 60-day post-call period, we show that firms with poor ES performance exhibit returns negatively related to the tone difference on the conference call – low tone difference leads to return continuation and high tone difference predicts reversals for firms with positive earnings surprises. These results are consistent with an increase in information asymmetry and lower transparency for firms following poor ES performance.

We jointly model green and regular bond markets. Green bonds can improve allocative efficiency and lower financing costs for green projects, but economies of scale, like liquidity fragmentation, may cause friction. Consequently, profitable and welfare-enhancing projects, green and brown, can be rationed in equilibrium. Rationing green projects happens with a shortage of climate investors, large non-monetary offsets, and/or costly fragmentation. Rationing regular projects can happen with a shortage of regular investors, but also with an abundance, when more profitable green projects crowd out regular ones. We propose an alternative security design that preserves green earmarking but prevents fragmentation.

In this study, we explore the impact of the establishment of environmental courts, an environmental justice system, on the cost of equity capital. Based on a quasi-natural experiment of establishing environmental courts in China, we find that they have a deterrent effect and reduce the cost of equity capital for heavily polluting firms in localities. We also find that a low proportion of managerial ownership, a low level of analyst attention, and high environmental uncertainty induce this deterrent effect. Furthermore, mechanism tests indicate that environmental courts enhance corporate environmental engagement and corporate ESG ratings, increase long-term institutional investor ownership, and reduce urban environmental violations to achieve a deterrent effect. The findings are more pronounced for the trial court sample, firms in cities with lower public participation in environmental protection, and firms with lower environmental information transparency. We also suggest the impacts and underlying mechanisms of the environmental justice system on the equity capital market, which is conducive to long-term planning by firm managers.

Stock market trading restrictions affect prices and liquidity directly through constraints on investors' transactions and indirectly by altering the information environment. We isolate this indirect effect by analyzing how stock market restrictions affect corporate bond yields. Exploiting the staggered reductions of trading restrictions in the Chinese stock market as a quasi-natural experiment, we document that the easing of trading restrictions on a firm's stock decreases its corporate bond spreads. This effect is stronger for firms with less transparency or lower credit ratings. Our evidence suggests that the effect is likely due to improved stock price informativeness.

In their article “Innovation and Institutional Ownership”, Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales (2013) find that the rise in institutional stock ownership in the U.S. during the 1990s led to an increase in corporate innovation, as measured by patent and patent citation counts. Their article concludes that “contrary to the view that institutional ownership induces a short-term focus in managers, we find that their presence boosts innovation” (p. 302). Subsequent research has generally accepted this finding at face value. However, we uncover several critical issues with their data. Addressing these issues renders the results economically and statistically insignificant and, in some instances, even suggests a negative relationship between institutional ownership and U.S. innovation.

Effective board monitoring prevents entrenched managers from undertaking acquisitions that are detrimental to shareholders. It also facilitates a smooth transition during the post-acquisition phase. We examine how independent board leadership affects M&A outcomes. Controlling for many firm, board, and CEO attributes, we find that acquirers with independent board chairpersons earn significantly higher CAR around M&A announcements. The positive effects of independent board chairpersons are more pronounced in acquirers with high monitoring needs. The boards led by independent chairpersons primarily add value by selecting targets with high synergetic gains, avoiding overpaying for targets, and facilitating smooth transition in the post-acquisition phase.

We analyze how the materialization of physical climate risk in the institutional investors’ portfolios spurs a propagation effect on the information content of stock prices. Institutional investors with a relatively high portfolio exposure to natural disasters divest from disaster-hit stocks, decrease the trading intensity in non-hit stocks, and their trading decisions predict low medium-term returns. At the firm-level, institutional investors propagate the effects of disasters to non-hit stocks through reduced incorporation of firm-specific information, especially when the stocks represent a low portfolio weight. Combined, these results suggest that natural disasters trigger a rational reallocation of information-processing resources by institutional investors.

We find that local religious social norms mitigate professional misconduct by financial advisors. Using publicly disclosed misconduct data, we find that financial advisors working in areas with greater religious participation are less likely to violate ethical standards. When advisors move to counties with greater religious participation, their misconduct rates decrease. The effect of local religiosity is robust across population density levels, misconduct types, and market conditions. We strengthen identification by using shocks to religious participation following local disclosures of sexual abuse by Catholic priests. The findings show that local religiosity restrains misconduct not only in previously studied corporate financial settings but also when professionals provide financial services to individuals and households.