This article offers a rejoinder to Felix Waldmann. In a critical note published in Locke Studies, Waldmann challenges our recent reconstruction of Locke’s thesis, developed across the Second Treatise of Government, that humans cannot possibly agree to subject themselves to absolute rule. Call this thesis No Contractual Absolutism. Our reconstruction, Waldmann objects, “neglects a basic datum of scholarship”: i.e., that Locke’s Second Treatise intended to counter Filmer’s political theory. Our reply is two-pronged. First, we argue that No Contractual Absolutism cannot plausibly be construed as an attack on Filmer, since it challenges a thesis that he did not hold. Indeed, as for him no form of government can be contractual in origin, Filmer would have agreed with Locke that absolute rule cannot be instituted by agreement. As our initial article suggested, the standard view about whom the polemical target is of the Second Treatise requires qualification with respect to No Contractual Absolutism. Second, we contend that Waldmann’s concerns rest on discipline-specific methodological assumptions, which are unhelpful for the kind of analytical reconstruction we advanced. We conclude with a plea for methodological pluralism in the study of Locke’s thought.
本文对费利克斯·沃尔德曼的观点进行了反驳。在《洛克研究》(Locke Studies)上发表的一篇评论文章中，瓦尔德曼挑战了我们最近对洛克在《政府论第二篇》(Second Treatise of Government)中提出的论点的重建，即人类不可能同意将自己置于绝对统治之下。把这篇论文称为“无契约绝对主义”。瓦尔德曼反对说，我们的重建“忽略了学术研究的一个基本基础”:即洛克的《政府论第二篇》意在反驳菲尔默的政治理论。我们的回答是双管齐下的。首先，我们认为无契约绝对主义不能被合理地解释为对菲尔默的攻击，因为它挑战了他并不持有的论点。事实上，对于他来说，没有任何形式的政府可以起源于契约，菲尔默会同意洛克的观点，即绝对统治不能通过协议来建立。正如我们最初的文章所建议的那样，关于《政府论第二篇》的争论目标是谁的标准观点需要对“无契约绝对主义”进行限定。其次，我们认为，瓦尔德曼的关注是建立在学科特定的方法论假设上的，这对我们提出的分析重建是没有帮助的。最后，我们呼吁在研究洛克的思想时采用方法论的多元主义。
{"title":"The Value of Methodological Pluralism in the Study of Locke on Slavery and Absolutism","authors":"J. Olsthoorn, Laurens van Apeldoorn","doi":"10.5206/ls.2021.14618","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/ls.2021.14618","url":null,"abstract":"This article offers a rejoinder to Felix Waldmann. In a critical note published in Locke Studies, Waldmann challenges our recent reconstruction of Locke’s thesis, developed across the Second Treatise of Government, that humans cannot possibly agree to subject themselves to absolute rule. Call this thesis No Contractual Absolutism. Our reconstruction, Waldmann objects, “neglects a basic datum of scholarship”: i.e., that Locke’s Second Treatise intended to counter Filmer’s political theory. Our reply is two-pronged. First, we argue that No Contractual Absolutism cannot plausibly be construed as an attack on Filmer, since it challenges a thesis that he did not hold. Indeed, as for him no form of government can be contractual in origin, Filmer would have agreed with Locke that absolute rule cannot be instituted by agreement. As our initial article suggested, the standard view about whom the polemical target is of the Second Treatise requires qualification with respect to No Contractual Absolutism. Second, we contend that Waldmann’s concerns rest on discipline-specific methodological assumptions, which are unhelpful for the kind of analytical reconstruction we advanced. We conclude with a plea for methodological pluralism in the study of Locke’s thought.","PeriodicalId":165811,"journal":{"name":"Locke Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115903972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many researchers have addressed the question of whether Locke’s individuals are fundamentally self-interested or motivated by the common good. This paper approaches this question by focusing on his views on labour, labourers, industry, and improvement. This approach reveals that Locke envisaged a community whose members are not only concerned with securing individual rights and self-interest, or with performing extra-civic or God-given duties, but should also be motivated to make efforts to improve both material and moral life. To him, labour represented the common capacities of mankind to make use of their “heads” and “hands” industriously, and to thus contribute to one another by making their lives better. Locke’s individuals are active members of society, regardless of status or class. His inclusion of the labouring poor as equal contributors marks the break with humanist political discourse on the one hand, and with the Protestant idea of calling on the other.
{"title":"Improvement as the Foundation of Liberty","authors":"Masanori Kashiwazaki","doi":"10.5206/ls.2021.11110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/ls.2021.11110","url":null,"abstract":"Many researchers have addressed the question of whether Locke’s individuals are fundamentally self-interested or motivated by the common good. This paper approaches this question by focusing on his views on labour, labourers, industry, and improvement. This approach reveals that Locke envisaged a community whose members are not only concerned with securing individual rights and self-interest, or with performing extra-civic or God-given duties, but should also be motivated to make efforts to improve both material and moral life. To him, labour represented the common capacities of mankind to make use of their “heads” and “hands” industriously, and to thus contribute to one another by making their lives better. Locke’s individuals are active members of society, regardless of status or class. His inclusion of the labouring poor as equal contributors marks the break with humanist political discourse on the one hand, and with the Protestant idea of calling on the other.","PeriodicalId":165811,"journal":{"name":"Locke Studies","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124157003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I argue for two controversial claims about Locke’s account of liberty in Essay 2.21. The first claim is that Locke does not identify liberty with freedom of action. Instead, Locke places further conditions on liberty beyond to the power to perform or forbear an action at will. The second (and closely related) claim is that Locke takes the power to suspend and examine desire to be necessary for liberty—in other words, that possession of the power to suspend and examine desire is one such further condition upon liberty.
{"title":"Liberty and Suspension in Locke’s Essay","authors":"Matthew A. Leisinger","doi":"10.5206/ls.2021.13972","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/ls.2021.13972","url":null,"abstract":"I argue for two controversial claims about Locke’s account of liberty in Essay 2.21. The first claim is that Locke does not identify liberty with freedom of action. Instead, Locke places further conditions on liberty beyond to the power to perform or forbear an action at will. The second (and closely related) claim is that Locke takes the power to suspend and examine desire to be necessary for liberty—in other words, that possession of the power to suspend and examine desire is one such further condition upon liberty.","PeriodicalId":165811,"journal":{"name":"Locke Studies","volume":"8 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120849560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lady Sarah Cowper (1644-1720) is best known for her commonplace books, which preserve unique and variant versions of poems by Restoration “wits.” She also kept a diary, in which she recorded her readings and meditations. The diary contains an unnoticed encomiastic “Character” of John Locke, composed at his death. It is one of the earliest obituaries of him, but it was commonplaced from other sources. Her use of her sources exemplifies aspects of the manuscript circulation of texts and the ways in which the active selection and redaction of textual material reflected a reader’s own religious, political, and personal preoccupations. Cowper portrays Locke as a moral exemplar and Christian virtuoso, whose orthodoxy she defends, and whose latitudinarian and Whig commitments she shares.
{"title":"Sarah Cowper's \"Character\" of John Locke","authors":"M. Goldie","doi":"10.5206/ls.2021.11009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/ls.2021.11009","url":null,"abstract":"Lady Sarah Cowper (1644-1720) is best known for her commonplace books, which preserve unique and variant versions of poems by Restoration “wits.” She also kept a diary, in which she recorded her readings and meditations. The diary contains an unnoticed encomiastic “Character” of John Locke, composed at his death. It is one of the earliest obituaries of him, but it was commonplaced from other sources. Her use of her sources exemplifies aspects of the manuscript circulation of texts and the ways in which the active selection and redaction of textual material reflected a reader’s own religious, political, and personal preoccupations. Cowper portrays Locke as a moral exemplar and Christian virtuoso, whose orthodoxy she defends, and whose latitudinarian and Whig commitments she shares.","PeriodicalId":165811,"journal":{"name":"Locke Studies","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116955858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A list 173 works related to Locke, published during late 2019 and 2020.
在2019年底和2020年期间出版的173部与洛克有关的作品清单。
{"title":"Recent Publications","authors":"B. Hill","doi":"10.5206/ls.2020.13630","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/ls.2020.13630","url":null,"abstract":"A list 173 works related to Locke, published during late 2019 and 2020.","PeriodicalId":165811,"journal":{"name":"Locke Studies","volume":"116 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121286332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke provides an empirical account of all of our ideas, including our moral ideas. However, Locke’s account of moral epistemology is difficult to understand leading to mistaken objections to his moral epistemological theory. In this paper, I offer what I believe to be the correct account of Locke’s moral epistemology. This account of his moral epistemology resolves the objections that morality is not demonstrable, that Locke’s account fails to demonstrate the normativity of statements, and that Locke has not provided us with the means to determine the correctness of the moral rules.
{"title":"A Defense of Locke’s Moral Epistemology","authors":"Jamie Hardy","doi":"10.5206/LS.2020.8249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/LS.2020.8249","url":null,"abstract":"In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke provides an empirical account of all of our ideas, including our moral ideas. However, Locke’s account of moral epistemology is difficult to understand leading to mistaken objections to his moral epistemological theory. In this paper, I offer what I believe to be the correct account of Locke’s moral epistemology. This account of his moral epistemology resolves the objections that morality is not demonstrable, that Locke’s account fails to demonstrate the normativity of statements, and that Locke has not provided us with the means to determine the correctness of the moral rules. ","PeriodicalId":165811,"journal":{"name":"Locke Studies","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127764686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For many years, there has been a vibrant debate about whether Locke is friendly or hostile to the proposition that the mind is a material thing. On the one hand, there are passages in which Locke tells us that it is probable that the mind is immaterial. On the other hand, there are passages in which Locke expressly allows for the possibility that matter, suitably arranged, could be given the power to think. It is no surprise, then, that some scholars assume that Locke is a dualist, while other scholars think that Locke is a materialist. Yet others think that Locke studiously tries to remain completely agnostic about the nature of mind. Taking the relevant primary sources and secondary literature into account, I argue that Locke takes it to be more probable than not that the mind is immaterial.
{"title":"Locke on the Probability of the Mind's Immateriality","authors":"S. Rickless","doi":"10.5206/LS.2020.10677","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/LS.2020.10677","url":null,"abstract":"For many years, there has been a vibrant debate about whether Locke is friendly or hostile to the proposition that the mind is a material thing. On the one hand, there are passages in which Locke tells us that it is probable that the mind is immaterial. On the other hand, there are passages in which Locke expressly allows for the possibility that matter, suitably arranged, could be given the power to think. It is no surprise, then, that some scholars assume that Locke is a dualist, while other scholars think that Locke is a materialist. Yet others think that Locke studiously tries to remain completely agnostic about the nature of mind. Taking the relevant primary sources and secondary literature into account, I argue that Locke takes it to be more probable than not that the mind is immaterial.","PeriodicalId":165811,"journal":{"name":"Locke Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128516668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The study of John Locke’s theological thought has yet to be combined with emerging historical research, pioneered by Jean-Louis Quantin, into the apologetic uses of Christian antiquity in the Restoration Church of England. This article will address this historiographical lacuna by making two related arguments. First, I will contend that Locke’s Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul (1705–1707) marked a definitive shift in his critique of the appeal to Christian antiquity. Prior to 1700, Locke had largely contested these references to the precedent of the early Christian Church by making a narrowly philosophical case against arguments from authority in general. However, the controversial reception of Locke’s theological writings in the 1690s, compelled him to develop historical and methodological arguments in the Paraphrase against the witness of Christian antiquity. Secondly, I will argue that Locke’s repudiation of the witness of Christian antiquity was the primary motivation for the diverse responses to the Paraphrase by early eighteenth-century Anglican writers, such as Robert Jenkin, Daniel Whitby, William Whiston, Winch Holdsworth and Catharine Cockburn.
{"title":"Christian Antiquity and the Anglican Reception of John Locke’s Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St Paul, 1707–1730","authors":"Jacob Donald Chatterjee","doi":"10.5206/LS.2020.10597","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/LS.2020.10597","url":null,"abstract":"The study of John Locke’s theological thought has yet to be combined with emerging historical research, pioneered by Jean-Louis Quantin, into the apologetic uses of Christian antiquity in the Restoration Church of England. This article will address this historiographical lacuna by making two related arguments. First, I will contend that Locke’s Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul (1705–1707) marked a definitive shift in his critique of the appeal to Christian antiquity. Prior to 1700, Locke had largely contested these references to the precedent of the early Christian Church by making a narrowly philosophical case against arguments from authority in general. However, the controversial reception of Locke’s theological writings in the 1690s, compelled him to develop historical and methodological arguments in the Paraphrase against the witness of Christian antiquity. Secondly, I will argue that Locke’s repudiation of the witness of Christian antiquity was the primary motivation for the diverse responses to the Paraphrase by early eighteenth-century Anglican writers, such as Robert Jenkin, Daniel Whitby, William Whiston, Winch Holdsworth and Catharine Cockburn. ","PeriodicalId":165811,"journal":{"name":"Locke Studies","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128179758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper I will defend the view that, according to Locke, secondary qualities are dispositions to produce sensations in us. Although this view is widely attributed to Locke, this interpretation needs defending for two reasons. First, commentators often assume that secondary qualities are dispositional properties because Locke calls them “powers” to produce sensations. However, primary qualities are also powers, so the powers locution is insufficient grounds for justifying the dispositionalist interpretation. Second, if secondary qualities are dispositional properties, then objects would retain secondary qualities while not being observed, but Locke says that colors “vanish” in the dark. Some commentators use this as evidence that Locke rejects the dispositionalist view of secondary qualities, and even those that are sympathetic to the traditional interpretation find these comments to be problematic. By contrast, I argue that even in these supposedly damning passages Locke shows an unwavering commitment to the view that the powers to produce sensations in us, i.e., the secondary qualities, remain in objects even when they are not being perceived. Thus, the arguments against the traditional interpretation are unpersuasive, and we should conclude that Locke does indeed hold that secondary qualities are dispositions to cause sensations in us.
{"title":"Secondary Qualities as Dispositions","authors":"Nathan Rockwood","doi":"10.5206/LS.2020.10799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/LS.2020.10799","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I will defend the view that, according to Locke, secondary qualities are dispositions to produce sensations in us. Although this view is widely attributed to Locke, this interpretation needs defending for two reasons. First, commentators often assume that secondary qualities are dispositional properties because Locke calls them “powers” to produce sensations. However, primary qualities are also powers, so the powers locution is insufficient grounds for justifying the dispositionalist interpretation. Second, if secondary qualities are dispositional properties, then objects would retain secondary qualities while not being observed, but Locke says that colors “vanish” in the dark. Some commentators use this as evidence that Locke rejects the dispositionalist view of secondary qualities, and even those that are sympathetic to the traditional interpretation find these comments to be problematic. By contrast, I argue that even in these supposedly damning passages Locke shows an unwavering commitment to the view that the powers to produce sensations in us, i.e., the secondary qualities, remain in objects even when they are not being perceived. Thus, the arguments against the traditional interpretation are unpersuasive, and we should conclude that Locke does indeed hold that secondary qualities are dispositions to cause sensations in us.","PeriodicalId":165811,"journal":{"name":"Locke Studies","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124781047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article maintains that Locke’s consciousness-based theory of personal identity, which Locke expounded in book 2, chapter 27 of the second edition of An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1694), perfectly fits with his views on the resurrection of the dead, the Last Judgment, and salvation. The compatibility of Locke’s theory of personal identity with his soteriology has been questioned by Udo Thiel and Galen Strawson. These two authors have claimed that Locke’s emphasis on repentance, which he described as necessary to salvation in The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), clashes with his notion of punishment as annexed to personality and, hence, to consciousness. Pace Thiel and Strawson, I argue that Locke’s theory of personal identity is compatible with his concept of repentance. To this purpose, I first explain Locke’s views on the soul’s death and the resurrection of the dead on Judgment Day, when, according to Locke, we will all be raised from death by divine miracle, but only the repentant faithful will be admitted to eternal bliss while the wicked will be annihilated. Locke’s mortalism, along with his agnosticism on the ontological constitution of thinking substances or souls, played a role in his formulation of a non-substantialist account of personal identity, because it denied the temporal continuity of the soul between physical death and resurrection and it rejected the resurrection of the same body. I then analyze Locke’s consciousness-based theory of personal identity, with a focus on the implications of this theory regarding moral accountability. Finally, I turn my attention to Thiel’s and Strawson’s considerations about Locke’s views on consciousness and repentance. To prove that Locke’s views on salvation are consistent with his theory of personal identity, I clarify Locke’s soteriology, which describes not only repentance, but also obedience, faith, and the conscientious study of Scripture as necessary to salvation.
{"title":"Reconciling Locke’s Consciousness-Based Theory of Personal Identity and His Soteriology","authors":"Diego Lucci","doi":"10.5206/ls.2020.7321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/ls.2020.7321","url":null,"abstract":"This article maintains that Locke’s consciousness-based theory of personal identity, which Locke expounded in book 2, chapter 27 of the second edition of An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1694), perfectly fits with his views on the resurrection of the dead, the Last Judgment, and salvation. The compatibility of Locke’s theory of personal identity with his soteriology has been questioned by Udo Thiel and Galen Strawson. These two authors have claimed that Locke’s emphasis on repentance, which he described as necessary to salvation in The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), clashes with his notion of punishment as annexed to personality and, hence, to consciousness. Pace Thiel and Strawson, I argue that Locke’s theory of personal identity is compatible with his concept of repentance. To this purpose, I first explain Locke’s views on the soul’s death and the resurrection of the dead on Judgment Day, when, according to Locke, we will all be raised from death by divine miracle, but only the repentant faithful will be admitted to eternal bliss while the wicked will be annihilated. Locke’s mortalism, along with his agnosticism on the ontological constitution of thinking substances or souls, played a role in his formulation of a non-substantialist account of personal identity, because it denied the temporal continuity of the soul between physical death and resurrection and it rejected the resurrection of the same body. I then analyze Locke’s consciousness-based theory of personal identity, with a focus on the implications of this theory regarding moral accountability. Finally, I turn my attention to Thiel’s and Strawson’s considerations about Locke’s views on consciousness and repentance. To prove that Locke’s views on salvation are consistent with his theory of personal identity, I clarify Locke’s soteriology, which describes not only repentance, but also obedience, faith, and the conscientious study of Scripture as necessary to salvation.","PeriodicalId":165811,"journal":{"name":"Locke Studies","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125841960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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