Grant Ho, Derek Leung, Pratyush Mishra, Ashkan Hosseini, D. Song, D. Wagner
We examine the security of home smart locks: cyber-physical devices that replace traditional door locks with deadbolts that can be electronically controlled by mobile devices or the lock manufacturer's remote servers. We present two categories of attacks against smart locks and analyze the security of five commercially-available locks with respect to these attacks. Our security analysis reveals that flaws in the design, implementation, and interaction models of existing locks can be exploited by several classes of adversaries, allowing them to learn private information about users and gain unauthorized home access. To guide future development of smart locks and similar Internet of Things devices, we propose several defenses that mitigate the attacks we present. One of these defenses is a novel approach to securely and usably communicate a user's intended actions to smart locks, which we prototype and evaluate. Ultimately, our work takes a first step towards illuminating security challenges in the system design and novel functionality introduced by emerging IoT systems.
{"title":"Smart Locks: Lessons for Securing Commodity Internet of Things Devices","authors":"Grant Ho, Derek Leung, Pratyush Mishra, Ashkan Hosseini, D. Song, D. Wagner","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897886","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897886","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the security of home smart locks: cyber-physical devices that replace traditional door locks with deadbolts that can be electronically controlled by mobile devices or the lock manufacturer's remote servers. We present two categories of attacks against smart locks and analyze the security of five commercially-available locks with respect to these attacks. Our security analysis reveals that flaws in the design, implementation, and interaction models of existing locks can be exploited by several classes of adversaries, allowing them to learn private information about users and gain unauthorized home access. To guide future development of smart locks and similar Internet of Things devices, we propose several defenses that mitigate the attacks we present. One of these defenses is a novel approach to securely and usably communicate a user's intended actions to smart locks, which we prototype and evaluate. Ultimately, our work takes a first step towards illuminating security challenges in the system design and novel functionality introduced by emerging IoT systems.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126496863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While users tend to indiscriminately use the same device to address every need, exfiltration of information becomes the end game of attackers. Average users need realistic and practical solutions to enable them to mitigate the consequences of a security breach in terms of data leakage. We present StemJail, an open-source security solution to isolate groups of processes pertaining to the same activity into an environment exposing only the relevant subset of user data. At the heart of our solution lies dynamic activity discovery, allowing seamless integration of StemJail into the user workflow. Our userland access control framework only relies on the ability of user to organize data in directories. Thus, it is easily configurable and requires very little user interaction once set up. Moreover, StemJail is designed to run without intrusive changes to the system and to be configured and used by any unprivileged user thanks to the Linux user namespaces.
{"title":"StemJail: Dynamic Role Compartmentalization","authors":"Mickaël Salaün, M. Daubignard, Hervé Debar","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897912","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897912","url":null,"abstract":"While users tend to indiscriminately use the same device to address every need, exfiltration of information becomes the end game of attackers. Average users need realistic and practical solutions to enable them to mitigate the consequences of a security breach in terms of data leakage. We present StemJail, an open-source security solution to isolate groups of processes pertaining to the same activity into an environment exposing only the relevant subset of user data. At the heart of our solution lies dynamic activity discovery, allowing seamless integration of StemJail into the user workflow. Our userland access control framework only relies on the ability of user to organize data in directories. Thus, it is easily configurable and requires very little user interaction once set up. Moreover, StemJail is designed to run without intrusive changes to the system and to be configured and used by any unprivileged user thanks to the Linux user namespaces.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126600943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kaoutar Elkhiyaoui, Melek Önen, Monir Azraoui, R. Molva
With the advent of cloud computing, individuals and companies alike are looking for opportunities to leverage cloud resources not only for storage but also for computation. Nevertheless, the reliance on the cloud to perform computation raises the unavoidable challenge of how to assure the correctness of the delegated computation. In this regard, we introduce two cryptographic protocols for publicly verifiable computation that allow a lightweight client to securely outsource to a cloud server the evaluation of high-degree univariate polynomials and the multiplication of large matrices. Similarly to existing work, our protocols follow the amortized verifiable computation approach. Furthermore, by exploiting the mathematical properties of polynomials and matrices, they are more efficient and give way to public delegatability. Finally, besides their efficiency, our protocols are provably secure under well-studied assumptions.
{"title":"Efficient Techniques for Publicly Verifiable Delegation of Computation","authors":"Kaoutar Elkhiyaoui, Melek Önen, Monir Azraoui, R. Molva","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897910","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897910","url":null,"abstract":"With the advent of cloud computing, individuals and companies alike are looking for opportunities to leverage cloud resources not only for storage but also for computation. Nevertheless, the reliance on the cloud to perform computation raises the unavoidable challenge of how to assure the correctness of the delegated computation. In this regard, we introduce two cryptographic protocols for publicly verifiable computation that allow a lightweight client to securely outsource to a cloud server the evaluation of high-degree univariate polynomials and the multiplication of large matrices. Similarly to existing work, our protocols follow the amortized verifiable computation approach. Furthermore, by exploiting the mathematical properties of polynomials and matrices, they are more efficient and give way to public delegatability. Finally, besides their efficiency, our protocols are provably secure under well-studied assumptions.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116035275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Chen Wang, Xiaonan Guo, Yan Wang, Yingying Chen, Bo Liu
The proliferation of wearable devices, e.g., smartwatches and activity trackers, with embedded sensors has already shown its great potential on monitoring and inferring human daily activities. This paper reveals a serious security breach of wearable devices in the context of divulging secret information (i.e., key entries) while people accessing key-based security systems. Existing methods of obtaining such secret information relies on installations of dedicated hardware (e.g., video camera or fake keypad), or training with labeled data from body sensors, which restrict use cases in practical adversary scenarios. In this work, we show that a wearable device can be exploited to discriminate mm-level distances and directions of the user's fine-grained hand movements, which enable attackers to reproduce the trajectories of the user's hand and further to recover the secret key entries. In particular, our system confirms the possibility of using embedded sensors in wearable devices, i.e., accelerometers, gyroscopes, and magnetometers, to derive the moving distance of the user's hand between consecutive key entries regardless of the pose of the hand. Our Backward PIN-Sequence Inference algorithm exploits the inherent physical constraints between key entries to infer the complete user key entry sequence. Extensive experiments are conducted with over 5000 key entry traces collected from 20 adults for key-based security systems (i.e. ATM keypads and regular keyboards) through testing on different kinds of wearables. Results demonstrate that such a technique can achieve 80% accuracy with only one try and more than 90% accuracy with three tries, which to our knowledge, is the first technique that reveals personal PINs leveraging wearable devices without the need for labeled training data and contextual information.
{"title":"Friend or Foe?: Your Wearable Devices Reveal Your Personal PIN","authors":"Chen Wang, Xiaonan Guo, Yan Wang, Yingying Chen, Bo Liu","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897847","url":null,"abstract":"The proliferation of wearable devices, e.g., smartwatches and activity trackers, with embedded sensors has already shown its great potential on monitoring and inferring human daily activities. This paper reveals a serious security breach of wearable devices in the context of divulging secret information (i.e., key entries) while people accessing key-based security systems. Existing methods of obtaining such secret information relies on installations of dedicated hardware (e.g., video camera or fake keypad), or training with labeled data from body sensors, which restrict use cases in practical adversary scenarios. In this work, we show that a wearable device can be exploited to discriminate mm-level distances and directions of the user's fine-grained hand movements, which enable attackers to reproduce the trajectories of the user's hand and further to recover the secret key entries. In particular, our system confirms the possibility of using embedded sensors in wearable devices, i.e., accelerometers, gyroscopes, and magnetometers, to derive the moving distance of the user's hand between consecutive key entries regardless of the pose of the hand. Our Backward PIN-Sequence Inference algorithm exploits the inherent physical constraints between key entries to infer the complete user key entry sequence. Extensive experiments are conducted with over 5000 key entry traces collected from 20 adults for key-based security systems (i.e. ATM keypads and regular keyboards) through testing on different kinds of wearables. Results demonstrate that such a technique can achieve 80% accuracy with only one try and more than 90% accuracy with three tries, which to our knowledge, is the first technique that reveals personal PINs leveraging wearable devices without the need for labeled training data and contextual information.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129468807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is our great pleasure to present you the proceedings of the 11th Asia CCS (held in Xi'an, China), an ACM SIGSAC venue just renamed ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security to reflect its leadership stance in the Asia security community and world-wide impact on security research. This name change also comes with a new high in the conference's academic excellence, thanks to the unprecedented number of high-quality submissions. This year, we received 350 submissions from 34 countries, a new record in the conference's decade-long history. These papers were reviewed by 104 security researchers from 17 countries, assisted by 218 external reviewers, based upon their novelty, technical quality and presentation. First time in the conference's history, we adopted a two-round review mechanism with early notifications, together with a three-week online discussion. This thoughtful and rigorous review process has led to 73 full papers selected for the program, representing an acceptance rate of 20.8%, and additional 8 short papers. This wonderful program was made possible by a team effort. Most important here are the authors, to whom we are grateful for submitting their best research outcomes to the conference. Also, we thank the Program Committee and external reviewers who worked very hard to provide valuable feedbacks to the authors. On average, each PC member reviewed 11 papers and actively participated in the discussion and some also volunteered to shepherd accepted papers to ensure their qualities. Their professionalism exemplifies the volunteer peer-review process that is so important to moving the security science forward. This year's technical program comes together with 5 workshops: CPSS'16, AsiaPKC'16, SCC'16, WTMC'16 and IoTPTS'16, also a new record. We thank the workshop organizers for their hard work for building up their individual programs. Also, we are so fortunate to have three distinguished speakers, Giovanni Vigna, Michael Backes and Yang Xiang, from three continents, to share with us their visions of security and privacy research.
我们很高兴向您介绍第11届亚洲计算机与通信安全会议(在中国西安举行)的会议记录，这是ACM SIGSAC的会场，刚刚更名为ACM亚洲计算机与通信安全会议，以反映其在亚洲安全界的领导地位和全球安全研究的影响。由于提交了数量空前的高质量论文，这次更名也使会议的学术成就达到了一个新的高度。今年，我们收到了来自34个国家的350份意见书，创下了大会十年来的新纪录。这些论文由来自17个国家的104名安全研究人员在218名外部审稿人的协助下，根据其新颖性、技术质量和表达方式进行了审查。我们在大会历史上首次采用了提前通知的两轮审议机制，并进行了为期三周的在线讨论。经过深思熟虑和严格的审查过程，73篇完整论文入选该项目，录取率为20.8%，另外还有8篇短文。这个精彩的节目是团队努力的结果。这里最重要的是作者，我们感谢他们向会议提交了他们最好的研究成果。同时，我们感谢项目委员会和外部审稿人，他们非常努力地为作者提供了有价值的反馈。每位委员平均审阅11篇论文，并积极参与讨论，有些委员还自愿指导论文，以确保论文的质量。他们的专业精神体现了志愿者同行评审过程，这对推动安全科学的发展至关重要。今年的技术计划包括5个研讨会:CPSS'16, AsiaPKC'16, SCC'16, WTMC'16和IoTPTS'16，也是一个新的纪录。我们感谢研讨会组织者为建立他们的个人项目所做的辛勤工作。此外，我们很荣幸邀请到三位杰出的演讲者，Giovanni Vigna, Michael Backes和Yang Xiang，他们来自三个大洲，与我们分享他们对安全和隐私研究的看法。
{"title":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","authors":"Xiaofeng Chen, Xiaofeng Wang, Xinyi Huang","doi":"10.1145/2897845","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845","url":null,"abstract":"It is our great pleasure to present you the proceedings of the 11th Asia CCS (held in Xi'an, China), an ACM SIGSAC venue just renamed ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security to reflect its leadership stance in the Asia security community and world-wide impact on security research. This name change also comes with a new high in the conference's academic excellence, thanks to the unprecedented number of high-quality submissions. \u0000 \u0000This year, we received 350 submissions from 34 countries, a new record in the conference's decade-long history. These papers were reviewed by 104 security researchers from 17 countries, assisted by 218 external reviewers, based upon their novelty, technical quality and presentation. First time in the conference's history, we adopted a two-round review mechanism with early notifications, together with a three-week online discussion. This thoughtful and rigorous review process has led to 73 full papers selected for the program, representing an acceptance rate of 20.8%, and additional 8 short papers. \u0000 \u0000This wonderful program was made possible by a team effort. Most important here are the authors, to whom we are grateful for submitting their best research outcomes to the conference. Also, we thank the Program Committee and external reviewers who worked very hard to provide valuable feedbacks to the authors. On average, each PC member reviewed 11 papers and actively participated in the discussion and some also volunteered to shepherd accepted papers to ensure their qualities. Their professionalism exemplifies the volunteer peer-review process that is so important to moving the security science forward. \u0000 \u0000This year's technical program comes together with 5 workshops: CPSS'16, AsiaPKC'16, SCC'16, WTMC'16 and IoTPTS'16, also a new record. We thank the workshop organizers for their hard work for building up their individual programs. Also, we are so fortunate to have three distinguished speakers, Giovanni Vigna, Michael Backes and Yang Xiang, from three continents, to share with us their visions of security and privacy research.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"465 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125852109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
W. Susilo, Rongmao Chen, F. Guo, Guomin Yang, Y. Mu, Yang-Wai Chow
In this paper, we present the notion of recipient-revocable identity-based broadcast encryption scheme. In this notion, a content provider will produce encrypted content and send them to a third party (which is a broadcaster). This third party will be able to revoke some identities from the ciphertext. We present a security model to capture these requirements, as well as a concrete construction. The ciphertext consists of k+3 group elements, assuming that the maximum number of revocation identities is k. That is, the ciphertext size is linear in the maximal size of R, where R is the revocation identity set. However, we say that the additional elements compared to that from an IBBE scheme are only for the revocation but not for decryption. Therefore, the ciphertext sent to the users for decryption will be of constant size (i.e.,3 group elements). Finally, we present the proof of security of our construction.
{"title":"Recipient Revocable Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption: How to Revoke Some Recipients in IBBE without Knowledge of the Plaintext","authors":"W. Susilo, Rongmao Chen, F. Guo, Guomin Yang, Y. Mu, Yang-Wai Chow","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897848","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we present the notion of recipient-revocable identity-based broadcast encryption scheme. In this notion, a content provider will produce encrypted content and send them to a third party (which is a broadcaster). This third party will be able to revoke some identities from the ciphertext. We present a security model to capture these requirements, as well as a concrete construction. The ciphertext consists of k+3 group elements, assuming that the maximum number of revocation identities is k. That is, the ciphertext size is linear in the maximal size of R, where R is the revocation identity set. However, we say that the additional elements compared to that from an IBBE scheme are only for the revocation but not for decryption. Therefore, the ciphertext sent to the users for decryption will be of constant size (i.e.,3 group elements). Finally, we present the proof of security of our construction.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130884852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Intent-based communication is an inter-application communication mechanism in Android. While its importance has been proven by plenty of security extensions that protect it with policy-driven mandatory access control, an overlooked problem is the verification of the security policies. Checking one security extension's policy is indeed complex. Furthermore, intent-based communication introduces even more complexities because it is mediated by multiple security extensions that respectively enforce their own incompatible, distributed, and dynamic policies. This paper seeks a systematic approach to address the complexities involved in checking intent-based communication. To this end, we propose intent space analysis. Intent space analysis formulates the intent forwarding functionalities of security extensions as transformations on a geometric intent space. We further introduce a policy checking framework called IntentScope that proactively and automatically aggregates distributed policies into a holistic and verifiable view. We evaluate our approach against customized Android OSs and commodity Android devices. In addition, we further conduct experiments with four security extensions to demonstrate how our approach helps identify potential vulnerabilities in each extension.
{"title":"Checking Intent-based Communication in Android with Intent Space Analysis","authors":"Yiming Jing, Gail-Joon Ahn, Adam Doupé, J. Yi","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897904","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897904","url":null,"abstract":"Intent-based communication is an inter-application communication mechanism in Android. While its importance has been proven by plenty of security extensions that protect it with policy-driven mandatory access control, an overlooked problem is the verification of the security policies. Checking one security extension's policy is indeed complex. Furthermore, intent-based communication introduces even more complexities because it is mediated by multiple security extensions that respectively enforce their own incompatible, distributed, and dynamic policies. This paper seeks a systematic approach to address the complexities involved in checking intent-based communication. To this end, we propose intent space analysis. Intent space analysis formulates the intent forwarding functionalities of security extensions as transformations on a geometric intent space. We further introduce a policy checking framework called IntentScope that proactively and automatically aggregates distributed policies into a holistic and verifiable view. We evaluate our approach against customized Android OSs and commodity Android devices. In addition, we further conduct experiments with four security extensions to demonstrate how our approach helps identify potential vulnerabilities in each extension.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130173271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Peng Xu, Jun Xu, Wei Wang, Hai Jin, W. Susilo, Deqing Zou
Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) is a favorable primitive to realize a cryptographic cloud with secure and flexible data sharing mechanism. A number of PRE schemes with versatile capabilities have been proposed for different applications. The secure data sharing can be internally achieved in each PRE scheme. But no previous work can guarantee the secure data sharing among different PRE schemes in a general manner. Moreover, it is challenging to solve this problem due to huge differences among the existing PRE schemes in their algebraic systems and public-key types. To solve this problem more generally, this paper uniforms the definitions of the existing PRE and Public Key Encryption (PKE) schemes, and further uniforms their security definitions. Then taking any uniformly defined PRE scheme and any uniformly defined PKE scheme as two building blocks, this paper constructs a Generally Hybrid Proxy Re-Encryption (GHPRE) scheme with the idea of temporary public and private keys to achieve secure data sharing between these two underlying schemes. Since PKE is a more general definition than PRE, the proposed GHPRE scheme also is workable between any two PRE schemes. Moreover, the proposed GHPRE scheme can be transparently deployed even if the underlying PRE schemes are implementing.
{"title":"Generally Hybrid Proxy Re-Encryption: A Secure Data Sharing among Cryptographic Clouds","authors":"Peng Xu, Jun Xu, Wei Wang, Hai Jin, W. Susilo, Deqing Zou","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897923","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897923","url":null,"abstract":"Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) is a favorable primitive to realize a cryptographic cloud with secure and flexible data sharing mechanism. A number of PRE schemes with versatile capabilities have been proposed for different applications. The secure data sharing can be internally achieved in each PRE scheme. But no previous work can guarantee the secure data sharing among different PRE schemes in a general manner. Moreover, it is challenging to solve this problem due to huge differences among the existing PRE schemes in their algebraic systems and public-key types. To solve this problem more generally, this paper uniforms the definitions of the existing PRE and Public Key Encryption (PKE) schemes, and further uniforms their security definitions. Then taking any uniformly defined PRE scheme and any uniformly defined PKE scheme as two building blocks, this paper constructs a Generally Hybrid Proxy Re-Encryption (GHPRE) scheme with the idea of temporary public and private keys to achieve secure data sharing between these two underlying schemes. Since PKE is a more general definition than PRE, the proposed GHPRE scheme also is workable between any two PRE schemes. Moreover, the proposed GHPRE scheme can be transparently deployed even if the underlying PRE schemes are implementing.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114281940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Shifeng Sun, Dawu Gu, Joseph K. Liu, P. Udaya, Tsz Hon Yuen
Non-malleability is an important and intensively studied security notion for many cryptographic primitives. In the context of public key encryption, this notion means it is infeasible for an adversary to transform an encryption of some message m into one of a related message m' under the given public key. Although it has provided a strong security property for many applications, it still does not suffice for some scenarios like the system where the users could issue keys on-the-fly. In such settings, the adversary may have the power to transform the given public key and the ciphertext. To withstand such attacks, Fischlin introduced a stronger notion, known as complete non-malleability, which requires that the non-malleability property be preserved even for the adversaries attempting to produce a ciphertext of some related message under the transformed public key. To date, many schemes satisfying this stronger security have been proposed, but they are either inefficient or proved secure in the random oracle model. In this work, we put forward a new encryption scheme in the common reference string model. Based on the standard DBDH assumption, the proposed scheme is proved completely non-malleable secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks in the standard model. In our scheme, the well-formed public keys and ciphertexts could be publicly recognized without drawing support from unwieldy techniques like non-interactive zero knowledge proofs or one-time signatures, thus achieving a better performance.
{"title":"Efficient Construction of Completely Non-Malleable CCA Secure Public Key Encryption","authors":"Shifeng Sun, Dawu Gu, Joseph K. Liu, P. Udaya, Tsz Hon Yuen","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897921","url":null,"abstract":"Non-malleability is an important and intensively studied security notion for many cryptographic primitives. In the context of public key encryption, this notion means it is infeasible for an adversary to transform an encryption of some message m into one of a related message m' under the given public key. Although it has provided a strong security property for many applications, it still does not suffice for some scenarios like the system where the users could issue keys on-the-fly. In such settings, the adversary may have the power to transform the given public key and the ciphertext. To withstand such attacks, Fischlin introduced a stronger notion, known as complete non-malleability, which requires that the non-malleability property be preserved even for the adversaries attempting to produce a ciphertext of some related message under the transformed public key. To date, many schemes satisfying this stronger security have been proposed, but they are either inefficient or proved secure in the random oracle model. In this work, we put forward a new encryption scheme in the common reference string model. Based on the standard DBDH assumption, the proposed scheme is proved completely non-malleable secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks in the standard model. In our scheme, the well-formed public keys and ciphertexts could be publicly recognized without drawing support from unwieldy techniques like non-interactive zero knowledge proofs or one-time signatures, thus achieving a better performance.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"407 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114936848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we propose Mastino, a novel defense system to detect malware download events. A download event is a 3-tuple that identifies the action of downloading a file from a URL that was triggered by a client (machine). Mastino utilizes global situation awareness and continuously monitors various network- and system-level events of the clients' machines across the Internet and provides real time classification of both files and URLs to the clients upon submission of a new, unknown file or URL to the system. To enable detection of the download events, Mastino builds a large download graph that captures the subtle relationships among the entities of download events, i.e. files, URLs, and machines. We implemented a prototype version of Mastino and evaluated it in a large-scale real-world deployment. Our experimental evaluation shows that Mastino can accurately classify malware download events with an average of 95.5% true positive (TP), while incurring less than 0.5% false positives (FP). In addition, we show the Mastino can classify a new download event as either benign or malware in just a fraction of a second, and is therefore suitable as a real time defense system.
{"title":"Real-Time Detection of Malware Downloads via Large-Scale URL->File->Machine Graph Mining","authors":"Babak Rahbarinia, Marco Balduzzi, R. Perdisci","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897918","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897918","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we propose Mastino, a novel defense system to detect malware download events. A download event is a 3-tuple that identifies the action of downloading a file from a URL that was triggered by a client (machine). Mastino utilizes global situation awareness and continuously monitors various network- and system-level events of the clients' machines across the Internet and provides real time classification of both files and URLs to the clients upon submission of a new, unknown file or URL to the system. To enable detection of the download events, Mastino builds a large download graph that captures the subtle relationships among the entities of download events, i.e. files, URLs, and machines. We implemented a prototype version of Mastino and evaluated it in a large-scale real-world deployment. Our experimental evaluation shows that Mastino can accurately classify malware download events with an average of 95.5% true positive (TP), while incurring less than 0.5% false positives (FP). In addition, we show the Mastino can classify a new download event as either benign or malware in just a fraction of a second, and is therefore suitable as a real time defense system.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127854562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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