In September 2015 the crowd-funding site Kickstarter announced that it would adopt a new corporate form, that of a benefit corporation. Kickstarter is far from alone in this decision; in fact, it joined a growing list of tech firms that are moving towards adopting a benefit corporation designation. The result of the legal movement is that corporate governance across the nation is changing, impacting everything from business ethics training to Board decision making, with wide-ranging implications for the economy, environment, and civil society. Despite its growing popularity, though, the rationale behind the emergence of benefit corporations is an understudied question. In this article, we argue that benefit incorporation affects the very nature of the corporation by creating corporate common pool resources, and that the common pool resource theory provides a way to understand the puzzle and future of the movement. This approach is important because it re-situates the conversation, from a narrow view of the effect of the legislation on traditional corporate concepts to a broader view of the impact of the legislation. Furthermore, we consider the benefit corporation through the lens of Professor Elinor Ostrom’s Design Principles, offering a unique perspective through which to analyze if the design of state statutes and implementation by business entities meet criteria that would predict successful governance of the benefit corporation Common Pool Resources.
{"title":"The Firm and Common Pool Resource Theory: Understanding the Rise of Benefit Corporations","authors":"J. Hiller, Scott J. Shackelford","doi":"10.1111/ABLJ.12116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ABLJ.12116","url":null,"abstract":"In September 2015 the crowd-funding site Kickstarter announced that it would adopt a new corporate form, that of a benefit corporation. Kickstarter is far from alone in this decision; in fact, it joined a growing list of tech firms that are moving towards adopting a benefit corporation designation. The result of the legal movement is that corporate governance across the nation is changing, impacting everything from business ethics training to Board decision making, with wide-ranging implications for the economy, environment, and civil society. Despite its growing popularity, though, the rationale behind the emergence of benefit corporations is an understudied question. In this article, we argue that benefit incorporation affects the very nature of the corporation by creating corporate common pool resources, and that the common pool resource theory provides a way to understand the puzzle and future of the movement. This approach is important because it re-situates the conversation, from a narrow view of the effect of the legislation on traditional corporate concepts to a broader view of the impact of the legislation. Furthermore, we consider the benefit corporation through the lens of Professor Elinor Ostrom’s Design Principles, offering a unique perspective through which to analyze if the design of state statutes and implementation by business entities meet criteria that would predict successful governance of the benefit corporation Common Pool Resources.","PeriodicalId":168140,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"119705999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study explores the relationship between board diversity and firm performance for a sample of companies listed in Italy, France, Germany, Spain and United Kingdom. We consider different dimensions of diversity, both demographic (gender, age and nationality diversity) and cognitive or non-observable (diversity in directors’ experience and education). We focus on diversity of both the entire board and its executive members only. We don’t find a significant relationship between firms’ performance and board diversity. However, when considering executive directors alone, results show that firms where female and foreign directors are more represented have better performance than others. As for cognitive diversity, results indicate that performance increases when directors have a longer tenure.
{"title":"Board Diversity and Firm Performance Across Europe","authors":"A. Ciavarella","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3084114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3084114","url":null,"abstract":"This study explores the relationship between board diversity and firm performance for a sample of companies listed in Italy, France, Germany, Spain and United Kingdom. We consider different dimensions of diversity, both demographic (gender, age and nationality diversity) and cognitive or non-observable (diversity in directors’ experience and education). We focus on diversity of both the entire board and its executive members only. We don’t find a significant relationship between firms’ performance and board diversity. However, when considering executive directors alone, results show that firms where female and foreign directors are more represented have better performance than others. As for cognitive diversity, results indicate that performance increases when directors have a longer tenure.","PeriodicalId":168140,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116448575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
M. Al-Absy, Ku Nor Izah Ku Ismail, Sitraselvi Chandren
This study investigates the influence of the board chairman’s involvement in the audit committee (AC) (as a proxy of AC independence) on earnings management (EM) practices. We examine Bursa Malaysia listed firms with slight positive earnings for the years 2013 to 2015. Using ordinary least squares regression and the Modified Jones Model by Kasznik as a measure of accruals, this study reveals that an AC that includes its board chairman is associated with greater discretionary accruals and EM. Further, we categorise a board chairman’s involvement in an AC into two types: a board chairman who also serves as the AC chairman (hereafter termed board chairman duality) and a board chairman who sits in the AC as an ordinary member. We find that board chairman duality does not influence EM. However, ACs whose members include the board chairman are associated with EM practices. This study supports agency theory and the initiatives taken by policy-makers to deter board chairmen from serving on ACs. It also alerts policy-makers, firms and their stakeholders, as well as researchers to the importance of having an AC free from the involvement of its board chairman as this will enhance the committee’s effectiveness in curbing EM.
{"title":"Board Chairmen's Involvement in Audit Committees and Earnings Management Practices","authors":"M. Al-Absy, Ku Nor Izah Ku Ismail, Sitraselvi Chandren","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3063845","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3063845","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the influence of the board chairman’s involvement in the audit committee (AC) (as a proxy of AC independence) on earnings management (EM) practices. We examine Bursa Malaysia listed firms with slight positive earnings for the years 2013 to 2015. Using ordinary least squares regression and the Modified Jones Model by Kasznik as a measure of accruals, this study reveals that an AC that includes its board chairman is associated with greater discretionary accruals and EM. Further, we categorise a board chairman’s involvement in an AC into two types: a board chairman who also serves as the AC chairman (hereafter termed board chairman duality) and a board chairman who sits in the AC as an ordinary member. We find that board chairman duality does not influence EM. However, ACs whose members include the board chairman are associated with EM practices. This study supports agency theory and the initiatives taken by policy-makers to deter board chairmen from serving on ACs. It also alerts policy-makers, firms and their stakeholders, as well as researchers to the importance of having an AC free from the involvement of its board chairman as this will enhance the committee’s effectiveness in curbing EM.","PeriodicalId":168140,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"190 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121729540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We use hand-collected data from SEC's litigation releases for insider trading violations to examine the effect of geographic distance on its enforcement activities and insider trading activities. First, we find that the SEC is more likely to investigate companies that are closer to its offices. Second, we find that illegal insider trading increases with a company's distance from an SEC office. Lastly, we utilize the closure of SEC offices as exogenous shocks to geographic proximity and find that insider trading at nearby companies increase significantly compared with trading at otherwise similar companies not affected by the closures. Overall, our findings suggest that information asymmetry and resource constraints prevent regulators from monitoring effectively.
{"title":"It is Easy to Be Brave from a Safe Distance: Proximity to the SEC and Insider Trading","authors":"Trung Nguyen, Q. Nguyen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3048660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3048660","url":null,"abstract":"We use hand-collected data from SEC's litigation releases for insider trading violations to examine the effect of geographic distance on its enforcement activities and insider trading activities. First, we find that the SEC is more likely to investigate companies that are closer to its offices. Second, we find that illegal insider trading increases with a company's distance from an SEC office. Lastly, we utilize the closure of SEC offices as exogenous shocks to geographic proximity and find that insider trading at nearby companies increase significantly compared with trading at otherwise similar companies not affected by the closures. Overall, our findings suggest that information asymmetry and resource constraints prevent regulators from monitoring effectively.","PeriodicalId":168140,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"256 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128728582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using a corporate lobbying event that led to the unexpected reversal of a tough insider trading blackout regulation in Hong Kong, we examine whether tightening the restrictions of insider trading in family firms-dominated financial markets affects shareholder value. We find that firms more significantly affected by the new regulation were more likely to lobby against the implementation of the new regulation. The stock prices of lobbying firms reacted more positively to the reversal of the regulation than the stock prices of matched non-lobbying firms. We find no evidence that lobbying firms’ insider trades in the proposed new blackout window took advantage of insiders’ private information about forthcoming earnings news. In contrast, our findings suggest that lobbying firms’ insider trades in the proposed new blackout window were motivated to stabilize their firms’ stock prices in times of market uncertainty. Overall, our results suggest caution in imposing one-size-fits-all insider trading blackout regulation.
{"title":"Should Regulators Ban Insider Trading? Evidence from Hong Kong","authors":"Zhihong Chen, Yuyan Guan, B. Ke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2990226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2990226","url":null,"abstract":"Using a corporate lobbying event that led to the unexpected reversal of a tough insider trading blackout regulation in Hong Kong, we examine whether tightening the restrictions of insider trading in family firms-dominated financial markets affects shareholder value. We find that firms more significantly affected by the new regulation were more likely to lobby against the implementation of the new regulation. The stock prices of lobbying firms reacted more positively to the reversal of the regulation than the stock prices of matched non-lobbying firms. We find no evidence that lobbying firms’ insider trades in the proposed new blackout window took advantage of insiders’ private information about forthcoming earnings news. In contrast, our findings suggest that lobbying firms’ insider trades in the proposed new blackout window were motivated to stabilize their firms’ stock prices in times of market uncertainty. Overall, our results suggest caution in imposing one-size-fits-all insider trading blackout regulation.","PeriodicalId":168140,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"159 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132334905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Cohen and Wang (2013) (CW2013) provide evidence consistent with market participants perceiving staggered boards to be value reducing. Amihud and Stoyanov (2016) (AS2016) contests these findings, reporting some specifications under which the results are not statistically significant. We show that the results retain their significance under a wide array of robustness tests that address the concerns expressed by AS2016. Our empirical findings reinforce the conclusions of CW2013.
{"title":"Reexamining Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value","authors":"Alma Cohen, Charles C. Y. Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2985152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2985152","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Cohen and Wang (2013) (CW2013) provide evidence consistent with market participants perceiving staggered boards to be value reducing. Amihud and Stoyanov (2016) (AS2016) contests these findings, reporting some specifications under which the results are not statistically significant. We show that the results retain their significance under a wide array of robustness tests that address the concerns expressed by AS2016. Our empirical findings reinforce the conclusions of CW2013.","PeriodicalId":168140,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123353294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper empirically examines the market's reaction to increased corporate governance provisions which were applied to pyramid-structured corporations under the Promotion of Competition and Reduction of Concentration Law. Specifically, the paper examines the influence of legal provisions dealing with the composition of boards of directors on the intensity of board connectivity in Israel. For the purpose of said examination, two databases were specially constructed, which include detailed information regarding boards of the 50 largest publicly-traded firms in the Israeli market. One database reflects the situation six months prior to the entry of the Reduction of Concentration Law into force, and the second database reflects the situation six months after the legislation has entered into force. This data has been processed and analyzed, using methodologies from the Social Network Analysis field, in order to examine the changes that occurred in various connectivity indices as a result of the legislation. The findings of the empirical analysis show that following the entry into force of these legal provisions, the average number of directors per board has declined, and so has the average number of corporates on which sits a director. In addition, there has been a decline in the level of connectivity of the board interlocks within the large publicly-traded corporations in Israel. The intensity of the decline was lower than that which was expected under complete adherence to the minimal standard required in primary and secondary legislation. The connections between directors themselves are complex and dense, but there has also been a decline in the level of connectivity between directors following the aforementioned regulatory changes. Additionally, when dividing the market to groups based on the intensity of connections between firms, one can see an increase in the number of different groups within the same sample of firms, and a decrease in the number of connections between groups.
{"title":"How Law Changes Networks: A Social Network Analysis of Board Interlocks","authors":"Moran Ofir","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2958778","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2958778","url":null,"abstract":"This paper empirically examines the market's reaction to increased corporate governance provisions which were applied to pyramid-structured corporations under the Promotion of Competition and Reduction of Concentration Law. Specifically, the paper examines the influence of legal provisions dealing with the composition of boards of directors on the intensity of board connectivity in Israel. For the purpose of said examination, two databases were specially constructed, which include detailed information regarding boards of the 50 largest publicly-traded firms in the Israeli market. One database reflects the situation six months prior to the entry of the Reduction of Concentration Law into force, and the second database reflects the situation six months after the legislation has entered into force. This data has been processed and analyzed, using methodologies from the Social Network Analysis field, in order to examine the changes that occurred in various connectivity indices as a result of the legislation. The findings of the empirical analysis show that following the entry into force of these legal provisions, the average number of directors per board has declined, and so has the average number of corporates on which sits a director. In addition, there has been a decline in the level of connectivity of the board interlocks within the large publicly-traded corporations in Israel. The intensity of the decline was lower than that which was expected under complete adherence to the minimal standard required in primary and secondary legislation. The connections between directors themselves are complex and dense, but there has also been a decline in the level of connectivity between directors following the aforementioned regulatory changes. Additionally, when dividing the market to groups based on the intensity of connections between firms, one can see an increase in the number of different groups within the same sample of firms, and a decrease in the number of connections between groups.","PeriodicalId":168140,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129253132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the field of research and international developments in business management, in particular in e-commerce, the most significant achievements outreach intelligents contracts and block-chains. They are called "Smart business networks". Indeed, in line with business agility concepts enabled by the generalized deployment of IP networks, they integrate not only business process management, auction based negotiations (direct and reverse auctions), but above all they rely on dynamic linking of partners via a network. Alike exploratory IP packet routing, a smart business network shall: 1) search for partners who, at a given instant, may co-bid to a specific request for proposal, 2) checks the conformity between business process blocks (via their BPM, UML or other specifications), 3) executes a multi-attribute negotiation (price, delays, quality, etc..), 4) synthezises the features of the virtual network which associates winning bidders for the order fulfillment. Another much simplified way of looking at these theories and implementations, is to get inspiration from "plug and play" or from "quick connects & disconnects" deals. The paper outlines the main concepts, provides examples of implementations, discusses a concrete case, specifies the required architectural components, and discusses how to extend smart business networks to the case where intellectual property rights too get networked. The conclusion addresses risks and future research avenues.
{"title":"Smart Business Networks: Their Evolution","authors":"L. Pau","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3000850","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3000850","url":null,"abstract":"In the field of research and international developments in business management, in particular in e-commerce, the most significant achievements outreach intelligents contracts and block-chains. They are called \"Smart business networks\". Indeed, in line with business agility concepts enabled by the generalized deployment of IP networks, they integrate not only business process management, auction based negotiations (direct and reverse auctions), but above all they rely on dynamic linking of partners via a network. \u0000Alike exploratory IP packet routing, a smart business network shall: \u00001) search for partners who, at a given instant, may co-bid to a specific request for proposal, \u00002) checks the conformity between business process blocks (via their BPM, UML or other specifications), \u00003) executes a multi-attribute negotiation (price, delays, quality, etc..), \u00004) synthezises the features of the virtual network which associates winning bidders for the order fulfillment. \u0000Another much simplified way of looking at these theories and implementations, is to get inspiration from \"plug and play\" or from \"quick connects & disconnects\" deals. The paper outlines the main concepts, provides examples of implementations, discusses a concrete case, specifies the required architectural components, and discusses how to extend smart business networks to the case where intellectual property rights too get networked. The conclusion addresses risks and future research avenues.","PeriodicalId":168140,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"6 17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123740247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the impact of CDS trading and the lifting of short sales restrictions on the profitability of reported insider trades within US financial firms. We find evidence that executive directors possess significant insider knowledge about their firm’s risk prior to the initiation of CDS trading. We also find that the profitability of insider trades are only reduced for non-executive directors after short selling is permitted, indicating that the executive directors possess more timely private information than short-sellers. Our results suggest that the introduction of CDS trading and short selling distinctly alters the ability of different types of insiders to extract rent on their private information.
{"title":"Are All Insiders on the Inside? Evidence from the Initiation of CDS Trading and Short Selling in the Financial Sector","authors":"T. To, Sirimon Treepongkaruna, Eliza Wu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2901766","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2901766","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the impact of CDS trading and the lifting of short sales restrictions on the profitability of reported insider trades within US financial firms. We find evidence that executive directors possess significant insider knowledge about their firm’s risk prior to the initiation of CDS trading. We also find that the profitability of insider trades are only reduced for non-executive directors after short selling is permitted, indicating that the executive directors possess more timely private information than short-sellers. Our results suggest that the introduction of CDS trading and short selling distinctly alters the ability of different types of insiders to extract rent on their private information.","PeriodicalId":168140,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127422909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the effect of board interlocks on patenting and R&D spending for publicly traded companies in India. We exploit a corporate governance reform to address the endogeneity of board interlocks through exogenous changes mandated by the reform requiring a subset of firms to adjust their board structure. We rely on two difference-in-differences frameworks, comparing firms affected by the reform to unaffected firms as well as comparing within the set of firms that did not have to adjust their board structure those that still experienced an exogenous increase of their network size as a result of the reform to those that did not experience a change in their network size. We find that board interlocks have significant positive effects on both R&D and patenting. The evidence suggests that the impact on R&D is induced by information transmission through interlocks. The effect on patenting is driven by firms extending patent protection by patenting inventions abroad that they have already patented in India.
{"title":"Do Board Interlocks Increase Innovation? Evidence from a Corporate Governance Reform in India","authors":"C. Helmers, Manasa Patnam, P. Rau","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2309082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2309082","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the effect of board interlocks on patenting and R&D spending for publicly traded companies in India. We exploit a corporate governance reform to address the endogeneity of board interlocks through exogenous changes mandated by the reform requiring a subset of firms to adjust their board structure. We rely on two difference-in-differences frameworks, comparing firms affected by the reform to unaffected firms as well as comparing within the set of firms that did not have to adjust their board structure those that still experienced an exogenous increase of their network size as a result of the reform to those that did not experience a change in their network size. We find that board interlocks have significant positive effects on both R&D and patenting. The evidence suggests that the impact on R&D is induced by information transmission through interlocks. The effect on patenting is driven by firms extending patent protection by patenting inventions abroad that they have already patented in India.","PeriodicalId":168140,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114693372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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