The concept of knowledge has gained in interest since industrialized economics have induced a shift in importance from labor, capital and natural resources towards intellectual resources. This study investigates how the management of knowledge influences the innovation performance of a firm. While former studies mainly focused on knowledge management cycles, we distinguish different types of knowledge management techniques. It turns out that there is a difference between three knowledge management techniques and their influence on product and process innovation. The ability to source external knowledge positively affects the firm’s introduction of new products and products new to the market. For obtaining cost reductions it is effective to stimulate employees to share knowledge. The availability of a codified knowledge management policy also positively affects the cost reduction possibilities of a firm. These results indicate that it is important for a firm to carefully select the tools of knowledge management in function of the kind of technical innovation it wants to proceed.
{"title":"Does Professional Knowledge Management Improve Innovation Performance at the Firm Level?","authors":"D. Czarnitzki, A. Wastyn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1504068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1504068","url":null,"abstract":"The concept of knowledge has gained in interest since industrialized economics have induced a shift in importance from labor, capital and natural resources towards intellectual resources. This study investigates how the management of knowledge influences the innovation performance of a firm. While former studies mainly focused on knowledge management cycles, we distinguish different types of knowledge management techniques. It turns out that there is a difference between three knowledge management techniques and their influence on product and process innovation. The ability to source external knowledge positively affects the firm’s introduction of new products and products new to the market. For obtaining cost reductions it is effective to stimulate employees to share knowledge. The availability of a codified knowledge management policy also positively affects the cost reduction possibilities of a firm. These results indicate that it is important for a firm to carefully select the tools of knowledge management in function of the kind of technical innovation it wants to proceed.","PeriodicalId":168140,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132085881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-09-24DOI: 10.5465/AMJ.2010.52814614
A. Shipilov, H. Greve, Tim J. Rowley
Despite the wealth of research on the origins of institutions, little is known about how institutions and their underlying logics are extended following initial diffusion stage. We argue that institutional extension happens through multi-wave diffusion of related practices such that an organization’s adoption of practices from an institutional logic implies its acceptance of the logic. This makes organizational adoption of subsequent practices sharing the same logic more likely, irrespective of these practices’ adoptions by the organization’s network contacts. We show evidence of such effects though analyzing the diffusion of governance practices related to the logic of board reform in Canada.
{"title":"When Do Interlocks Matter? Institutional Logics and the Diffusion of Multiple Corporate Governance Practices","authors":"A. Shipilov, H. Greve, Tim J. Rowley","doi":"10.5465/AMJ.2010.52814614","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5465/AMJ.2010.52814614","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the wealth of research on the origins of institutions, little is known about how institutions and their underlying logics are extended following initial diffusion stage. We argue that institutional extension happens through multi-wave diffusion of related practices such that an organization’s adoption of practices from an institutional logic implies its acceptance of the logic. This makes organizational adoption of subsequent practices sharing the same logic more likely, irrespective of these practices’ adoptions by the organization’s network contacts. We show evidence of such effects though analyzing the diffusion of governance practices related to the logic of board reform in Canada.","PeriodicalId":168140,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"185 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134319721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A 2004 study of the results of stock trading by United States Senators during the 1990s found that that senators on average beat the market by 12% a year. In sharp contrast, U.S. households on average underperformed the market by 1.4% a year and even corporate insiders on average beat the market by only about 6% a year during that period. A reasonable inference is that some Senators had access to - and were using - material nonpublic information about the companies in whose stock they trade.Under current law, it is uncertain whether members of Congress can be held liable for insider trading. The proposed Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act addresses that problem by instructing the Securities and Exchange Commission to adopt rules intended to prohibit such trading.This article analyzes present law to determine whether members of Congress, Congressional employees, and other federal government employees can be held liable for trading on the basis of material nonpublic information. It argues that there is no public policy rationale for permitting such trading and that doing so creates perverse legislative incentives and opens the door to corruption. The article explains that the Speech and Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution is no barrier to legislative and regulatory restrictions on Congressional insider trading. Finally, the article critiques the current version of the STOCK Act, proposing several improvements.
2004年的一项关于20世纪90年代美国参议员股票交易结果的研究发现，参议员平均每年比市场高出12%。与此形成鲜明对比的是，在此期间，美国家庭平均每年的表现落后于市场1.4%，就连公司内部人士的平均表现也只比市场好6%左右。一个合理的推论是，一些参议员能够获得——并且正在使用——有关他们所交易股票的公司的重要非公开信息。根据现行法律，不确定国会议员是否会对内幕交易负责。拟议的《国会知情停止交易法案》(Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act)通过指示美国证券交易委员会(Securities and Exchange Commission)采取旨在禁止此类交易的规则，解决了这一问题。本文分析了现行法律，以确定国会议员、国会雇员和其他联邦政府雇员是否可以对基于重大非公开信息的交易承担责任。它认为，允许此类交易没有公共政策依据，这样做会产生不正当的立法激励，并为腐败打开大门。文章解释说，美国宪法的言论和辩论条款并不是立法和监管限制国会内幕交易的障碍。最后，本文对当前版本的《股票法》进行了批评，并提出了几点改进建议。
{"title":"The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act","authors":"Stephen M. Bainbridge","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1449744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1449744","url":null,"abstract":"A 2004 study of the results of stock trading by United States Senators during the 1990s found that that senators on average beat the market by 12% a year. In sharp contrast, U.S. households on average underperformed the market by 1.4% a year and even corporate insiders on average beat the market by only about 6% a year during that period. A reasonable inference is that some Senators had access to - and were using - material nonpublic information about the companies in whose stock they trade.Under current law, it is uncertain whether members of Congress can be held liable for insider trading. The proposed Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act addresses that problem by instructing the Securities and Exchange Commission to adopt rules intended to prohibit such trading.This article analyzes present law to determine whether members of Congress, Congressional employees, and other federal government employees can be held liable for trading on the basis of material nonpublic information. It argues that there is no public policy rationale for permitting such trading and that doing so creates perverse legislative incentives and opens the door to corruption. The article explains that the Speech and Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution is no barrier to legislative and regulatory restrictions on Congressional insider trading. Finally, the article critiques the current version of the STOCK Act, proposing several improvements.","PeriodicalId":168140,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123194288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Are corporations, in general, amenable to good governance? Are there inherent incompatibilities between good governance and the corporate format of organizations? How can these be addressed satisfactorily without over-regulation that might impair entrepreneurial potential? These are some of the nagging issues this paper explores and offers some radical suggestions for consideration.
{"title":"Addressing Some Inherent Challenges to Good Corporate Governance","authors":"B. Balasubramanian","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2125801","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2125801","url":null,"abstract":"Are corporations, in general, amenable to good governance? Are there inherent incompatibilities between good governance and the corporate format of organizations? How can these be addressed satisfactorily without over-regulation that might impair entrepreneurial potential? These are some of the nagging issues this paper explores and offers some radical suggestions for consideration.","PeriodicalId":168140,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124981309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-01-23DOI: 10.1787/FMT-V2009-ART10-EN
H. Christiansen, Alissa Amico (Koldertsova)
Historically, the main direct contribution of exchanges to corporate governance has been listing and disclosure standards and monitoring compliance. Stock exchanges have established themselves as promoters of corporate governance recommendations for listed companies. Demutualisation and the subsequent self-listing of exchanges have spurred debate on the role of exchanges.Regulators have been concerned about conflicts of interest between exchanges' for-profit activities and their regulatory responsabilities. The conversion of exchanges to listed companies is thought to have intensified competition. And, the sharper competition has forced the question of whether there is a risk of a regulatory 'race to the bottom'. Recently, the rise of alternative trading systems (ATS), first in the United States and then in Europe have had a profound impact. Their existence has induced exchanges to cut fees and in some cases launch their own off-exchange trading platforms. The effect of ATSs on corporate governance is not clear. Two practical concerns voiced so far are, first, that trading fragmentation may reduce the transparency of the markets for corporate control and adverse consequences for price discovery. Secondly, exchanges are uneasy about the prospect of having to continue performing their traditional regulatory and other corporate-governance enhancing functions amid a shrinking revenue base.
{"title":"The Role of Stock Exchanges in Corporate Governance","authors":"H. Christiansen, Alissa Amico (Koldertsova)","doi":"10.1787/FMT-V2009-ART10-EN","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/FMT-V2009-ART10-EN","url":null,"abstract":"Historically, the main direct contribution of exchanges to corporate governance has been listing and disclosure standards and monitoring compliance. Stock exchanges have established themselves as promoters of corporate governance recommendations for listed companies. Demutualisation and the subsequent self-listing of exchanges have spurred debate on the role of exchanges.Regulators have been concerned about conflicts of interest between exchanges' for-profit activities and their regulatory responsabilities. The conversion of exchanges to listed companies is thought to have intensified competition. And, the sharper competition has forced the question of whether there is a risk of a regulatory 'race to the bottom'. \u0000Recently, the rise of alternative trading systems (ATS), first in the United States and then in Europe have had a profound impact. Their existence has induced exchanges to cut fees and in some cases launch their own off-exchange trading platforms. The effect of ATSs on corporate governance is not clear. Two practical concerns voiced so far are, first, that trading fragmentation may reduce the transparency of the markets for corporate control and adverse consequences for price discovery. Secondly, exchanges are uneasy about the prospect of having to continue performing their traditional regulatory and other corporate-governance enhancing functions amid a shrinking revenue base.","PeriodicalId":168140,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133639434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
French law mandates that employees of publicly listed companies can elect two types of directors to represent employees. Privatized companies must reserve board seats for directors elected by employees by right of employment, while employee-shareholders can elect a director whenever they hold at least 3% of outstanding shares. Using a comprehensive sample of firms in the Societe des Bourses Francaises (SBF) 120 Index from 1998 to 2008, we examine the impact of employee-directors on corporate valuation, payout policy, and internal board organization and performance. We find that directors elected by employee shareholders increase firm valuation and profitability, but do not significantly impact corporate payout policy. Directors elected by employees by right significantly reduce payout ratios, but do not impact firm value or profitability. Employee representation on corporate boards thus appears to be at least value-neutral, and perhaps value-enhancing in the case of directors elected by employee shareholders.
{"title":"Employee Ownership, Board Representation, and Corporate Financial Policies","authors":"Edith Ginglinger, W. Megginson, Timothée Waxin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1259609","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1259609","url":null,"abstract":"French law mandates that employees of publicly listed companies can elect two types of directors to represent employees. Privatized companies must reserve board seats for directors elected by employees by right of employment, while employee-shareholders can elect a director whenever they hold at least 3% of outstanding shares. Using a comprehensive sample of firms in the Societe des Bourses Francaises (SBF) 120 Index from 1998 to 2008, we examine the impact of employee-directors on corporate valuation, payout policy, and internal board organization and performance. We find that directors elected by employee shareholders increase firm valuation and profitability, but do not significantly impact corporate payout policy. Directors elected by employees by right significantly reduce payout ratios, but do not impact firm value or profitability. Employee representation on corporate boards thus appears to be at least value-neutral, and perhaps value-enhancing in the case of directors elected by employee shareholders.","PeriodicalId":168140,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122981268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Volatility and ambiguity are generally thought to create exchange situations more conducive towards opportunism. We examine the effectiveness of contractual and relational governance in constraining opportunism under volatility and ambiguity. We hypothesize that relational contracts will be robust to volatility but not ambiguity, whereas formal contracts will be robust to ambiguity but not volatility. The hypotheses are supported using data from 125 interorganizational relationships involving R&D for new product development. Our findings suggest that formal and relational contracts each may have advantages and disadvantages relative to the other in specific situations, so that they are not simply substitutes. The results have important implications for transaction cost and relational contracting theory, and challenge the view that relational contracts are not so susceptible to opportunism. A revised comparative governance schema is theorized for future research.
{"title":"Uncertainty, Opportunism and Governance: The Effects of Volatility and Ambiguity on Formal and Relational Contracting","authors":"Stephen J. Carson, A. Madhok, Tao Wu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.611208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.611208","url":null,"abstract":"Volatility and ambiguity are generally thought to create exchange situations more conducive towards opportunism. We examine the effectiveness of contractual and relational governance in constraining opportunism under volatility and ambiguity. We hypothesize that relational contracts will be robust to volatility but not ambiguity, whereas formal contracts will be robust to ambiguity but not volatility. The hypotheses are supported using data from 125 interorganizational relationships involving R&D for new product development. Our findings suggest that formal and relational contracts each may have advantages and disadvantages relative to the other in specific situations, so that they are not simply substitutes. The results have important implications for transaction cost and relational contracting theory, and challenge the view that relational contracts are not so susceptible to opportunism. A revised comparative governance schema is theorized for future research.","PeriodicalId":168140,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116015443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper examines the relationship between numbers of topic-specific board meetings and quality of corporate governance. The quality of corporate governance is estimated by CEO turnover-performance and compensation-performance sensitivities. Information about topic-specific meetings is collected from the reports of independent directors in Chinese listed firms over the period of 2005 to 2015. We document that more frequent discussions of growth strategies for the use of IPO proceeds, investment and acquisitions increase the CEO compensation-performance sensitivity. However, more discussions about the nomination of directors and top management are likely to reduce the sensitivities of CEO turnover and compensation to performance. Our findings shed light on what makes boards more efficient, and how board monitoring on assorted decisions modifies the relationship between CEO interests and firm performance.
{"title":"Board Meeting Frequencies on Various Topics and Corporate Governance: Evidence from China","authors":"Jiao Ji, Oleksandr Talavera, Shuxing Yin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3167302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3167302","url":null,"abstract":"The paper examines the relationship between numbers of topic-specific board meetings and quality of corporate governance. The quality of corporate governance is estimated by CEO turnover-performance and compensation-performance sensitivities. Information about topic-specific meetings is collected from the reports of independent directors in Chinese listed firms over the period of 2005 to 2015. We document that more frequent discussions of growth strategies for the use of IPO proceeds, investment and acquisitions increase the CEO compensation-performance sensitivity. However, more discussions about the nomination of directors and top management are likely to reduce the sensitivities of CEO turnover and compensation to performance. Our findings shed light on what makes boards more efficient, and how board monitoring on assorted decisions modifies the relationship between CEO interests and firm performance.","PeriodicalId":168140,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134149090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4468/2006.1.04GNECCHI
F. Gnecchi
The recognised critical importance of corporate governance, and the attention that it is paid today, can be ascribed to several factors: sensational financial scandals (and the repercussions they have had for securities and financial markets), the exponential development of stock option policies, the information asymmetry that can be noted in practically every company, The different requests for information of the various categories of stakeholders, combine to strengthen the decision to adopt integrated corporate communication policies. The concept of integrated communication highlights a radical rethink of the function and role of the system of corporate information flows.
{"title":"Corporate Governance Communication","authors":"F. Gnecchi","doi":"10.4468/2006.1.04GNECCHI","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4468/2006.1.04GNECCHI","url":null,"abstract":"The recognised critical importance of corporate governance, and the attention that it is paid today, can be ascribed to several factors: sensational financial scandals (and the repercussions they have had for securities and financial markets), the exponential development of stock option policies, the information asymmetry that can be noted in practically every company, The different requests for information of the various categories of stakeholders, combine to strengthen the decision to adopt integrated corporate communication policies. The concept of integrated communication highlights a radical rethink of the function and role of the system of corporate information flows.","PeriodicalId":168140,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124976599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4468/2006.1.02BRONDONI
S. Brondoni
Corporate governance communication has steadily become more important as markets have globalised. On open markets, the specific report on economic-financial disclosures supplements the communication system of companies, whose policies are founded strongly on integration, in order to tackle an economic context that is characterised by strong competitive dynamics and growing managerial complexity. Globalisation tends to underline the importance of corporate governance communication designed to assert a corporate culture of competitive confrontation, therefore emphasising communication and information flows, decision-making autonomy and operating accountability.
{"title":"Managerial Corporate Governance Communication","authors":"S. Brondoni","doi":"10.4468/2006.1.02BRONDONI","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4468/2006.1.02BRONDONI","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate governance communication has steadily become more important as markets have globalised. On open markets, the specific report on economic-financial disclosures supplements the communication system of companies, whose policies are founded strongly on integration, in order to tackle an economic context that is characterised by strong competitive dynamics and growing managerial complexity. Globalisation tends to underline the importance of corporate governance communication designed to assert a corporate culture of competitive confrontation, therefore emphasising communication and information flows, decision-making autonomy and operating accountability.","PeriodicalId":168140,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"92 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115114689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：