Hassan Benchekroun, Gerard van der Meijden, C. Withagen
We show that OPEC’s market power contributes to global warming by enabling producers of relatively expensive and dirty oil to start producing before OPEC reserves are depleted. We fully characterize the equilibrium of a cartel-fringe model and use a calibration to examine the importance of this extraction sequence effect. While welfare under the cartel-fringe equilibrium can be significantly lower than under a first-best outcome, almost all of this welfare loss is due to the sequence effect. Moreover, the recent boom in shale oil reserves may reduce social welfare and renewables subsidies can increase the carbon content of current extraction.
{"title":"OPEC, Shale Oil, and Global Warming - On the Importance of the Order of Extraction","authors":"Hassan Benchekroun, Gerard van der Meijden, C. Withagen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3064713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3064713","url":null,"abstract":"We show that OPEC’s market power contributes to global warming by enabling producers of relatively expensive and dirty oil to start producing before OPEC reserves are depleted. We fully characterize the equilibrium of a cartel-fringe model and use a calibration to examine the importance of this extraction sequence effect. While welfare under the cartel-fringe equilibrium can be significantly lower than under a first-best outcome, almost all of this welfare loss is due to the sequence effect. Moreover, the recent boom in shale oil reserves may reduce social welfare and renewables subsidies can increase the carbon content of current extraction.","PeriodicalId":176966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"272 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123121994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyses optimal corrective taxation and optimal income redistribution. Under general utility functions, the Pigouvian pollution tax is higher if pollution damages disproportionally hurt the poor due to equity weighting of pollution damages. Moreover, optimal pollution taxes should be set below the Pigouvian tax if the poor spend a disproportionate fraction of their income on polluting goods. However, if preferences for commodities are of the Gorman (1961) polar form, optimal pollution taxes should follow the first-best rule for the Pigouvian corrective tax even if the government wants to redistribute income and the poor spend a disproportional part of their income on polluting goods. The often-used quasi-linear, CES and Stone-Geary utility functions all belong to the Gorman polar class. If preferences are Gorman polar, and if pollution taxes are not optimized, Pareto-improving green tax reforms exist that move the pollution tax closer to the Pigouvian tax. Simulations demonstrate that optimal corrective taxes should be Pigouvian if the demand for polluting goods is derived from a LES demand system, but deviate from the Pigouvian taxes if demand for polluting goods demand is derived from a PIGLOG demand system.
{"title":"Should Pollution Taxes Be Targeted at Income Redistribution?","authors":"B. Jacobs, Rick van der Ploeg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3021768","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3021768","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses optimal corrective taxation and optimal income redistribution. Under general utility functions, the Pigouvian pollution tax is higher if pollution damages disproportionally hurt the poor due to equity weighting of pollution damages. Moreover, optimal pollution taxes should be set below the Pigouvian tax if the poor spend a disproportionate fraction of their income on polluting goods. However, if preferences for commodities are of the Gorman (1961) polar form, optimal pollution taxes should follow the first-best rule for the Pigouvian corrective tax even if the government wants to redistribute income and the poor spend a disproportional part of their income on polluting goods. The often-used quasi-linear, CES and Stone-Geary utility functions all belong to the Gorman polar class. If preferences are Gorman polar, and if pollution taxes are not optimized, Pareto-improving green tax reforms exist that move the pollution tax closer to the Pigouvian tax. Simulations demonstrate that optimal corrective taxes should be Pigouvian if the demand for polluting goods is derived from a LES demand system, but deviate from the Pigouvian taxes if demand for polluting goods demand is derived from a PIGLOG demand system.","PeriodicalId":176966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125170664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Flexibly coupling power and heat sectors may contribute to both renewable energy integration and decarbonization. We present a literature review of modelbased analyses in this field, focusing on residential heating. We compare geographical and temporal research scopes and identify state-of-the-art analytical model formulations, particularly concerning heat pumps and thermal storage. While numerical findings are idiosyncratic to specific assumptions, a synthesis of results generally indicates that power-to-heat technologies can cost-effectively contribute to fossil fuel substitution, renewable integration, and decarbonization. Heat pumps and passive thermal storage emerge as particularly favorable options.
{"title":"Power-to-Heat for Renewable Energy Integration: Technologies, Modeling Approaches, and Flexibility Potentials","authors":"A. Bloess, W. Schill, Alexander Zerrahn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3028516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3028516","url":null,"abstract":"Flexibly coupling power and heat sectors may contribute to both renewable energy integration and decarbonization. We present a literature review of modelbased analyses in this field, focusing on residential heating. We compare geographical and temporal research scopes and identify state-of-the-art analytical model formulations, particularly concerning heat pumps and thermal storage. While numerical findings are idiosyncratic to specific assumptions, a synthesis of results generally indicates that power-to-heat technologies can cost-effectively contribute to fossil fuel substitution, renewable integration, and decarbonization. Heat pumps and passive thermal storage emerge as particularly favorable options.","PeriodicalId":176966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129194545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Various incentives may be used in order to cause a person to desist from an activity that creates negative externalities. It is possible, naturally, to use a stick and to apply an economic sanction in order to incentivize them to desist from that activity. It is also possible to use a carrot, i.e., to grant them a financial prize if they desist from the activity. Each of these incentives has advantages and disadvantages. Literature and practice are familiar with various combinations of sticks and carrots. In most cases, the mechanism is “horizontal”, e.g. using carrots with respect to certain parts of the population, and sticks against other parts. The Article presents a novel, vertical, sequential mechanism, in the form of a “game” played in two consecutive stages that are connected to each other, that trap the person who perpetrated a negative action within the mechanism, with no possible way out. At the center of the first stage of the vertical mechanism stands a carrot – a reward or a positive incentive – which is combined with a certain social sanction (shaming). At the center of the second stage, which is activated only if the implementation of the first stage did not meet with success, stands a stick – a punishment or a negative incentive. The objective will be to incentivize a person to engage in fruitful negotiations to end the harmful activity at the pre-mechanism stage, for after the mechanism begins operating and as more time passes, he will only lose. For this purpose, an illustration will be offered of the negative social behavior of one-sided refusal to give or accept the Jewish divorce bill in the Jewish sector the world over, in a reality in which it is not possible under religious law to compel a refuser to give or accept that bill, namely, the intractable agunah problem. The mechanism will be built primarily on the basis of a few theories from the field of law and economics: reversible rewards, dual-chooser rules, and modular liability rules. The main argument will be that the use of a multi-part vertical incentives mechanism increases efficiency at minimal additional cost; it overcomes a moral problem of “rewarding the sinner” by giving him a carrot and combines in optimal fashion the advantages entailed by activating the sticks and the carrots, and at the same time – insofar as possible – nullifies most of the disadvantages of each of them. It is possible to extrapolate from the specific to the general. From this aspect, the Article has several contributions to make. First, the example that will be discussed – that of refusal to divorce – is universal, and it is relevant anywhere in the world where there are Jews. Second, the Article has a contribution to make to legal and social sciences literature on the subject of incentives in general, and sticks and carrots in particular. Third, the Article will present a unique case of integration of a social sanction within a legal mechanism. Fourth, the Article might constitute a mod
{"title":"Hybrid Incentives: Carrots, Sticks, or Carrots Which Become Sticks?","authors":"Benjamin Shmueli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2977408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2977408","url":null,"abstract":"Various incentives may be used in order to cause a person to desist from an activity that creates negative externalities. It is possible, naturally, to use a stick and to apply an economic sanction in order to incentivize them to desist from that activity. It is also possible to use a carrot, i.e., to grant them a financial prize if they desist from the activity. Each of these incentives has advantages and disadvantages. Literature and practice are familiar with various combinations of sticks and carrots. In most cases, the mechanism is “horizontal”, e.g. using carrots with respect to certain parts of the population, and sticks against other parts. The Article presents a novel, vertical, sequential mechanism, in the form of a “game” played in two consecutive stages that are connected to each other, that trap the person who perpetrated a negative action within the mechanism, with no possible way out. At the center of the first stage of the vertical mechanism stands a carrot – a reward or a positive incentive – which is combined with a certain social sanction (shaming). At the center of the second stage, which is activated only if the implementation of the first stage did not meet with success, stands a stick – a punishment or a negative incentive. The objective will be to incentivize a person to engage in fruitful negotiations to end the harmful activity at the pre-mechanism stage, for after the mechanism begins operating and as more time passes, he will only lose. For this purpose, an illustration will be offered of the negative social behavior of one-sided refusal to give or accept the Jewish divorce bill in the Jewish sector the world over, in a reality in which it is not possible under religious law to compel a refuser to give or accept that bill, namely, the intractable agunah problem. The mechanism will be built primarily on the basis of a few theories from the field of law and economics: reversible rewards, dual-chooser rules, and modular liability rules. The main argument will be that the use of a multi-part vertical incentives mechanism increases efficiency at minimal additional cost; it overcomes a moral problem of “rewarding the sinner” by giving him a carrot and combines in optimal fashion the advantages entailed by activating the sticks and the carrots, and at the same time – insofar as possible – nullifies most of the disadvantages of each of them. \u0000It is possible to extrapolate from the specific to the general. From this aspect, the Article has several contributions to make. First, the example that will be discussed – that of refusal to divorce – is universal, and it is relevant anywhere in the world where there are Jews. Second, the Article has a contribution to make to legal and social sciences literature on the subject of incentives in general, and sticks and carrots in particular. Third, the Article will present a unique case of integration of a social sanction within a legal mechanism. Fourth, the Article might constitute a mod","PeriodicalId":176966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133307590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study analyzes whether enabling people to get informed about redistributive consequences is an effective measure to prevent equivalence framing in the domain of voting on redistribution. Utilizing the redistribution mechanism of the Meltzer-Richard model, an equivalent frame is induced by letting subjects vote either on a proportional tax rate or an outcome equivalent minimum net income. In a series of laboratory experiments, we find that framing effects both on the individually preferred and collectively agreed level of redistribution are tremendously strong if the information tool is not available (low transparency condition). Once subjects have access to the information tool (high transparency condition), the framing effect on individually preferred tax rates is significantly reduced, and after group communication, the framing effect is washed out from the collective decision. High transparency increases redistribution if subjects have to set a redistributive tax rate and lowers redistribution if subjects have to set a minimal income. Thus, the availability of the information tool has an asymmetric effect on the level of redistribution.
{"title":"Transparency Diminishes Framing-Effects in Voting on Redistribution: Some Experimental Evidence","authors":"Fabian Paetzel, J. Lorenz, M. Tepe","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2965442","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2965442","url":null,"abstract":"This study analyzes whether enabling people to get informed about redistributive consequences is an effective measure to prevent equivalence framing in the domain of voting on redistribution. Utilizing the redistribution mechanism of the Meltzer-Richard model, an equivalent frame is induced by letting subjects vote either on a proportional tax rate or an outcome equivalent minimum net income. In a series of laboratory experiments, we find that framing effects both on the individually preferred and collectively agreed level of redistribution are tremendously strong if the information tool is not available (low transparency condition). Once subjects have access to the information tool (high transparency condition), the framing effect on individually preferred tax rates is significantly reduced, and after group communication, the framing effect is washed out from the collective decision. High transparency increases redistribution if subjects have to set a redistributive tax rate and lowers redistribution if subjects have to set a minimal income. Thus, the availability of the information tool has an asymmetric effect on the level of redistribution.","PeriodicalId":176966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"122 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134315104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We introduce a skewness-based approach to measure tax progression and demand for redistribution. Adapting a novel, quantile-based statistical measure of skewness to right-skewed income distributions, we uncover its political economy foundation, by simultaneously relating the same measure to the classical model of income redistribution due to Meltzer and Richard (1981), to the Prospect Of Upward Mobility (POUM) mechanism due to Benabou and Ok (2001), and to the progressivity of a tax schedule. In an empirical analysis of UK income distributions in 1979 { 2013, we find that skewness has increased over time, with the rich moving further away from the median. While the magnitude of the increase has remained small enough so that observed redistribution (or lack thereof ) could be consistent with POUM hypothesis, more recent periods show an increase in tax progression.
{"title":"Skewness, Tax Progression, and Demand for Redistribution: Evidence from the UK","authors":"K. Pogorelskiy, Stefan Traub","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2958128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2958128","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a skewness-based approach to measure tax progression and demand for redistribution. Adapting a novel, quantile-based statistical measure of skewness to right-skewed income distributions, we uncover its political economy foundation, by simultaneously relating the same measure to the classical model of income redistribution due to Meltzer and Richard (1981), to the Prospect Of Upward Mobility (POUM) mechanism due to Benabou and Ok (2001), and to the progressivity of a tax schedule. In an empirical analysis of UK income distributions in 1979 { 2013, we find that skewness has increased over time, with the rich moving further away from the median. While the magnitude of the increase has remained small enough so that observed redistribution (or lack thereof ) could be consistent with POUM hypothesis, more recent periods show an increase in tax progression.","PeriodicalId":176966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134009543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The inelastic supply of fossil energy in the international input market precipitates failure of Pigouvian taxation consequent to competition among governments, as imposition of an environmental tax increases (decreases) the marginal cost of domestic (foreign) firms. This paper demonstrates that unless the supply of fossil energy is perfectly elastic, cap-and-trade outperforms Pigouvian taxation in terms of the domestic welfare of adopting countries, and global welfare is maximized when all countries implement the alternative scheme. We further demonstrate that the linkage of permit markets, when the energy supply is sufficiently inelastic, improves global welfare.
{"title":"Inelastic Supply of Fossil Energy and Competing Environmental Policies","authors":"Sung-gyun Hong, Seung-Gyu Sim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2896540","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2896540","url":null,"abstract":"The inelastic supply of fossil energy in the international input market precipitates failure of Pigouvian taxation consequent to competition among governments, as imposition of an environmental tax increases (decreases) the marginal cost of domestic (foreign) firms. This paper demonstrates that unless the supply of fossil energy is perfectly elastic, cap-and-trade outperforms Pigouvian taxation in terms of the domestic welfare of adopting countries, and global welfare is maximized when all countries implement the alternative scheme. We further demonstrate that the linkage of permit markets, when the energy supply is sufficiently inelastic, improves global welfare.","PeriodicalId":176966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121686805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As a conceptual framework for understanding contemporary sustainability challenges, telecoupling emphasises the importance of socioeconomic and environmental interactions over long distances. These long-distance interactions can occur through multiple human activities. Here we focus on international trade, a major channel of telecoupling flows, and in particular on the international trade of metals. We present a conceptual model to show how trade can be viewed through the telecoupling framework. We then use world input-output tables to quantitatively examine how countries contribute to both economic and environmental flows through trade of metals, but also how that contribution varies depending on their position in the global value chain of contemporary international trade. This analysis is built on recently-developed techniques for decomposing gross exports of physical products and embedded environmental assets as well as previous methods for valuing environmental assets. We make comparisons between countries' contributions to flows of economic value vs embedded greenhouse gas emissions, but also examine contributions beyond total volumes of trade and bilateral trade. Specifically, we quantify the economic and environmental ‘spillover’ effects that occur in contemporary international trade due to the global value chain in which flows of intermediate goods form components in other subsequently traded goods. We interpret differences between countries' contributions to the flows of economic value versus embedded environmental assets as being related to the intensity and efficiency of resource use during production. In turn, differences in contributions to direct trade flows versus spillover flows are related to their positions in the global value chain. Subsequently, we discuss other elements of the telecoupling framework in trade – agents, causes and effects. Quantitatively incorporating these telecoupling framework elements alongside spillover flows will enable investigation of dynamics and relationships that traditional trade theories, data and models do not currently account for well.
{"title":"Trade in the Telecoupling Framework","authors":"Hang Xiong, J. Millington, Wei Xu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2930562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2930562","url":null,"abstract":"As a conceptual framework for understanding contemporary sustainability challenges, telecoupling emphasises the importance of socioeconomic and environmental interactions over long distances. These long-distance interactions can occur through multiple human activities. Here we focus on international trade, a major channel of telecoupling flows, and in particular on the international trade of metals. We present a conceptual model to show how trade can be viewed through the telecoupling framework. We then use world input-output tables to quantitatively examine how countries contribute to both economic and environmental flows through trade of metals, but also how that contribution varies depending on their position in the global value chain of contemporary international trade. This analysis is built on recently-developed techniques for decomposing gross exports of physical products and embedded environmental assets as well as previous methods for valuing environmental assets. We make comparisons between countries' contributions to flows of economic value vs embedded greenhouse gas emissions, but also examine contributions beyond total volumes of trade and bilateral trade. Specifically, we quantify the economic and environmental ‘spillover’ effects that occur in contemporary international trade due to the global value chain in which flows of intermediate goods form components in other subsequently traded goods. We interpret differences between countries' contributions to the flows of economic value versus embedded environmental assets as being related to the intensity and efficiency of resource use during production. In turn, differences in contributions to direct trade flows versus spillover flows are related to their positions in the global value chain. Subsequently, we discuss other elements of the telecoupling framework in trade – agents, causes and effects. Quantitatively incorporating these telecoupling framework elements alongside spillover flows will enable investigation of dynamics and relationships that traditional trade theories, data and models do not currently account for well.","PeriodicalId":176966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132605351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies the optimal extraction and taxation of nonrenewable natural resources. It is well known that the market values of the main strategic resources such as oil, natural gas, uranium, copper,..., etc, fluctuate randomly following global and seasonal macroeconomic parameters, these values are modeled using Markov switching L'evy processes. We formulate this problem as a differential game. The two players of this differential game are the mining company whose aim is to maximize the revenues generated from its extracting activities and the government agency in charge of regulating and taxing natural resources. We prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium. The corresponding Hamilton Jacobi Isaacs equations are completely solved and the value functions as well as the optimal extraction and taxation rates are derived in closed-form. A Numerical example is presented to illustrate our findings.
{"title":"Optimal Extraction and Taxation of Strategic Natural Resources: A Differential Game Approach","authors":"M. Pemy","doi":"10.21314/jem.2020.206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21314/jem.2020.206","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the optimal extraction and taxation of nonrenewable natural resources. It is well known that the market values of the main strategic resources such as oil, natural gas, uranium, copper,..., etc, fluctuate randomly following global and seasonal macroeconomic parameters, these values are modeled using Markov switching L'evy processes. We formulate this problem as a differential game. The two players of this differential game are the mining company whose aim is to maximize the revenues generated from its extracting activities and the government agency in charge of regulating and taxing natural resources. We prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium. The corresponding Hamilton Jacobi Isaacs equations are completely solved and the value functions as well as the optimal extraction and taxation rates are derived in closed-form. A Numerical example is presented to illustrate our findings.","PeriodicalId":176966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123920739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Fiscal policies are used to improve vehicle fuel efficiency and reduce CO2 emissions in the transport sector. Years of forceful reform in Norway may be seen as informative. From 2007, Norway has linked its new vehicle registration tax to CO2 intensities, later adapting it into a feebate form. We exploit a detailed dataset of new vehicle registrations, using fixed effects and instrumental variables in our econometric analysis. We find that the CO2 differentiated registration tax contributes significantly to shifting purchases towards low-emitting cars. A 1000NOK tax increase (about 120USD) is associated with a reduction of 1.13% - 1.58% in vehicle registrations, and the responsiveness in car choice to fuel costs is of the same magnitude. The estimated effect of the tax explains the majority (79%) of the reduction in average CO2 intensity in the new car fleet 2006 through 2011. A point estimate of the elasticity of the CO2 intensity with respect to the CO2 price is minus 0.06, whereas the elasticity with respect to (resulting) car prices is about minus 0.5. An intuitive model with ‘all’ car types losing demand to low-emitting types applies fairly well: low-emitting segments gain in share and do not get CO2 leaner, while high-emitting segments lose in share and become CO2 leaner. Moves between nine segments and within those segments are equally important.
{"title":"Greening the Vehicle Fleet: Evidence from Norway's CO2 Differentiated Registration Tax","authors":"Shiyu Yan, G. Eskeland","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2834804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2834804","url":null,"abstract":"Fiscal policies are used to improve vehicle fuel efficiency and reduce CO2 emissions in the transport sector. Years of forceful reform in Norway may be seen as informative. From 2007, Norway has linked its new vehicle registration tax to CO2 intensities, later adapting it into a feebate form. We exploit a detailed dataset of new vehicle registrations, using fixed effects and instrumental variables in our econometric analysis. We find that the CO2 differentiated registration tax contributes significantly to shifting purchases towards low-emitting cars. A 1000NOK tax increase (about 120USD) is associated with a reduction of 1.13% - 1.58% in vehicle registrations, and the responsiveness in car choice to fuel costs is of the same magnitude. The estimated effect of the tax explains the majority (79%) of the reduction in average CO2 intensity in the new car fleet 2006 through 2011. A point estimate of the elasticity of the CO2 intensity with respect to the CO2 price is minus 0.06, whereas the elasticity with respect to (resulting) car prices is about minus 0.5. An intuitive model with ‘all’ car types losing demand to low-emitting types applies fairly well: low-emitting segments gain in share and do not get CO2 leaner, while high-emitting segments lose in share and become CO2 leaner. Moves between nine segments and within those segments are equally important.","PeriodicalId":176966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"235 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115068810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：