This paper investigates duopoly competition when horizontally differentiated firms are able to make personalized product-price offers to returning customers, within a behavior-based discrimination model. In the second period, firms can profile old customers according to their preferences, selling them targeted products at personalized prices. Product-price personalization (PP) allows firms to retain all old customers, eliminating second-period customer poaching. The overall profit effects of PP are shown to be ambiguous. In the second period, PP improves the matching between customers’ preferences and firms’ offers, but firms do not make any revenues in the rival’s turf. In the Bertrand outcome, second-period profits only increase for both firms if the size of their old turfs are not too different or initial products are not too differentiated. However, the additional second-period profits may be offset by lower first-period profits. PP is likely to increase firms’ overall discounted profits when consumers’ (firms’) discount factor is low (high) and firms’ initial products are exogenous and sufficiently different. When the location of initial products is endogenous, profits are hurt because of an additional location (strategic) effect aggravating head-to-head competition in the first period. Likewise, when a fraction of active consumers conceals their identity, PP increases second-period profits at the cost of aggressive first-period price competition. Finally, we show that the room for profitable PP enlarges considerably if firms rely on PP as an effective device to sustain tacit collusive outcomes, with firms credibly threatening to respond to first-period price deviations with second-period aggressive relocations of their standard products. This paper was accepted by Matthew Shum, marketing.
{"title":"When Is Product Personalization Profit-Enhancing? A Behavior-Based Discrimination Model","authors":"D. Laussel, J. Resende","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.4298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4298","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates duopoly competition when horizontally differentiated firms are able to make personalized product-price offers to returning customers, within a behavior-based discrimination model. In the second period, firms can profile old customers according to their preferences, selling them targeted products at personalized prices. Product-price personalization (PP) allows firms to retain all old customers, eliminating second-period customer poaching. The overall profit effects of PP are shown to be ambiguous. In the second period, PP improves the matching between customers’ preferences and firms’ offers, but firms do not make any revenues in the rival’s turf. In the Bertrand outcome, second-period profits only increase for both firms if the size of their old turfs are not too different or initial products are not too differentiated. However, the additional second-period profits may be offset by lower first-period profits. PP is likely to increase firms’ overall discounted profits when consumers’ (firms’) discount factor is low (high) and firms’ initial products are exogenous and sufficiently different. When the location of initial products is endogenous, profits are hurt because of an additional location (strategic) effect aggravating head-to-head competition in the first period. Likewise, when a fraction of active consumers conceals their identity, PP increases second-period profits at the cost of aggressive first-period price competition. Finally, we show that the room for profitable PP enlarges considerably if firms rely on PP as an effective device to sustain tacit collusive outcomes, with firms credibly threatening to respond to first-period price deviations with second-period aggressive relocations of their standard products. This paper was accepted by Matthew Shum, marketing.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"24 1","pages":"8872-8888"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78940640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dynamic structures in intertemporal choices offer multiple channels through which reference dependence can occur. We examine intertemporal reference dependence when using choice lists to elicit time preference over outcome sequences. Reference point effects can arise endogenously within an outcome sequence and exogenously from the experimental environment of the choice list. We show that estimated discount factors in the choice list are biased by both kinds of reference points and propose a model to jointly account for both. Our experimental design with outcome sequences also enables us to jointly estimate the discount factor and utility curvature. We further discuss the implications for recent developments in the measurement of intertemporal preference. This paper was accepted by Manel Baucells, behavioral economics and decision analysis.
{"title":"Reference Dependence in Intertemporal Preference","authors":"Zhihua Li, Songfa Zhong","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.4348","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4348","url":null,"abstract":"Dynamic structures in intertemporal choices offer multiple channels through which reference dependence can occur. We examine intertemporal reference dependence when using choice lists to elicit time preference over outcome sequences. Reference point effects can arise endogenously within an outcome sequence and exogenously from the experimental environment of the choice list. We show that estimated discount factors in the choice list are biased by both kinds of reference points and propose a model to jointly account for both. Our experimental design with outcome sequences also enables us to jointly estimate the discount factor and utility curvature. We further discuss the implications for recent developments in the measurement of intertemporal preference. This paper was accepted by Manel Baucells, behavioral economics and decision analysis.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"39 1","pages":"475-490"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91169103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the effect of introducing an incentive plan based on social performance in a sample of 186 social mission–oriented firms in Korea. We find that the social performance of social enterprises (SEs) significantly improves over time after adoption of an incentive plan based on social performance, and that the incentive effect increases with managers’ perceived measurability of social performance. Moreover, we document that social bonuses do not harm SEs’ financial performance and that they have a positive spillover effect on financial performance in SEs that have a higher level of task complementarity between social and financial goals. Our results also show that when the main beneficiary of social bonuses is expected to be a firm’s employees, the incentive effect of social bonuses decreases (increases) with a firm’s focus on social controls (formal controls). In contrast, when the main beneficiary is expected to be a firm’s social mission, the incentive effect increases with a firm’s reliance on social controls. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.
{"title":"Social Performance Incentives in Mission-Driven Firms","authors":"Sunseop Jung, J. Shin","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2021.4232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4232","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the effect of introducing an incentive plan based on social performance in a sample of 186 social mission–oriented firms in Korea. We find that the social performance of social enterprises (SEs) significantly improves over time after adoption of an incentive plan based on social performance, and that the incentive effect increases with managers’ perceived measurability of social performance. Moreover, we document that social bonuses do not harm SEs’ financial performance and that they have a positive spillover effect on financial performance in SEs that have a higher level of task complementarity between social and financial goals. Our results also show that when the main beneficiary of social bonuses is expected to be a firm’s employees, the incentive effect of social bonuses decreases (increases) with a firm’s focus on social controls (formal controls). In contrast, when the main beneficiary is expected to be a firm’s social mission, the incentive effect increases with a firm’s reliance on social controls. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"33 1","pages":"7631-7657"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76133367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A growing number of people today are participating in the gig economy, working as independent contractors on short-term projects. We study the effects of competition on gig workers’ effort and creativity on a Chinese novel-writing platform. Authors produce and sell their works chapter by chapter under a revenue-sharing or pay-by-the-word contract with the platform. Exploiting a regulation that induced a massive entry of novels in the romance genre but not other genres, we find that, on average, intensified competition led authors to produce content more quickly, whereas its effect on book novelty was weak. However, revenue-sharing books responded to competition substantially more than pay-by-the-word books, particularly regarding novelty. Moreover, the effect of competition on novelty is considerably stronger for books at earlier stages of the product life cycle. Finally, the platform increased the promotion of contracted books, which disproportionately favored pay-by-the-word books. We discuss the implications of these results for creative workers, platform firms, and policy makers in the gig economy. This paper was accepted by Anandhi Bharadwaj, information systems.
{"title":"Competition, Contracts, and Creativity: Evidence from Novel Writing in a Platform Market","authors":"Yanhui Wu, Feng Zhu","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.4329","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4329","url":null,"abstract":"A growing number of people today are participating in the gig economy, working as independent contractors on short-term projects. We study the effects of competition on gig workers’ effort and creativity on a Chinese novel-writing platform. Authors produce and sell their works chapter by chapter under a revenue-sharing or pay-by-the-word contract with the platform. Exploiting a regulation that induced a massive entry of novels in the romance genre but not other genres, we find that, on average, intensified competition led authors to produce content more quickly, whereas its effect on book novelty was weak. However, revenue-sharing books responded to competition substantially more than pay-by-the-word books, particularly regarding novelty. Moreover, the effect of competition on novelty is considerably stronger for books at earlier stages of the product life cycle. Finally, the platform increased the promotion of contracted books, which disproportionately favored pay-by-the-word books. We discuss the implications of these results for creative workers, platform firms, and policy makers in the gig economy. This paper was accepted by Anandhi Bharadwaj, information systems.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"52 1","pages":"8613-8634"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73502427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Practitioners and academics alike have argued that a firm’s interest in its short-term capital market valuation (short-termism) is harmful to the firm’s long-term profit. Their argument is intuitive—when a firm exhibits short-termism, its decision making will cater to the short term at the expense of the long term. Some practitioners claim that the adverse effects of increased short-termism become particularly acute in competitive markets. However, there is little academic research that examines the compound effect of short-termism and competition on a firm’s operational choices and long-term profit. In this paper, we provide a rigorous analytical model to examine how short-termism and competition can interact to induce a firm to distort its capacity investment and affect its long-term profit. We model a firm that has private information about its market demand, which can be either high or low and is captured by the firm’s type. Signaling this private information can influence both the investor’s valuation and the competitor’s entry decision. We find that operational distortion can emerge not only when short-termism is large, but also when it is small. In fact, when short-termism is sufficiently small, both firm types will distort their operational decision by underinvesting in a pooling outcome. We show, however, that the impact of short-termism on a firm’s long-term profit is not monotonically negative, and a certain level of short-termism can be beneficial to a firm’s long-term profit. The positive impact of incremental short-termism is robust to alternative modeling assumptions, including the form of competition and the investor’s risk profile. This paper was accepted by Victor Martínez-de-Albéniz, operations management.
{"title":"Operational Distortion: Compound Effects of Short-Termism and Competition","authors":"Xiaoyan Liu, W. Schmidt","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2021.4204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4204","url":null,"abstract":"Practitioners and academics alike have argued that a firm’s interest in its short-term capital market valuation (short-termism) is harmful to the firm’s long-term profit. Their argument is intuitive—when a firm exhibits short-termism, its decision making will cater to the short term at the expense of the long term. Some practitioners claim that the adverse effects of increased short-termism become particularly acute in competitive markets. However, there is little academic research that examines the compound effect of short-termism and competition on a firm’s operational choices and long-term profit. In this paper, we provide a rigorous analytical model to examine how short-termism and competition can interact to induce a firm to distort its capacity investment and affect its long-term profit. We model a firm that has private information about its market demand, which can be either high or low and is captured by the firm’s type. Signaling this private information can influence both the investor’s valuation and the competitor’s entry decision. We find that operational distortion can emerge not only when short-termism is large, but also when it is small. In fact, when short-termism is sufficiently small, both firm types will distort their operational decision by underinvesting in a pooling outcome. We show, however, that the impact of short-termism on a firm’s long-term profit is not monotonically negative, and a certain level of short-termism can be beneficial to a firm’s long-term profit. The positive impact of incremental short-termism is robust to alternative modeling assumptions, including the form of competition and the investor’s risk profile. This paper was accepted by Victor Martínez-de-Albéniz, operations management.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"101 1","pages":"5907-5923"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73535776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Medicare does not pay for a skilled nursing facility (SNF) unless a fee-for-service patient has stayed in the hospital for at least three days. This Medicare reimbursement rule, or the “three-day rule,” provides full coverage for the first 20 days and partial coverage for days 21–100 for skilled nursing care provided at any Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services-approved SNF. In this paper, we study how this Medicare reimbursement rule affects patient routing to SNFs and whether an SNF discharge reduces patients’ 30-day hospital readmission rates. Data analysis shows that Medicare patients are more likely to be discharged to an SNF rather than home after the three-day cutoff, and SNF discharges increase hospital readmission rates for Medicare day 3 patients. This perverse effect is driven by infection-related readmissions and is more likely to occur when local SNFs have lower occupancy rates and higher deficiency citations than the median SNF of the same state-year. Back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the three-day rule may have generated an extra Medicare cost of $71 million to $345 million per year due to the overuse of SNFs and the subsequent rise in hospital readmissions. Replacing the three-day rule with a machine-learning algorithm mimicking private insurers would help. This paper was accepted by Stefan Scholtes, healthcare management.
{"title":"Patient Routing to Skilled Nursing Facilities: The Consequences of the Medicare Reimbursement Rule","authors":"G. Jin, Ajin Lee, S. F. Lu","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.4316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4316","url":null,"abstract":"Medicare does not pay for a skilled nursing facility (SNF) unless a fee-for-service patient has stayed in the hospital for at least three days. This Medicare reimbursement rule, or the “three-day rule,” provides full coverage for the first 20 days and partial coverage for days 21–100 for skilled nursing care provided at any Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services-approved SNF. In this paper, we study how this Medicare reimbursement rule affects patient routing to SNFs and whether an SNF discharge reduces patients’ 30-day hospital readmission rates. Data analysis shows that Medicare patients are more likely to be discharged to an SNF rather than home after the three-day cutoff, and SNF discharges increase hospital readmission rates for Medicare day 3 patients. This perverse effect is driven by infection-related readmissions and is more likely to occur when local SNFs have lower occupancy rates and higher deficiency citations than the median SNF of the same state-year. Back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the three-day rule may have generated an extra Medicare cost of $71 million to $345 million per year due to the overuse of SNFs and the subsequent rise in hospital readmissions. Replacing the three-day rule with a machine-learning algorithm mimicking private insurers would help. This paper was accepted by Stefan Scholtes, healthcare management.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"37 1","pages":"8722-8740"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90455425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Kesavan, S. Lambert, Joan C. Williams, Pradeep K. Pendem
We estimate the causal effects of responsible scheduling practices on store financial performance at the U.S. retailer Gap, Inc. The randomized field experiment evaluated a multicomponent intervention designed to improve dimensions of work schedules—consistency, predictability, adequacy, and employee control—shown to foster employee well-being. The experiment was conducted in 28 stores in the San Francisco and Chicago metropolitan areas for nine months between November 2015 and August 2016. Intent-to-treat (ITT) analyses indicate that implementing responsible scheduling practices increased store productivity by 5.1%, a result of increasing sales (by 3.3%) and decreasing labor (by 1.8%). Drawing on qualitative interviews with managers and quantitative analyses of employee shift-level data, we offer evidence that the intervention improved financial performance through improved store execution. Our experiment provides evidence that responsible scheduling practices that take worker well-being into account can enhance store productivity by motivating additional employee effort and reducing barriers to employees adhering to the scheduled labor plan. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, operations management.
{"title":"Doing Well by Doing Good: Improving Retail Store Performance with Responsible Scheduling Practices at the Gap, Inc","authors":"S. Kesavan, S. Lambert, Joan C. Williams, Pradeep K. Pendem","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2021.4291","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4291","url":null,"abstract":"We estimate the causal effects of responsible scheduling practices on store financial performance at the U.S. retailer Gap, Inc. The randomized field experiment evaluated a multicomponent intervention designed to improve dimensions of work schedules—consistency, predictability, adequacy, and employee control—shown to foster employee well-being. The experiment was conducted in 28 stores in the San Francisco and Chicago metropolitan areas for nine months between November 2015 and August 2016. Intent-to-treat (ITT) analyses indicate that implementing responsible scheduling practices increased store productivity by 5.1%, a result of increasing sales (by 3.3%) and decreasing labor (by 1.8%). Drawing on qualitative interviews with managers and quantitative analyses of employee shift-level data, we offer evidence that the intervention improved financial performance through improved store execution. Our experiment provides evidence that responsible scheduling practices that take worker well-being into account can enhance store productivity by motivating additional employee effort and reducing barriers to employees adhering to the scheduled labor plan. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, operations management.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"12 1","pages":"7818-7836"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73699557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the impact of social investing on charitable donations using a unique data set consisting of investment behaviors and donation transactions for more than 10,000 customers of an investment app platform. We find that investors switching to a recently introduced social fund reduced their donations, mainly in charities supporting causes similar to those of the social fund. However, 79% of the investors that switched to the social fund did not donate before switching, so the social fund attracted more people to fund social causes. Still, because of the substitution effect, we estimate social funds have a positive effect on society only if their annual contributions to social causes are greater than 3.2% of the balance invested. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, finance.
{"title":"The Impact of Social Investing on Charitable Donations","authors":"Jake An, Donnel Briley, S. Danziger, S. Levi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3958187","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3958187","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the impact of social investing on charitable donations using a unique data set consisting of investment behaviors and donation transactions for more than 10,000 customers of an investment app platform. We find that investors switching to a recently introduced social fund reduced their donations, mainly in charities supporting causes similar to those of the social fund. However, 79% of the investors that switched to the social fund did not donate before switching, so the social fund attracted more people to fund social causes. Still, because of the substitution effect, we estimate social funds have a positive effect on society only if their annual contributions to social causes are greater than 3.2% of the balance invested. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, finance.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"83 1","pages":"1264-1274"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86563461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The editors of Management Science acknowledge all our 2021 reviewers and guest associate editors who generously provided expert counsel and guidance on a voluntary basis. We are grateful for their contributions; without them, the journal could not function. Here, we list those reviewers who contributed four or more reviews in 2021.
{"title":"2022 Reviewers and Guest Editors","authors":"","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.4345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4345","url":null,"abstract":"The editors of Management Science acknowledge all our 2021 reviewers and guest associate editors who generously provided expert counsel and guidance on a voluntary basis. We are grateful for their contributions; without them, the journal could not function. Here, we list those reviewers who contributed four or more reviews in 2021.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"45 1","pages":"1931-1934"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87553078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
K. Giesecke, G. Liberali, Hamid Nazerzadeh, J. Shanthikumar, C. Teo
{"title":"Introduction to the Special Section on Data-Driven Prescriptive Analytics","authors":"K. Giesecke, G. Liberali, Hamid Nazerzadeh, J. Shanthikumar, C. Teo","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2021.4296","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4296","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"10 1","pages":"1591-1594"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84191814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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