The relationship between education and economic growth has always been considered a fundamental concern of many economists as well as governments. This research provides empirical evidence of the education true effects are not well understood, especially in Vietnam. This research provides empirical evidence of the influences of education in Vietnam’s economy, more specifically on Vietnam’s productivity, from the period 2000 to 2015. The paper find that the final findings are supportive to the hypothesis made: education is critical factor of economic enhancement. More specifically, primary and secondary schooling levels better the productivity of the economy estimated by the Total Factor Productivity and the GDP growth. Keywords: GPD growth, social return, TFP DOI: 10.7176/JEP/11-6-02 Publication date: February 29 th 2020
{"title":"Education and Economic Growth in Vietnam","authors":"B. Dao","doi":"10.7176/jep/11-6-02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7176/jep/11-6-02","url":null,"abstract":"The relationship between education and economic growth has always been considered a fundamental concern of many economists as well as governments. This research provides empirical evidence of the education true effects are not well understood, especially in Vietnam. This research provides empirical evidence of the influences of education in Vietnam’s economy, more specifically on Vietnam’s productivity, from the period 2000 to 2015. The paper find that the final findings are supportive to the hypothesis made: education is critical factor of economic enhancement. More specifically, primary and secondary schooling levels better the productivity of the economy estimated by the Total Factor Productivity and the GDP growth. Keywords: GPD growth, social return, TFP DOI: 10.7176/JEP/11-6-02 Publication date: February 29 th 2020","PeriodicalId":18516,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Production","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90396091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome of optimally designed auctions. In a single-object auction environment, we assume that before the revenue-maximizing auctioneer designs the auction, bidders noncooperatively choose signal structures that disclose information about their valuations. We show that an equilibrium exists in this two-stage game and that in every equilibrium the object is sold with probability one. Our main result concerns the consequences of information disclosure for the auctioneer’s revenue. If in the benchmark without disclosure the object remains unsold with positive probability, then disclosure yields strictly higher revenue in every equilibrium. (JEL D44, D82, D83)
{"title":"Competitive Information Disclosure to an Auctioneer","authors":"Stefan Terstiege, Cédric Wasser","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3444994","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3444994","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome of optimally designed auctions. In a single-object auction environment, we assume that before the revenue-maximizing auctioneer designs the auction, bidders noncooperatively choose signal structures that disclose information about their valuations. We show that an equilibrium exists in this two-stage game and that in every equilibrium the object is sold with probability one. Our main result concerns the consequences of information disclosure for the auctioneer’s revenue. If in the benchmark without disclosure the object remains unsold with positive probability, then disclosure yields strictly higher revenue in every equilibrium. (JEL D44, D82, D83)","PeriodicalId":18516,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Production","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85147474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The relationship between prices of paintings at public auctions and their attributes has received much attention in recent years. However, the effects of color have been mostly absent from these studies. The present study explored the relationship between price and color in Rothko’s post 1950 paintings, which were dominated by color rather than figurative elements. We characterized the color features of the paintings in terms of their dominant hues and luminosity. In addition, we developed two additional metrics to evaluate color contrast, and palette diversity. We found that in general the market favored diverse color compositions, and preferred reds over greens, blues over yellows, and lighter-colored paintings. We also identified two distinct price regimes in the period studied: a first period, dominated by enthusiasm for the artist, regardless of the painting’s characteristics; and a second period, driven by color-related attributes.
{"title":"The Price of Color in Mark Rothko’s Paintings","authors":"V. Charlin, Arturo Cifuentes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3262314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3262314","url":null,"abstract":"The relationship between prices of paintings at public auctions and their attributes has received much attention in recent years. However, the effects of color have been mostly absent from these studies. The present study explored the relationship between price and color in Rothko’s post 1950 paintings, which were dominated by color rather than figurative elements. We characterized the color features of the paintings in terms of their dominant hues and luminosity. In addition, we developed two additional metrics to evaluate color contrast, and palette diversity. We found that in general the market favored diverse color compositions, and preferred reds over greens, blues over yellows, and lighter-colored paintings. We also identified two distinct price regimes in the period studied: a first period, dominated by enthusiasm for the artist, regardless of the painting’s characteristics; and a second period, driven by color-related attributes.","PeriodicalId":18516,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Production","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89639285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study optimal dynamic information disclosure in a regime change setting. A shock arrives at some stochastic date. The agents can preemptively attack at any time, where the attack is irreversible, and waiting is costly. This may create a panic --- agents attack expecting others to attack, causing regime change even when the fundamental does not warrant it. The principal prefers the regime to survive and wants to minimize the chance of panic. We construct a simple optimal disclosure policy that resembles forward-looking stress tests. The principal sets a disaster alert, which, at a given future date, gets triggered if it becomes evident that the regime will change regardless of the agents' actions thereafter. A timely disaster alert serves as an early warning. Under the unique rationalizable strategy, agents ignore their private information, wait for, and then follow the alert. This policy perfectly coordinates the agents' actions and eliminates panic.
{"title":"Timely Persuasion","authors":"Deepal Basak, Zhen Zhou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3540708","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3540708","url":null,"abstract":"We study optimal dynamic information disclosure in a regime change setting. A shock arrives at some stochastic date. The agents can preemptively attack at any time, where the attack is irreversible, and waiting is costly. This may create a panic --- agents attack expecting others to attack, causing regime change even when the fundamental does not warrant it. The principal prefers the regime to survive and wants to minimize the chance of panic. We construct a simple optimal disclosure policy that resembles forward-looking stress tests. The principal sets a disaster alert, which, at a given future date, gets triggered if it becomes evident that the regime will change regardless of the agents' actions thereafter. A timely disaster alert serves as an early warning. Under the unique rationalizable strategy, agents ignore their private information, wait for, and then follow the alert. This policy perfectly coordinates the agents' actions and eliminates panic.","PeriodicalId":18516,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Production","volume":"10 2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78045307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study a signal-jamming model of product review manipulation in which rational consumers consult product reviews and price to better estimate a product’s quality, and a firm, whose quality is either high or low, chooses its price and how much bias to insert into product reviews. We show that both firm types always exert positive effort to manipulate product reviews, and, depending on the equilibrium price level, one or both of them can increase its sales. When the high-type firm exerts more effort than the low-type, review manipulation benefits consumers by raising [lowering] their demand for the high-quality [low-quality] product.
{"title":"Manipulation Through Biased Product Reviews","authors":"K. K. Aköz, Cemal Eren Arbatlı, Levent Çelik","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3068345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3068345","url":null,"abstract":"We study a signal-jamming model of product review manipulation in which rational consumers consult product reviews and price to better estimate a product’s quality, and a firm, whose quality is either high or low, chooses its price and how much bias to insert into product reviews. We show that both firm types always exert positive effort to manipulate product reviews, and, depending on the equilibrium price level, one or both of them can increase its sales. When the high-type firm exerts more effort than the low-type, review manipulation benefits consumers by raising [lowering] their demand for the high-quality [low-quality] product.","PeriodicalId":18516,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Production","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86104716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Modern antitrust and competition law relies extensively on the firm as defined by Ronald Coase: a hierarchy reducing transaction costs thanks to vertical control, where such control defines the firm’s boundaries. Meanwhile, the governance of public permissionless blockchains is horizontal. Transaction costs are minimized thanks to specific characteristics that are singular to these blockchains and do not depend on the verticality of relationships. The absence of vertical control to direct the resources holds antitrust and competition in check. Against this background, the present article introduces the “theory of granularity,” which permits analysis of the roles played by each (group of) participant in the horizontal governance of public permissionless blockchains. On this basis, one may identify a “blockchain nucleus,” i.e., a set of participants collaborating to ensure and maximize the blockchain survival by “controlling” it all together. Antitrust and competition law becomes applicable again as the nucleus serves as the basis for the definition of the relevant market and market power, the assessment of practices’ legality, and liability assignment.
{"title":"The Theory of Granularity: A Path for Antitrust in Blockchain Ecosystems","authors":"Thibault Schrepel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3519032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3519032","url":null,"abstract":"Modern antitrust and competition law relies extensively on the firm as defined by Ronald Coase: a hierarchy reducing transaction costs thanks to vertical control, where such control defines the firm’s boundaries. Meanwhile, the governance of public permissionless blockchains is horizontal. Transaction costs are minimized thanks to specific characteristics that are singular to these blockchains and do not depend on the verticality of relationships. The absence of vertical control to direct the resources holds antitrust and competition in check. \u0000 \u0000Against this background, the present article introduces the “theory of granularity,” which permits analysis of the roles played by each (group of) participant in the horizontal governance of public permissionless blockchains. On this basis, one may identify a “blockchain nucleus,” i.e., a set of participants collaborating to ensure and maximize the blockchain survival by “controlling” it all together. Antitrust and competition law becomes applicable again as the nucleus serves as the basis for the definition of the relevant market and market power, the assessment of practices’ legality, and liability assignment.","PeriodicalId":18516,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Production","volume":"115 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90528407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the design of core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions (CAs), a challenging setting where no strategyproof rules exist. We show that the rule most commonly used in practice, the Quadratic rule, can be improved upon in terms of efficiency, incentives and revenue. We present a new algorithm search framework for finding good mechanisms, and we apply it towards a search for good core-selecting rules. Within our framework, we use an algorithmic Bayes-Nash equilibrium solver to evaluate 366 rules across 31 settings to identify rules that outperform Quadratic. Our main finding is that our best-performing rules are Large-style rules, i.e., they provide bidders with large values with better incentives than Quadratic. Finally, we identify two particularly well-performing rules and suggest that they may be considered for practical implementation in place of Quadratic.
{"title":"Designing Core-Selecting Payment Rules: A Computational Search Approach","authors":"Benedikt Buenz, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3178454","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3178454","url":null,"abstract":"We study the design of core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions (CAs), a challenging setting where no strategyproof rules exist. We show that the rule most commonly used in practice, the Quadratic rule, can be improved upon in terms of efficiency, incentives and revenue. We present a new algorithm search framework for finding good mechanisms, and we apply it towards a search for good core-selecting rules. Within our framework, we use an algorithmic Bayes-Nash equilibrium solver to evaluate 366 rules across 31 settings to identify rules that outperform Quadratic. Our main finding is that our best-performing rules are Large-style rules, i.e., they provide bidders with large values with better incentives than Quadratic. Finally, we identify two particularly well-performing rules and suggest that they may be considered for practical implementation in place of Quadratic.","PeriodicalId":18516,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Production","volume":"88 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88620103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a storable good market, we investigate a firm’s pricing policy and the welfare effects associated with the firm’s ability to commit to future prices in the presence of time-varying production costs. We show that, if costs are expected to increase, the firm’s lack of commitment leads to lower prices than full commitment when consumer storage costs are relatively small and demand is not too convex. This enhances consumer surplus and, under certain circumstances, total welfare. For intermediate consumer storage costs, the firm’s full commitment generally benefits consumers and, a fortiori, the whole economy. Our analysis provides potentially significant empirical and policy implications, especially regarding the patterns of cost pass-through rates.
{"title":"Storable good market with intertemporal cost variations","authors":"Fabio Antoniou, Raffaele Fiocco","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3513326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3513326","url":null,"abstract":"In a storable good market, we investigate a firm’s pricing policy and the welfare effects associated with the firm’s ability to commit to future prices in the presence of time-varying production costs. We show that, if costs are expected to increase, the firm’s lack of commitment leads to lower prices than full commitment when consumer storage costs are relatively small and demand is not too convex. This enhances consumer surplus and, under certain circumstances, total welfare. For intermediate consumer storage costs, the firm’s full commitment generally benefits consumers and, a fortiori, the whole economy. Our analysis provides potentially significant empirical and policy implications, especially regarding the patterns of cost pass-through rates.","PeriodicalId":18516,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Production","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74228504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the late 2000s, a regulatory reform dramatically strengthened the incentives of French nonprofit hospitals to attract patients. Exploiting exhaustive data for surgery treatments and modeling hospitals as supplying utility to patients, we show that increased competitive pressure on nonprofit hospitals caused them to perform more procedures but did not inflate overall activity. Although they have gained market shares, nonprofit hospitals have been significantly worse off after the reform. To adjust to stronger financial incentives, they incurred an additional effort (pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs) equivalent to about a quarter of their annual revenue.
{"title":"Financial Incentives and Competitive Pressure: The Case of the Hospital Industry","authors":"Philippe Choné, L. Wilner","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvab031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvab031","url":null,"abstract":"In the late 2000s, a regulatory reform dramatically strengthened the incentives of French nonprofit hospitals to attract patients. Exploiting exhaustive data for surgery treatments and modeling hospitals as supplying utility to patients, we show that increased competitive pressure on nonprofit hospitals caused them to perform more procedures but did not inflate overall activity. Although they have gained market shares, nonprofit hospitals have been significantly worse off after the reform. To adjust to stronger financial incentives, they incurred an additional effort (pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs) equivalent to about a quarter of their annual revenue.","PeriodicalId":18516,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Production","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82604879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Auctions with endogenous rationing have been introduced to stimulate competition. Such (procurement) auctions reduce the volume put out to tender when competition is low. This paper finds a strong negative effect of endogenous rationing on participation when bid-preparation is costly, counteracting the aim to stimulate competition. For multiple auctioneer's objectives mentioned in directives, we derive optimal mechanisms, which differ due to different evaluation of the tradeoff between participation and bid-preparation costs. Thus, the auctioneer needs to decide on an objective. However, reducing bid-preparation costs improves the optimal values of multiple objective functions.
{"title":"A Small Volume Reduction that Melts Down the Market: Auctions with Endogenous Rationing","authors":"Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Ann-Katrin Hanke, Marion Ott","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3570389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3570389","url":null,"abstract":"Auctions with endogenous rationing have been introduced to stimulate competition. Such (procurement) auctions reduce the volume put out to tender when competition is low. This paper finds a strong negative effect of endogenous rationing on participation when bid-preparation is costly, counteracting the aim to stimulate competition. For multiple auctioneer's objectives mentioned in directives, we derive optimal mechanisms, which differ due to different evaluation of the tradeoff between participation and bid-preparation costs. Thus, the auctioneer needs to decide on an objective. However, reducing bid-preparation costs improves the optimal values of multiple objective functions.","PeriodicalId":18516,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Production","volume":"155 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77123805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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