Memory最新文献

Encoding lists of categorised words produces robust false memory for non-presented exemplars but few false memories for category labels. The present research examined the conditions under which categorical false memories can be elicited by variations in list composition in which a subset of category labels was presented for half of the lists. In Experiment 1, participants encoded lists of exemplars with or without the presence of category labels under full or divided attention conditions. Presentation of a subset of category labels produced false memories for non-presented labels and dividing attention reduced this effect. In Experiment 2, participants encoded lists as in Experiment 1 and prior to retrieval, were (or were not), given warnings about the nature of false memory effects and to avoid false memory errors. Categorical false memories arose when a subset of labels was encoded and warnings did not significantly reduce their magnitude, testifying to the robustness of this effect. Explanations are considered from the perspective of activation monitoring, fuzzy trace theory and how encoding and subsequent monitoring interact.

Research on the saying-is-believing effect shows that individuals tune their messages to match the audience's attitude and subsequently exhibit memory bias in the same direction. However, its implications in the context of collective memory remain understudied. Drawing on social identity theory, prior research suggests that people reconstruct memories of their group's past selectively, emphasising positive aspects and minimising negative ones. Using a 2 × 2 factorial design, this study examined the saying-is-believing effect in national history by manipulating audience attitude (positive vs. negative) and message production (with vs. without message generation). Results show that the effect extends to national history, with participants tuning their messages and biasing their memory according to the audience's attitude. However, those high in nationalism showed neither message tuning nor memory bias. These findings suggest that for individuals high in nationalism, social identity motivations override the epistemic and relational motives that typically drive the saying-is-believing effect.

When retrieving information, people often shift over time from "Remembering" high levels of detail about a study episode to simply "Knowing" the information absent such detail. This "Remember-Know" shift is well-documented for true information, and recent work suggests that this effect exists, but is attenuated, for false information. One explanation for this difference is that true information is better represented in people's prior knowledge, supporting retention of this content as "Known" over time. In this registered report we tested this hypothesis by measuring people's reported retrieval experiences (e.g., "Remembering" or "Knowing") for true and false information at two levels of anticipated prior knowledge. While we replicate the "Remember-Know" shift, we do not find that it differs by anticipated prior knowledge. We also examine the relation between retrieval experiences and the production of encountered information, as well as the impact of repeated testing on retrieval experiences.

We investigated age-related differences and commonalities in earliest memories, focusing on retrieval speed, recollection type (remember vs. know), retrieval type (direct vs. generative), age at the time of the event, and phenomenological characteristics. The sample consisted of 131 adults: 68 young adults (48.5% males; M_age = 20.29, Sa_ge = 1.53) and 63 older adults (47.6% males; M_age = 68.43, SD_age = 4.11). They reported their earliest memories, estimated their age at the time, indicated recollection and retrieval types, and rated event characteristics (e.g., importance, vividness). Results showed that older adults were significantly more likely to classify their memories as remembered and directly retrieved, whereas young adults had a more balanced distribution of the classifications. Directly retrieved memories were accessed more rapidly than generatively retrieved ones, and young adults demonstrated shorter retrieval latencies than older adults. Additionally, older adults dated their earliest memories to later age and rated them as significantly more vivid, emotionally intense, and personally meaningful. Recollection type was not associated with retrieval latency but linked to higher vividness and confidence. Overall, our findings demonstrate potential age-related shifts in the retrieval and subjective evaluation of earliest autobiographical memories.

Although previous research has extensively examined the characteristics of specific autobiographical memories, few tools have been available to assess how individuals recall their personal past in general. To address this gap, we adapted into Polish the Autobiographical Recollection Test (ART), a self-report instrument originally designed to capture general autobiographical remembering across seven components: vividness, narrative coherence, reliving, rehearsal, scene construction, visual imagery, and life story relevance. Confirmatory factor analysis supported the factorial validity of the Polish version, demonstrating adequate psychometric properties. The Polish adaptation also showed expected correlations with another self-report measure of autobiographical memory ability (Survey of Autobiographical Memory, SAM), supporting its convergent validity. Furthermore, both the full and brief versions of ART showed significant associations with scores on the Involuntary Autobiographical Memory Inventory (IAMI). These findings provide robust support for the Polish adaptation of ART as a reliable tool for assessing the subjective qualities of autobiographical memory, with potential applications in research on diverse populations.

False autobiographical memories can have serious implications in legal settings, where the case outcomes may hinge entirely on memory-based eyewitness testimony. This study investigated whether a sensitisation memory training could reduce false autobiographical memory reports. We employed a blind implantation method in which participants (N = 294) indicated whether various childhood events had happened to them. Participants were then told they had confirmed five events - one of which was false - and were asked to rate their memory and belief. In session two, 15% (44/294) of participants reported a false belief and an additional 3.4% (10/294) a false memory, meaning that a total of 18.4% made a false report. Before session three, participants were randomly assigned to receive either the memory training or a distractor task, then repeated the false memory procedure. Contrary to our expectations, the training did not reduce false reports. Instead, false beliefs (SMT: 20.4%, 28/137, Control: 22.3%, 31/139) and false memories (SMT: 5.1%, 7/137, Control: 2.9% 4/139) increased in session three. The findings suggest false memories elicited in the blind implantation paradigm might be particularly resistant to correction.

Studies have shown that involuntary autobiographical memories often have identifiable cues, which are rooted in a variety of experiences. Studies have also suggested that one's activities and thoughts may also sometimes be related to these memories. Here, we examined a relatively large diary sample of involuntary memories (N = 123), where participants were asked to record their activities and thoughts along with their involuntary memories, and to decide if these activities and thoughts were related to these memories. The results showed that nearly two-thirds of the recorded involuntary memories were reported to be related to the activities and/or thoughts that coincided with them. Further, independent judges determined that activities and thoughts frequently overlapped conceptually with the memories, resulting in high inter-rater reliability estimates between the judges and the participants. We argue that the results suggest that activities and thoughts may have a priming role in the elicitation of involuntary memories.

Unfamiliar face recognition is a critical ability that can have significant implications, such as in legal or security contexts. Despite this, little is known about the cognitive skills that support children's ability to accurately recognise and report unfamiliar faces and how these change with age. This research examined whether executive functioning (EF), including working memory, cognitive flexibility, response inhibition, and updating, predicts school-aged children's performance on two face recognition tasks: an old/new recognition task (Experiment 1; N = 113) and a lineup identification task (Experiment 2; N = 121). While EF was not strongly related to recognition accuracy in either task, it was associated with children's response bias, indicating that EF supports regulation of decision thresholds rather than memory strength. Age predicted modest improvements in discriminability, but these effects were not explained by EF, indicating that other developmental factors, such as metacognition or social understanding, may also play a role. Together, these findings suggest that EF contributes more to how children regulate and apply memory decisions than to how accurately they encode or retrieve unfamiliar faces.

Background: Dissociative identity disorder remains contested. The debate hinges on whether memories carry over between identity states and whether those states are truly distinct, but most evidence rests on self report rather than direct memory tests. Neuroimaging has been advanced as an indirect, non self-report approach by scanning individuals with DID in different identity states and comparing them with simulators or other groups. Objective: To evaluate how studies that scan people with DID in more than one identity state inform the core memory claims of DID, by assessing their methodological quality. Methods: Systematically reviewing studies from the past 40 years, quality was assessed using GRADE criteria and the Newcastle-Ottawa scale. Results: Of the nine studies reviewed, many lacked specific aims and only one stated clear hypotheses throughout. The results further indicated several concerns related to diagnostic comorbidity, and absence of clinical comparisons, reverse inference, and post hoc reasoning. Conclusions: On current evidence, functional imaging across identity states does not support firm claims about identity fragmentation or inter identity amnesia, nor does it decide between trauma based and sociocognitive accounts. Methodological refinement and direct tests of memory transfer are needed for progress.

Past research has found substantial evidence of enhanced memory for objects and events that are highly incongruent with individuals' prior expectations. This well-known bizarreness effect, was recently extended into the domain of colour, revealing enhanced memory for objects paired with expectation-incongruent colours (or bizarre - e.g., blue carrot) relative to expectation-congruent colours (e.g., orange carrots; Morita & Kambara, 2022). Colour bizarreness effects in object memory: Evidence from a recall test and eye tracking.. In two experiments, we explored whether the enhanced memory for bizarre, expectation-incongruent objects includes object-feature memory and whether this feature memory persists long-term. Using a 4-Alternative recognition task, we assessed memory for object colours as a function of expectation-congruence immediately following study and three days later. Results of Study 1 revealed no significant difference in recognition memory for bizarre compared to expectation-congruent colours, and no enhanced memory for bizarre colours in long-term memory. In Study 2, we found that an encoding task requiring participants to activate their prior expectations during study did not promote greater retention of bizarre object features. Instead, the results across both studies revealed a long-term memory advantage for expectation-congruent items. These findings highlight conditions where the enhanced memory for bizarre information is limited, providing an interesting challenge to current mechanistic accounts of memory for expectation-related information.