Memory最新文献

ABSTRACTDeficits in episodic memory have been reported in various psychiatric conditions, including Major Depressive Disorder (MDD). Many widely used episodic memory tests do not have the ability to distinguish between impaired memory of separate components of a real-life event (e.g., what happened, where it happened and when), and impaired binding of such real-life features. To address this issue, a naturalistic, real-world What-Where-When memory task was employed to assess the nature of episodic memory impairments in MDD. A validation study established that the task is sensitive to age-related episodic memory changes, and that intentional encoding does not invalidate the task. The main study then compared the performance of patients with depression and control participants on the intentionally encoded WWW task. Patients with MDD presented an overall episodic memory impairment arising from deficits in object memory and the ability to bind objects to temporal context. Taken together, our study confirms the episodic memory impairment in MDD, by providing evidence of deficient object memory and reduced ability to bind temporal context to objects in patients. Our naturalistic WWW task presents a promising approach for thorough identification of the nature of episodic memory impairments, under a real-world environment, in various conditions, including MDD.

In this article we present a review of research on the IAM Task, whereby memories are cued by self-images in the form of "I am … " statements, such as I am a grandfather, I am a Bob Dylan fan, I am from Darlington, I am a Psychologist. Such cues are particularly successful at accessing memories associated with the formation of specific aspects of the self. We describe the conceptual and historical context for the development of our task and review findings from other researchers who have used the same basic design. We present aggregate data and examples from across several experiments, examining how these patterns change in psychological distress and dysfunction. We also discuss research on "I will be" statements and how these have been adopted to examine self-related future cognitions. We conclude that the working self operates to organise memory retrieval and make accessible episodic and semantic material for self-relevant periods across the lifespan. Moreover, accessibility of self-images can be modulated by retrieval of autobiographical memories, highlighting Conway's bidirectional relationship between memory and the self. We provide suggestions for future research and for the first time provide a standardised version of our IAM Task for use by researchers.

We extend Conway's self-memory system by adding theory and data from shame, an emotion that disrupts the internalised ideals of society needed for a positive self-concept. The event that caused 273 undergraduates their greatest amount of shame was analyzed; 66% were not very negative except for producing shame. Ratings of post-event effects, including two measure of self (self-perceived weakness, and centrality to identity) and four clinical symptoms (intrusions, avoidance, anxiety, and depression), were attributed separately to the remembered event, behaviour during the event, and shame from the event. The effects of shame were generally as large as the those of the event and larger than those of the behaviour, demonstrating the importance of shame's effects. The Tonic Immobility Scale (TIS), which measures tonic immobility (i.e., freezing), was obtained for the event that produced the most tonic immobility but that was not the event that caused the most shame. The post-event symptoms measured on the event that caused the most shame and the TIS correlated highly, suggesting that shame and tonic immobility may belong to a cluster of phylogenetically conserved submissive defensive mechanisms that could account for effects currently attributed to goals in self-memory systems.

According to Conway's view, Autobiographical memory (AM) construction is accompanied by control processes. These processes range from filtering out relevant memories according to the current context, to generating or elaborating appropriate retrieval cues. These processes can be conceptualised as metacognition, the ability to control and monitor cognitive processes. Experimentally, little has been carried out to support the idea that metacognition is involved in AM. To assess this, we designed a task, the Feeling of Retrieval. Participants had to predict whether cue words would facilitate AM access (i.e., fluent access cues) or not (i.e., limited access cues) in a limited time (either 1 (Exp. 2) or 2 (Exp. 1) s). Later, they retrieved memories in response to both types of cues. Results show that cues judged as fluent access led to better AM generation, as illustrated by AM retrieval latency and a subjective measure of the ease with which the AMs were retrieved. These rapid predictions may rely on epistemic feelings and / or other mnemonic cues such as a partial retrieval of information. This metacognitive access to the earliest stages of AM retrieval illustrates the ability to monitor AM processes as proposed by Conway (2005).

A plethora of studies have shown that people persistently remember public and personal events experienced during adolescence and early adulthood, particularly with a positive valence. In five studies, we investigate the reminiscence bump (RB) for positive and negative memories of public events (Studies 1 and 2), private events (Study 3), music-related events (Study 4), and cross-cultural memory differences (i.e., China and US) (Study 5). Participants retrieved either one positive or one negative memory, indicated their Age of Encoding, and provided secondary measures, i.e., memory vividness and rehearsal (Studies 1 and 3) and emotional intensity (Studies 2 and 4). About 10,000 memories were collected and positive memories appeared generally older than negative recollections, but the RB emerged for both positive and negative memories. Furthermore, the peak was earlier for positive memories of public events (<15 years old) than for negative memories (20-40 years), while no differences were found for private events or music-related experiences (15-25 years). Chinese had their RB later than US respondents. Finally, autobiographical recollections have moderate to low associations with secondary measures of phenomenological features of memory. These findings are consistent with the identity-formation theory, providing additional and important information on the development of the Self.

Martin Conway's influential theorising about the self-memory system (Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000). The construction of autobiographical memories in the self-memory system. Psychological Review, 107(2), 261-288) illuminated how the "working self" influences the construction of autobiographical memories. Moreover, his constructive view of self and memory is compatible with the occurrence of various kinds of errors and distortions in remembering. Here we consider one of the "seven sins" of memory (Schacter, D. L. (2021). The seven sins of memory updated edition: How the mind forgets and remembers. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt) that we believe is most closely related to the operation of Conway's self-memory system: bias, which refers to the role of current knowledge, beliefs, and feelings in shaping and sometimes distorting memories for past experiences and attitudes. More specifically, we discuss recent research on three forms of bias - consistency, self-enhancing, and positivity biases - that illuminate their role in influencing how people remember the past and also imagine the future. We consider both theoretical and applied aspects of these biases and, consistent with Conway's perspective, argue that despite sometimes contributing to inaccuracies, bias also serves adaptive functions.

Involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) have been typically studied with paper diaries, kept for a week or longer. However, such studies are unable to capture the true frequency of IAMs, nor the level of detail that would give new insights into the mechanisms of IAMs. To address this gap, a new audio-recording method was developed and tested on the first author who recorded 674 IAMs while driving a car on a 30-40-minute-long habitual route on 20 occasions. Results revealed very high frequency of IAMs (almost 34 per journey) that were reported more often in response to dynamic (one-off) than static cues. Moreover, a substantial number of memory chains and long-term priming of IAMs by previously encountered incidental stimuli were also recorded. Based on these results, a new theoretical model is proposed in which the occurrence of IAMs is determined by an interplay of factors at the time of the IAM, such as the type of ongoing activity and internal or external triggers, as well as different types of long-term priming. The results also have practical implications for studying mind-wandering and safety issues in driving and aircraft-flying, where periods of concentration are followed by monotony and less demanding tasks.

Experimental studies show that vividness and emotionality of aversive memories decrease after recall with eye movements. We aimed at replicating this finding. Relatedly, consistent with Conway's view that memory retrieval is constructive, we examined changes in the content of the memories. If eye movements render a memory less aversive, it may be avoided less, stimulating recall and increasing the opportunity to infer (contextual) details. Two experiments (N = 97 and N = 250) examined whether eye movements affect the number of central and peripheral memory details and characteristics. Female undergraduate students were randomly allocated to either eye movements with recall (EM) or recall only (RO). Before and after the experimental task, participants rated the vividness and emotionality, provided a detailed description and evaluated other memory characteristics. We replicated earlier findings that vividness (both experiments) and emotionality (experiment 2) were reduced more after EM compared to RO. However, conditions did not statistically significantly differ with respect to content details and other memory characteristics. Overall, findings support the idea that eye movements decrease the experience of the memory as vivid and emotional. Results are inconclusive regarding the idea that eye movements alter the number of recalled central and peripheral memory details.

I evaluate the conception of direct retrieval as originally formulated in the Self-Memory System model (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce [2000]. The construction of autobiographical memories in the self-memory system. Psychological Review, 107(2), 261-288. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.107.2.261). In the hierarchical memory organisation proposed in the Self-Memory System model, direct retrieval is described as a bottom-up associative process. While its theoretical role within this model is clear, systematic empirical examination of direct retrieval, viewed as a natural and observable phenomenon, has been hampered by inconsistent operationalisations. Here, I suggest that direct retrieval should be treated as a theoretical concept, aiming at explaining the phenomenon of involuntary (spontaneously arising) autobiographical memories. I evaluate predictions derived from the concept of direct retrieval against findings on involuntary autobiographical memories obtained over the past 25 years. Most of these predictions are consistent with the evidence, notably, the enhanced episodic specificity and constructive nature of involuntary autobiographical memories. However, the theory also has critical limitations. It did not predict the frequent occurrence of involuntary recollections in daily life, exceeding the prevalence of voluntary memories. Additionally, it overlooked the early emergence of spontaneously arising event memories in ontogenesis and their presence in other species, such as great apes. Future advancements of the Self-Memory System model should integrate evolutionary perspectives to address these limitations.

While the role of autobiographical memory in self-representation is well established, the identity function of future thinking has received much less attention. Yet, most people commonly imagine future events that convey meaningful information about the person they wish or expect to become. In three experiments, we assessed the extent to which thinking about such self-defining future events influences the current content of self-representation (i.e., the working self-concept). Participants were asked to think about either a past or future self-defining event, or a control topic, before describing aspects of their identity in the form of "I am" statements (Experiments 1 and 3) or completing scales assessing self-related dimensions (Experiments 2 and 3). We found that thinking about a future self-defining event led participants to conceptualise themselves more in terms of their psychological traits, as did thinking about a past self-defining event. Furthermore, thinking about a future self-defining event increased the sense of present-future self-continuity, whereas thinking about a past self-defining event increased the sense of past-present self-continuity. These results suggest that self-representations are fuelled not only by autobiographical memories, but also by projections into the future.