Tax or transfer benefits in the United States are often conditioned on marital status, creating complicated incentives that reward marriage for some couples and penalize it for others. Same-sex couples, who only recently gained the right to marry, now face the same marriage incentives that different-sex couples faced for decades. We highlight marriage incentives affecting older couples, who have rarely been studied. Using the American Community Survey, we estimate decreases in the propensity to marry among older, previously married women, which are consistent with remarriage disincentives from Social Security and marriage disincentives from Medicaid that are more salient for women.
美国的税收或转移福利通常以婚姻状况为条件，这就产生了复杂的激励机制，对一些夫妇来说，婚姻是一种奖励，对另一些夫妇来说，则是一种惩罚。最近才获得结婚权利的同性伴侣，现在面临着异性伴侣几十年来面临的同样的婚姻激励措施。我们强调了影响老年夫妇的婚姻激励因素，这方面的研究很少。我们利用美国社区调查(American Community Survey)估计，年龄较大、结过婚的女性的结婚倾向有所下降，这与社会保障对再婚的抑制作用和医疗补助对结婚的抑制作用是一致的，这对女性来说更为突出。
{"title":"Marriage in Old Age: What Can We Learn About Policy Impacts on Same-Sex Couples?","authors":"Leora Friedberg, Elliott Isaac","doi":"10.1086/725892","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/725892","url":null,"abstract":"Tax or transfer benefits in the United States are often conditioned on marital status, creating complicated incentives that reward marriage for some couples and penalize it for others. Same-sex couples, who only recently gained the right to marry, now face the same marriage incentives that different-sex couples faced for decades. We highlight marriage incentives affecting older couples, who have rarely been studied. Using the American Community Survey, we estimate decreases in the propensity to marry among older, previously married women, which are consistent with remarriage disincentives from Social Security and marriage disincentives from Medicaid that are more salient for women.","PeriodicalId":18983,"journal":{"name":"National Tax Journal","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136173355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent events have increased the focus on racial justice. One aspect of this attention is the realization that race interacts in important — but often not fully understood — ways with taxation, including taxation of the family. In this paper, we quantify the racial disparity in the magnitude of the “marriage penalty” or “marriage bonus,” using individual micro-level data from the Current Population Survey for the years 1992–2019. We find that Black married couples nearly always face a higher averaged marriage penalty (or a smaller averaged marriage bonus) compared with white married couples, even when we compare couples with similar family earnings. This occurs primarily because the incomes of Black married couples tend to be more evenly split between spouses than the incomes of white married couples. The differences between white couples and Hispanic couples tend to be smaller, but nonetheless they are still present in many cases, with Hispanic couples also facing a marriage penalty. We conclude with suggestions for reform of the individual income tax that would reduce the disparate racial and ethnic treatments across families.
{"title":"Race, Ethnicity, and Taxation of the Family: The Many Shades of the Marriage Penalty/Bonus","authors":"J. Alm, J. Leguizamon, Susane Leguizamon","doi":"10.1086/724934","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/724934","url":null,"abstract":"Recent events have increased the focus on racial justice. One aspect of this attention is the realization that race interacts in important — but often not fully understood — ways with taxation, including taxation of the family. In this paper, we quantify the racial disparity in the magnitude of the “marriage penalty” or “marriage bonus,” using individual micro-level data from the Current Population Survey for the years 1992–2019. We find that Black married couples nearly always face a higher averaged marriage penalty (or a smaller averaged marriage bonus) compared with white married couples, even when we compare couples with similar family earnings. This occurs primarily because the incomes of Black married couples tend to be more evenly split between spouses than the incomes of white married couples. The differences between white couples and Hispanic couples tend to be smaller, but nonetheless they are still present in many cases, with Hispanic couples also facing a marriage penalty. We conclude with suggestions for reform of the individual income tax that would reduce the disparate racial and ethnic treatments across families.","PeriodicalId":18983,"journal":{"name":"National Tax Journal","volume":"76 1","pages":"525 - 560"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46656661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper tests whether temporary property tax relief influences sales of eligible properties. We examine the short-run impact of a new five-year property tax credit made available to long-tenured senior homeowners in Maryland using property-level assessment and transaction data. We find that the temporary credit resulted in a statistically insignificant and economically modest decline in sales of eligible properties. We also find no change in non-arm’s-length sales of eligible properties, which include foreclosures. The results suggest temporary property tax relief does not induce short-term lock-in effects among eligible homeowners.
{"title":"Temporary Property Tax Relief and Residential Home Sales","authors":"T. Spreen, Colton Keddington","doi":"10.1086/725504","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/725504","url":null,"abstract":"This paper tests whether temporary property tax relief influences sales of eligible properties. We examine the short-run impact of a new five-year property tax credit made available to long-tenured senior homeowners in Maryland using property-level assessment and transaction data. We find that the temporary credit resulted in a statistically insignificant and economically modest decline in sales of eligible properties. We also find no change in non-arm’s-length sales of eligible properties, which include foreclosures. The results suggest temporary property tax relief does not induce short-term lock-in effects among eligible homeowners.","PeriodicalId":18983,"journal":{"name":"National Tax Journal","volume":"76 1","pages":"593 - 620"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44040891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study Roth conversions using administrative tax data on all individuals who made Roth conversions from 2003 to 2018. We find that Roth conversions increased by more than 800 percent in 2010 when income limits were eliminated. We find that individuals (1) tend to convert when their tax rate is lower, (2) often convert only a portion of their individual retirement account (IRA), (3) use conversions to increase total tax-advantaged savings, and (4) are more likely to convert at ages shortly before distributions must be taken from IRAs but not Roth IRAs. We also find that behavioral factors may play a role in conversion decisions.
{"title":"Why Do People Engage In Roth Conversions?","authors":"Lucas W. Goodman, Heidi R. Schramm","doi":"10.1086/725142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/725142","url":null,"abstract":"We study Roth conversions using administrative tax data on all individuals who made Roth conversions from 2003 to 2018. We find that Roth conversions increased by more than 800 percent in 2010 when income limits were eliminated. We find that individuals (1) tend to convert when their tax rate is lower, (2) often convert only a portion of their individual retirement account (IRA), (3) use conversions to increase total tax-advantaged savings, and (4) are more likely to convert at ages shortly before distributions must be taken from IRAs but not Roth IRAs. We also find that behavioral factors may play a role in conversion decisions.","PeriodicalId":18983,"journal":{"name":"National Tax Journal","volume":"76 1","pages":"561 - 592"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48405000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The federal tax code is progressive — taxpayers with higher incomes pay a greater share of their income in taxes than taxpayers with lower income. The federal tax system also provides many benefits that favor those with high incomes over those with low incomes. Women, and especially women of color, tend to have lower incomes, and as such, these provisions widen income inequality between men and women, most dramatically women of color. This article argues that refundable tax credits, which deliver benefits to low-income families, have a substantial, positive impact on women and their families, and that recent expansions improved the economic security of women, especially women of color, promoting gender and racial equity.
{"title":"How Refundable Tax Credits Can Advance Gender and Racial Equity","authors":"Elaine M. Maag, A. Matsui, Kathryn Menefee","doi":"10.1086/725875","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/725875","url":null,"abstract":"The federal tax code is progressive — taxpayers with higher incomes pay a greater share of their income in taxes than taxpayers with lower income. The federal tax system also provides many benefits that favor those with high incomes over those with low incomes. Women, and especially women of color, tend to have lower incomes, and as such, these provisions widen income inequality between men and women, most dramatically women of color. This article argues that refundable tax credits, which deliver benefits to low-income families, have a substantial, positive impact on women and their families, and that recent expansions improved the economic security of women, especially women of color, promoting gender and racial equity.","PeriodicalId":18983,"journal":{"name":"National Tax Journal","volume":"76 1","pages":"743 - 763"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48922888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The gold standard for informing policy makers is when theory, model results, and observations tell a similar story. Some estimated economic effects influence policy but are not reasonable. This paper discusses several tax examples where estimates based on one tool of inquiry are inconsistent with the findings of others. Examples discussed are the luxury-boat tax, the capital gains realization response, the corporate income tax, and the life-cycle model. The common thread in all is that when economists bring all their tools to bear, the results fail the sniff test.
{"title":"When Estimated Economic Effects Fail the Sniff Test: Tax Examples","authors":"Jane G. Gravelle","doi":"10.1086/725855","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/725855","url":null,"abstract":"The gold standard for informing policy makers is when theory, model results, and observations tell a similar story. Some estimated economic effects influence policy but are not reasonable. This paper discusses several tax examples where estimates based on one tool of inquiry are inconsistent with the findings of others. Examples discussed are the luxury-boat tax, the capital gains realization response, the corporate income tax, and the life-cycle model. The common thread in all is that when economists bring all their tools to bear, the results fail the sniff test.","PeriodicalId":18983,"journal":{"name":"National Tax Journal","volume":"76 1","pages":"621 - 645"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49215885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I estimate the share of eligible individuals who received unemployment insurance (UI) benefits during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. I use individual data on reported recipiency from the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS-ASEC) survey to validate a UI eligibility algorithm that I then apply to the monthly CPS data. Combined with administrative data on actual payments and adjustments for fraud, I estimate that 88 percent of eligible individuals received UI benefits. When I calculate recipiency by program, I find 98 percent of individuals who were eligible for standard UI received benefits, whereas only 76 percent of individuals who were eligible for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance received benefits.
{"title":"Unemployment Insurance Recipiency During the Covid-19 Pandemic","authors":"E. Forsythe","doi":"10.1086/724589","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/724589","url":null,"abstract":"I estimate the share of eligible individuals who received unemployment insurance (UI) benefits during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. I use individual data on reported recipiency from the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS-ASEC) survey to validate a UI eligibility algorithm that I then apply to the monthly CPS data. Combined with administrative data on actual payments and adjustments for fraud, I estimate that 88 percent of eligible individuals received UI benefits. When I calculate recipiency by program, I find 98 percent of individuals who were eligible for standard UI received benefits, whereas only 76 percent of individuals who were eligible for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance received benefits.","PeriodicalId":18983,"journal":{"name":"National Tax Journal","volume":"76 1","pages":"367 - 391"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47511271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：