Governments around the world redistribute to distressed areas by conditioning taxes and transfers on location. We show that when poor households are spatially concentrated, transfers from one location to another can yield equity gains that outweigh their efficiency costs, even when income-based transfers are set optimally. Expressions for the optimal transfer size depend on the mobility of households, the earnings responses of movers, and sorting patterns. Surveys find support for targeting tax credits to poor Americans who live in distressed places. A calibration exercise finds optimal transfers of the same order of magnitude as prominent American zone policies. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
{"title":"Place-Based Redistribution","authors":"C. Gaubert, Patrick M. Kline, Danny Yagan","doi":"10.3386/W28337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W28337","url":null,"abstract":"Governments around the world redistribute to distressed areas by conditioning taxes and transfers on location. We show that when poor households are spatially concentrated, transfers from one location to another can yield equity gains that outweigh their efficiency costs, even when income-based transfers are set optimally. Expressions for the optimal transfer size depend on the mobility of households, the earnings responses of movers, and sorting patterns. Surveys find support for targeting tax credits to poor Americans who live in distressed places. A calibration exercise finds optimal transfers of the same order of magnitude as prominent American zone policies. \u0000 \u0000Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.","PeriodicalId":19091,"journal":{"name":"NBER Working Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83339480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We derive the effect of plausible deniability on asset risk premia in a dynamic setting with correlated firm values, systematic risk, and risk-averse investors. Firms optimally exercise American disclosure options, which are more valuable due to the possibility that other correlated firms may disclose high values, lifting investors' perceptions of the values of nondisclosing firms. Risk premia rise (and average prices fall) prior to disclosures, because investors make inferences about aggregate risks from failures to disclose, resulting in higher state prices for bad states. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
{"title":"The Asset Pricing Implications of Plausible Deniability","authors":"K. Back, B. Carlin, Seyed Mohammad Kazempour","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3764055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3764055","url":null,"abstract":"We derive the effect of plausible deniability on asset risk premia in a dynamic setting with correlated firm values, systematic risk, and risk-averse investors. Firms optimally exercise American disclosure options, which are more valuable due to the possibility that other correlated firms may disclose high values, lifting investors' perceptions of the values of nondisclosing firms. Risk premia rise (and average prices fall) prior to disclosures, because investors make inferences about aggregate risks from failures to disclose, resulting in higher state prices for bad states. \u0000 \u0000Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.","PeriodicalId":19091,"journal":{"name":"NBER Working Paper Series","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89562568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1920/WP.IFS.2021.0121
Thomas F. Crossley, Yifan Gong, Todd R. Stinebrickner, Ralph Stinebrickner
Unique longitudinal probabilistic expectations data from the Berea Panel Study, which cover both the college and early post-college periods, are used to examine young adults’ beliefs about their future incomes. We introduce a new measure of the ex post accuracy of beliefs, and two new approaches to testing whether, ex ante, agents exhibit Rational Expectations. We show that taking into account the additional information about higher moments of individual belief distributions contained in probabilistic expectations data is important for detecting types of violations of Rational Expectations that are not detectable by existing mean-based tests. Beliefs about future income are found to become more accurate as students progress through school and then enter the post-college period. Tests of Rational Expectations almost always reject for the in-school period, but the evidence against Rational Expectations is much weaker in the post-college period.
{"title":"Examining Income Expectations in the College and Early Post-College Periods: New Distributional Tests of Rational Expectations","authors":"Thomas F. Crossley, Yifan Gong, Todd R. Stinebrickner, Ralph Stinebrickner","doi":"10.1920/WP.IFS.2021.0121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1920/WP.IFS.2021.0121","url":null,"abstract":"Unique longitudinal probabilistic expectations data from the Berea Panel Study, which cover both the college and early post-college periods, are used to examine young adults’ beliefs about their future incomes. We introduce a new measure of the ex post accuracy of beliefs, and two new approaches to testing whether, ex ante, agents exhibit Rational Expectations. We show that taking into account the additional information about higher moments of individual belief distributions contained in probabilistic expectations data is important for detecting types of violations of Rational Expectations that are not detectable by existing mean-based tests. Beliefs about future income are found to become more accurate as students progress through school and then enter the post-college period. Tests of Rational Expectations almost always reject for the in-school period, but the evidence against Rational Expectations is much weaker in the post-college period.","PeriodicalId":19091,"journal":{"name":"NBER Working Paper Series","volume":"241 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75777896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We use an analytically tractable heterogeneous‐agent (HANK) version of the standard New Keynesian model to show how the size of fiscal multipliers depends on (i) the distribution of factor incomes, and (ii) the source of nominal rigidities. With sticky prices but flexible wages, the standard representative‐agent (RANK) model predicts large multipliers because profits fall after a fiscal stimulus and the resulting negative income effect makes the representative worker work harder. Our HANK model, where workers do not own stock, and thus do not receive profit income, predicts smaller fiscal multipliers. In fact, they are smaller with sticky prices than with flexible prices. When wages are the source of nominal rigidity, in contrast, fiscal multipliers are close to one, independently of income heterogeneity and price stickiness.
{"title":"Fiscal Multipliers: A Heterogenous-Agent Perspective","authors":"Tobias Broer, Per Krusell, Erik Öberg","doi":"10.3386/W28366","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W28366","url":null,"abstract":"We use an analytically tractable heterogeneous‐agent (HANK) version of the standard New Keynesian model to show how the size of fiscal multipliers depends on (i) the distribution of factor incomes, and (ii) the source of nominal rigidities. With sticky prices but flexible wages, the standard representative‐agent (RANK) model predicts large multipliers because profits fall after a fiscal stimulus and the resulting negative income effect makes the representative worker work harder. Our HANK model, where workers do not own stock, and thus do not receive profit income, predicts smaller fiscal multipliers. In fact, they are smaller with sticky prices than with flexible prices. When wages are the source of nominal rigidity, in contrast, fiscal multipliers are close to one, independently of income heterogeneity and price stickiness.","PeriodicalId":19091,"journal":{"name":"NBER Working Paper Series","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75594919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The US has been a global leader in regulating local air pollution and a global laggard in regulating greenhouse gases (GHGs). For decades, critics of US policy have expressed fears that stringent US regulations on local air pollution would lead to pollution havens overseas. Prior research suggests that has not happened. But what about the converse fear? Are the less stringent US climate regulations causing the US to become a pollution haven for other countries’ GHG-intensive industries? We provide a decomposition of US manufacturing GHG emissions and find no evidence of offshoring either to or from the United States since 1990.
{"title":"Globalization and Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Evidence from the United States","authors":"","doi":"10.3386/W28372","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W28372","url":null,"abstract":"The US has been a global leader in regulating local air pollution and a global laggard in regulating greenhouse gases (GHGs). For decades, critics of US policy have expressed fears that stringent US regulations on local air pollution would lead to pollution havens overseas. Prior research suggests that has not happened. But what about the converse fear? Are the less stringent US climate regulations causing the US to become a pollution haven for other countries’ GHG-intensive industries? We provide a decomposition of US manufacturing GHG emissions and find no evidence of offshoring either to or from the United States since 1990.","PeriodicalId":19091,"journal":{"name":"NBER Working Paper Series","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75005368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
C. Çakmaklı, Selva Demiralp, Ṣebnem Kalemli-Özcan, Sevcan Yeşiltaş, M. Yıldırım
COVID-19 pandemic had a devastating effect on both lives and livelihoods in 2020. The arrival of effective vaccines can be a major game changer. However, vaccines are in short supply as of early 2021 and most of them are reserved for the advanced economies. We show that the global GDP loss of not inoculating all the countries, relative to a counterfactual of global vaccinations, is higher than the cost of manufacturing and distributing vaccines globally. We use an economic-epidemiological framework that combines a SIR model with international production and trade networks. Based on this framework, we estimate the costs for 65 countries and 35 sectors. Our estimates suggest that up to 49 percent of the global economic costs of the pandemic in 2021 are borne by the advanced economies even if they achieve universal vaccination in their own countries.
{"title":"The Economic Case for Global Vaccinations: An Epidemiological Model with International Production Networks","authors":"C. Çakmaklı, Selva Demiralp, Ṣebnem Kalemli-Özcan, Sevcan Yeşiltaş, M. Yıldırım","doi":"10.3386/W28395","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W28395","url":null,"abstract":"COVID-19 pandemic had a devastating effect on both lives and livelihoods in 2020. The arrival of effective vaccines can be a major game changer. However, vaccines are in short supply as of early 2021 and most of them are reserved for the advanced economies. We show that the global GDP loss of not inoculating all the countries, relative to a counterfactual of global vaccinations, is higher than the cost of manufacturing and distributing vaccines globally. We use an economic-epidemiological framework that combines a SIR model with international production and trade networks. Based on this framework, we estimate the costs for 65 countries and 35 sectors. Our estimates suggest that up to 49 percent of the global economic costs of the pandemic in 2021 are borne by the advanced economies even if they achieve universal vaccination in their own countries.","PeriodicalId":19091,"journal":{"name":"NBER Working Paper Series","volume":"253 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87057259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Post WWII globalization forces are facing headwinds in the form of global crises-the “The Great Recession” and the “The Pandemic Recession”. Israel’s trade and financial globalization, however, is steadily rising. The pandemic-induced slump in economic activity is deep, as consumer spending, investment spending, and export demand tumble. Central banks, tied down by the zero interest rate, resort to semi-fiscal expansionary policies. Indeed, the stabilization burden falls on fiscal policy. The paper provides an overview of the new globalization trends in the world and in Israel, with emphasis on the role of global crises, the Global Financial Crisis, and the Pandemic Crisis in changing globalization long-term trends. When the coronavirus hit, supply chains and production have been disrupted. However, the impact of the pandemic shock is not on the supply side only. On the demand side, the desire to invest has plunged, while people across the rich world are now saving much of their income. Would this short-term changes can reinforce the re-trending of the globalization, which is observed since the Global Financial Crisis? The paper focuses on globalization and provides comparative overview of experiences of the advanced economies and Israel.
{"title":"Globalization and Global Crises: Rest of the World vs. Israel","authors":"A. Razin","doi":"10.3386/W28339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W28339","url":null,"abstract":"Post WWII globalization forces are facing headwinds in the form of global crises-the “The Great Recession” and the “The Pandemic Recession”. Israel’s trade and financial globalization, however, is steadily rising. The pandemic-induced slump in economic activity is deep, as consumer spending, investment spending, and export demand tumble. Central banks, tied down by the zero interest rate, resort to semi-fiscal expansionary policies. Indeed, the stabilization burden falls on fiscal policy. The paper provides an overview of the new globalization trends in the world and in Israel, with emphasis on the role of global crises, the Global Financial Crisis, and the Pandemic Crisis in changing globalization long-term trends. When the coronavirus hit, supply chains and production have been disrupted. However, the impact of the pandemic shock is not on the supply side only. On the demand side, the desire to invest has plunged, while people across the rich world are now saving much of their income. Would this short-term changes can reinforce the re-trending of the globalization, which is observed since the Global Financial Crisis? The paper focuses on globalization and provides comparative overview of experiences of the advanced economies and Israel.","PeriodicalId":19091,"journal":{"name":"NBER Working Paper Series","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75566190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Wealth varies considerably across the population and changes significantly over the lifecycle. In this paper, we trace out trajectories of wealth across several key life milestones, including marriage, homeownership, childbirth, divorce, disability, health shocks, retirement and widowhood using multiple decades of longitudinal panel data. We estimate both changes over the ten-year period before and after each milestone and assess whether those changes occur gradually or sharply after the milestone. We find evidence of significant long-run increases in wealth associated with homeownership and retirement, and significant long-run reductions in wealth associated with divorce, health shocks, and disability. In general, these changes appear to occur gradually rather than immediately after the milestone. Our results also indicate a large degree of heterogeneity across demographics, socioeconomic status and risk protection from insurance. In particular, those with lower levels of socioeconomic status and those without access to risk protection experience smaller wealth gains (or larger wealth losses) following life-course transitions. These results identify populations and life stages where individuals are most vulnerable to large reductions in wealth.
{"title":"Wealth Trajectories Across Key Milestones: Longitudinal Evidence from Life-Course Transitions","authors":"G. Goda, Jialu L. Streeter","doi":"10.3386/W28329","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W28329","url":null,"abstract":"Wealth varies considerably across the population and changes significantly over the lifecycle. In this paper, we trace out trajectories of wealth across several key life milestones, including marriage, homeownership, childbirth, divorce, disability, health shocks, retirement and widowhood using multiple decades of longitudinal panel data. We estimate both changes over the ten-year period before and after each milestone and assess whether those changes occur gradually or sharply after the milestone. We find evidence of significant long-run increases in wealth associated with homeownership and retirement, and significant long-run reductions in wealth associated with divorce, health shocks, and disability. In general, these changes appear to occur gradually rather than immediately after the milestone. Our results also indicate a large degree of heterogeneity across demographics, socioeconomic status and risk protection from insurance. In particular, those with lower levels of socioeconomic status and those without access to risk protection experience smaller wealth gains (or larger wealth losses) following life-course transitions. These results identify populations and life stages where individuals are most vulnerable to large reductions in wealth.","PeriodicalId":19091,"journal":{"name":"NBER Working Paper Series","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77124038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using time-diary data from the U.S. and six wealthy European countries, I demonstrate that non-partnered mothers spend slightly less time performing childcare, but much less time in other household activities than partnered mothers. Unpartnered mothers' total work time—paid work and household production—is slightly less than partnered women's. In the U.S. but not elsewhere they watch more television and engage in fewer other leisure activities. These differences are independent of any differences in age, race/ethnicity, ages and numbers of children, and household incomes. Non-partnered mothers feel slightly more pressured for time and much less satisfied with their lives. Analyses using the NLSY79 show that mothers whose partners left the home in the past two years became more depressed than those whose marriages remained intact. Coupled with evidence that husbands spend substantial time in childcare and with their children, the results suggest that children of non-partnered mothers receive much less parental care—perhaps 40 percent less—than other children; and most of what they receive is from mothers who are less satisfied with their lives.
{"title":"Moms’ Time—Married or Not","authors":"D. Hamermesh","doi":"10.3386/W28317","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W28317","url":null,"abstract":"Using time-diary data from the U.S. and six wealthy European countries, I demonstrate that non-partnered mothers spend slightly less time performing childcare, but much less time in other household activities than partnered mothers. Unpartnered mothers' total work time—paid work and household production—is slightly less than partnered women's. In the U.S. but not elsewhere they watch more television and engage in fewer other leisure activities. These differences are independent of any differences in age, race/ethnicity, ages and numbers of children, and household incomes. Non-partnered mothers feel slightly more pressured for time and much less satisfied with their lives. Analyses using the NLSY79 show that mothers whose partners left the home in the past two years became more depressed than those whose marriages remained intact. Coupled with evidence that husbands spend substantial time in childcare and with their children, the results suggest that children of non-partnered mothers receive much less parental care—perhaps 40 percent less—than other children; and most of what they receive is from mothers who are less satisfied with their lives.","PeriodicalId":19091,"journal":{"name":"NBER Working Paper Series","volume":"530 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80166888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Median household wealth shot up by 21.2 percent in real terms between 2016 and 2019, as asset prices continued to rebound. However, 2007 still remains the watershed year, and median wealth was down 20.4 percent relative to 2007, though mean wealth more than fully recovered. There was a modest remission in wealth inequality, with the share of the top one percent down by 1.4 percentage points, that of the top 20 percent down by 1.0 percentage points, the Gini coefficient down by 0.008, and the mean wealth of the top one percent also down by 1.9 percent. The homeownership rate finally rebounded a bit, by 1.2 percentage points, to 64.9 percent. The stock ownership rate advanced by 0.4 percentage points to 49.6 percent, though still down from its 2001 peak. Though the mean debt of the middle class rose by 10.7 percent in real terms, the debt-income and debt-net worth ratios remained largely unchanged. The black-white gap in mean net worth remained unchanged, as did the Hispanic-white wealth gap. The wealth of households under age 35 continued to deteriorate in both absolute and relative terms between 2016 and 2019. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
{"title":"Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962 to 2019: Median Wealth Rebounds... But Not Enough","authors":"E. Wolff","doi":"10.3386/W28383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W28383","url":null,"abstract":"Median household wealth shot up by 21.2 percent in real terms between 2016 and 2019, as asset prices continued to rebound. However, 2007 still remains the watershed year, and median wealth was down 20.4 percent relative to 2007, though mean wealth more than fully recovered. There was a modest remission in wealth inequality, with the share of the top one percent down by 1.4 percentage points, that of the top 20 percent down by 1.0 percentage points, the Gini coefficient down by 0.008, and the mean wealth of the top one percent also down by 1.9 percent. The homeownership rate finally rebounded a bit, by 1.2 percentage points, to 64.9 percent. The stock ownership rate advanced by 0.4 percentage points to 49.6 percent, though still down from its 2001 peak. Though the mean debt of the middle class rose by 10.7 percent in real terms, the debt-income and debt-net worth ratios remained largely unchanged. The black-white gap in mean net worth remained unchanged, as did the Hispanic-white wealth gap. The wealth of households under age 35 continued to deteriorate in both absolute and relative terms between 2016 and 2019. \u0000 \u0000Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.","PeriodicalId":19091,"journal":{"name":"NBER Working Paper Series","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86830032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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