What I would like to speak of in this piece is not only to discuss the way addiction is formulated by the practices and tactics of law whether through poverty law or otherwise, but to say that law itself is addition, and addiction is law. Combining desire and destruction through the work of Gilles Deleuze and Catherine Malabou, both addiction and law are explored as cumulative processes of material and immaterial yearning emanating from and within thermodynamic movements of order/disorder, destruction/creation and the tightrope of equilibrium known better as entropy, within and outside, human and other bodies. Addiction is described as rule-making, through the funneling of attention to sediment layers of law as habit, routine and custom through repetition, leading to the ultimate expression of law, that of subjectivity and the crystallization of form - the institutionalization of property and the overcoming of uncertainty through control. Addiction is argued as the very extremity, the ultimate meaning, the very motor of legal morphology itself; the striving of life against death, a speculative genesis and the baroque pathways carved in the process.
{"title":"A Poverty of the Spirit? Law, Property and Addiction","authors":"Lucy Finchett-Maddock","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3730916","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3730916","url":null,"abstract":"What I would like to speak of in this piece is not only to discuss the way addiction is formulated by the practices and tactics of law whether through poverty law or otherwise, but to say that law itself is addition, and addiction is law. Combining desire and destruction through the work of Gilles Deleuze and Catherine Malabou, both addiction and law are explored as cumulative processes of material and immaterial yearning emanating from and within thermodynamic movements of order/disorder, destruction/creation and the tightrope of equilibrium known better as entropy, within and outside, human and other bodies. Addiction is described as rule-making, through the funneling of attention to sediment layers of law as habit, routine and custom through repetition, leading to the ultimate expression of law, that of subjectivity and the crystallization of form - the institutionalization of property and the overcoming of uncertainty through control. Addiction is argued as the very extremity, the ultimate meaning, the very motor of legal morphology itself; the striving of life against death, a speculative genesis and the baroque pathways carved in the process.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130370688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper traces the history of computers in medicine, focusing on the rise of Expert Systems (ES) in the mid-20th century, to the rise of connectionist AI research in its latter half, and ultimately the development of Automated Mental State Detection (AMSD), fMRI scanning, and human brain interfaces. Following the critique of Joseph Weizenbaum in Computer Power and Human Reason (1976), the paper examines theoretical, practical, and ethical problems for implementing these systems in the real world, and how mental health law and psychiatry are likely to be impacted by near term technological advances which will increasingly 'objectify' the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders. It concludes with a discussion for how computational reasoning could--and indeed should--operate in the context of mental capacity decisions in England and Wales, and suggests that the use of machines to assess mental capacity should be a "Red Line" for the ingress of AI and related technologies. It concludes with reflections on the legal implications of this claim, and identifies opportunities for further research.
{"title":"Capacitas Ex Machina: Are Computerised Assessmets of Mental Capacity a Benchmark or 'Red Line' for Artificial Intelligence?","authors":"Christopher Markou, Lily Hands","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3582424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3582424","url":null,"abstract":"This paper traces the history of computers in medicine, focusing on the rise of Expert Systems (ES) in the mid-20th century, to the rise of connectionist AI research in its latter half, and ultimately the development of Automated Mental State Detection (AMSD), fMRI scanning, and human brain interfaces. \u0000 \u0000Following the critique of Joseph Weizenbaum in Computer Power and Human Reason (1976), the paper examines theoretical, practical, and ethical problems for implementing these systems in the real world, and how mental health law and psychiatry are likely to be impacted by near term technological advances which will increasingly 'objectify' the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders. \u0000 \u0000It concludes with a discussion for how computational reasoning could--and indeed should--operate in the context of mental capacity decisions in England and Wales, and suggests that the use of machines to assess mental capacity should be a \"Red Line\" for the ingress of AI and related technologies. It concludes with reflections on the legal implications of this claim, and identifies opportunities for further research.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"144 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123296128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Norms prohibiting conflicts of interest apply in private fiduciary relationships and also to many public office holders. Whether or not such relationships are founded on trust, such norms can cultivate trust towards those holding governance authority, whether in interpersonal, civic or political relationships. In legal and philosophical discourse, however, conflicts of interest are rarely carefully defined. It has become a commonplace that ‘not every breach of duty by a fiduciary is a breach of fiduciary duty’. We must now go on to realize that ‘not every improper action by one who must avoid conflicts of interest is a conflict of interest’. A conflict of interest arises when duty- bound judgment is exercised in the presence of a conflicting interest. There can be conflicts that are not conflicts of interest; and there can be potential conflicts as well as actual ones. The simple misuse of power is not itself conflict of interest; on the contrary, it is the problem that the rules that forbid acting in a conflict situation aim to avoid. Bias is not identical with conflict of interest, although some kinds of bias arise from conflicts. Unauthorized profits are none of the above. They represent a different dimension of the relationship: not the supervision of powers, but the simple fact that when acting for another, one may not extract benefits for oneself. The rules about conflicts can foster trust in proper decision-making, while the rule against unauthorized profits can foster trust in the proper separation between a person’s private and official actions.
{"title":"Conflict, Profit, Bias, Misuse of Power: Dimensions of Governance","authors":"Lionel R. Smith","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3686644","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3686644","url":null,"abstract":"Norms prohibiting conflicts of interest apply in private fiduciary relationships and also to many public office holders. Whether or not such relationships are founded on trust, such norms can cultivate trust towards those holding governance authority, whether in interpersonal, civic or political relationships. In legal and philosophical discourse, however, conflicts of interest are rarely carefully defined. It has become a commonplace that ‘not every breach of duty by a fiduciary is a breach of fiduciary duty’. We must now go on to realize that ‘not every improper action by one who must avoid conflicts of interest is a conflict of interest’. A conflict of interest arises when duty- bound judgment is exercised in the presence of a conflicting interest. There can be conflicts that are not conflicts of interest; and there can be potential conflicts as well as actual ones. The simple misuse of power is not itself conflict of interest; on the contrary, it is the problem that the rules that forbid acting in a conflict situation aim to avoid. Bias is not identical with conflict of interest, although some kinds of bias arise from conflicts. Unauthorized profits are none of the above. They represent a different dimension of the relationship: not the supervision of powers, but the simple fact that when acting for another, one may not extract benefits for oneself. The rules about conflicts can foster trust in proper decision-making, while the rule against unauthorized profits can foster trust in the proper separation between a person’s private and official actions.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129422822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The present study examined the influence of the putative confession (in which children are told that the suspect told them “everything that happened” and “wants [the child] to tell the truth”) and evidence presentation on 9- to 12-year-old maltreated and non-maltreated children’s disclosure (N = 321). Half of the children played a forbidden game with an adult confederate which resulted in a laptop breaking (no transgression occurred for the other half of children), followed by coaching to conceal the forbidden game and to falsely disclose the sanctioned game. Children were then interviewed about the interaction with the confederate. Among the 9- to 10-year-olds, the putative confession led to a higher rate of breakage disclosure (62%) than the control condition (13%), and higher rates of leakage of incriminating details during recall (47% compared to 9%). Older children were more likely to disclose than younger children, and uninfluenced by the putative confession. Among all ages, evidence presentation elicited disclosures from 63% of children who had not previously disclosed, without eliciting any false disclosures.
{"title":"The Effects of the Putative Confession and Evidence Presentation on Maltreated and Non-Maltreated 9- to 12- year-olds' Coached Concealment of a Minor Transgression","authors":"Angela D. Evans, T. Lyon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3425511","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3425511","url":null,"abstract":"The present study examined the influence of the putative confession (in which children are told that the suspect told them “everything that happened” and “wants [the child] to tell the truth”) and evidence presentation on 9- to 12-year-old maltreated and non-maltreated children’s disclosure (N = 321). Half of the children played a forbidden game with an adult confederate which resulted in a laptop breaking (no transgression occurred for the other half of children), followed by coaching to conceal the forbidden game and to falsely disclose the sanctioned game. Children were then interviewed about the interaction with the confederate. Among the 9- to 10-year-olds, the putative confession led to a higher rate of breakage disclosure (62%) than the control condition (13%), and higher rates of leakage of incriminating details during recall (47% compared to 9%). Older children were more likely to disclose than younger children, and uninfluenced by the putative confession. Among all ages, evidence presentation elicited disclosures from 63% of children who had not previously disclosed, without eliciting any false disclosures.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114203902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Quantitative empirical research is central to both legal scholarship and litigation, but there is little confidence in it. This is because researchers can manipulate data to arrive at any result they seek to find. The root of the problem is data fishing, the practice of using data to search for and selectively report results that are statistically significant or otherwise favorable to the researcher. For reasons explained in this article, data fishing invalidates statistical results by causing false positives and false impressions. It creates an environment in which, at best, readers are highly skeptical of statistical analysis and, at worst, they base important decisions, such as policy decisions and jury verdicts, on incorrect information. The practice is nevertheless prevalent in law—often committed by well-intentioned researchers who are unaware of its harms or unaware that their analysis constitutes data fishing. This article exposes the harm that data fishing in empirical legal research causes. It then develops a framework for eliminating data fishing and restoring confidence in empirical analysis in legal scholarship and litigation. This framework, which I call DASS (an acronym for Design, Analyze, Scrutinize, and Substantiate), builds on methods in statistics and is designed for researchers to use to safeguard against data fishing and for consumers of empirical research—including scholars, courts, policymakers, and members of the public—to use to evaluate the reliability of a researcher’s statistical claims. DASS is designed to be simple and flexible, tailored to suit empirical research in law, and a substantial advancement over current anti-data-fishing practices in the social sciences, which have generally been ineffective. It can be applied broadly as a framework for credibility in empirical legal research, as well as to address a range of classical challenges in litigation, such as the hired-gun and battle-of-the-experts problems in evidence law.
{"title":"Credibility in Empirical Legal Analysis","authors":"Hillel J. Bavli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3434095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3434095","url":null,"abstract":"Quantitative empirical research is central to both legal scholarship and litigation, but there is little confidence in it. This is because researchers can manipulate data to arrive at any result they seek to find. The root of the problem is data fishing, the practice of using data to search for and selectively report results that are statistically significant or otherwise favorable to the researcher. For reasons explained in this article, data fishing invalidates statistical results by causing false positives and false impressions. It creates an environment in which, at best, readers are highly skeptical of statistical analysis and, at worst, they base important decisions, such as policy decisions and jury verdicts, on incorrect information. The practice is nevertheless prevalent in law—often committed by well-intentioned researchers who are unaware of its harms or unaware that their analysis constitutes data fishing. \u0000 \u0000This article exposes the harm that data fishing in empirical legal research causes. It then develops a framework for eliminating data fishing and restoring confidence in empirical analysis in legal scholarship and litigation. This framework, which I call DASS (an acronym for Design, Analyze, Scrutinize, and Substantiate), builds on methods in statistics and is designed for researchers to use to safeguard against data fishing and for consumers of empirical research—including scholars, courts, policymakers, and members of the public—to use to evaluate the reliability of a researcher’s statistical claims. DASS is designed to be simple and flexible, tailored to suit empirical research in law, and a substantial advancement over current anti-data-fishing practices in the social sciences, which have generally been ineffective. It can be applied broadly as a framework for credibility in empirical legal research, as well as to address a range of classical challenges in litigation, such as the hired-gun and battle-of-the-experts problems in evidence law.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"140 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130459292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper contributes to addressing a fundamental question: how do institutions, in general, and financial regulators, in particular, “think”? To this end, the analytical tools of social psychology are applied to the regulatory framework for financial services in the European Union. The paper reveals a relationship between the constitutional status of EU regulators and the dominant group dynamics typified in the literature of social psychology. Such a relationship indicates that institutional structures might favour the emergence of specific behavioural patterns and modus operandi within regulatory bodies. Furthermore, the identification of dominant group dynamics paves the way to a more profound understanding of conflictual dynamics within groups of decision-makers. Such a novel analytical map is, then, applied to the context of the ongoing debate as to whether, following Brexit, the decision-making process of EU regulators is poised to be marked by a divide separating eurozone and non-eurozone Member States.
{"title":"The Social Psychology of Financial Regulatory Governance","authors":"Giuliano G. Castellano, G. Helleringer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3402265","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3402265","url":null,"abstract":"This paper contributes to addressing a fundamental question: how do institutions, in general, and financial regulators, in particular, “think”? To this end, the analytical tools of social psychology are applied to the regulatory framework for financial services in the European Union. The paper reveals a relationship between the constitutional status of EU regulators and the dominant group dynamics typified in the literature of social psychology. Such a relationship indicates that institutional structures might favour the emergence of specific behavioural patterns and modus operandi within regulatory bodies. Furthermore, the identification of dominant group dynamics paves the way to a more profound understanding of conflictual dynamics within groups of decision-makers. Such a novel analytical map is, then, applied to the context of the ongoing debate as to whether, following Brexit, the decision-making process of EU regulators is poised to be marked by a divide separating eurozone and non-eurozone Member States.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"9 9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123803591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the target article of this symposium, Ron Allen and Michael Pardo advance the empirical claim that Relative Plausibility is the best account of juridical proof. While I tend to agree with the relative plausibility approach and endorse its holistic underpinnings, the article suffers from three weaknesses. First, the authors fail to substantiate their empirical claim. Second, the authors cite too casually to the Story Model. For all its brilliance, the story model provides too narrow a basis to serve as a general model of legal fact-finding. Finally, the authors fail to appreciate the adverse effects of holistic cognition on legal fact-finding.
{"title":"Thin Empirics: Comment on Allen & Pardo Relative Plausibility and its Critics","authors":"Dan Simon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3289699","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3289699","url":null,"abstract":"In the target article of this symposium, Ron Allen and Michael Pardo advance the empirical claim that Relative Plausibility is the best account of juridical proof. While I tend to agree with the relative plausibility approach and endorse its holistic underpinnings, the article suffers from three weaknesses. First, the authors fail to substantiate their empirical claim. Second, the authors cite too casually to the Story Model. For all its brilliance, the story model provides too narrow a basis to serve as a general model of legal fact-finding. Finally, the authors fail to appreciate the adverse effects of holistic cognition on legal fact-finding.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127828293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Constructive trusts of disloyal fiduciary gain often are justified by the argument of deterrence. For there to be effective deterrence, two conditions must be satisfied: first, potentially disloyal fiduciaries must be sufficiently informed, directly or indirectly, of the properties of the constructive trust; secondly, fiduciaries must respond by accurately weighing the costs/benefits of disloyalty and other options before choosing the option that maximises their self-interest. Typically, one or both of these conditions will not be satisfied. Drawing upon insights from the behavioural sciences we find that fiduciaries contemplating disloyalty generally cannot be expected to be cognisant of the properties of the constructive trust and therefore cannot be influenced by them. Even when known, such properties will not necessarily influence fiduciary behaviour due to the way well-informed fiduciaries are likely to perceive and process the risk that their disloyalty will be detected. The deterrence gains generated by the recognition of a constructive trust are therefore likely to be negligible.
{"title":"Do Constructive Trusts Deter Disloyalty?","authors":"A. Hicks","doi":"10.53386/nilq.v69i2.90","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v69i2.90","url":null,"abstract":"Constructive trusts of disloyal fiduciary gain often are justified by the argument of deterrence. For there to be effective deterrence, two conditions must be satisfied: first, potentially disloyal fiduciaries must be sufficiently informed, directly or indirectly, of the properties of the constructive trust; secondly, fiduciaries must respond by accurately weighing the costs/benefits of disloyalty and other options before choosing the option that maximises their self-interest. Typically, one or both of these conditions will not be satisfied. Drawing upon insights from the behavioural sciences we find that fiduciaries contemplating disloyalty generally cannot be expected to be cognisant of the properties of the constructive trust and therefore cannot be influenced by them. Even when known, such properties will not necessarily influence fiduciary behaviour due to the way well-informed fiduciaries are likely to perceive and process the risk that their disloyalty will be detected. The deterrence gains generated by the recognition of a constructive trust are therefore likely to be negligible.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130521625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Empirical legal scholarship has emerged as a dominant trend in legal scholarship. At its best, empirical scholarship subjects assertions about the effect of legal rules to a neutral test. But is empirical inquiry truly neutral? The validity of an empirical study should rest on the reliability of the methods used, rather than the political implications of its conclusions. Scholars might choose targets of inquiry, sources of data, or methods of analysis that support their political allegiances. This paper tests this thesis by matching the political beliefs of authors of empirical legal scholarship with the results of their research. The political allegiances of authors mildly correlate with the results of empirical inquiry in legal scholarship.
{"title":"The Politics of Legal Empirics: Do Political Attitudes Predict the Results of Empirical Legal Scholarship?","authors":"J. Rachlinski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3130086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3130086","url":null,"abstract":"Empirical legal scholarship has emerged as a dominant trend in legal scholarship. At its best, empirical scholarship subjects assertions about the effect of legal rules to a neutral test. But is empirical inquiry truly neutral? The validity of an empirical study should rest on the reliability of the methods used, rather than the political implications of its conclusions. Scholars might choose targets of inquiry, sources of data, or methods of analysis that support their political allegiances. This paper tests this thesis by matching the political beliefs of authors of empirical legal scholarship with the results of their research. The political allegiances of authors mildly correlate with the results of empirical inquiry in legal scholarship.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115401550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We leverage response-time data from repeated strategic interactions to measure the strategic complexity of a situation by how long people think on average when they face that situation (where we categorize situations according to characteristics of play in the previous round). We find that strategic complexity varies significantly across situations, and we find considerable heterogeneity in how responsive subjects’ thinking times are to complexity. We also study how variation in response times at the individual level affects success: when a subject thinks for longer than she would normally do in a particular situation, she wins less frequently and earns less.
{"title":"Strategic Complexity and the Value of Thinking","authors":"David Gill, Victoria Prowse","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3041519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3041519","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We leverage response-time data from repeated strategic interactions to measure the strategic complexity of a situation by how long people think on average when they face that situation (where we categorize situations according to characteristics of play in the previous round). We find that strategic complexity varies significantly across situations, and we find considerable heterogeneity in how responsive subjects’ thinking times are to complexity. We also study how variation in response times at the individual level affects success: when a subject thinks for longer than she would normally do in a particular situation, she wins less frequently and earns less.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127714755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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