The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., which replaced the longstanding per-se rule against resale price maintenance (RPM) with a rule of reason approach, has resurrected the debate over RPM. Legal and economic proponents of this practice again point to its potential procompetitive benefits, while RPM detractors emphasize its possible anticompetitive consequences. Despite their disagreements regarding the overall RPM evaluation, however, scholars, the Court, and the limited empirical data appear near-unanimous in agreeing that such arrangements can either increase or decrease efficiency. Consequently, the RPM debate predominantly revolves around theoretical assertions regarding the likely frequency and significance of RPM's pro- versus anti-competitive manifestations. Importantly, however, all of these theories also assume – like traditional antitrust scholarship more generally – that manufacturers are strictly rational actors, who employ only profit-maximizing arrangements. In contrast, a behavioral analysis suggests that real-world, boundedly-rational manufacturers are prone to overuse RPM, at times harming consumers. The available evidence reveals this excessive reliance on RPM slowly diminishes over time, as biased manufacturers are taught or disciplined by the market. The slow demise of this practice, however, may entail significant efficiency losses over many years. Yet because RPM will sometimes be procompetitive, Leegin's rejection of its per-se condemnation in favor of a rule of reason analysis is still justified. The present analysis therefore not only offers a novel account of resale price maintenance, but also shows how boundedly rational RPM challenges the various post-Leegin approaches developed by some courts, enforcement agencies, and scholars on both sides of the RPM debate. We close by outlining our alternative, behaviorally informed, structured rule of reason inquiry for this restraint.
最高法院最近在Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.一案中的裁决，用理性原则取代了长期以来反对转售价格维持(RPM)的本身规则，重新引发了关于RPM的辩论。这种做法的法律和经济支持者再次指出其潜在的促进竞争的好处，而RPM的批评者则强调其可能的反竞争后果。然而，尽管学者、法院和有限的经验数据在总体RPM评估方面存在分歧，但他们似乎一致认为，这种安排既可以提高效率，也可以降低效率。因此，RPM辩论主要围绕着关于RPM的亲与反竞争表现的可能频率和意义的理论断言。然而，重要的是，所有这些理论也都假定——就像传统的反垄断学术一样——制造商是严格的理性行为者，他们只采用利润最大化的安排。相反，一项行为分析表明，现实世界中，有限理性的制造商倾向于过度使用RPM，有时会伤害消费者。现有证据表明，随着时间的推移，这种对RPM的过度依赖会慢慢减少，因为有偏见的制造商会受到市场的教导或约束。然而，这种做法的缓慢消亡可能会导致多年来的重大效率损失。然而，由于RPM有时是有利于竞争的，Leegin拒绝其本身的谴责而支持理性分析的规则仍然是合理的。因此，当前的分析不仅提供了转售价格维持的新描述，而且还显示了有限理性RPM如何挑战由RPM辩论双方的一些法院，执法机构和学者开发的各种后leegin方法。最后，我们概述了我们对这种约束的另一种选择，行为信息，结构化的理性规则调查。
{"title":"Behavioral Antitrust: A New Approach to the Rule of Reason after Leegin","authors":"Avishalom Tor, William J. Rinner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1522948","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1522948","url":null,"abstract":"The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., which replaced the longstanding per-se rule against resale price maintenance (RPM) with a rule of reason approach, has resurrected the debate over RPM. Legal and economic proponents of this practice again point to its potential procompetitive benefits, while RPM detractors emphasize its possible anticompetitive consequences. Despite their disagreements regarding the overall RPM evaluation, however, scholars, the Court, and the limited empirical data appear near-unanimous in agreeing that such arrangements can either increase or decrease efficiency. Consequently, the RPM debate predominantly revolves around theoretical assertions regarding the likely frequency and significance of RPM's pro- versus anti-competitive manifestations. Importantly, however, all of these theories also assume – like traditional antitrust scholarship more generally – that manufacturers are strictly rational actors, who employ only profit-maximizing arrangements. In contrast, a behavioral analysis suggests that real-world, boundedly-rational manufacturers are prone to overuse RPM, at times harming consumers. The available evidence reveals this excessive reliance on RPM slowly diminishes over time, as biased manufacturers are taught or disciplined by the market. The slow demise of this practice, however, may entail significant efficiency losses over many years. Yet because RPM will sometimes be procompetitive, Leegin's rejection of its per-se condemnation in favor of a rule of reason analysis is still justified. The present analysis therefore not only offers a novel account of resale price maintenance, but also shows how boundedly rational RPM challenges the various post-Leegin approaches developed by some courts, enforcement agencies, and scholars on both sides of the RPM debate. We close by outlining our alternative, behaviorally informed, structured rule of reason inquiry for this restraint.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"92 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124102466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Behavior in the local commons is usually embedded in a context of regulations and social norms that the group of users face. Such norms and rules affect how individuals value material and non-material incentives and therefore determine their decision to cooperate or over extract the resources from the common-pool. This paper discusses the importance of social norms in shaping behavior in the commons through the lens of experiments, and in particular experiments conducted in the field with people that usually face these social dilemmas in their daily life. Through a large sample of experimental sessions with around one thousand people between villagers and students, I test some hypothesis about behavior in the commons when regulations and social norms constrain the choices of people. The results suggest that people evaluate several components of the intrinsic and material motivations in their decision to cooperate. While responding in the expected direction to a imperfectly monitored fine on over extraction, the expected cost of the regulation is not a sufficient explanatory factor for the changes in behavior by the participants in the experiments. Even with zero cost of violations, people can respond positively to an external regulator that issues a normative statement about a rule that is aimed at solving the social dilemma.
{"title":"Social Norms and Behavior in the Local Commons Through the Lens of Field Experiments","authors":"Juan-Camilo Cardenas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1543821","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1543821","url":null,"abstract":"Behavior in the local commons is usually embedded in a context of regulations and social norms that the group of users face. Such norms and rules affect how individuals value material and non-material incentives and therefore determine their decision to cooperate or over extract the resources from the common-pool. This paper discusses the importance of social norms in shaping behavior in the commons through the lens of experiments, and in particular experiments conducted in the field with people that usually face these social dilemmas in their daily life. Through a large sample of experimental sessions with around one thousand people between villagers and students, I test some hypothesis about behavior in the commons when regulations and social norms constrain the choices of people. The results suggest that people evaluate several components of the intrinsic and material motivations in their decision to cooperate. While responding in the expected direction to a imperfectly monitored fine on over extraction, the expected cost of the regulation is not a sufficient explanatory factor for the changes in behavior by the participants in the experiments. Even with zero cost of violations, people can respond positively to an external regulator that issues a normative statement about a rule that is aimed at solving the social dilemma.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115890745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
C. Engel, Heike Hennig�?Schmidt, Bernd Irlenbusch, Sebastian Kube
Does probation pay a double dividend? Society saves the cost of incarceration, and convicts preserve their liberty. But does probation also reduce the risk of recidivism? In a meta-study we show that the field evidence is inconclusive. Moreover it struggles with an identification problem: those put on probation are less likely to recidivate in the first place. We therefore complement the field evidence by a lab experiment that isolates the definitional feature of probation: the first sanction is conditional on being sanctioned again during the probation period. We find that probationers contribute less to a joint project; punishment cost is higher; efficiency is lower; inequity is higher. While experimental subjects are on probation, they increase their contributions to a joint project. However, once the probation period expires, they reduce their contributions. While in the aggregate these two effects almost cancel out, critically those not punished themselves do trust the institution less if punishment does not become effective immediately.
{"title":"On Probation - An Experimental Analysis","authors":"C. Engel, Heike Hennig�?Schmidt, Bernd Irlenbusch, Sebastian Kube","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1428407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1428407","url":null,"abstract":"Does probation pay a double dividend? Society saves the cost of incarceration, and convicts preserve their liberty. But does probation also reduce the risk of recidivism? In a meta-study we show that the field evidence is inconclusive. Moreover it struggles with an identification problem: those put on probation are less likely to recidivate in the first place. We therefore complement the field evidence by a lab experiment that isolates the definitional feature of probation: the first sanction is conditional on being sanctioned again during the probation period. We find that probationers contribute less to a joint project; punishment cost is higher; efficiency is lower; inequity is higher. While experimental subjects are on probation, they increase their contributions to a joint project. However, once the probation period expires, they reduce their contributions. While in the aggregate these two effects almost cancel out, critically those not punished themselves do trust the institution less if punishment does not become effective immediately.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134316220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
If people face cognitive limitations or biases that lead to financial mistakes, what are possible ways lawmakers can help? One approach is to remove the option of the bad decision; another approach is to increase financial education such that individuals can reason through choices when they arise. A third, less discussed, approach is to mandate disclosure of information in a form that enables people to overcome limitations or biases at the point of the decision. This third approach is the topic of this paper. We study whether and what information can be disclosed to payday loan borrowers to lower their use of high-cost debt via a field experiment at a national chain of payday lenders. We find that information that helps people think less narrowly (over time) about the cost of payday borrowing, and in particular information that reinforces the adding-up effect over pay cycles of the dollar fees incurred on a payday loan, reduces the take-up of payday loans by about 10 percent in a 4 month-window following exposure to the new information. Overall, our results suggest that consumer information regulations based on a deeper understanding of cognitive biases might be an effective policy tool when it comes to regulating payday borrowing, and possibly other financial and non-financial products.
{"title":"Information Disclosure, Cognitive Biases and Payday Borrowing","authors":"Marianne Bertrand, Adair Morse","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1533012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1533012","url":null,"abstract":"If people face cognitive limitations or biases that lead to financial mistakes, what are possible ways lawmakers can help? One approach is to remove the option of the bad decision; another approach is to increase financial education such that individuals can reason through choices when they arise. A third, less discussed, approach is to mandate disclosure of information in a form that enables people to overcome limitations or biases at the point of the decision. This third approach is the topic of this paper. We study whether and what information can be disclosed to payday loan borrowers to lower their use of high-cost debt via a field experiment at a national chain of payday lenders. We find that information that helps people think less narrowly (over time) about the cost of payday borrowing, and in particular information that reinforces the adding-up effect over pay cycles of the dollar fees incurred on a payday loan, reduces the take-up of payday loans by about 10 percent in a 4 month-window following exposure to the new information. Overall, our results suggest that consumer information regulations based on a deeper understanding of cognitive biases might be an effective policy tool when it comes to regulating payday borrowing, and possibly other financial and non-financial products.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"24 28","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120837276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The authors propose that two central ingredients in lay models of intentionality are (a) “distal intent” (the actor’s mind is focused on a broader goal) and (b) “proximal intent” (the actor’s mind is focused narrowly on the act itself). Study 1 established that participants rate an actor with both forms of intent more responsible than an actor with only one form of intent or neither form of intent. In Study 2, when the actor had only distal intent, participants with a high level construal rated the actor more responsible than did those with a low level construal. In Study 3, when the actor had only distal intent, participants primed with psychodynamic concepts rated the actor more responsible than did those primed with cognitive control concepts. However, when the actor had only proximal intent, the effect reversed. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for the literatures on moral reasoning and law.
{"title":"Thoughts Versus Deeds: Folk Beliefs About Intentionality and Mens Rea","authors":"N. McNichols, Jennifer L. Fortune, Jason E. Plaks","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1434120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1434120","url":null,"abstract":"The authors propose that two central ingredients in lay models of intentionality are (a) “distal intent” (the actor’s mind is focused on a broader goal) and (b) “proximal intent” (the actor’s mind is focused narrowly on the act itself). Study 1 established that participants rate an actor with both forms of intent more responsible than an actor with only one form of intent or neither form of intent. In Study 2, when the actor had only distal intent, participants with a high level construal rated the actor more responsible than did those with a low level construal. In Study 3, when the actor had only distal intent, participants primed with psychodynamic concepts rated the actor more responsible than did those primed with cognitive control concepts. However, when the actor had only proximal intent, the effect reversed. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for the literatures on moral reasoning and law.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127586634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay introduces a neurologically-informed formal model of collective action that reveals the role for empathy and distress in motivating costly helping behaviors. This model is based on a brain circuit that our lab has recently characterized called HOME (Human Oxytocin Mediated Empathy) System. We review how our studies have identified HOME and use this to draw implications for how collective action can be initiated, sustained, and revived.
{"title":"Empathy and Collective Action","authors":"P. Zak, Jorge A. Barraza","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1375059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1375059","url":null,"abstract":"This essay introduces a neurologically-informed formal model of collective action that reveals the role for empathy and distress in motivating costly helping behaviors. This model is based on a brain circuit that our lab has recently characterized called HOME (Human Oxytocin Mediated Empathy) System. We review how our studies have identified HOME and use this to draw implications for how collective action can be initiated, sustained, and revived.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122052754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper argues that individual values provide a framework for an economic theory of "expanded rationality." Defined as conceptions of the desirable, values guide the way individuals select actions, evaluate people and events, and explain or justify their actions and evaluations. Values thus may be seen as arguments in individuals' personal utility functions; they underlie the construction of preferences; and they supply reasons for reason-based choice. The theory expands the conception of rationality by incorporating a set of motivational goals that is richer than the standard depiction of self-interest yet avoids the pitfalls of ad hocery and tautological definitions. Such a theory can better illuminate policy debates. It thus entails direct implications for law.
{"title":"Expanded Rationality: From the Preferred to the Desirable, with Some Implications for Law","authors":"A. Licht","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1317293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1317293","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that individual values provide a framework for an economic theory of \"expanded rationality.\" Defined as conceptions of the desirable, values guide the way individuals select actions, evaluate people and events, and explain or justify their actions and evaluations. Values thus may be seen as arguments in individuals' personal utility functions; they underlie the construction of preferences; and they supply reasons for reason-based choice. The theory expands the conception of rationality by incorporating a set of motivational goals that is richer than the standard depiction of self-interest yet avoids the pitfalls of ad hocery and tautological definitions. Such a theory can better illuminate policy debates. It thus entails direct implications for law.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124667787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Criminal Law and Economics applies economic theory to explain crime, law enforcement, criminal law and criminal procedure. This pathbreaking book draws together sixteen chapters by leading scholars in the field, summarizing theoretical and empirical work researched to date on criminal law and economics. The topics range from private and public enforcement of the law, criminal procedure and regulation to terrorism, cyber crime and tax evasion. The expert contributors also cover the political economy of criminal law as well as behavioral criminal law and economics.
{"title":"Behavioral Criminal Law and Economics","authors":"Richard Mcadams, T. Ulen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1299963","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1299963","url":null,"abstract":"Criminal Law and Economics applies economic theory to explain crime, law enforcement, criminal law and criminal procedure. This pathbreaking book draws together sixteen chapters by leading scholars in the field, summarizing theoretical and empirical work researched to date on criminal law and economics. The topics range from private and public enforcement of the law, criminal procedure and regulation to terrorism, cyber crime and tax evasion. The expert contributors also cover the political economy of criminal law as well as behavioral criminal law and economics.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121534260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-04-01DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-0696-0_7
Jeremy A. Blumenthal
{"title":"A Moody View of the Law: Looking Back and Looking Ahead at Law and the Emotions","authors":"Jeremy A. Blumenthal","doi":"10.1007/978-1-4419-0696-0_7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-0696-0_7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122240201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Decision theory seems to offer a very attractive normative framework for individual and social choice under uncertainty. The decisionmaker should think of her choice situation, at any given moment, in terms of a set of possible outcomes, that is, specifications of the possible consequences of choice, described in light of the decisionmaker's goals; a set of possible actions; and a "state set" consisting of possible prior "states of the world." It is this framework for choice which provides the foundation for expected utility theory, as demonstrated in the work of Leonard Savage. Problems arise, however, when the decisionmaker is boundedly rational: when the mental process of thinking about outcomes, actions, and states is itself expensive and time consuming. In the case of the unboundedly rational decisionmaker, decision theory enjoins her to employ maximally specific outcomes; to consider all possible actions; and to use a set of mutually exclusive and collective exhaustive states, each of which is sufficiently finely specified so that each action, together with each state, yields one and only one maximally specific outcome. In the case of the boundedly rational decisionmaker, this procedure is either infeasible or, if feasible, irrational. This paper presents the problem of bounded rationality. It surveys possible solutions, none of which are found to be attractive. And it concludes by discussing the difficulties that the problem of bounded rationality poses for the welfarist program for legal scholarship presented by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell in their book, Fairness versus Welfare.
{"title":"Bounded Rationality and Legal Scholarship","authors":"M. Adler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1095874","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1095874","url":null,"abstract":"Decision theory seems to offer a very attractive normative framework for individual and social choice under uncertainty. The decisionmaker should think of her choice situation, at any given moment, in terms of a set of possible outcomes, that is, specifications of the possible consequences of choice, described in light of the decisionmaker's goals; a set of possible actions; and a \"state set\" consisting of possible prior \"states of the world.\" It is this framework for choice which provides the foundation for expected utility theory, as demonstrated in the work of Leonard Savage. Problems arise, however, when the decisionmaker is boundedly rational: when the mental process of thinking about outcomes, actions, and states is itself expensive and time consuming. In the case of the unboundedly rational decisionmaker, decision theory enjoins her to employ maximally specific outcomes; to consider all possible actions; and to use a set of mutually exclusive and collective exhaustive states, each of which is sufficiently finely specified so that each action, together with each state, yields one and only one maximally specific outcome. In the case of the boundedly rational decisionmaker, this procedure is either infeasible or, if feasible, irrational. This paper presents the problem of bounded rationality. It surveys possible solutions, none of which are found to be attractive. And it concludes by discussing the difficulties that the problem of bounded rationality poses for the welfarist program for legal scholarship presented by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell in their book, Fairness versus Welfare.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114477143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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