Tax regulation authors habitually infuse regulations with explanatory examples. These examples are viewed favorably by both the government that encourages their drafting and the taxpayers who regularly rely on such examples to assist them in dealing with the notoriously complex tax rules. Despite the ubiquity of these examples, there is no published guidance for their drafting, their use, or their interpretation. The first original contribution of this Article is the exposition and classification of the advantages and deficiencies in the current use of examples in tax regulations. This Article is the first to question the rationale behind the ubiquitous use of examples in tax regulations. The Article uses data collected by original surveys of expert tax professionals and government employees involved in drafting tax regulations. The second original contribution of this Article is the explanation of the appeal of these examples among tax experts, and the potential hazards of the examples despite this apparent appeal. This analysis uses insights from behavioral science, and particularly from the study of cognitive biases, to explain, for example, how anchoring via an example could shift the focus of a regulatory rule and alter the boundaries of the law in inappropriate or unfair ways. Relying on this analysis, the Article finally proposes — the third original contribution — a better-informed approach to the writing of examples in tax regulations.
{"title":"Why Examples? Towards More Behaviorally-Intelligent Regulation","authors":"Y. Brauner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3008261","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3008261","url":null,"abstract":"Tax regulation authors habitually infuse regulations with explanatory examples. These examples are viewed favorably by both the government that encourages their drafting and the taxpayers who regularly rely on such examples to assist them in dealing with the notoriously complex tax rules. Despite the ubiquity of these examples, there is no published guidance for their drafting, their use, or their interpretation. The first original contribution of this Article is the exposition and classification of the advantages and deficiencies in the current use of examples in tax regulations. This Article is the first to question the rationale behind the ubiquitous use of examples in tax regulations. The Article uses data collected by original surveys of expert tax professionals and government employees involved in drafting tax regulations. The second original contribution of this Article is the explanation of the appeal of these examples among tax experts, and the potential hazards of the examples despite this apparent appeal. This analysis uses insights from behavioral science, and particularly from the study of cognitive biases, to explain, for example, how anchoring via an example could shift the focus of a regulatory rule and alter the boundaries of the law in inappropriate or unfair ways. Relying on this analysis, the Article finally proposes — the third original contribution — a better-informed approach to the writing of examples in tax regulations.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130983317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Empirical evidence indicates that national court judges fall prey to cognitive biases and heuristics. The same may be assumed for international arbitrators. Improving third-party adjudication through behavior-ally informed rules on procedure thus seems to be an avenue of research worth being pursued. In applying behavioral law and economics to international commercial arbitration, the present analysis shows (1) that behavioral economics can help to understand arbitrators’ behavior and (2) suggests how the law may mitigate their cognitive biases and heuristics in order to design more effective, efficient, and fair arbitral proceedings under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The analysis focuses on (i) the representativeness heuristic, (ii) anchoring, (iii) the hindsight bias, (iv) framing effects, and (v) the egocentric bias. Building on their underlying dynamics and recent research on context-dependent decision-making, corresponding debiasing mechanisms may be implemented into arbitral proceedings through either behaviorally informed (model) arbitration clauses or by complementing existing frameworks such as the UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings in a behaviorally informed manner. Hence, in applying insights from economics and psychology to international arbitration, the present analysis adopts a prescriptive approach, examining how to actively mitigate arbitrators’ cognitive shortcomings as much as possible. Ac-curacy in fact determination – or the search for the truth – is perceived as the central motivation of this approach. As prescriptive insights from behavioral economics are able to allow for more accurate judgment, behaviorally informed rules on procedure not only benefit disputing parties by enhancing the idea of due process, but in doing so, they also empower international arbitration as a legal institution when con-fronted with national legal systems.
{"title":"Behavioral Insights into International Arbitration: An Analysis of How to De-Bias Arbitrators","authors":"Jan-Philip Elm","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2973266","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2973266","url":null,"abstract":"Empirical evidence indicates that national court judges fall prey to cognitive biases and heuristics. The same may be assumed for international arbitrators. Improving third-party adjudication through behavior-ally informed rules on procedure thus seems to be an avenue of research worth being pursued. In applying behavioral law and economics to international commercial arbitration, the present analysis shows (1) that behavioral economics can help to understand arbitrators’ behavior and (2) suggests how the law may mitigate their cognitive biases and heuristics in order to design more effective, efficient, and fair arbitral proceedings under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The analysis focuses on (i) the representativeness heuristic, (ii) anchoring, (iii) the hindsight bias, (iv) framing effects, and (v) the egocentric bias. Building on their underlying dynamics and recent research on context-dependent decision-making, corresponding debiasing mechanisms may be implemented into arbitral proceedings through either behaviorally informed (model) arbitration clauses or by complementing existing frameworks such as the UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings in a behaviorally informed manner. Hence, in applying insights from economics and psychology to international arbitration, the present analysis adopts a prescriptive approach, examining how to actively mitigate arbitrators’ cognitive shortcomings as much as possible. Ac-curacy in fact determination – or the search for the truth – is perceived as the central motivation of this approach. As prescriptive insights from behavioral economics are able to allow for more accurate judgment, behaviorally informed rules on procedure not only benefit disputing parties by enhancing the idea of due process, but in doing so, they also empower international arbitration as a legal institution when con-fronted with national legal systems.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127910361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It can be paternalistic to force people to choose. Although many people insist on drawing a bright line between active choosing and paternalism, that line is often illusory. Calling for active choosing is a form of libertarian paternalism if people are permitted to opt out of choosing in favor of a default (and in that sense not to choose). By contrast, calling for active choosing is a form of nonlibertarian paternalism insofar as people are actually required to choose. These points have implications for a range of issues in law and policy, suggesting that those who favor active choosing, and insist on it, may well be overriding people’s preferences and thus running afoul of John Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle (for better or for worse).
{"title":"Forcing People To Choose Is Paternalistic","authors":"C. Sunstein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2862694","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2862694","url":null,"abstract":"It can be paternalistic to force people to choose. Although many people insist on drawing a bright line between active choosing and paternalism, that line is often illusory. Calling for active choosing is a form of libertarian paternalism if people are permitted to opt out of choosing in favor of a default (and in that sense not to choose). By contrast, calling for active choosing is a form of nonlibertarian paternalism insofar as people are actually required to choose. These points have implications for a range of issues in law and policy, suggesting that those who favor active choosing, and insist on it, may well be overriding people’s preferences and thus running afoul of John Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle (for better or for worse).","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132177482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-02-22DOI: 10.5195/LAWREVIEW.2015.395
Julia Y. Lee
Internet commerce has transformed the marketing of goods and services. The separation between point of sale and seller, and the presence of geographically dispersed sellers who do not engage in repeated transactions with the same customers challenge traditional mechanisms for building the trust required for commercial exchanges. In this changing environment, legal rules and institutions play a diminished role in building trust. Instead, new systems and methods are emerging to foster trust in one-shot commercial transactions in cyberspace. The Article focuses on the rise of “social commerce,” a socio-economic phenomenon centered on the use of social media and other modes of social connection in electronic commerce. It identifies three mechanisms that are central to the development of trust in social commerce: communication and voluntary disclosure; barriers to entry; and community policing. These mechanisms simulate the characteristics of closely-knit environments, creating conditions conducive to trust. The Article describes these mechanisms in four new commercial settings: the sharing economy; next generation electronic commerce; online escort services; and online black markets in credit cards and controlled substances.
{"title":"Trust and Social Commerce","authors":"Julia Y. Lee","doi":"10.5195/LAWREVIEW.2015.395","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/LAWREVIEW.2015.395","url":null,"abstract":"Internet commerce has transformed the marketing of goods and services. The separation between point of sale and seller, and the presence of geographically dispersed sellers who do not engage in repeated transactions with the same customers challenge traditional mechanisms for building the trust required for commercial exchanges. In this changing environment, legal rules and institutions play a diminished role in building trust. Instead, new systems and methods are emerging to foster trust in one-shot commercial transactions in cyberspace. The Article focuses on the rise of “social commerce,” a socio-economic phenomenon centered on the use of social media and other modes of social connection in electronic commerce. It identifies three mechanisms that are central to the development of trust in social commerce: communication and voluntary disclosure; barriers to entry; and community policing. These mechanisms simulate the characteristics of closely-knit environments, creating conditions conducive to trust. The Article describes these mechanisms in four new commercial settings: the sharing economy; next generation electronic commerce; online escort services; and online black markets in credit cards and controlled substances.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129155362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-11-06DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-29562-6_1
Avishalom Tor
{"title":"The Critical and Problematic Role of Bounded Rationality in Nudging","authors":"Avishalom Tor","doi":"10.1007/978-3-319-29562-6_1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29562-6_1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124657184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This Introduction provides an overview of the articles in a volume of the Albany Government Law Review dedicated to addressing the issue of the "criminalization of mental illness." They attempt to address just some of the many questions that this troubling trend raises. They offer insightful analysis and offer compelling, if, at times, controversial, responses to these questions.
{"title":"Introduction: The Criminalization of Mental Illness","authors":"Raymond H. Brescia","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2682575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2682575","url":null,"abstract":"This Introduction provides an overview of the articles in a volume of the Albany Government Law Review dedicated to addressing the issue of the \"criminalization of mental illness.\" They attempt to address just some of the many questions that this troubling trend raises. They offer insightful analysis and offer compelling, if, at times, controversial, responses to these questions.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128022453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, I attempt to mine what were the deeper implications of Moynihan's effort through his Report to identify the problems that were confronting the poor, black urban family, and using interpersonal neurobiology, attachment theory, and early childhood trauma theory, I interrogate the meaning of "weak, disorganized structure" of the black family and the contributing factors of "self-perpetuating pathologies." by examining these critical concepts through the aforementioned theories, I hope to learn if Moynihan was directing our attention by implication at the parenting styles of poor, black urban families, and at the source, along with the legacies of racism, that contributed to why black children and adolescents were woefully lagging behind their peers and committing social dislocation issues like crime. By taking seriously the teachings of these theories, I believe that they would reveal a dark secret within poor, black urban families that few people, including Moynihan, wanted to confront directly. After controlling for the legacies of slavery, Jim Crow, which had only legally died in 1964, and thus modern discrimination, that dark secret would be disruptions caused by childhood trauma early in the infant child's relationship with her black family caregivers. These disruptions and their negative, downstream effects would be correlated with the findings that Moynihan so clearly illustrated in his Report. By necessity, then, such disruptions would affected the black infants' right brain development, which would contribute to their inability to self-regulate and to adapt and thrive adequately not only at home but also at school and in their community. In short, white racism and its legacy don't account for the weak, disorganized structure of the poor black family and self-perpetuating pathologies more than the impact of the earliest disruption in the black infants and caregivers' relationship caused by early childhood cruelties and maltreatment.
{"title":"A Dark Secret Too Scandalous to Confront: Did the Moynihan Report Imply That Poor Black Caregivers' Parenting Styles and Childhood Cruelties Were Strongly Correlated With Self-Perpetuating Pathologies?","authors":"R. Robinson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2756844","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2756844","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I attempt to mine what were the deeper implications of Moynihan's effort through his Report to identify the problems that were confronting the poor, black urban family, and using interpersonal neurobiology, attachment theory, and early childhood trauma theory, I interrogate the meaning of \"weak, disorganized structure\" of the black family and the contributing factors of \"self-perpetuating pathologies.\" by examining these critical concepts through the aforementioned theories, I hope to learn if Moynihan was directing our attention by implication at the parenting styles of poor, black urban families, and at the source, along with the legacies of racism, that contributed to why black children and adolescents were woefully lagging behind their peers and committing social dislocation issues like crime. By taking seriously the teachings of these theories, I believe that they would reveal a dark secret within poor, black urban families that few people, including Moynihan, wanted to confront directly. After controlling for the legacies of slavery, Jim Crow, which had only legally died in 1964, and thus modern discrimination, that dark secret would be disruptions caused by childhood trauma early in the infant child's relationship with her black family caregivers. These disruptions and their negative, downstream effects would be correlated with the findings that Moynihan so clearly illustrated in his Report. By necessity, then, such disruptions would affected the black infants' right brain development, which would contribute to their inability to self-regulate and to adapt and thrive adequately not only at home but also at school and in their community. In short, white racism and its legacy don't account for the weak, disorganized structure of the poor black family and self-perpetuating pathologies more than the impact of the earliest disruption in the black infants and caregivers' relationship caused by early childhood cruelties and maltreatment.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124335788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the US, judges typically retain sentencing discretion in criminal cases, but in some states this discretion is given to juries. One criticism of jury sentencing is that jurors will be tempted to issue “compromise verdicts,” where they return a guilty verdict but a light sentence when they are uncertain about the facts of a case. A simple expected utility model shows that any fact finder with sentencing discretion should engage in behavior that is observationally equivalent to a compromise verdict. Intuitively, the fact finder chooses a more lenient sentence than the punishment that fits the crime because he wants to mitigate the potential cost of a wrongful conviction; in turn, a lower cost of a wrongful conviction leads him to reduce his standard of proof. Although critics of jury sentencing intuit the risk of compromise, a bench trial poses the same risk for a judge. Alternatively, the jury trial format (jury verdict, judge sentence) can lessen the risk of compromise if juries are denied punishment information.
{"title":"Sentencing Discretion and Burdens of Proof","authors":"Alex Lundberg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2578661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2578661","url":null,"abstract":"In the US, judges typically retain sentencing discretion in criminal cases, but in some states this discretion is given to juries. One criticism of jury sentencing is that jurors will be tempted to issue “compromise verdicts,” where they return a guilty verdict but a light sentence when they are uncertain about the facts of a case. A simple expected utility model shows that any fact finder with sentencing discretion should engage in behavior that is observationally equivalent to a compromise verdict. Intuitively, the fact finder chooses a more lenient sentence than the punishment that fits the crime because he wants to mitigate the potential cost of a wrongful conviction; in turn, a lower cost of a wrongful conviction leads him to reduce his standard of proof. Although critics of jury sentencing intuit the risk of compromise, a bench trial poses the same risk for a judge. Alternatively, the jury trial format (jury verdict, judge sentence) can lessen the risk of compromise if juries are denied punishment information.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123672508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Objective: As part of the expansive overhaul of the mental health system, many states have passed laws that allow, under certain conditions, voluntary and involuntarily committed patients to refuse medication. While some predicted the consequences of these laws would be dire, the effect on violent behavior remains untested. This study measures the effect of various right to refuse medication laws on homicides.Method: Using a sample of the homicide rate of every US state between 1972 and 2001 (N=1,479), I compare the difference in homicide rates before and after a law change to that same difference in a set of control states to estimate the effect of laws aimed at extending the right to refuse medication to both voluntary and involuntarily committed mental health patients. Results: Laws designed to allow voluntarily committed patients to refuse medication are associated with a 0.8 increase in the homicide rate, and while point estimates suggest that allowing for review of requests to refuse medication are associated with a decrease in the homicide rate, the estimates are imprecise and statistically insignificant.Conclusion: Allowing voluntarily committed patients to refuse medication may entice some to enter in-patient facilities, but the brief and optional exposure to medication and their side effects may actually discourage treatment and increase violence.
{"title":"Pre-Medicated Murder: Violence and the Degree to Which the Mentally Ill Can Refuse Treatment","authors":"G. Edwards","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2573331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2573331","url":null,"abstract":"Objective: As part of the expansive overhaul of the mental health system, many states have passed laws that allow, under certain conditions, voluntary and involuntarily committed patients to refuse medication. While some predicted the consequences of these laws would be dire, the effect on violent behavior remains untested. This study measures the effect of various right to refuse medication laws on homicides.Method: Using a sample of the homicide rate of every US state between 1972 and 2001 (N=1,479), I compare the difference in homicide rates before and after a law change to that same difference in a set of control states to estimate the effect of laws aimed at extending the right to refuse medication to both voluntary and involuntarily committed mental health patients. Results: Laws designed to allow voluntarily committed patients to refuse medication are associated with a 0.8 increase in the homicide rate, and while point estimates suggest that allowing for review of requests to refuse medication are associated with a decrease in the homicide rate, the estimates are imprecise and statistically insignificant.Conclusion: Allowing voluntarily committed patients to refuse medication may entice some to enter in-patient facilities, but the brief and optional exposure to medication and their side effects may actually discourage treatment and increase violence.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126657257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Based upon psychological research and neuroscience studies about subjective well-being, 2002 Nobel Laureate in Economics, Daniel Kahneman, poses a riddle about which of these two selves should count: experiencing selves or remembering selves. Our remembered emotions (memories) are usually rosier than our experienced emotions, and people are motivated by their predicted emotions, which tend to coincide with their emotional memories. This Article advocates that law should care more about experiencing selves than remembering selves if and when experiences result in chronic health or stress consequences that either (1) societies care about more than people do (because of externalities, public bads, or public goods) or (2) people also care about, but are unaware of, do not remember, or are unable to act upon (due to self-control problems). This Article analyzes examples of chronic health or stress effects from such experiences as dense and long commutes, unhealthy eating, lack of regular physical exercise, sedentary behavior, and financial/retirement planning.
{"title":"Torn Between Two Selves: Should Law Care More About Experiencing Selves or Remembering Selves?","authors":"Peter H. Huang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1743025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1743025","url":null,"abstract":"Based upon psychological research and neuroscience studies about subjective well-being, 2002 Nobel Laureate in Economics, Daniel Kahneman, poses a riddle about which of these two selves should count: experiencing selves or remembering selves. Our remembered emotions (memories) are usually rosier than our experienced emotions, and people are motivated by their predicted emotions, which tend to coincide with their emotional memories. This Article advocates that law should care more about experiencing selves than remembering selves if and when experiences result in chronic health or stress consequences that either (1) societies care about more than people do (because of externalities, public bads, or public goods) or (2) people also care about, but are unaware of, do not remember, or are unable to act upon (due to self-control problems). This Article analyzes examples of chronic health or stress effects from such experiences as dense and long commutes, unhealthy eating, lack of regular physical exercise, sedentary behavior, and financial/retirement planning.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133892814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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