Many millions of people hold conspiracy theories; they believe that powerful people have worked together in order to withhold the truth about some important practice or some terrible event. A recent example is the belief, widespread in some parts of the world, that the attacks of 9/11 were carried out not by Al Qaeda, but by Israel or the United States. Those who subscribe to conspiracy theories may create serious risks, including risks of violence, and the existence of such theories raises significant challenges for policy and law. The first challenge is to understand the mechanisms by which conspiracy theories prosper; the second challenge is to understand how such theories might be undermined. Such theories typically spread as a result of identifiable cognitive blunders, operating in conjunction with informational and reputational influences. A distinctive feature of conspiracy theories is their self-sealing quality. Conspiracy theorists are not likely to be persuaded by an attempt to dispel their theories; they may even characterize that very attempt as further proof of the conspiracy. Because those who hold conspiracy theories typically suffer from a crippled epistemology, in accordance with which it is rational to hold such theories, the best response consists in cognitive infiltration of extremist groups. Various policy dilemmas, such as the question whether it is better for government to rebut conspiracy theories or to ignore them, are explored in this light.
{"title":"Conspiracy Theories","authors":"C. Sunstein, Adrian Vermeule","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1084585","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1084585","url":null,"abstract":"Many millions of people hold conspiracy theories; they believe that powerful people have worked together in order to withhold the truth about some important practice or some terrible event. A recent example is the belief, widespread in some parts of the world, that the attacks of 9/11 were carried out not by Al Qaeda, but by Israel or the United States. Those who subscribe to conspiracy theories may create serious risks, including risks of violence, and the existence of such theories raises significant challenges for policy and law. The first challenge is to understand the mechanisms by which conspiracy theories prosper; the second challenge is to understand how such theories might be undermined. Such theories typically spread as a result of identifiable cognitive blunders, operating in conjunction with informational and reputational influences. A distinctive feature of conspiracy theories is their self-sealing quality. Conspiracy theorists are not likely to be persuaded by an attempt to dispel their theories; they may even characterize that very attempt as further proof of the conspiracy. Because those who hold conspiracy theories typically suffer from a crippled epistemology, in accordance with which it is rational to hold such theories, the best response consists in cognitive infiltration of extremist groups. Various policy dilemmas, such as the question whether it is better for government to rebut conspiracy theories or to ignore them, are explored in this light.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127525154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. Kahan, Donald Braman, P. Slovic, John Gastil, Geoffrey L. Cohen
Cultural Cognition refers to the disposition to conform one's beliefs about societal risks to one's preferences for how society should be organized. Based on surveys and experiments involving some 5,000 Americans, the Second National Risk and Culture Study presents empirical evidence of the effect of this dynamic in generating conflict about global warming, school shootings, domestic terrorism, nanotechnology, and the mandatory vaccination of school-age girls against HPV, among other issues. The Study also presents evidence of risk-communication strategies that counteract cultural cognition. Because nuclear power affirms rather than threatens the identity of persons who hold individualist values, for example, proposing it as a solution to global warming makes persons who hold such values more willing to consider evidence that climate change is a serious risk. Because people tend to impute credibility to people who share their values, persons who hold hierarchical and egalitarian values are less likely to polarize when they observe people who hold their values advocating unexpected positions on the vaccination of young girls against HPV. Such techniques can help society to create a deliberative climate in which citizens converge on policies that are both instrumentally sound and expressively congenial to persons of diverse values.
{"title":"The Second National Risk and Culture Study: Making Sense of - and Making Progress In - The American Culture War of Fact","authors":"D. Kahan, Donald Braman, P. Slovic, John Gastil, Geoffrey L. Cohen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1017189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1017189","url":null,"abstract":"Cultural Cognition refers to the disposition to conform one's beliefs about societal risks to one's preferences for how society should be organized. Based on surveys and experiments involving some 5,000 Americans, the Second National Risk and Culture Study presents empirical evidence of the effect of this dynamic in generating conflict about global warming, school shootings, domestic terrorism, nanotechnology, and the mandatory vaccination of school-age girls against HPV, among other issues. The Study also presents evidence of risk-communication strategies that counteract cultural cognition. Because nuclear power affirms rather than threatens the identity of persons who hold individualist values, for example, proposing it as a solution to global warming makes persons who hold such values more willing to consider evidence that climate change is a serious risk. Because people tend to impute credibility to people who share their values, persons who hold hierarchical and egalitarian values are less likely to polarize when they observe people who hold their values advocating unexpected positions on the vaccination of young girls against HPV. Such techniques can help society to create a deliberative climate in which citizens converge on policies that are both instrumentally sound and expressively congenial to persons of diverse values.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127208585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-06-18DOI: 10.1108/03090550710816500
Kath Hall
This article discusses some of the most common ways in which business decisions are affected by cognitive biases. It focuses on the individual level of decision making and discusses how biases are deeply entrenched in the way many decisions are made. It also discusses how flaws in decision making can escalate when executives are under pressure, over-confident or part of a group. The article argues that we need to develop a better understanding of the effect of cognitive biases on executive decision making. Whilst research suggests that many aspects of our decision making processes operate outside of our conscious awareness, it is suggested that these flaws may be easier to monitor and control when we are aware of their potential impact on corporate decisions.
{"title":"Looking Beneath the Surface: The Impact of Psychology on Corporate Decision Making","authors":"Kath Hall","doi":"10.1108/03090550710816500","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/03090550710816500","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses some of the most common ways in which business decisions are affected by cognitive biases. It focuses on the individual level of decision making and discusses how biases are deeply entrenched in the way many decisions are made. It also discusses how flaws in decision making can escalate when executives are under pressure, over-confident or part of a group. The article argues that we need to develop a better understanding of the effect of cognitive biases on executive decision making. Whilst research suggests that many aspects of our decision making processes operate outside of our conscious awareness, it is suggested that these flaws may be easier to monitor and control when we are aware of their potential impact on corporate decisions.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125058098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As is well known, there are special tensions between Hobbesian moral psychology and Thomist moral psychology, on the one hand; and between the Hobbesian theory of free will and its Thomist rival, on the other. But what is the fundamental difference between the Thomist and Hobbesian theories of the will? This paper argues that the fundamental difference consists in three things. First, that Hobbes's theory omits, while Aquinas's theory relies on, appeals to such theoretical entities as reason, goodness, intellect, soul, and choice. Second, that Hobbes's theory admits, while Aquinas's theory denies, that brute animals have wills. Third, that Hobbes's theory denies, while Aquinas's theory grants, that the question, Is the will free? has sense. Call these differences the threefold difference, and this thesis the Threefold Difference Thesis. This thesis the paper argues for as follows. Part 2 argues that any theory of the will has nine chief features. It must answer nine questions: What is the will's nature? What is its internal structure? What is its external structure? What is its tendency? What are its functions? What is the class of will-bearers? What if anything does a volition consist in? What does voluntariness consist in? What if anything does free will consist in? Parts 3 and 4 then describe how Hobbes's and Aquinas's theories of the will answer each of these questions. Part 5 then uses these descriptions to argue for the Threefold Difference Thesis. Part 6 meets an objection to the Thesis. The objection is the thesis, inspired by the work of Thomas Pink, that the fundamental difference between the two theories is that the Thomist theory accepts a practical reason-based conception of agency, while the Hobbesian theory rejects it. Part 7 concludes the paper by considering some new questions the inquiry has broached.
{"title":"What is the Fundamental Difference between the Thomist and Hobbesian Theories of the Will?","authors":"T. Donahue","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.985165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.985165","url":null,"abstract":"As is well known, there are special tensions between Hobbesian moral psychology and Thomist moral psychology, on the one hand; and between the Hobbesian theory of free will and its Thomist rival, on the other. But what is the fundamental difference between the Thomist and Hobbesian theories of the will? This paper argues that the fundamental difference consists in three things. First, that Hobbes's theory omits, while Aquinas's theory relies on, appeals to such theoretical entities as reason, goodness, intellect, soul, and choice. Second, that Hobbes's theory admits, while Aquinas's theory denies, that brute animals have wills. Third, that Hobbes's theory denies, while Aquinas's theory grants, that the question, Is the will free? has sense. Call these differences the threefold difference, and this thesis the Threefold Difference Thesis. This thesis the paper argues for as follows. Part 2 argues that any theory of the will has nine chief features. It must answer nine questions: What is the will's nature? What is its internal structure? What is its external structure? What is its tendency? What are its functions? What is the class of will-bearers? What if anything does a volition consist in? What does voluntariness consist in? What if anything does free will consist in? Parts 3 and 4 then describe how Hobbes's and Aquinas's theories of the will answer each of these questions. Part 5 then uses these descriptions to argue for the Threefold Difference Thesis. Part 6 meets an objection to the Thesis. The objection is the thesis, inspired by the work of Thomas Pink, that the fundamental difference between the two theories is that the Thomist theory accepts a practical reason-based conception of agency, while the Hobbesian theory rejects it. Part 7 concludes the paper by considering some new questions the inquiry has broached.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115095958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-11-07DOI: 10.1111/j.1571-9979.2006.00119.x
Carrie Menkel‐Meadow
This is a review essay on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the publication of Roger Fisher, William Ury and Bruce Patton's, Getting to Yes, which reviews the interdisciplinary field of Negotiation and how it came to be, as well as where it is heading. The review focuses on constituent questions, constituent disciplines, the legacy of GTY on theory, practice and pedagogy and discusses the issue of why more of the world's actors and institutions have not employed more integrative, problem-solving and peace seeking approaches to conflicts at all levels. It also reports, more optimistically, on the enormous contributions GTY and its progeny have made to how some people approach each other in resolving disputes and negotiating new transactions and relationships. This is a short synthesis and intellectual history of the protean interdisciplinary field of negotiation.
{"title":"Why Hasn't the World Gotten to Yes? An Appreciation and Some Reflections","authors":"Carrie Menkel‐Meadow","doi":"10.1111/j.1571-9979.2006.00119.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.2006.00119.x","url":null,"abstract":"This is a review essay on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the publication of Roger Fisher, William Ury and Bruce Patton's, Getting to Yes, which reviews the interdisciplinary field of Negotiation and how it came to be, as well as where it is heading. The review focuses on constituent questions, constituent disciplines, the legacy of GTY on theory, practice and pedagogy and discusses the issue of why more of the world's actors and institutions have not employed more integrative, problem-solving and peace seeking approaches to conflicts at all levels. It also reports, more optimistically, on the enormous contributions GTY and its progeny have made to how some people approach each other in resolving disputes and negotiating new transactions and relationships. This is a short synthesis and intellectual history of the protean interdisciplinary field of negotiation.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114546752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article introduces an innovative approach to legal theory which the authors call "critical realism." The approach endeavors to integrate insights of social psychology, and affiliated social sciences, together with the methods of conventional economic analysis, as well as traditional methods of legal inquiry. Canvassing robust findings from across the behavioral sciences, the authors articulate a framework for thinking about human agency in legal analysis that the authors call "the situational character," a conception which is meant to provide a more scientifically grounded understanding of the sources of human behavior and decision-making then is provided by the "rational actor" model that has become so prominent in legal scholarship through the influence of the law and economics movement. The authors further explore the extend to which market-actors, such as corporations, have a stake in promoting to consumers and to policymakers the rational-actor model of human agency, even as market pressures are likely to lead such market-actors to understand and exploit the reality of the "situational character." The authors refer to such efforts on the part of market-actors as "deep capture," an extension of the conception of administrative "capture" long understood by public choice theorists. The authors review several historical episodes and scholarly debates through the innovative framework that their article provides, and suggest many avenues of future research and development of the framework.
{"title":"The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture","authors":"John D. Hanson, D. Yosifon","doi":"10.2307/3313062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3313062","url":null,"abstract":"This article introduces an innovative approach to legal theory which the authors call \"critical realism.\" The approach endeavors to integrate insights of social psychology, and affiliated social sciences, together with the methods of conventional economic analysis, as well as traditional methods of legal inquiry. Canvassing robust findings from across the behavioral sciences, the authors articulate a framework for thinking about human agency in legal analysis that the authors call \"the situational character,\" a conception which is meant to provide a more scientifically grounded understanding of the sources of human behavior and decision-making then is provided by the \"rational actor\" model that has become so prominent in legal scholarship through the influence of the law and economics movement. The authors further explore the extend to which market-actors, such as corporations, have a stake in promoting to consumers and to policymakers the rational-actor model of human agency, even as market pressures are likely to lead such market-actors to understand and exploit the reality of the \"situational character.\" The authors refer to such efforts on the part of market-actors as \"deep capture,\" an extension of the conception of administrative \"capture\" long understood by public choice theorists. The authors review several historical episodes and scholarly debates through the innovative framework that their article provides, and suggest many avenues of future research and development of the framework.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129175653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper models how imperfect memory affects the optimal continuity of policies. We examine the choices of a player (individual or firm) who observes previous actions but cannot remember the rationale for these actions. In a stable environment, the player optimally responds to memory loss with excess inertia, defined as a higher probability of following old policies than would occur under full recall. In a volatile environment, the player can exhibit excess impulsiveness (i.e., be more prone to follow new information signals). The model provides a memory-loss explanation for some documented psychological biases, implies that inertia and organizational routines should be more important instable environments than in volatile ones, and provides other empirical implications relating memory and environmental variables to the continuity of decisions.
{"title":"An Economic Approach to the Psychology of Change: Amnesia, Inertia, and Impulsiveness","authors":"D. Hirshleifer, I. Welch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.269611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.269611","url":null,"abstract":"This paper models how imperfect memory affects the optimal continuity of policies. We examine the choices of a player (individual or firm) who observes previous actions but cannot remember the rationale for these actions. In a stable environment, the player optimally responds to memory loss with excess inertia, defined as a higher probability of following old policies than would occur under full recall. In a volatile environment, the player can exhibit excess impulsiveness (i.e., be more prone to follow new information signals). The model provides a memory-loss explanation for some documented psychological biases, implies that inertia and organizational routines should be more important instable environments than in volatile ones, and provides other empirical implications relating memory and environmental variables to the continuity of decisions.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"122 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128009600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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