Similar to other workers in industrial settings NFL running backs can choose to provide additional work effort with possible negative health consequences. We find that the most informative measure for running backs is yards gained after contact, which not only increases total rushing yards but also increases injuries that can cause subsequent lost income due to future games missed. We econometrically examine the decisions running backs reveal in trading off injury risk against total yards gained and salary in the short run and how the tradeoff appears in the longer run where career length considerations come into play. Our estimates reveal subtle nonlinearities and interpersonal heterogeneity in risky effort and the associated short and long run injury risk and economic payoffs.
{"title":"Running the Risk of an Injury in the NFL: Short-Run and Career Consequences","authors":"Quinn A. W. Keefer, T. Kniesner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3439605","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3439605","url":null,"abstract":"Similar to other workers in industrial settings NFL running backs can choose to provide additional work effort with possible negative health consequences. We find that the most informative measure for running backs is yards gained after contact, which not only increases total rushing yards but also increases injuries that can cause subsequent lost income due to future games missed. We econometrically examine the decisions running backs reveal in trading off injury risk against total yards gained and salary in the short run and how the tradeoff appears in the longer run where career length considerations come into play. Our estimates reveal subtle nonlinearities and interpersonal heterogeneity in risky effort and the associated short and long run injury risk and economic payoffs.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130935997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Diego F. Angel-Urdinola, Sebastian Francisco Burgos Davila
The development of pertinent and effective in-service teacher training remains a policy challenge for many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Ecuador stands out as a country in the region that has made significant investments in teacher training in the past decade. However, most in-service training provision has been designed without enough elements to properly address teachers' skills gaps. This paper proposes a roadmap for improving the design of in-service teacher training in Ecuador using available data from student and teacher assessments. Although countries in the region have made important efforts to carry out periodic evaluations of student and teacher performance, the data resulting from these evaluations are rarely used to guide teacher development programs. The analysis presented in this paper suggests that doing so has the potential to raise program pertinence while allowing the prioritization of investments in teachers and students with the greatest needs.
{"title":"Using Student and Teacher Assessments to Design More Pertinent In-Service Teacher Training: The Case of Ecuador","authors":"Diego F. Angel-Urdinola, Sebastian Francisco Burgos Davila","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-8970","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-8970","url":null,"abstract":"The development of pertinent and effective in-service teacher training remains a policy challenge for many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Ecuador stands out as a country in the region that has made significant investments in teacher training in the past decade. However, most in-service training provision has been designed without enough elements to properly address teachers' skills gaps. This paper proposes a roadmap for improving the design of in-service teacher training in Ecuador using available data from student and teacher assessments. Although countries in the region have made important efforts to carry out periodic evaluations of student and teacher performance, the data resulting from these evaluations are rarely used to guide teacher development programs. The analysis presented in this paper suggests that doing so has the potential to raise program pertinence while allowing the prioritization of investments in teachers and students with the greatest needs.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130536713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Derek K. Oler, Christopher J. Skousen, Kevin R. Smith, Jayson Talakai
We examine a number of characteristics of the academic accounting career. On average, an assistant professor is promoted to associate rank after 6.46 years as an assistant, and 5.62 years at her current school. An assistant professor moves just under 1 times before promotion to associate. An associate professor is promoted to full in 7.14 years, after being at her current school for 9.27 years (including years spent as an assistant). Faculty that move from a tenure-track rank to non-tenure-track do so after 6.73 years in a tenure-track rank. Faculty starting at assistant rank stay at their current school for an average of 7.79 years; faculty starting at associate rank stay for 9.61 years, faculty starting at full professor rank stay for 8.28 years. Faculty starting at a non-tenure-track rank stay for 6.11 years. For career length, faculty retiring as assistants have a career length of 19.36 years; faculty retiring as associates have a career length of 21.72 years, and faulty retiring as full have a career length of 23.00 years. We also examine faculty mobility, by year, from 1976 to 2016, and the proportion of faculty promoted from assistant to associate and from associate to full.
{"title":"Promotion and Mobility in the Academic Accounting Career","authors":"Derek K. Oler, Christopher J. Skousen, Kevin R. Smith, Jayson Talakai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3437123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3437123","url":null,"abstract":"We examine a number of characteristics of the academic accounting career. On average, an assistant professor is promoted to associate rank after 6.46 years as an assistant, and 5.62 years at her current school. An assistant professor moves just under 1 times before promotion to associate. An associate professor is promoted to full in 7.14 years, after being at her current school for 9.27 years (including years spent as an assistant). Faculty that move from a tenure-track rank to non-tenure-track do so after 6.73 years in a tenure-track rank. Faculty starting at assistant rank stay at their current school for an average of 7.79 years; faculty starting at associate rank stay for 9.61 years, faculty starting at full professor rank stay for 8.28 years. Faculty starting at a non-tenure-track rank stay for 6.11 years. For career length, faculty retiring as assistants have a career length of 19.36 years; faculty retiring as associates have a career length of 21.72 years, and faulty retiring as full have a career length of 23.00 years. We also examine faculty mobility, by year, from 1976 to 2016, and the proportion of faculty promoted from assistant to associate and from associate to full.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133624308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bruce E. Kaufman, A. Wilkinson, Michael Barry, R. Gómez
This paper uses the popular balanced scorecard from strategic management, and a new survey data set, to empirically measure and evaluate the state of workplace employment capabilities, relations, practices, and performance for shareholders and stakeholders. An innovative feature is that two alternative scorecards are constructed based, respectively, on the high-performance work system (HPWS) model and model of an employment relations system (ERS). The two models are depicted and compared in diagrams, used as theoretical frameworks to build alternative scorecards, and filled in with nationally-representative data on more than fifty workplace attributes provided by separate panels of managers and employees from over 2,000 U.S. workplaces. The workplace performance scores are transformed into frequency distributions showing, first, the mean and dispersion of U.S. workplaces as ordered from lowest to highest performance and, second, evidence that the HPWS and ERS models yield different evaluation assessments – indicating "models matter" for scorecard analysis.
{"title":"Measuring the Quality of Workplace Relations and Organizational Performance with Alternative Balanced Scorecards from Strategic HRM and Employment-Industrial Relations","authors":"Bruce E. Kaufman, A. Wilkinson, Michael Barry, R. Gómez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3453465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3453465","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses the popular balanced scorecard from strategic management, and a new survey data set, to empirically measure and evaluate the state of workplace employment capabilities, relations, practices, and performance for shareholders and stakeholders. An innovative feature is that two alternative scorecards are constructed based, respectively, on the high-performance work system (HPWS) model and model of an employment relations system (ERS). The two models are depicted and compared in diagrams, used as theoretical frameworks to build alternative scorecards, and filled in with nationally-representative data on more than fifty workplace attributes provided by separate panels of managers and employees from over 2,000 U.S. workplaces. The workplace performance scores are transformed into frequency distributions showing, first, the mean and dispersion of U.S. workplaces as ordered from lowest to highest performance and, second, evidence that the HPWS and ERS models yield different evaluation assessments – indicating \"models matter\" for scorecard analysis.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121437287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Christopher M. Cornwell, Ian M. Schmutte, Daniela Scur
In an influential study, Bender et al. [Bender S, Bloom N, Card D, Van Reenen J, Wolter S (2018) Management practices, workforce selection, and productivity. J. Labor Econom. 36(S1):S371–S409] document consistent relationships between management practices, productivity, and workforce composition using administrative data from German firms matched to ratings of their practices from the World Management Survey. We replicate and extend their analysis using comparable data from Brazil. The main conclusions from their study are supported in ours, strengthening the view that more structured practices affect organizational performance through workforce selection across different institutional settings. However, we find that more structured management practices are linked to greater wage inequality in Brazil, relative to greater wage compression in Germany, suggesting that some of the consequences of adopting structured practices are tied to the local context. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.
在一项有影响力的研究中，Bender等人[Bender S, Bloom N, Card D, Van Reenen J, Wolter S(2018)管理实践，劳动力选择和生产力。][j]《劳动经济研究》，36(S1): S371-S409]利用德国企业的管理数据与世界管理调查对其管理行为的评级相匹配，证明了管理实践、生产率和劳动力构成之间的一致关系。我们使用来自巴西的可比数据复制并扩展了他们的分析。他们研究的主要结论在我们的研究中得到了支持，强化了这样一种观点，即更结构化的实践通过不同制度背景下的劳动力选择来影响组织绩效。然而，我们发现，相对于德国更大的工资压缩，巴西更结构化的管理实践与更大的工资不平等有关，这表明采用结构化实践的一些后果与当地背景有关。这篇论文被Joshua Gans接受，商业策略。
{"title":"Building a Productive Workforce: The Role of Structured Management","authors":"Christopher M. Cornwell, Ian M. Schmutte, Daniela Scur","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2021.3960","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.3960","url":null,"abstract":"In an influential study, Bender et al. [Bender S, Bloom N, Card D, Van Reenen J, Wolter S (2018) Management practices, workforce selection, and productivity. J. Labor Econom. 36(S1):S371–S409] document consistent relationships between management practices, productivity, and workforce composition using administrative data from German firms matched to ratings of their practices from the World Management Survey. We replicate and extend their analysis using comparable data from Brazil. The main conclusions from their study are supported in ours, strengthening the view that more structured practices affect organizational performance through workforce selection across different institutional settings. However, we find that more structured management practices are linked to greater wage inequality in Brazil, relative to greater wage compression in Germany, suggesting that some of the consequences of adopting structured practices are tied to the local context. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128834251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A nine-factor input model is developed to estimate the monthly demand for employment, capital, and weekly hours per worker/workweek in U.S. Manufacturing. The labor inputs correspond to production and non-production workers disaggregated by overtime and non-overtime employment. Policy simulations are conducted to examine the short-run effects on the monthly growth rates for employment, labor earnings, capital usage, and the workweek from either a) raising the overtime premium to double-time, or b) reducing the standard workweek to 35 hours. Although the growth rate policy effects are heterogeneous across disaggregated labor input categories, on aver- age both policy changes exhibit negative effects on the growth rates of industry-wide employment, earnings, and non-labor input usage. The growth rate of the workweek is virtually unaffected by raising the overtime premium but is negatively impacted by reducing the standard work week.
{"title":"Raising the Overtime Premium and Reducing the Standard Workweek: Short-Run Impacts on U.S. Manufacturing","authors":"G. Sagyndykova, R. Oaxaca","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3445823","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3445823","url":null,"abstract":"A nine-factor input model is developed to estimate the monthly demand for employment, capital, and weekly hours per worker/workweek in U.S. Manufacturing. The labor inputs correspond to production and non-production workers disaggregated by overtime and non-overtime employment. Policy simulations are conducted to examine the short-run effects on the monthly growth rates for employment, labor earnings, capital usage, and the workweek from either a) raising the overtime premium to double-time, or b) reducing the standard workweek to 35 hours. Although the growth rate policy effects are heterogeneous across disaggregated labor input categories, on aver- age both policy changes exhibit negative effects on the growth rates of industry-wide employment, earnings, and non-labor input usage. The growth rate of the workweek is virtually unaffected by raising the overtime premium but is negatively impacted by reducing the standard work week.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125453953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine disclosures of business outlook by rank-and-file employees on Glassdoor.com. Glassdoor.com is a social media platform where employees can share their views publicly and anonymously. We find that employee disclosures are more highly associated with loan spreads in private lending agreements as those disclosures become more relevant to lenders’ decisions (i.e., when the borrowing firm has higher information opacity, has more dispersed operations, or is more financially constrained) and as those disclosures become more reliable (i.e., as the number of employee ratings increases, when those ratings are based proportionately more on current employees, and when firms have a larger labor force.). The results are consistent with employee disclosures providing useful inside information that otherwise may not have been disclosed publicly by upper-level managers. The rapid growth in information disclosed on social media platforms provides researchers an important and interesting setting to explore how alternative sources of information may be generated and disseminated by various stakeholders.
{"title":"The Relevance and Reliability of Employee Business Outlook Disclosures","authors":"Y. Fan, Yuan Ji, W. Thomas, Chong Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3411883","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3411883","url":null,"abstract":"We examine disclosures of business outlook by rank-and-file employees on Glassdoor.com. Glassdoor.com is a social media platform where employees can share their views publicly and anonymously. We find that employee disclosures are more highly associated with loan spreads in private lending agreements as those disclosures become more relevant to lenders’ decisions (i.e., when the borrowing firm has higher information opacity, has more dispersed operations, or is more financially constrained) and as those disclosures become more reliable (i.e., as the number of employee ratings increases, when those ratings are based proportionately more on current employees, and when firms have a larger labor force.). The results are consistent with employee disclosures providing useful inside information that otherwise may not have been disclosed publicly by upper-level managers. The rapid growth in information disclosed on social media platforms provides researchers an important and interesting setting to explore how alternative sources of information may be generated and disseminated by various stakeholders.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116267869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We explore the role that contracting plays within the careers of managerial workers. Contracting distances workers from organizational coordination and politics, aspects of organizational life that...
我们探讨承包在管理工人的职业生涯中所起的作用。承包使工人远离组织协调和政治，组织生活的各个方面……
{"title":"Outside Insiders: Understanding the Role of Contracting in the Careers of Managerial Workers","authors":"Tracy Anderson, Matthew Bidwell","doi":"10.1287/ORSC.2018.1275","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/ORSC.2018.1275","url":null,"abstract":"We explore the role that contracting plays within the careers of managerial workers. Contracting distances workers from organizational coordination and politics, aspects of organizational life that...","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127639894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jed DeVaro, Oliver Gürtler, Marc Gürtler, C. Deutscher
Talented, ambitious workers (big fish) often join highly competitive organizations (big ponds), though they sometimes instead choose less competitive organizations (small ponds) offering brighter promotion prospects. Big fish exist in both types of organizations, though average worker ability is higher in big ponds. Top executives enjoy higher wages in big ponds. Choosing a big pond allows workers to signal high ability. Workers sometimes overestimate or underestimate their abilities, choosing the wrong pond. They also vary in their desire to be promoted. All of the preceding phenomena are shown to be consistent with equilibrium in a new theoretical model of careers.
{"title":"Big Fish in Small (and Big) Ponds - A Study of Careers","authors":"Jed DeVaro, Oliver Gürtler, Marc Gürtler, C. Deutscher","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3306924","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3306924","url":null,"abstract":"Talented, ambitious workers (big fish) often join highly competitive organizations (big ponds), though they sometimes instead choose less competitive organizations (small ponds) offering brighter promotion prospects. Big fish exist in both types of organizations, though average worker ability is higher in big ponds. Top executives enjoy higher wages in big ponds. Choosing a big pond allows workers to signal high ability. Workers sometimes overestimate or underestimate their abilities, choosing the wrong pond. They also vary in their desire to be promoted. All of the preceding phenomena are shown to be consistent with equilibrium in a new theoretical model of careers.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115185813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We hypothesize that companies with board level employee representation (BLER) are less likely than other firms to experience crisis-induced employment reductions, since the employers and employees in BLER firms are better able to negotiate alternative labor-cost savings to preserve employment. Theoretically, we link this ability to BLER’s contribution in reducing information asymmetries and moral hazard in employee-employer contracting. We confirm our hypotheses by studying Scandinavian corporations with/without BLER during the Great Recession. In line with the hypothesized cooperative nature of employee-employer agreements, we also show that BLER firms did not underperform compared to other firms during the last crisis.
{"title":"Board‐Level Employee Representation (Bler) and Firms’ Responses to Crisis","authors":"A. Gregorič, M. S. Rapp","doi":"10.1111/irel.12241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/irel.12241","url":null,"abstract":"We hypothesize that companies with board level employee representation (BLER) are less likely than other firms to experience crisis-induced employment reductions, since the employers and employees in BLER firms are better able to negotiate alternative labor-cost savings to preserve employment. Theoretically, we link this ability to BLER’s contribution in reducing information asymmetries and moral hazard in employee-employer contracting. We confirm our hypotheses by studying Scandinavian corporations with/without BLER during the Great Recession. In line with the hypothesized cooperative nature of employee-employer agreements, we also show that BLER firms did not underperform compared to other firms during the last crisis.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126442271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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