Christophe Malaterre, Emmanuelle J. Javaux, Purificación López-García
Abstract Disagreement in science exists in a variety of strengths, from doubt-raising articles and issues of non-reproducibility up to raging disputes and major controversies. An often-latent form of disagreement consists of misconceptions whereby false ideas are held that run contrary to what is commonly accepted as knowledge. Misconceptions have been the focus of much research in education science and psychology. Here we draw attention to misconceptions that may arise in the very practice of science. We highlight formal features that can be used to characterize misconceptions and distinguish them from controversies, in addition to how they relate to knowledge creation.
{"title":"Misconceptions in Science","authors":"Christophe Malaterre, Emmanuelle J. Javaux, Purificación López-García","doi":"10.1162/posc_a_00590","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00590","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Disagreement in science exists in a variety of strengths, from doubt-raising articles and issues of non-reproducibility up to raging disputes and major controversies. An often-latent form of disagreement consists of misconceptions whereby false ideas are held that run contrary to what is commonly accepted as knowledge. Misconceptions have been the focus of much research in education science and psychology. Here we draw attention to misconceptions that may arise in the very practice of science. We highlight formal features that can be used to characterize misconceptions and distinguish them from controversies, in addition to how they relate to knowledge creation.","PeriodicalId":19867,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Science","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136364841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper will address scientific collaboration at the Zoophysiological Laboratory during the 1911–1945 directorship of Nobel Prize winner August Krogh. Using authorship information and acknowledgments from the laboratory’s publications, this paper maps the many researchers involved in the work. In total, 193 different people contributed to the work at the Zoophysiological Laboratory. The paper further analyzes what labor, materials, ideas, and knowledge were exchanged between the individuals in the laboratory. While science has become more collaborative throughout the twentieth century, this paper underlines that collaboration was very much part of the research process in the early twentieth century.
{"title":"Science as a Collective Effort: Collaboration at the Zoophysiological Laboratory 1911–1945","authors":"Allan Lyngs","doi":"10.1162/posc_a_00620","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00620","url":null,"abstract":"This paper will address scientific collaboration at the Zoophysiological Laboratory during the 1911–1945 directorship of Nobel Prize winner August Krogh. Using authorship information and acknowledgments from the laboratory’s publications, this paper maps the many researchers involved in the work. In total, 193 different people contributed to the work at the Zoophysiological Laboratory. The paper further analyzes what labor, materials, ideas, and knowledge were exchanged between the individuals in the laboratory. While science has become more collaborative throughout the twentieth century, this paper underlines that collaboration was very much part of the research process in the early twentieth century.","PeriodicalId":19867,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Science","volume":"24 1","pages":"-"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81552951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this essay, I analyze the role of physics in Baumgarten’s founding of aesthetics. After examining for the first time his courses on physics and their relationship with aesthetics, I explore the importance of physical metaphors in the issues of aesthetic experiments and aesthetic enthusiasm, with special regard to the influence of Bacon, Boyle, and Leibniz’s doctrine of vis viva.
{"title":"Impetus aestheticus. Baumgarten on Physics and Aesthetics","authors":"A. Nannini","doi":"10.1162/posc_a_00617","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00617","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this essay, I analyze the role of physics in Baumgarten’s founding of aesthetics. After examining for the first time his courses on physics and their relationship with aesthetics, I explore the importance of physical metaphors in the issues of aesthetic experiments and aesthetic enthusiasm, with special regard to the influence of Bacon, Boyle, and Leibniz’s doctrine of vis viva.","PeriodicalId":19867,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Science","volume":"63 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83051584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I analyze a momentous change in eighteenth century French life sciences. Whereas in the first half of the century the conception of natural history as the systematic collection of facts had been most successful, at mid-century a new approach emerged. This approach was characterized by an accent on general philosophical themes rather than on observation and experiment. I study the grounds and features of this historical shift through the work of Maupertuis, who published papers in institutional (or Baconian) natural history in his early years, but then adopted a more speculative approach to the life sciences.
{"title":"Maupertuis and the Reshaping of Natural History in Eighteenth-Century France","authors":"Marco Storni","doi":"10.1162/posc_a_00618","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00618","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper, I analyze a momentous change in eighteenth century French life sciences. Whereas in the first half of the century the conception of natural history as the systematic collection of facts had been most successful, at mid-century a new approach emerged. This approach was characterized by an accent on general philosophical themes rather than on observation and experiment. I study the grounds and features of this historical shift through the work of Maupertuis, who published papers in institutional (or Baconian) natural history in his early years, but then adopted a more speculative approach to the life sciences.","PeriodicalId":19867,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Science","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85209405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines Jean le Rond d’Alembert’s views of metaphysical cosmology and argues that these constitute an important context for Kant’s critical-period response to rational cosmology. D’Alembert is commonly taken to have dismissed cosmology from the roster of the legitimate sciences, and there is indeed evidence of his scepticism towards Maupertuis’ cosmology no less than towards Wolff’s cosmologia generalis. I argue, however, that a broadly Leibnizian cosmological perspective underpins d’Alembert’s accounts of our knowledge and of the task of the philosopher. D’Alembert’s work thus anticipates and helps bring into focus Kant’s own nuanced engagement with the cosmological tradition.
{"title":"D’Alembert’s Cosmological View of the Sciences and its Legacy in Kant","authors":"S. Howard","doi":"10.1162/posc_a_00619","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00619","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper examines Jean le Rond d’Alembert’s views of metaphysical cosmology and argues that these constitute an important context for Kant’s critical-period response to rational cosmology. D’Alembert is commonly taken to have dismissed cosmology from the roster of the legitimate sciences, and there is indeed evidence of his scepticism towards Maupertuis’ cosmology no less than towards Wolff’s cosmologia generalis. I argue, however, that a broadly Leibnizian cosmological perspective underpins d’Alembert’s accounts of our knowledge and of the task of the philosopher. D’Alembert’s work thus anticipates and helps bring into focus Kant’s own nuanced engagement with the cosmological tradition.","PeriodicalId":19867,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Science","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76058528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Peter Harrison explains the disappearance of symbolic meanings of animals from seventeenth-century works in natural history through what he calls the “literalist mentality of the reformers.” By contrast, the present article argues in favor of a different understanding of the connection between hermeneutics and Protestant natural history. Martin Luther, Philipp Melanchthon, Johannes Brenz, Johannes Oecolampadius, and Jean Calvin continued to assign moral meanings to natural particulars, and moral interpretations can still be found in the writings of Protestant naturalists such as Conrad Gesner, Caspar Heldelinus, Jeremias Wilde, Thomas Penny, and Thomas Moffett. If there are differences between Protestant and Catholic interpretations of animals, then these differences derive from the reformer’s greater insistence on providing textual support for assigning symbolic meanings, their resulting greater reluctance in assigning prophetic meanings to animals, and their elimination of spiritual interpretations of animals that are in tension with central tenets of Protestant theology. These differences in hermeneutics and theology may explain some of the divergences between the symbolic interpretations of animals proposed by Protestant natural historians and their Catholic colleague, Ulisse Aldrovandi.
{"title":"Protestant Hermeneutics and the Persistence of Moral Meanings in Early Modern Natural Histories","authors":"A. Blank","doi":"10.1162/posc_a_00615","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00615","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Peter Harrison explains the disappearance of symbolic meanings of animals from seventeenth-century works in natural history through what he calls the “literalist mentality of the reformers.” By contrast, the present article argues in favor of a different understanding of the connection between hermeneutics and Protestant natural history. Martin Luther, Philipp Melanchthon, Johannes Brenz, Johannes Oecolampadius, and Jean Calvin continued to assign moral meanings to natural particulars, and moral interpretations can still be found in the writings of Protestant naturalists such as Conrad Gesner, Caspar Heldelinus, Jeremias Wilde, Thomas Penny, and Thomas Moffett. If there are differences between Protestant and Catholic interpretations of animals, then these differences derive from the reformer’s greater insistence on providing textual support for assigning symbolic meanings, their resulting greater reluctance in assigning prophetic meanings to animals, and their elimination of spiritual interpretations of animals that are in tension with central tenets of Protestant theology. These differences in hermeneutics and theology may explain some of the divergences between the symbolic interpretations of animals proposed by Protestant natural historians and their Catholic colleague, Ulisse Aldrovandi.","PeriodicalId":19867,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Science","volume":"123 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85671307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper discusses the methodological relation between natural history and natural philosophy in the case of John Evelyn (1620–1706). I propose to examine Evelyn’s tree cultivation projects and to identify relevant aspects of his attempt to move from descriptive natural history to experimental natural history. My central argument is that Evelyn’s intention in this endeavour was to develop a series of experimental natural history projects that could provide general laws and axioms of nature as foundations for natural philosophy. I suggest that, considering Bacon’s methodological recommendations regarding the relation between natural history and natural philosophy, Evelyn evolved from one “Baconian” role to another. While in the 1650s, Evelyn acted as a “merchant of light,” as he devoted interest to write natural history projects based on collecting data and commonplacing different sources, in the 1660s, he moved to an advanced role, that of a “compiler” or a “lamp,” in which he composed projects of experimental natural history. In Evelyn’s view, the latter kind of natural history would serve as a methodological step in building a natural philosophy.
{"title":"Merchants of Light and Lamps: John Evelyn’s Transition from Descriptive to Experimental Natural History","authors":"O. Matei","doi":"10.1162/posc_a_00616","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00616","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper discusses the methodological relation between natural history and natural philosophy in the case of John Evelyn (1620–1706). I propose to examine Evelyn’s tree cultivation projects and to identify relevant aspects of his attempt to move from descriptive natural history to experimental natural history. My central argument is that Evelyn’s intention in this endeavour was to develop a series of experimental natural history projects that could provide general laws and axioms of nature as foundations for natural philosophy. I suggest that, considering Bacon’s methodological recommendations regarding the relation between natural history and natural philosophy, Evelyn evolved from one “Baconian” role to another. While in the 1650s, Evelyn acted as a “merchant of light,” as he devoted interest to write natural history projects based on collecting data and commonplacing different sources, in the 1660s, he moved to an advanced role, that of a “compiler” or a “lamp,” in which he composed projects of experimental natural history. In Evelyn’s view, the latter kind of natural history would serve as a methodological step in building a natural philosophy.","PeriodicalId":19867,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Science","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76157607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In optics, real images can be projected onto a screen, while virtual ones always remain behind mirrors. This apparently straightforward distinction is based on complex premises which emerged in the Early Modern period, and its development went hand in hand with a transformation of the notion of image, which became detached from sensual perception. In this article I will outline this historical process, and argue that the distinction between a real and virtual image still implies a reference to visual perception which makes it problematic, yet useful for didactic purposes.
{"title":"The Eye Stays in the Picture: Virtual Images in Early Modern and Modern Optics","authors":"A. Borrelli","doi":"10.1162/posc_a_00608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00608","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In optics, real images can be projected onto a screen, while virtual ones always remain behind mirrors. This apparently straightforward distinction is based on complex premises which emerged in the Early Modern period, and its development went hand in hand with a transformation of the notion of image, which became detached from sensual perception. In this article I will outline this historical process, and argue that the distinction between a real and virtual image still implies a reference to visual perception which makes it problematic, yet useful for didactic purposes.","PeriodicalId":19867,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Science","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75809355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines how scientific understanding is enhanced by virtual entities, focusing on the case of the synthetic cell. Comparing it to other virtual entities and environments in science, we argue that the synthetic cell has a virtual dimension, in that it is functionally similar to living cells, though it does not mimic any particular naturally evolved cell (nor is it constructed to do so). In being cell-like at most, the synthetic cell is akin to many other virtual objects as it is selective and only partially implemented. However, there is one important difference: it is constructed by using the same materials and, to some extent, the same kind of processes as its natural counterparts. In contrast to virtual reality, especially to that of digital entities and environments, the details of its implementation is what matters for the scientific understanding generated by the synthetic cell. We conclude by arguing for the close connection between the virtual and the artifactual.
{"title":"Understanding, virtually: How does the synthetic cell matter?","authors":"D. Broeks, T. Knuuttila, Henk W. de Regt","doi":"10.1162/posc_a_00612","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00612","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper examines how scientific understanding is enhanced by virtual entities, focusing on the case of the synthetic cell. Comparing it to other virtual entities and environments in science, we argue that the synthetic cell has a virtual dimension, in that it is functionally similar to living cells, though it does not mimic any particular naturally evolved cell (nor is it constructed to do so). In being cell-like at most, the synthetic cell is akin to many other virtual objects as it is selective and only partially implemented. However, there is one important difference: it is constructed by using the same materials and, to some extent, the same kind of processes as its natural counterparts. In contrast to virtual reality, especially to that of digital entities and environments, the details of its implementation is what matters for the scientific understanding generated by the synthetic cell. We conclude by arguing for the close connection between the virtual and the artifactual.","PeriodicalId":19867,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Science","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90869938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper proposes a way to understand the meaning of reality (in science). It first supports the ontological view that reality consists of persistent potentialities, which resist being excluded from existence. A study of the cases of the Higgs boson and the hypothetical F-particle helps to illustrate how real entities persist and resist. The paper then suggests that, perceptually speaking, the results of ordinary perception or observational processes persistently appear under appropriate conditions, and they resist disappearance even when the conditions are not completely appropriate. It also argues that, epistemologically speaking, a truthful theory resists being falsified and persists across replicable observations and experiments. Overall, discussing the notion of reality in the context of the philosophy of science, science and technology studies, and phenomenology, the paper explicates the ‘real’ on the basis of these two concepts: ‘persistence’ and ‘resistance’.
{"title":"Reality as Persistence and Resistance","authors":"Mahdi Khalili","doi":"10.1162/posc_a_00604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00604","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper proposes a way to understand the meaning of reality (in science). It first supports the ontological view that reality consists of persistent potentialities, which resist being excluded from existence. A study of the cases of the Higgs boson and the hypothetical F-particle helps to illustrate how real entities persist and resist. The paper then suggests that, perceptually speaking, the results of ordinary perception or observational processes persistently appear under appropriate conditions, and they resist disappearance even when the conditions are not completely appropriate. It also argues that, epistemologically speaking, a truthful theory resists being falsified and persists across replicable observations and experiments. Overall, discussing the notion of reality in the context of the philosophy of science, science and technology studies, and phenomenology, the paper explicates the ‘real’ on the basis of these two concepts: ‘persistence’ and ‘resistance’.","PeriodicalId":19867,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Science","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86965617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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