The article explains the crucial role of the dual paradoxical contrary ~ complementary properties of tensegrity. It is a neglected phenomenon in understanding how living things and their social organisations become self-regulating, self-managing and self-governing. Tensegrity is identified as a defining feature of the architecture of nature that drives evolution. Corporations that include tensegrity into the polycentric self-governing processes identified by Ostrom create an ecological form of governance for citizens to self-govern sustainability of their host bioregions for the global common good. This requires system scientists working with social scientists in educating students to become governance architects to custom design ecological corporations. Research opportunities are identified in testing six hypotheses that include fundamental aspects of the universe.
{"title":"How Cybernetics Explains Behavioural Tensegrity and its Advantages for Organisations","authors":"S. Turnbull","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3913811","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3913811","url":null,"abstract":"The article explains the crucial role of the dual paradoxical contrary ~ complementary properties of tensegrity. It is a neglected phenomenon in understanding how living things and their social organisations become self-regulating, self-managing and self-governing. Tensegrity is identified as a defining feature of the architecture of nature that drives evolution. Corporations that include tensegrity into the polycentric self-governing processes identified by Ostrom create an ecological form of governance for citizens to self-govern sustainability of their host bioregions for the global common good. This requires system scientists working with social scientists in educating students to become governance architects to custom design ecological corporations. Research opportunities are identified in testing six hypotheses that include fundamental aspects of the universe.","PeriodicalId":201560,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Social Responsibility & Social Impact (Topic)","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132284771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The passive index investing revolution and the demand for bespoke environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) investment products are the most monumental changes to shape the investor landscape for many years. These developments have been accompanied by an unprecedented concentration of power among BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street (the “Big Three” asset managers), who are now the biggest shareholders and common owners of the vast majority of globally significant companies. Inevitably, the Big Three are among the most powerful shareholders of the companies that have been identified as major contributors to the climate crisis. Due to the failure of governments to take effective action in the global effort to combat climate change, there has been intense pressure directed at the Big Three to provide investor driven solutions. The Big Three therefore increasingly purport to assume what I call the role of “sustainable capitalists”. In this Article, I build upon Gilson and Gordon’s “agency capitalism” framework to put forward a new agency-costs theory of sustainable capitalism. In this “sustainable capitalism” framework, I show that the Big Three still exhibit some form of “rational reticence”, especially with regard to firm-specific sustainability activism. I theorize that they may also be inflicted with a second agency problem that I call “rational hypocrisy”. This concept is similar to corporate greenwashing as the Big Three are incentivized to claim that they have a stronger commitment to sustainability than is actually reflected in their voting and engagement records in reality. The combination of “rational reticence” and “rational hypocrisy” results in a dual monitoring shortfall–the “agency costs of sustainable capitalism”. In the agency capitalism framework, the proposed solution was for specialist activist hedge funds to fill the monitoring shortfall by initiating firm-specific activism as “governance arbitrageurs”. Analogously, in my sustainable capitalism framework, both ESG hedge funds (initiating firm-specific ESG activism) and other “responsible activists” (focusing on portfolio-wide ESG issues) can be thought of as potential candidates for the role of “ESG arbitrageurs”. Successfully mitigating the problem of rational reticence depends on the complementarity of interests between the ESG arbitrageurs (as initiators) and the Big Three (as arbiters). When discussing appropriate strategies for responsible activists, I demonstrate that important lessons can be learned from a close examination of the way activist hedge funds have adapted to fit the role of governance arbitrageurs. Mitigating the problem of rational hypocrisy, however, requires a different approach. Here, I argue that responsible activists may need to focus on, and target their activism at, the Big Three themselves.
{"title":"The Agency Costs of Sustainable Capitalism","authors":"A. Christie","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3766478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3766478","url":null,"abstract":"The passive index investing revolution and the demand for bespoke environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) investment products are the most monumental changes to shape the investor landscape for many years. These developments have been accompanied by an unprecedented concentration of power among BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street (the “Big Three” asset managers), who are now the biggest shareholders and common owners of the vast majority of globally significant companies. Inevitably, the Big Three are among the most powerful shareholders of the companies that have been identified as major contributors to the climate crisis. Due to the failure of governments to take effective action in the global effort to combat climate change, there has been intense pressure directed at the Big Three to provide investor driven solutions. The Big Three therefore increasingly purport to assume what I call the role of “sustainable capitalists”. \u0000 \u0000In this Article, I build upon Gilson and Gordon’s “agency capitalism” framework to put forward a new agency-costs theory of sustainable capitalism. In this “sustainable capitalism” framework, I show that the Big Three still exhibit some form of “rational reticence”, especially with regard to firm-specific sustainability activism. I theorize that they may also be inflicted with a second agency problem that I call “rational hypocrisy”. This concept is similar to corporate greenwashing as the Big Three are incentivized to claim that they have a stronger commitment to sustainability than is actually reflected in their voting and engagement records in reality. The combination of “rational reticence” and “rational hypocrisy” results in a dual monitoring shortfall–the “agency costs of sustainable capitalism”. \u0000 \u0000In the agency capitalism framework, the proposed solution was for specialist activist hedge funds to fill the monitoring shortfall by initiating firm-specific activism as “governance arbitrageurs”. Analogously, in my sustainable capitalism framework, both ESG hedge funds (initiating firm-specific ESG activism) and other “responsible activists” (focusing on portfolio-wide ESG issues) can be thought of as potential candidates for the role of “ESG arbitrageurs”. Successfully mitigating the problem of rational reticence depends on the complementarity of interests between the ESG arbitrageurs (as initiators) and the Big Three (as arbiters). When discussing appropriate strategies for responsible activists, I demonstrate that important lessons can be learned from a close examination of the way activist hedge funds have adapted to fit the role of governance arbitrageurs. Mitigating the problem of rational hypocrisy, however, requires a different approach. Here, I argue that responsible activists may need to focus on, and target their activism at, the Big Three themselves.","PeriodicalId":201560,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Social Responsibility & Social Impact (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122422566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investment has evolved from the concept of socially responsible investing (SRI) starting in the period concerned with the civil rights movement and social responsibility. The concept of socially responsible investing has evolved into sustainable investment focusing on the companies that show concerns about environmental, social, and governance (ESG). This study aims to investigate the performance of ESG investment in the Stock Exchange of Thailand based on the list of companies with good performances in environmental, social and governance known as “ESG100 Companies” in Thailand. The performance of ESG investment is not different from the corresponding benchmarks. However, the risk of ESG portfolio is lower both in term of total risk and systematic risk, which results in the abnormal performance measured by Jensen’s Alpha. Finally, the list of ESG100 companies does not provide only static information in portfolio selection, but it can also provide information like the persistence in the list or the new inclusion to the list that can help in constructing the investment portfolio and generate abnormal performance.
{"title":"The Performance of Environmental, Social, and Governance Investment in Thailand","authors":"Chayakrit Asvathitanont, Nopphon Tangjitprom","doi":"10.5430/ijfr.v11n6p253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5430/ijfr.v11n6p253","url":null,"abstract":"The environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investment has evolved from the concept of socially responsible investing (SRI) starting in the period concerned with the civil rights movement and social responsibility. The concept of socially responsible investing has evolved into sustainable investment focusing on the companies that show concerns about environmental, social, and governance (ESG). This study aims to investigate the performance of ESG investment in the Stock Exchange of Thailand based on the list of companies with good performances in environmental, social and governance known as “ESG100 Companies” in Thailand. The performance of ESG investment is not different from the corresponding benchmarks. However, the risk of ESG portfolio is lower both in term of total risk and systematic risk, which results in the abnormal performance measured by Jensen’s Alpha. Finally, the list of ESG100 companies does not provide only static information in portfolio selection, but it can also provide information like the persistence in the list or the new inclusion to the list that can help in constructing the investment portfolio and generate abnormal performance.","PeriodicalId":201560,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Social Responsibility & Social Impact (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122874068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We document that good ES-performance is rewarded in primary bond markets by lower credit spreads. This effect is strongest for low-rated bonds and for firms in manufacturing, agriculture, mining and construction. However, not all ES-dimensions are equally important. The above results are driven mostly by the product-related dimension and to a lesser extent by the employee-related dimension. Environment-related aspects only seem to matter for those industries with largest exposure to environmental risks. Finally, we neither find that the above results are driven by crisis periods nor pronounced dynamics reflecting the growing interest in ESG. Overall, our evidence suggests that some ES-dimensions capture information that is relevant for default risk.
{"title":"Primary Corporate Bond Markets and Social Responsibility","authors":"M. Halling, Jin Yu, J. Zechner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3681666","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3681666","url":null,"abstract":"We document that good ES-performance is rewarded in primary bond markets by lower credit spreads. This effect is strongest for low-rated bonds and for firms in manufacturing, agriculture, mining and construction. However, not all ES-dimensions are equally important. The above results are driven mostly by the product-related dimension and to a lesser extent by the employee-related dimension. Environment-related aspects only seem to matter for those industries with largest exposure to environmental risks. Finally, we neither find that the above results are driven by crisis periods nor pronounced dynamics reflecting the growing interest in ESG. Overall, our evidence suggests that some ES-dimensions capture information that is relevant for default risk.","PeriodicalId":201560,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Social Responsibility & Social Impact (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122021749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Milton Friedman’s admonition 50 years ago that the modern corporation should maximize shareholder value remains controversial. We argue that under certain broad assumptions, the admonition remains a good place to start. To strengthen the prospects for success of long-term shareholder value maximization, we suggest steps to align shareholder wealth maximization with stakeholder interests. First, antitrust public policies should be vigorously enforced to maintain and enhance competition in product markets and labor markets. Second, management and board compensation should be reformed to focus on creating and sustaining long-term shareholder value. Finally, and more importantly, for many of society’s serious challenges, corporations do not represent the appropriate level of action. Climate change, for example, poses significant challenges for societies and businesses. But significant changes to combat climate change require public policy changes in the United States and abroad. Turning more to corporations because the political process seems broken will not do.
{"title":"Should the Modern Corporation Maximize Shareholder Value?","authors":"Sanjai Bhagat, R. Hubbard","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3548293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3548293","url":null,"abstract":"Milton Friedman’s admonition 50 years ago that the modern corporation should maximize shareholder value remains controversial. We argue that under certain broad assumptions, the admonition remains a good place to start. To strengthen the prospects for success of long-term shareholder value maximization, we suggest steps to align shareholder wealth maximization with stakeholder interests. First, antitrust public policies should be vigorously enforced to maintain and enhance competition in product markets and labor markets. Second, management and board compensation should be reformed to focus on creating and sustaining long-term shareholder value. Finally, and more importantly, for many of society’s serious challenges, corporations do not represent the appropriate level of action. Climate change, for example, poses significant challenges for societies and businesses. But significant changes to combat climate change require public policy changes in the United States and abroad. Turning more to corporations because the political process seems broken will not do.","PeriodicalId":201560,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Social Responsibility & Social Impact (Topic)","volume":"12 8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125965881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I show that the maritime shipping industry - handling above 80% of global trade flows - has evolved over the past decades to systematically evade "corporate responsibilities," i.e., compliance with regulatory standards and potential tort liabilities. Shipping firms increasingly dissociated legal and ultimate ownership, fragmented assets in one-ship subsidiaries, used flags of convenience, and evaded end-of-life responsibilities with "last-voyage flags." Microeconomic tests confirm that responsibility evasion, amidst global competition, is a dominant motive behind these patterns. These findings have implications for our understanding of corporate social responsibility, of extended forms of liability, and of the "dark side" of globalization.
{"title":"Evading Corporate Responsibilities: Evidence from the Shipping Industry","authors":"Guillaume Vuillemey","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3691188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3691188","url":null,"abstract":"I show that the maritime shipping industry - handling above 80% of global trade flows - has evolved over the past decades to systematically evade \"corporate responsibilities,\" i.e., compliance with regulatory standards and potential tort liabilities. Shipping firms increasingly dissociated legal and ultimate ownership, fragmented assets in one-ship subsidiaries, used flags of convenience, and evaded end-of-life responsibilities with \"last-voyage flags.\" Microeconomic tests confirm that responsibility evasion, amidst global competition, is a dominant motive behind these patterns. These findings have implications for our understanding of corporate social responsibility, of extended forms of liability, and of the \"dark side\" of globalization.","PeriodicalId":201560,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Social Responsibility & Social Impact (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125062076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article presents the practice of shareholder primacy theory and stakeholder theory, with the support of relevant laws and examples in American and British contexts. Here the article argues that managers following shareholder primacy theory should always act in a manner that they reasonably believe they are serving the best interests of the corporation. Such a belief does not exclude directors and managers from considering the interests of non-shareholders as whether “the best interests of the corporation” encompass non-shareholders’ benefits is arguable. In addition, this article discusses corporate social responsibility (CSR) and argues how CSR is related to the practice of stakeholder theory and an improvement of both public and corporate interests.
{"title":"Shareholder Primacy Theory vs. Stakeholder Theory","authors":"J. Hung","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3564804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3564804","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents the practice of shareholder primacy theory and stakeholder theory, with the support of relevant laws and examples in American and British contexts. Here the article argues that managers following shareholder primacy theory should always act in a manner that they reasonably believe they are serving the best interests of the corporation. Such a belief does not exclude directors and managers from considering the interests of non-shareholders as whether “the best interests of the corporation” encompass non-shareholders’ benefits is arguable. In addition, this article discusses corporate social responsibility (CSR) and argues how CSR is related to the practice of stakeholder theory and an improvement of both public and corporate interests.","PeriodicalId":201560,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Social Responsibility & Social Impact (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125110706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter starts with an exposition of the context of shareholder stewardship in South Africa and the institutional investor landscape. This is followed by a discussion of the two main soft law initiatives that support shareholder stewardship in South Africa, namely the Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa (‘CRISA’) and the King IV Report on Governance for South Africa (‘King IV’). These soft law initiatives are extensively supported by hard law provisions, especially for retirement funds and their service providers, but also for other institutional actors. Brief mention is made of the social and ethics committee of certain investee companies and the FTSE/JSE Responsible Investment Index. The chapter concludes with some recommendations for the improvement of the current system.
{"title":"Encouraging Sustainable Investment in South Africa: CRISA and Beyond","authors":"Natania Locke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3564853","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3564853","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter starts with an exposition of the context of shareholder stewardship in South Africa and the institutional investor landscape. This is followed by a discussion of the two main soft law initiatives that support shareholder stewardship in South Africa, namely the Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa (‘CRISA’) and the King IV Report on Governance for South Africa (‘King IV’). These soft law initiatives are extensively supported by hard law provisions, especially for retirement funds and their service providers, but also for other institutional actors. Brief mention is made of the social and ethics committee of certain investee companies and the FTSE/JSE Responsible Investment Index. The chapter concludes with some recommendations for the improvement of the current system.","PeriodicalId":201560,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Social Responsibility & Social Impact (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126296624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Contracts in a variety of contexts — from multinational supply chain agreements to movie-production deals — increasingly include promises on such “social responsibility” matters as human trafficking, environmental sustainability, and socio-demographic diversity. These terms literally promise justice. Can they deliver? This paper makes three claims about the use of contract to achieve social responsibility (which I abbreviate “KSR”). First, KSR can be seen as a response to “vertical deconstruction,” the erosion of intra-firm and social orders that historically generated and transmitted non-commercial social norms. Second, as such, KSR terms will be legally un(der)-enforceable: Like better-studied relational contracts, KSR will blend enforceable and unenforceable terms to achieve governance, risk-sharing, and educative goals. Third, although KSR may be more effective than more popular mechanisms, in particular **corporate** social responsibility, KSR is not a panacea, and presents risks of cooptation and fragmentation often associated with soft-law regimes.
{"title":"Promising Justice: Contract (as) Social Responsibility","authors":"Jonathan C. Lipson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3388312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3388312","url":null,"abstract":"Contracts in a variety of contexts — from multinational supply chain agreements to movie-production deals — increasingly include promises on such “social responsibility” matters as human trafficking, environmental sustainability, and socio-demographic diversity. These terms literally promise justice. \u0000 \u0000Can they deliver? \u0000 \u0000This paper makes three claims about the use of contract to achieve social responsibility (which I abbreviate “KSR”). First, KSR can be seen as a response to “vertical deconstruction,” the erosion of intra-firm and social orders that historically generated and transmitted non-commercial social norms. Second, as such, KSR terms will be legally un(der)-enforceable: Like better-studied relational contracts, KSR will blend enforceable and unenforceable terms to achieve governance, risk-sharing, and educative goals. Third, although KSR may be more effective than more popular mechanisms, in particular **corporate** social responsibility, KSR is not a panacea, and presents risks of cooptation and fragmentation often associated with soft-law regimes.","PeriodicalId":201560,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Social Responsibility & Social Impact (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125365705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Corporate Governance is a recent global development that has attracted the attention of corporate investors, researchers, and governments. It arose out of the need to address sudden collapses and failures of big businesses and corporate bodies in every angle of today’s world. In the last decade, there has been increased focus worldwide on corporate governance in terms of structure, processes, systems, and practices which drive the conduct of business. This is in recognition of the critical role of corporate governance in the success or otherwise of companies. The need for renewed corporate governance in Nigeria arose out of the realization that corporate governance has not been given adequate attention it deserves in most developing countries. For instance, it is on record that many of the thirty-four Nigerian banks that had their operating license revoked between the late ‘80s and early ‘90s suffered from poor corporate governance. The United States of America (USA) is arguably the biggest economy of the world. It is argued that it produces twenty-one percent (21%) of the total world output through millions of business firms operating in its territory. It is generally assumed that US human capital is more productive and business firms are more efficient. Thus, the US firms have been obtaining efficiency gains vis-a-vis their European and Asian competitors. This is often attributed to good corporate governance. This study seeks to examine the level of corporate governance in Nigeria and the United States of America. The work will compare both systems in order to identify areas of difference and similarities and establish how they can be of benefit to stakeholders in both countries with a view to identifying factors that led to the collapse of businesses and corporations on account of the inapplicable methodology of Corporate Governance. Different scholars and researchers have used both qualitative and quantitative methods in analyzing corporate governance in Nigeria. Quantitative methods are usually used in assessing the effectiveness of corporate governance on different variables such as productivity and profitability. Qualitative methods on the other hand are used to assess the effectiveness of corporate governance in preventing future collapses by analyzing previous collapses. This study shall thus make use of the Qualitative Method. This study will be evaluating the corporate governance codes and its effectiveness in preventing future corporate collapses and scandals in Nigeria. It would compare the Nigerian corporate governance code to that of the United States as a measure of its standard and effectiveness.
{"title":"Comparative Analysis of the Concept of Corporate Governance in Nigeria and the United States of America (USA)","authors":"Rahmah Oladejo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3888221","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3888221","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate Governance is a recent global development that has attracted the attention of corporate investors, researchers, and governments. It arose out of the need to address sudden collapses and failures of big businesses and corporate bodies in every angle of today’s world. \u0000 \u0000In the last decade, there has been increased focus worldwide on corporate governance in terms of structure, processes, systems, and practices which drive the conduct of business. This is in recognition of the critical role of corporate governance in the success or otherwise of companies. \u0000The need for renewed corporate governance in Nigeria arose out of the realization that corporate governance has not been given adequate attention it deserves in most developing countries. For instance, it is on record that many of the thirty-four Nigerian banks that had their operating license revoked between the late ‘80s and early ‘90s suffered from poor corporate governance. \u0000 \u0000The United States of America (USA) is arguably the biggest economy of the world. It is argued that it produces twenty-one percent (21%) of the total world output through millions of business firms operating in its territory. It is generally assumed that US human capital is more productive and business firms are more efficient. Thus, the US firms have been obtaining efficiency gains vis-a-vis their European and Asian competitors. This is often attributed to good corporate governance. \u0000 \u0000This study seeks to examine the level of corporate governance in Nigeria and the United States of America. The work will compare both systems in order to identify areas of difference and similarities and establish how they can be of benefit to stakeholders in both countries with a view to identifying factors that led to the collapse of businesses and corporations on account of the inapplicable methodology of Corporate Governance. \u0000 \u0000Different scholars and researchers have used both qualitative and quantitative methods in analyzing corporate governance in Nigeria. Quantitative methods are usually used in assessing the effectiveness of corporate governance on different variables such as productivity and profitability. Qualitative methods on the other hand are used to assess the effectiveness of corporate governance in preventing future collapses by analyzing previous collapses. \u0000 \u0000This study shall thus make use of the Qualitative Method. This study will be evaluating the corporate governance codes and its effectiveness in preventing future corporate collapses and scandals in Nigeria. It would compare the Nigerian corporate governance code to that of the United States as a measure of its standard and effectiveness.","PeriodicalId":201560,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Social Responsibility & Social Impact (Topic)","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122094101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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