Pub Date : 2024-05-21DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10057
Jan Faye
The present article discusses scientific research in relation to the norms of representative democracy, arguing that politicians are committed to base their policy on scientific evidence. It is argued that people have both natural interests and social interests and that our natural interests, which we have acquired through natural selection and adaptation, are best taken care of by a representative democracy in which science proliferates. The article also argues why politicians and the public should trust science as the best means to fulfil our natural interests.
{"title":"Science in a World of Politics","authors":"Jan Faye","doi":"10.1163/24689300-bja10057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10057","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The present article discusses scientific research in relation to the norms of representative democracy, arguing that politicians are committed to base their policy on scientific evidence. It is argued that people have both natural interests and social interests and that our natural interests, which we have acquired through natural selection and adaptation, are best taken care of by a representative democracy in which science proliferates. The article also argues why politicians and the public should trust science as the best means to fulfil our natural interests.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"132 27","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141114891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-16DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10050
Morten Ebbe Juul Nielsen
Public reason liberalism strives to accommodate as broad an array of viewpoints as possible. Some people are selective science skeptics, meaning that they disagree with parts of mainstream science. Of special interest for this paper are climate deniers, who disagree with the mainstream consensus views of climate science. This creates a problem for public reason: on the one hand, public reason wants to avoid basing rules and policies on controversial principles, values, and so on. On the other hand, there are citizens whom we cannot outright call irrational who are skeptical about central tenets of climate science. This seems to imply that public reason cannot base policies on the robust findings of climate science because these findings are controversial among the citizenry. But we have strong reasons to base our policies vis-à-vis climate change on the robust findings of climate science. How should we proceed?
{"title":"Should Liberal Communities Respect Bad Believers? On Empirical Disagreement over Climate Change and Public Reason","authors":"Morten Ebbe Juul Nielsen","doi":"10.1163/24689300-bja10050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10050","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Public reason liberalism strives to accommodate as broad an array of viewpoints as possible. Some people are selective science skeptics, meaning that they disagree with parts of mainstream science. Of special interest for this paper are climate deniers, who disagree with the mainstream consensus views of climate science. This creates a problem for public reason: on the one hand, public reason wants to avoid basing rules and policies on controversial principles, values, and so on. On the other hand, there are citizens whom we cannot outright call irrational who are skeptical about central tenets of climate science. This seems to imply that public reason cannot base policies on the robust findings of climate science because these findings are controversial among the citizenry. But we have strong reasons to base our policies vis-à-vis climate change on the robust findings of climate science. How should we proceed?","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"10 41","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140696106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-16DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10056
N. Nottelmann
Dorian Abbot and twenty-eight coauthors from many quarters of science have recently published a spirited defense of a perceived ‘liberal’ scientific meritocratism—roughly the view that rivalrous or excludable goods in the sphere of scientific work should be distributed entirely based on potential recipients’ merits in that sphere. They propose to understand merit in terms of ‘achievements,’ not least in the form of individual academic track records. A closer examination of their argument reveals their implicit reliance on several incompatible conceptions of merit. Moreover, they conspicuously ignore the typical collective nature of academic achievements in modern science. In this paper, I argue that a different version of scientific meritocratism, based on the central theses of standpoint epistemology, represents an attractive compromise between Abbot et al. and anti-meritocratic theories informed by the sociology of science. Ultimately, however, the credentials of this ‘strong scientific meritocratism’ rest on empirical hypotheses which remain underexamined.
{"title":"Strong Scientific Meritocratism: Standpoint Epistemology as a Middle Ground in the Debate over Personal Merit in Science","authors":"N. Nottelmann","doi":"10.1163/24689300-bja10056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10056","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Dorian Abbot and twenty-eight coauthors from many quarters of science have recently published a spirited defense of a perceived ‘liberal’ scientific meritocratism—roughly the view that rivalrous or excludable goods in the sphere of scientific work should be distributed entirely based on potential recipients’ merits in that sphere. They propose to understand merit in terms of ‘achievements,’ not least in the form of individual academic track records. A closer examination of their argument reveals their implicit reliance on several incompatible conceptions of merit. Moreover, they conspicuously ignore the typical collective nature of academic achievements in modern science. In this paper, I argue that a different version of scientific meritocratism, based on the central theses of standpoint epistemology, represents an attractive compromise between Abbot et al. and anti-meritocratic theories informed by the sociology of science. Ultimately, however, the credentials of this ‘strong scientific meritocratism’ rest on empirical hypotheses which remain underexamined.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"5 23","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140695988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-15DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10048
Jan Faye
I argue that meaning is a result of our biological evolution, and that language evolved from primates’ ability to grasp conceptually the most important features of their environment. I hold that natural selection and adaptation ensure that primates both sense and conceptualize their world similarly, and that they therefore think similarly, whenever they receive the same sense impressions. This cognitive similarity enabled our predecessors to learn and develop a language because of the regular association of a particular sound and a particular image. The evolutionary pressure on our predecessors to develop a language was the advantage that such a language had for cooperation and survival. Finally, I argue that the old, but in wider circles frowned-upon theory of meaning, the expressive theory of language, provides the best explanation of the relationship between thought, meaning, and words, because it operates with words and not sentences as the basic semantic unit.
{"title":"Understanding Meaning through Human Evolution","authors":"Jan Faye","doi":"10.1163/24689300-bja10048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10048","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000I argue that meaning is a result of our biological evolution, and that language evolved from primates’ ability to grasp conceptually the most important features of their environment. I hold that natural selection and adaptation ensure that primates both sense and conceptualize their world similarly, and that they therefore think similarly, whenever they receive the same sense impressions. This cognitive similarity enabled our predecessors to learn and develop a language because of the regular association of a particular sound and a particular image. The evolutionary pressure on our predecessors to develop a language was the advantage that such a language had for cooperation and survival. Finally, I argue that the old, but in wider circles frowned-upon theory of meaning, the expressive theory of language, provides the best explanation of the relationship between thought, meaning, and words, because it operates with words and not sentences as the basic semantic unit.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"9 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140699590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-22DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10047
Matthew Congdon
{"title":"The Radical Demand in Løgstrup’s Ethics, written by Robert Stern","authors":"Matthew Congdon","doi":"10.1163/24689300-bja10047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10047","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"34 27","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139164809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-20DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10045
Antje Gimmler, Philip Højme, Jacob Bo Lautrup Kristensen
{"title":"The Varieties of Applied Philosophy: Introduction","authors":"Antje Gimmler, Philip Højme, Jacob Bo Lautrup Kristensen","doi":"10.1163/24689300-bja10045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10045","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"16 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139257682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-14DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10046
Matt Matravers
{"title":"Why Criminalize?: New Perspectives on Normative Principles of Criminalization, written by Thomas Søbirk Petersen","authors":"Matt Matravers","doi":"10.1163/24689300-bja10046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10046","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"14 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139277696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-16DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10043
C. Kühl
Counterfactual reasoning has always played a role in human life. We ask questions like, “Could it have been different?,” “Under which conditions might/would it have been different?,” and “What would have happened if … ?” If we do not find an answer, i.e., what we accept as an answer, we may start reasoning. Reasoning means introducing new information or assumptions, new questions, new answers to new questions, and so on. From a formal point of view, reasoning may be compared with moving stepwise toward a destination in a path system without ever achieving an overview of the system. Seen in this way, reasoning is an activity with its own rationale, which must be studied from the agent’s own perspective. This paper explores the following query: Which conditions are necessarily fulfilled when the act of posing a specific question, or of introducing a particular piece of information or assumption, etc., may count as a step toward the answer to the initial question?
{"title":"On Counterfactual Reasoning","authors":"C. Kühl","doi":"10.1163/24689300-bja10043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10043","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Counterfactual reasoning has always played a role in human life. We ask questions like, “Could it have been different?,” “Under which conditions might/would it have been different?,” and “What would have happened if … ?” If we do not find an answer, i.e., what we accept as an answer, we may start reasoning. Reasoning means introducing new information or assumptions, new questions, new answers to new questions, and so on. From a formal point of view, reasoning may be compared with moving stepwise toward a destination in a path system without ever achieving an overview of the system. Seen in this way, reasoning is an activity with its own rationale, which must be studied from the agent’s own perspective. This paper explores the following query: Which conditions are necessarily fulfilled when the act of posing a specific question, or of introducing a particular piece of information or assumption, etc., may count as a step toward the answer to the initial question?","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129641055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-20DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10042
A. Lever
The aim of this paper is to explore the claim that lotteries are more democratic than elections. The paper starts by looking at the two main forms of equality that give lotteries their democratic appeal: an individually equal chance to be selected for office, and the proportionate representation of groups in the legislature. It shows that they cannot be jointly realized and argues that their egalitarian appeal is more apparent than real. Finally, the paper considers the democratic reasons to value randomly selected assemblies, even if claims about their distinctively egalitarian properties are exaggerated.
{"title":"Democracy: Should We Replace Elections with Random Selection?","authors":"A. Lever","doi":"10.1163/24689300-bja10042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10042","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The aim of this paper is to explore the claim that lotteries are more democratic than elections. The paper starts by looking at the two main forms of equality that give lotteries their democratic appeal: an individually equal chance to be selected for office, and the proportionate representation of groups in the legislature. It shows that they cannot be jointly realized and argues that their egalitarian appeal is more apparent than real. Finally, the paper considers the democratic reasons to value randomly selected assemblies, even if claims about their distinctively egalitarian properties are exaggerated.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128569364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-16DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10040
Asger Sørensen
It is with great pleasure that we present volume 56 of the Danish Yearbook of Philosophy. This spring issue, vol. 56, no. 1 (2023), is a general issue containing four articles and four book reviews with no common theme. The autumn issue, vol. 56, no. 2 (2023), will be a special issue on applied philosophy following a call for articles within this field by our colleagues at the Centre for Applied Philosophy at Aalborg University, edited by Jacob Bo Lautrup Kristensen, with an introduction coauthored by Kristensen, Antje Gimmler, and Phillip Højme.1 “Applied Philosophy” was also the overall theme for the annual meeting of the Danish Philosophical Society in March 2021, which was organized and hosted by the aforementioned center but ultimately had to be held via Zoom due to yet another wave of the Covid-19 pandemic. The Danish philosophical community owes a lot to our colleagues in Aalborg for their persistent efforts to successfully hold the society’s traditional annual meeting despite all the difficulties during this period—difficulties that we will do well to remember, but which we hopefully nevertheless can consign to history. Despite the challenges, the Yearbook thus continues the format first presented in 2021,2 dedicating a special issue to the overall theme of the society’s annual meeting.3 The theme of the most recent annual meeting, held in March 2023, was “The Nature of Nature,” hosted by the Philosophy of Education research unit and the Danish Philosophy of Education Association at the Danish School of Education, Aarhus University. In continuation of the meeting, there is an open call for submissions for a special issue of the Yearbook on “The Nature of Nature,” edited by Sune Frølund and Jon Auring Grimm from the research unit. The call will remain open until autumn 2023. This meeting also hosted a parallel session on “The Nature of Reproduction and the Public Sphere,” resulting in a call for papers for another special issue of the Yearbook edited by Lucrecia Paz Burges Cruz, Tomeu Sales Gelabert, and
我们非常高兴地介绍《丹麦哲学年鉴》第56卷。今年春季刊，第56卷，第。1(2023)，是一个包含四篇文章和四篇书评没有共同主题的一般性问题。秋季刊，第56卷，第。第2期(2023)将是应用哲学的特刊，我们在奥尔堡大学应用哲学中心的同事们呼吁在这一领域发表文章，由Jacob Bo Lautrup Kristensen编辑，由Kristensen、Antje Gimmler和Phillip Højme.1共同撰写引言“应用哲学”也是由上述中心组织和主办的2021年3月丹麦哲学学会年会的总体主题，但由于新冠肺炎疫情的再次爆发，最终不得不通过Zoom举行。丹麦哲学界非常感谢我们在奥尔堡的同事们，他们坚持不懈的努力，尽管在这段时间里遇到了所有的困难，但还是成功地举办了这个学会的传统年会——我们会很好地记住这些困难，但我们希望这些困难能够成为历史。尽管面临诸多挑战，《年鉴》仍延续了2021年首次出版的形式，2专门为学会年会的总体主题出版了一期特刊最近一次年会的主题是“自然的本质”(The Nature of Nature)，由奥胡斯大学丹麦教育学院教育哲学研究组和丹麦教育哲学协会主办。作为会议的延续，我们公开征集关于“自然的本质”年鉴特刊的投稿，该年鉴由研究部门的Sune Frølund和Jon auuring Grimm编辑。征集将持续到2023年秋季。这次会议还举办了“再生产的本质和公共领域”的平行会议，结果是为Lucrecia Paz Burges Cruz, Tomeu Sales Gelabert和
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