Pub Date : 2018-12-12DOI: 10.1163/24689300-05101007
S. Frølund
The paper explores Gernot Böhme’s attempt to transform the concept of atmosphere into an aesthetical concept of the natural environment and follows his effort to outline a phenomenology of the weather based on this aesthetics. Böhme’s original project, prompted by a growing environmental concern, was to develop new forms of knowledge of nature to counter what he considered detrimental consequences of a one-sided rationalistic-scientific view of nature. Inspired by Hermann Schmitz’s phenomenology of the body and emotional atmospheres, Böhme developed his aesthetics to be a general theory of sensation and a phenomenology of the environment. His weather phenomenology is yet only a sketch, but, in light of imminent climatic changes, it might prove a sketch worth considering.
{"title":"Gernot Böhme’s Sketch for a Weather Phenomenology","authors":"S. Frølund","doi":"10.1163/24689300-05101007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-05101007","url":null,"abstract":"The paper explores Gernot Böhme’s attempt to transform the concept of atmosphere into an aesthetical concept of the natural environment and follows his effort to outline a phenomenology of the weather based on this aesthetics. Böhme’s original project, prompted by a growing environmental concern, was to develop new forms of knowledge of nature to counter what he considered detrimental consequences of a one-sided rationalistic-scientific view of nature. Inspired by Hermann Schmitz’s phenomenology of the body and emotional atmospheres, Böhme developed his aesthetics to be a general theory of sensation and a phenomenology of the environment. His weather phenomenology is yet only a sketch, but, in light of imminent climatic changes, it might prove a sketch worth considering.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128750922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-12DOI: 10.1163/24689300-05101003
Kresten Lundsgaard-Leth
This article looks into the phenomena of irony and hope as well as their relation. The article starts out with an analysis of Richard Rorty’s understanding of private irony and social hope. Here, I argue the case that Rortarian irony is not primarily a matter of epistemic skepticism but instead an existential stance meant to deal appropriately with the idiosyncratic nature of one’s private projects. Moving on, the article focuses on Jonathan Lear’s depiction of two peculiar instances of two phenomena: radical hope and ironic disruption. Whereas radical hope is the experience of hope in a crisis situation where all meaning—and thus every reason to act—has been lost, the experience of ironic disruption accentuates the constitutive instability and openness of the practical identities we inhabit. Insofar as Rorty cannot account for these phenomena, Lear’s analyses present a serious challenge to Rorty’s neo-pragmatic philosophy.
{"title":"Hope and Irony","authors":"Kresten Lundsgaard-Leth","doi":"10.1163/24689300-05101003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-05101003","url":null,"abstract":"This article looks into the phenomena of irony and hope as well as their relation. The article starts out with an analysis of Richard Rorty’s understanding of private irony and social hope. Here, I argue the case that Rortarian irony is not primarily a matter of epistemic skepticism but instead an existential stance meant to deal appropriately with the idiosyncratic nature of one’s private projects. Moving on, the article focuses on Jonathan Lear’s depiction of two peculiar instances of two phenomena: radical hope and ironic disruption. Whereas radical hope is the experience of hope in a crisis situation where all meaning—and thus every reason to act—has been lost, the experience of ironic disruption accentuates the constitutive instability and openness of the practical identities we inhabit. Insofar as Rorty cannot account for these phenomena, Lear’s analyses present a serious challenge to Rorty’s neo-pragmatic philosophy.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"185-186 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116011106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-12DOI: 10.1163/24689300-05101002
S. Larsen
Ontology and epistemology will never be reconciled, this article argues. There is widespread opinion among scientists and laymen alike that we are standing at the threshold of a fusion and reconciliation of ontology (being, what the world is) and epistemology (acknowledgement theory, how the world is). But my thesis is that this will never happen – and my argument can be read as a credo for non-identity. The tensions between being and thinking are here to stay, and this philosophical ‘position’ has a wide range of implications for politics, education, Bildung and thinking. Strongly rooted in Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno’s philosophy, it is claimed that he was right in emphasizing that the non-identical must be honored, defended and emancipated. The vivid dream is that conceptual work opens and ‘dignifies’ the non-identical, while the non-identical ‘longs for’ conceptual assistance so it can come to exist among us.
{"title":"A Critical Essay on the Exercise of Critique","authors":"S. Larsen","doi":"10.1163/24689300-05101002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-05101002","url":null,"abstract":"Ontology and epistemology will never be reconciled, this article argues. There is widespread opinion among scientists and laymen alike that we are standing at the threshold of a fusion and reconciliation of ontology (being, what the world is) and epistemology (acknowledgement theory, how the world is). But my thesis is that this will never happen – and my argument can be read as a credo for non-identity. The tensions between being and thinking are here to stay, and this philosophical ‘position’ has a wide range of implications for politics, education, Bildung and thinking. Strongly rooted in Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno’s philosophy, it is claimed that he was right in emphasizing that the non-identical must be honored, defended and emancipated. The vivid dream is that conceptual work opens and ‘dignifies’ the non-identical, while the non-identical ‘longs for’ conceptual assistance so it can come to exist among us.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134145239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-12DOI: 10.1163/24689300-05101006
P. Standish
Is there something that lies beneath the surface of our ordinary ways of speaking? Philosophy sometimes encourages the all-too-human thought that reality lies just outside our ordinary grasp, hidden beneath the surface of our experience and language. The present discussion concentrates initially on a few connected paragraphs of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (particularly ##431–435). Wittgenstein leads the reader to the view that meaning is there in the surface of the expression. Yet how adequate is Wittgenstein’s treatment of the sounds and ink-marks, the materiality of the sign? With some reference to Emerson, Stanley Cavell, and Jacques Derrida, my discussion explores how far a more adequate account of the sign can coincide with the claim that nothing is hidden. It exposes phony obsessions with transparency, which in a culture of accountability have had a distorting effect on education and the wider social field. It endorses confidence in the reality of ordinary words.
{"title":"“Nothing but Sounds, Ink-Marks”—Is Nothing Hidden? Must Everything Be Transparent?","authors":"P. Standish","doi":"10.1163/24689300-05101006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-05101006","url":null,"abstract":"Is there something that lies beneath the surface of our ordinary ways of speaking? Philosophy sometimes encourages the all-too-human thought that reality lies just outside our ordinary grasp, hidden beneath the surface of our experience and language. The present discussion concentrates initially on a few connected paragraphs of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (particularly ##431–435). Wittgenstein leads the reader to the view that meaning is there in the surface of the expression. Yet how adequate is Wittgenstein’s treatment of the sounds and ink-marks, the materiality of the sign? With some reference to Emerson, Stanley Cavell, and Jacques Derrida, my discussion explores how far a more adequate account of the sign can coincide with the claim that nothing is hidden. It exposes phony obsessions with transparency, which in a culture of accountability have had a distorting effect on education and the wider social field. It endorses confidence in the reality of ordinary words.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"19 23","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131505726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-09DOI: 10.1163/24689300-05101004
J. A. Steenbuch
In patristic ethics there are many differing formulations of the Golden Rule (“do unto others…”), the greatest difference being perhaps that between the negative and the positive version. The Golden Rule was typically considered a matter of natural law, but it is rarely considered the exclusive principle to be applied in practice. Often it was considered an instrument for recognizing generally true principles, such as those of the second table of the Decalogue, or, in Augustine, to direct attention to a “law of the heart.” While Chrysostom saw it solely as a regulative principle for horizontal relationships between human beings, Augustine believed it to regulate the believer’s relationship with God as well. The rule was not, in patristic ethics, an abstract philosophical principle, but something that structured not only particular actions or types of actions, but practices in a more contextual sense. For these reasons the Golden Rule should, in patristic ethics, always be understood against the background of a broader context of values. Though the Golden Rule may seem to express a universal ethics, its meanings and functions depend on the larger moral-philosophical framework.
{"title":"How “Trivial” is the Golden Rule in Patristic Ethics?","authors":"J. A. Steenbuch","doi":"10.1163/24689300-05101004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-05101004","url":null,"abstract":"In patristic ethics there are many differing formulations of the Golden Rule (“do unto others…”), the greatest difference being perhaps that between the negative and the positive version. The Golden Rule was typically considered a matter of natural law, but it is rarely considered the exclusive principle to be applied in practice. Often it was considered an instrument for recognizing generally true principles, such as those of the second table of the Decalogue, or, in Augustine, to direct attention to a “law of the heart.” While Chrysostom saw it solely as a regulative principle for horizontal relationships between human beings, Augustine believed it to regulate the believer’s relationship with God as well. The rule was not, in patristic ethics, an abstract philosophical principle, but something that structured not only particular actions or types of actions, but practices in a more contextual sense. For these reasons the Golden Rule should, in patristic ethics, always be understood against the background of a broader context of values. Though the Golden Rule may seem to express a universal ethics, its meanings and functions depend on the larger moral-philosophical framework.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116512156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：