Pub Date : 2022-02-21DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10028
Peter Wolsing
This paper examines Hegel’s idea of nation and its significance for his theory of the modern state, namely, the role that ‘the national’ plays for his justification of right in the Philosophy of Right. It is argued that Hegel strikes a balance between historicism and a rational justification of state and law. He bases the state on a notion of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) that is both national and subjected to a world historical development toward rationality and universal right. Consequently, ‘nation,’ in the sense of a group of people invoking identity and rights based on a primordial common language, culture, and territory, does not cover what Hegel means by the modern nation state. ‘Ethical life’ is national, but it also constitutes a historically changeable community of values supported by citizens’ conscious participation in communal life (patriotism). Today, Hegel’s idea undermines the legitimacy of nationalistic invocations of primordial ethnic cultures within politics.
{"title":"Hegel on Nation, Ethical Life, and the Modern State","authors":"Peter Wolsing","doi":"10.1163/24689300-bja10028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10028","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper examines Hegel’s idea of nation and its significance for his theory of the modern state, namely, the role that ‘the national’ plays for his justification of right in the Philosophy of Right. It is argued that Hegel strikes a balance between historicism and a rational justification of state and law. He bases the state on a notion of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) that is both national and subjected to a world historical development toward rationality and universal right. Consequently, ‘nation,’ in the sense of a group of people invoking identity and rights based on a primordial common language, culture, and territory, does not cover what Hegel means by the modern nation state. ‘Ethical life’ is national, but it also constitutes a historically changeable community of values supported by citizens’ conscious participation in communal life (patriotism). Today, Hegel’s idea undermines the legitimacy of nationalistic invocations of primordial ethnic cultures within politics.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124318335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-28DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10026
Nora Hämäläinen
{"title":"Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen, Moral Philosophy and Moral Life","authors":"Nora Hämäläinen","doi":"10.1163/24689300-bja10026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10026","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128903038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-17DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10025
L. Bortolotti, Kathleen Murphy-Hollies
Exceptionalism is the view that one group is better than other groups and, by virtue of its alleged superiority, is not subject to the same constraints. Here we identify national exceptionalism in the responses made by political leaders in the United States and the United Kingdom to the covid-19 pandemic in early 2020. First, we observe that responses appealed to national values and national character and were marked by a denial of the severity of the situation. Second, we suggest an analogy between national exceptionalism and unrealistic optimism, i.e., people’s tendency to make rosier predictions about their future than is warranted by the evidence due to illusions of superiority and control. Finally, we argue that, at the national level, exceptionalism gave rise to an assumption of invulnerability that made for slow responses to the pandemic, and at the individual level, it served as a justification of people’s failures to adopt safety behaviors.
{"title":"Exceptionalism at the Time of covid-19: Where Nationalism Meets Irrationality","authors":"L. Bortolotti, Kathleen Murphy-Hollies","doi":"10.1163/24689300-bja10025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10025","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Exceptionalism is the view that one group is better than other groups and, by virtue of its alleged superiority, is not subject to the same constraints. Here we identify national exceptionalism in the responses made by political leaders in the United States and the United Kingdom to the covid-19 pandemic in early 2020. First, we observe that responses appealed to national values and national character and were marked by a denial of the severity of the situation. Second, we suggest an analogy between national exceptionalism and unrealistic optimism, i.e., people’s tendency to make rosier predictions about their future than is warranted by the evidence due to illusions of superiority and control. Finally, we argue that, at the national level, exceptionalism gave rise to an assumption of invulnerability that made for slow responses to the pandemic, and at the individual level, it served as a justification of people’s failures to adopt safety behaviors.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116262679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-29DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10022
Sarah Pawlett-Jackson
In this paper I analyze Alessandro Salice and Joona Taipale’s account of ‘group-directed empathy.’ I am highly sympathetic to Salice and Taipale’s account and intend this paper to be an endorsement of their project. However, I will argue that a more fine-grained account of group-directed empathy can be offered, and I seek to contribute to this discussion by outlining at least one way in which different types of group-directed empathy may be identified. I argue that while Salice and Taipale are right to claim that an account of group-directed empathy requires a corresponding account of ‘collective bodiliness,’ there is an important form of collective bodiliness that their account does not fully incorporate, namely embodied interaction between others. I argue that a closer look at the perceivability of interactions between others offers a richer and more complete account of how we can empathetically perceive shared emotions between groups of people.
{"title":"Bodies-in-Relation: Fine-Tuning Group-Directed Empathy","authors":"Sarah Pawlett-Jackson","doi":"10.1163/24689300-bja10022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10022","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In this paper I analyze Alessandro Salice and Joona Taipale’s account of ‘group-directed empathy.’ I am highly sympathetic to Salice and Taipale’s account and intend this paper to be an endorsement of their project. However, I will argue that a more fine-grained account of group-directed empathy can be offered, and I seek to contribute to this discussion by outlining at least one way in which different types of group-directed empathy may be identified. I argue that while Salice and Taipale are right to claim that an account of group-directed empathy requires a corresponding account of ‘collective bodiliness,’ there is an important form of collective bodiliness that their account does not fully incorporate, namely embodied interaction between others. I argue that a closer look at the perceivability of interactions between others offers a richer and more complete account of how we can empathetically perceive shared emotions between groups of people.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"93 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126205858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-29DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10018
Liselotte Hedegaard
This article positions place within a phenomenological framework. Current philosophical inquiry shows little interest in place, yet academic disciplines concerned with spatial properties look to philosophy—and in particular phenomenology—to provide important contributions to overcome the limitations of quantitative methodologies, particularly with respect to sentiments of attachment to and identification with places. Seemingly, however, philosophy offers little support in this field. Place disappears from philosophical investigations during the Middle Ages and is replaced by considerations on space. Keeping the employment of phenomenological approaches in other academic disciplines in mind, this article sets out to explore traces of a re-emerging interest in place among twentieth-century phenomenologists. It proposes a phenomenological approach to place in which there is a shift from regarding place in terms of a where to understanding what a place is in human experience.
{"title":"Place Matters","authors":"Liselotte Hedegaard","doi":"10.1163/24689300-bja10018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This article positions place within a phenomenological framework. Current philosophical inquiry shows little interest in place, yet academic disciplines concerned with spatial properties look to philosophy—and in particular phenomenology—to provide important contributions to overcome the limitations of quantitative methodologies, particularly with respect to sentiments of attachment to and identification with places. Seemingly, however, philosophy offers little support in this field. Place disappears from philosophical investigations during the Middle Ages and is replaced by considerations on space. Keeping the employment of phenomenological approaches in other academic disciplines in mind, this article sets out to explore traces of a re-emerging interest in place among twentieth-century phenomenologists. It proposes a phenomenological approach to place in which there is a shift from regarding place in terms of a where to understanding what a place is in human experience.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133991535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-29DOI: 10.1163/24689300-54010002
Con Tents, Sergio Cremaschi, Rasmus Dyring, Andreas Melson Gregersen, Søren Riis, Carl Erik Kühl, Carl Erik Kühl
The problem of truthmakers for negative propositions was introduced by Bertrand Russell in 1918. Since then the debate has mostly been concerned with whether to accept or reject their existence, and little has been said about what it is that makes a negative proposition negative. This is a problem as it is obvious that you cannot just read it off from the grammar of a sentence. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that propositions may be negative or positive in many ways: it offers a typology, and shows how the question of the existence of negative facts will receive a different answer depending on its relationship to that typology.
{"title":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","authors":"Con Tents, Sergio Cremaschi, Rasmus Dyring, Andreas Melson Gregersen, Søren Riis, Carl Erik Kühl, Carl Erik Kühl","doi":"10.1163/24689300-54010002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-54010002","url":null,"abstract":"The problem of truthmakers for negative propositions was introduced by Bertrand Russell in 1918. Since then the debate has mostly been concerned with whether to accept or reject their existence, and little has been said about what it is that makes a negative proposition negative. This is a problem as it is obvious that you cannot just read it off from the grammar of a sentence. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that propositions may be negative or positive in many ways: it offers a typology, and shows how the question of the existence of negative facts will receive a different answer depending on its relationship to that typology.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"126 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130249846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-29DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10023
P. Hertel-Storm
On February 28, 2019, the doors opened for the 20th Anniversary Annual Meeting of the Danish Philosophical Society. As is customary, this meeting was a national conference with invited keynote speakers and other international guests and participants. This meeting was noteworthy for at least two reasons other than the anniversary itself. First, it was held in the relatively academically insignificant Danish city of Vejle. Second, it was hosted by an innovation and entrepreneurship education department at a university college of applied science, and not, according to custom, by a philosophy department at a major Danish university. The three keynote speakers, Dan Zahavi from the University of Copenhagen, Achim Stephan from the University of Osnabrück, and Helena De Preester from Ghent University, have all contributed to this volume. In fact, it was during the conference itself that Asger Sørensen, the chairman of the Danish Philosophical Society, and I decided to propose devoting an issue of the Danish Yearbook of Philosophy to the same theme explored in the conference: “Subjectivity in the Individual and the Group.” “Emotion” was added later, as we were preparing the call for papers, because I wanted to indicate a focus that had clearly been emerging at the conference itself. The question of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and sociality was largely discussed with reference to emotionality in general, and social or shared emotions in particular. When I wrote these pages, I was eager to include a list of people who should be mentioned, people toward whom I feel gratitude for helping to make the
2019年2月28日，丹麦哲学学会20周年年会开幕。按照惯例，这次会议是一次全国会议，邀请了主旨发言人和其他国际嘉宾和与会者。除了周年纪念本身，这次会议至少有两个原因值得注意。首先，它是在学术上相对不起眼的丹麦城市维耶勒举行的。其次，它是由一所大学应用科学学院的创新与创业教育部门主办的，而不是按照惯例，由丹麦一所主要大学的哲学系主办。三位主讲人，哥本哈根大学的Dan Zahavi、奥斯纳布尔克大学的Achim Stephan和根特大学的Helena De Preester，都为这本书做出了贡献。事实上，正是在会议期间，丹麦哲学学会主席Asger Sørensen和我决定将《丹麦哲学年鉴》的一期专门用于讨论会议上探讨的同一个主题:“个人和群体中的主体性”。后来，当我们准备征集论文时，我又加上了“情感”一词，因为我想指出会议本身已经明确出现的一个重点。主体性、主体间性和社会性的问题在很大程度上是根据一般的情感，特别是社会或共享的情感来讨论的。当我写这几页的时候，我渴望列出一个应该被提及的人的名单，我对他们的帮助感到感激
{"title":"Introduction. Subjectivity and Emotion in the Individual and the Group","authors":"P. Hertel-Storm","doi":"10.1163/24689300-bja10023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10023","url":null,"abstract":"On February 28, 2019, the doors opened for the 20th Anniversary Annual Meeting of the Danish Philosophical Society. As is customary, this meeting was a national conference with invited keynote speakers and other international guests and participants. This meeting was noteworthy for at least two reasons other than the anniversary itself. First, it was held in the relatively academically insignificant Danish city of Vejle. Second, it was hosted by an innovation and entrepreneurship education department at a university college of applied science, and not, according to custom, by a philosophy department at a major Danish university. The three keynote speakers, Dan Zahavi from the University of Copenhagen, Achim Stephan from the University of Osnabrück, and Helena De Preester from Ghent University, have all contributed to this volume. In fact, it was during the conference itself that Asger Sørensen, the chairman of the Danish Philosophical Society, and I decided to propose devoting an issue of the Danish Yearbook of Philosophy to the same theme explored in the conference: “Subjectivity in the Individual and the Group.” “Emotion” was added later, as we were preparing the call for papers, because I wanted to indicate a focus that had clearly been emerging at the conference itself. The question of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and sociality was largely discussed with reference to emotionality in general, and social or shared emotions in particular. When I wrote these pages, I was eager to include a list of people who should be mentioned, people toward whom I feel gratitude for helping to make the","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133375951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-05DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10021
Helena De Preester, John Dorsch
On the basis of Descartes’s account of the passions of the soul, we argue that current interoception-based theories of emotions cannot account for the hallmark of a passion of the soul, i.e., that its effects are felt as being in the soul itself. We also pay attention to the epistemic functions of the passions and to Descartes’s category of emotions that are caused and occur in the soul alone. Certain passions of the soul and certain internal (or intellectual) emotions are similar to what are today called ‘epistemic (or noetic) feelings’ and ‘epistemic emotions.’ Descartes’s work reflects another challenge for contemporary embodied cognition: how might epistemic affect be embodied? Since the signature of embodiment is increasingly understood as interoceptive, the challenge to interoceptive research is demonstrating the degree to which (epistemic) affect results from interoception. This challenge also implies that the locus of emotional experience is taken into account.
{"title":"Descartes on the Passions of the Soul and Internal Emotions: Two Challenges for Interoception Research in Emotions","authors":"Helena De Preester, John Dorsch","doi":"10.1163/24689300-bja10021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000On the basis of Descartes’s account of the passions of the soul, we argue that current interoception-based theories of emotions cannot account for the hallmark of a passion of the soul, i.e., that its effects are felt as being in the soul itself. We also pay attention to the epistemic functions of the passions and to Descartes’s category of emotions that are caused and occur in the soul alone. Certain passions of the soul and certain internal (or intellectual) emotions are similar to what are today called ‘epistemic (or noetic) feelings’ and ‘epistemic emotions.’ Descartes’s work reflects another challenge for contemporary embodied cognition: how might epistemic affect be embodied? Since the signature of embodiment is increasingly understood as interoceptive, the challenge to interoceptive research is demonstrating the degree to which (epistemic) affect results from interoception. This challenge also implies that the locus of emotional experience is taken into account.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127689016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-22DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10019
S. Coninx, A. Stephan
In this paper, we argue that the concept of environmental scaffolding can contribute to a better understanding of our affective life and the complex manners in which it is shaped by environmental entities. In particular, the concept of environmental scaffolding offers a more comprehensive and less controversial framework than the notions of embeddedness and extendedness. We contribute to the literature on situated affectivity by embracing and systematizing the diversity of affective scaffolding. In doing so, we introduce several distinctions that provide classifications of different types of environmentally scaffolded affectivity. Furthermore, we differentiate eight dimensions (e.g., trust, individualization, or intent) that allow us to evaluate the quality and effectivity of scaffolds in particular applications. On that basis, we develop a taxonomy using paradigmatic examples of affective scaffolding. This taxonomy enriches the current debate by emphasizing distinctions that are often conflated and by identifying fields of application that are commonly overlooked.
{"title":"A Taxonomy of Environmentally Scaffolded Affectivity","authors":"S. Coninx, A. Stephan","doi":"10.1163/24689300-bja10019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10019","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In this paper, we argue that the concept of environmental scaffolding can contribute to a better understanding of our affective life and the complex manners in which it is shaped by environmental entities. In particular, the concept of environmental scaffolding offers a more comprehensive and less controversial framework than the notions of embeddedness and extendedness. We contribute to the literature on situated affectivity by embracing and systematizing the diversity of affective scaffolding. In doing so, we introduce several distinctions that provide classifications of different types of environmentally scaffolded affectivity. Furthermore, we differentiate eight dimensions (e.g., trust, individualization, or intent) that allow us to evaluate the quality and effectivity of scaffolds in particular applications. On that basis, we develop a taxonomy using paradigmatic examples of affective scaffolding. This taxonomy enriches the current debate by emphasizing distinctions that are often conflated and by identifying fields of application that are commonly overlooked.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114234047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-12DOI: 10.1163/24689300-BJA10004
G. Thonhauser
According to individualism about feelings, only individuals can experience feelings, because only individuals live under the condition of embodiment. Assuming a necessary link between emotions and feelings thus seems to justify doubt about the possibility of shared emotions. I challenge this line of argumentation by showing that feelings are best understood as enactments of a feeling body, which is a psycho-physically neutral expressive unity. Based on the body’s embeddedness into a world and connectedness with others, feelings are perceivable and shareable. Accordingly, dynamics of mutual incorporation and interaffectivity are shown to be the ground for shared feelings.
{"title":"Shared Emotions and the Body","authors":"G. Thonhauser","doi":"10.1163/24689300-BJA10004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-BJA10004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000According to individualism about feelings, only individuals can experience feelings, because only individuals live under the condition of embodiment. Assuming a necessary link between emotions and feelings thus seems to justify doubt about the possibility of shared emotions. I challenge this line of argumentation by showing that feelings are best understood as enactments of a feeling body, which is a psycho-physically neutral expressive unity. Based on the body’s embeddedness into a world and connectedness with others, feelings are perceivable and shareable. Accordingly, dynamics of mutual incorporation and interaffectivity are shown to be the ground for shared feelings.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126076956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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