Pub Date : 2020-11-26DOI: 10.1163/24689300-05301003
B. Hansen, Mads Peter Karlsen, R. Rosfort
This paper presents an introduction to Arne Grøn’s existential hermeneutics as a philosophical method, while also attempting to indicate how Grøn’s work contributes to and engages in a number of crucial topics in modern continental philosophy. The first section of the paper shows how Grøn draws on Paul Ricoeur and Michael Theunissen to rethink the concept of existence through a reading of Kierkegaard that uncouples this concept from the self-evident status it attained in twenty-century existentialism. The second section of the paper argues that Grøn proposes an existential ethics that takes the Kierkegaardian notion that humans are inherently normative beings and uses this as a basis for a critique of ethics, as well as for establishing an ethics of vision inspired by Kierkegaard. The third section of the paper presents a reading of Grøn’s notion of religion as an inextricable part of human existence.
{"title":"Arne Grøn’s Existential Hermeneutics: Existence, Ethics and Religion","authors":"B. Hansen, Mads Peter Karlsen, R. Rosfort","doi":"10.1163/24689300-05301003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-05301003","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents an introduction to Arne Grøn’s existential hermeneutics as a philosophical method, while also attempting to indicate how Grøn’s work contributes to and engages in a number of crucial topics in modern continental philosophy. The first section of the paper shows how Grøn draws on Paul Ricoeur and Michael Theunissen to rethink the concept of existence through a reading of Kierkegaard that uncouples this concept from the self-evident status it attained in twenty-century existentialism. The second section of the paper argues that Grøn proposes an existential ethics that takes the Kierkegaardian notion that humans are inherently normative beings and uses this as a basis for a critique of ethics, as well as for establishing an ethics of vision inspired by Kierkegaard. The third section of the paper presents a reading of Grøn’s notion of religion as an inextricable part of human existence.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"118 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122807272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-26DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10006
Jørgen Huggler
Berkeley’s criticism of Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities is a challenge to epistemologists. Do we experience a mind-independent reality, even though we do it with the help of senses bound to give us subjective experiences? Berkeley – or a straw man by that name (i.e. Berkeley without God) – played an important part as sparring partner for an influential development of Danish theoretical philosophy in the second half of the 20th century. The protagonists here are Peter Zinkernagel (1921–2003) and David Favrholdt (1931–2012). Zinkernagel held an extraordinary appointment as research fellow at the University of Copenhagen. Favrholdt was the founding father of the Philosophical Institute at Odense University (today: University of Southern Denmark). This essay focuses on the constructive moments in Zinkernagel’s alternative to immaterialism, being based on a distinction between perception and action, and on Favrholdt’s development of a reconstruction of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
{"title":"Peter Zinkernagel and David Favrholdt: A Response to George Berkeley in Twentieth-Century Danish Philosophy","authors":"Jørgen Huggler","doi":"10.1163/24689300-bja10006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Berkeley’s criticism of Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities is a challenge to epistemologists. Do we experience a mind-independent reality, even though we do it with the help of senses bound to give us subjective experiences? Berkeley – or a straw man by that name (i.e. Berkeley without God) – played an important part as sparring partner for an influential development of Danish theoretical philosophy in the second half of the 20th century. The protagonists here are Peter Zinkernagel (1921–2003) and David Favrholdt (1931–2012). Zinkernagel held an extraordinary appointment as research fellow at the University of Copenhagen. Favrholdt was the founding father of the Philosophical Institute at Odense University (today: University of Southern Denmark). This essay focuses on the constructive moments in Zinkernagel’s alternative to immaterialism, being based on a distinction between perception and action, and on Favrholdt’s development of a reconstruction of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.\u0000","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129309582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-26DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10011
N. Holtug, K. Lippert‐Rasmussen, J. Ryberg, P. Sandøe
The aim of this paper is to present some important contributions to ethics, value theory and political philosophy the former members of the Bioethics Research Group have made. The group was established at the University of Copenhagen in 1992 and was formally dissolved in 1997, but the members continued to work in ethics and political philosophy and set up research groups and centres at four Danish universities. Within four research themes, contributions made over the years are described. Research outputs of the group have, in various ways, served to bring studies of ethics and political philosophy originating in Denmark into the wider international research arena. Members of the group have increasingly included empirical approaches in their research and have thereby participated in the more general “empirical turn” in analytic philosophy. Some members of the group can also be said to have participated in a “pluralist turn”.
{"title":"Bioethics Research Group and Beyond: Three Decades of Studies in Ethics and Political Philosophy","authors":"N. Holtug, K. Lippert‐Rasmussen, J. Ryberg, P. Sandøe","doi":"10.1163/24689300-bja10011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The aim of this paper is to present some important contributions to ethics, value theory and political philosophy the former members of the Bioethics Research Group have made. The group was established at the University of Copenhagen in 1992 and was formally dissolved in 1997, but the members continued to work in ethics and political philosophy and set up research groups and centres at four Danish universities. Within four research themes, contributions made over the years are described. Research outputs of the group have, in various ways, served to bring studies of ethics and political philosophy originating in Denmark into the wider international research arena. Members of the group have increasingly included empirical approaches in their research and have thereby participated in the more general “empirical turn” in analytic philosophy. Some members of the group can also be said to have participated in a “pluralist turn”.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124918625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-26DOI: 10.1163/24689300-05301004
Martin Ejsing Christensen, T. Bohl
This paper examines the way in which Ordinary Language Philosophy came to exert an important influence on the work done at Aarhus University’s department of philosophy in the latter half of the 20th century. The first section depicts the rise of Ordinary Language Philosophy as an international movement centered around Oxford in the wake of World War ii. The second section goes on to describe how it was brought to Aarhus by Professor Justus Hartnack, who had been deeply influenced by the movement during stays abroad in the UK and the US. The following three sections move on to describe some of the important ways in which Ordinary Language Philosophy has influenced the work of three of Hartnack’s most prominent students (Hans Fink, Uffe Juul Jensen and Jørgen Husted), who have influenced the life of the department in crucial ways from the 1970s until recently. Finally, the paper ends by briefly assessing the legacy and contemporary influence of Ordinary Language Philosophy in Aarhus.
{"title":"Ordinary Language Philosophy in Aarhus","authors":"Martin Ejsing Christensen, T. Bohl","doi":"10.1163/24689300-05301004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-05301004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This paper examines the way in which Ordinary Language Philosophy came to exert an important influence on the work done at Aarhus University’s department of philosophy in the latter half of the 20th century. The first section depicts the rise of Ordinary Language Philosophy as an international movement centered around Oxford in the wake of World War ii. The second section goes on to describe how it was brought to Aarhus by Professor Justus Hartnack, who had been deeply influenced by the movement during stays abroad in the UK and the US. The following three sections move on to describe some of the important ways in which Ordinary Language Philosophy has influenced the work of three of Hartnack’s most prominent students (Hans Fink, Uffe Juul Jensen and Jørgen Husted), who have influenced the life of the department in crucial ways from the 1970s until recently. Finally, the paper ends by briefly assessing the legacy and contemporary influence of Ordinary Language Philosophy in Aarhus.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123858486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-26DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10002
C. Koch
Between the two World Wars, Jørgen Jørgensen was a central figure in Danish philosophy and internationally recognized, as his teacher Harald Høffding had been before World War 1. When in the late 1920s Jørgensen established contact with the movement that would later be called logical positivism, he found a group of philosophers of his own age who advocated empiricism, the tools of formal logic and the Unity of Science, and who shared his anti-metaphysical approach to philosophy. He became one of the movement’s organizers and wrote its history, but he was only for a short period influenced by especially Rudolf Carnap’s philosophy of logic. Although Jørgensen was never an uncritical member of the movement, he is often considered as a central representative of logical positivism in Scandinavia.
{"title":"Jørgen Jørgensen’s Relation to Logical Positivism","authors":"C. Koch","doi":"10.1163/24689300-bja10002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10002","url":null,"abstract":"Between the two World Wars, Jørgen Jørgensen was a central figure in Danish philosophy and internationally recognized, as his teacher Harald Høffding had been before World War 1. When in the late 1920s Jørgensen established contact with the movement that would later be called logical positivism, he found a group of philosophers of his own age who advocated empiricism, the tools of formal logic and the Unity of Science, and who shared his anti-metaphysical approach to philosophy. He became one of the movement’s organizers and wrote its history, but he was only for a short period influenced by especially Rudolf Carnap’s philosophy of logic. Although Jørgensen was never an uncritical member of the movement, he is often considered as a central representative of logical positivism in Scandinavia.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127791698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-26DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10009
M. G. Henriksen, Felipe León, D. Zahavi
In this article, we describe the history and impact of the Center for Subjectivity Research (cfs) since its inception in 2002 and until 2020. From its very beginning, cfs was structured to facilitate and carry out interdisciplinary research on human subjectivity, taking phenomenology as an important source of inspiration. We cover some of the most important research areas in which cfs has had a national and international impact. These include developing the field of existential hermeneutics, opening a dialogue between phenomenology and analytic philosophy, creating a multi-dimensional account of the self, exploring the interrelations between I, you and we, and conceptualizing and assessing self-disorders in schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Over the years, research at cfs has demonstrated the vitality of the phenomenological tradition, and shown how phenomenology can contribute to contemporary theoretical and scientific debates.
{"title":"Center for Subjectivity Research: History, Contribution and Impact","authors":"M. G. Henriksen, Felipe León, D. Zahavi","doi":"10.1163/24689300-bja10009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In this article, we describe the history and impact of the Center for Subjectivity Research (cfs) since its inception in 2002 and until 2020. From its very beginning, cfs was structured to facilitate and carry out interdisciplinary research on human subjectivity, taking phenomenology as an important source of inspiration. We cover some of the most important research areas in which cfs has had a national and international impact. These include developing the field of existential hermeneutics, opening a dialogue between phenomenology and analytic philosophy, creating a multi-dimensional account of the self, exploring the interrelations between I, you and we, and conceptualizing and assessing self-disorders in schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Over the years, research at cfs has demonstrated the vitality of the phenomenological tradition, and shown how phenomenology can contribute to contemporary theoretical and scientific debates.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123324090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-08DOI: 10.1163/24689300-bja10005
M. Jacobsen
This paper is a contribution to the conceptual history of subjective rights. The subjective right is generally understood as an individual right in contradistinction to the system of legal rules, which are named the ‘objective right.’ These notions have enjoyed immense popularity among Continental legal scholars and historians. This article gives an explanation of how the terms “subjective” and “objective” right came into usage in Germany, and it shows how these terms were elaborated within a metaphysical context. This paper suggests that the origin of this terminology is to be found in the philosophy of Christian Wolff and in particular in that of one of his pupils, Joachim Georg Darjes. The notion of a subjective right thus has its origin in an intellectualistic and perfectionist philosophy, where rights in a primary sense are at the same time conceived as duties.
{"title":"Pursuing “the Subjective” in “Subjective Rights”","authors":"M. Jacobsen","doi":"10.1163/24689300-bja10005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10005","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is a contribution to the conceptual history of subjective rights. The subjective right is generally understood as an individual right in contradistinction to the system of legal rules, which are named the ‘objective right.’ These notions have enjoyed immense popularity among Continental legal scholars and historians. This article gives an explanation of how the terms “subjective” and “objective” right came into usage in Germany, and it shows how these terms were elaborated within a metaphysical context. This paper suggests that the origin of this terminology is to be found in the philosophy of Christian Wolff and in particular in that of one of his pupils, Joachim Georg Darjes. The notion of a subjective right thus has its origin in an intellectualistic and perfectionist philosophy, where rights in a primary sense are at the same time conceived as duties.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115427787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-09DOI: 10.1163/24689300-05201008
U. Renz
In the past few years, the philosophical debate about self-knowledge has presented itself in a strikingly ‘pre-Kantian’ fashion. Some claimed that all sorts of self-knowledge can be analyzed in the manner of the empiricists, or in terms of cognitive psychology (to use a more contemporary label), whereas defenders of rationalism have not grown tired of voicing the claim that there must be some sort of self-knowledge present and underlying, as it were, all sorts of epistemic self-concern. It is against this background that this paper advocates what I would call a ‘Kantian’ strategy to approach the problem of self-knowledge. Taking Kant as a model, it argues, we may come to see how the current divide between empiricism and rationalism may be overcome in philosophical theorizing about self-knowledge.
{"title":"Self-Knowledge: A Kantian Strategy","authors":"U. Renz","doi":"10.1163/24689300-05201008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-05201008","url":null,"abstract":"In the past few years, the philosophical debate about self-knowledge has presented itself in a strikingly ‘pre-Kantian’ fashion. Some claimed that all sorts of self-knowledge can be analyzed in the manner of the empiricists, or in terms of cognitive psychology (to use a more contemporary label), whereas defenders of rationalism have not grown tired of voicing the claim that there must be some sort of self-knowledge present and underlying, as it were, all sorts of epistemic self-concern. It is against this background that this paper advocates what I would call a ‘Kantian’ strategy to approach the problem of self-knowledge. Taking Kant as a model, it argues, we may come to see how the current divide between empiricism and rationalism may be overcome in philosophical theorizing about self-knowledge.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"111 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122988503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-07DOI: 10.1163/24689300-05201001
T. S. Goetze
Current disputes over the nature and purpose of the university are rooted in a philosophical divide between theory and practice. Academics often defend the concept of a university devoted to purely theoretical activities. Politicians and wider society tend to argue that the university should take on more practical concerns. I critique two typical defenses of the theoretical concept—one historical and one based on the value of pure research—and show that neither the theoretical nor the practical concept of a university accommodates all the important goals expected of university research and teaching. Using the classical pragmatist argument against a sharp division between theory and practice, I show how we can move beyond the debate between the theoretical and practical concepts of a university, while maintaining a place for pure and applied research, liberal and vocational education, and social impact through both economic applications and criticism aimed at promoting social justice.
{"title":"The Concept of a University: Theory, Practice, and Society","authors":"T. S. Goetze","doi":"10.1163/24689300-05201001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-05201001","url":null,"abstract":"Current disputes over the nature and purpose of the university are rooted in a philosophical divide between theory and practice. Academics often defend the concept of a university devoted to purely theoretical activities. Politicians and wider society tend to argue that the university should take on more practical concerns. I critique two typical defenses of the theoretical concept—one historical and one based on the value of pure research—and show that neither the theoretical nor the practical concept of a university accommodates all the important goals expected of university research and teaching. Using the classical pragmatist argument against a sharp division between theory and practice, I show how we can move beyond the debate between the theoretical and practical concepts of a university, while maintaining a place for pure and applied research, liberal and vocational education, and social impact through both economic applications and criticism aimed at promoting social justice.","PeriodicalId":202424,"journal":{"name":"Danish Yearbook of Philosophy","volume":"156 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131470789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-12DOI: 10.1163/24689300-05101001
Jørgen Huggler
The purpose of this paper is to explore the reception of George Berkeley in a particular corner of 20th-century Danish psychology and philosophy. In contrast to philosophers, such as Peter Zinkernagel and David Favrholdt, Danish experimental psychologists, including Edgar Rubin and Edgar Tranekjær Rasmussen, made highly appreciative reference to the methodology and experimental observations of Berkeley and David Hume. This paper focuses on these psychologists’ interest in Berkeley’s ideas. I will first present Rubin’s path from a mosaic-like understanding of psychological phenomena (elemental psychology) to a holistic view, detailing what he termed adspective psychology and its method. I then turn to Rubin’s embrace of certain experimental observations made by Berkeley and, in particular, by Hume concerning the minima visibilia. The second part of the paper deals with Tranekjær Rasmussen’s interpretation of Berkeley’s work, and in particular of his immaterialism, his notion of God, and his critique of abstract ideas.
本文的目的是探讨乔治伯克利在20世纪丹麦心理学和哲学的一个特定角落的接受。与哲学家(如Peter Zinkernagel和David Favrholdt)不同，丹麦实验心理学家(包括Edgar Rubin和Edgar tranekj - ekr Rasmussen)对伯克利和休谟的方法论和实验观察给予了高度赞赏。本文主要关注这些心理学家对伯克利思想的兴趣。我将首先介绍鲁宾从对心理现象(元素心理学)的马赛克式理解到整体观点的路径，详细介绍他所谓的相应心理学及其方法。然后，我转向鲁宾对伯克利，特别是休谟关于最小可见性的某些实验观察的接受。论文的第二部分讨论了特拉内克·拉斯穆森对伯克利著作的解读，特别是他的非唯物主义、他的上帝观念以及他对抽象观念的批判。
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