{"title":"Input material reduction incentives vs. scrap recycling for closed loop supply chains","authors":"Tolga Aydinliyim, E. Çil, Nagesh N. Murthy","doi":"10.1111/poms.14039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14039","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45650499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Evaluating the ending‐9 pricing strategy along the online shopping funnel","authors":"Jialie Chen","doi":"10.1111/poms.14045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14045","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63619085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nianxin Wang, Yuxue Yang, Yulin Fang, Huifang Li, Angela Lu
{"title":"Growing user base in the early stage of sharing economy platforms: An integration of competitive repertoire and institutional legitimacy theories","authors":"Nianxin Wang, Yuxue Yang, Yulin Fang, Huifang Li, Angela Lu","doi":"10.1111/poms.14046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14046","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45226145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Facing consumers' growing demand for fast order fulfillment, it is important yet challenging for franchise companies to best incentivize frequent inventory sharing among their independent franchise retailers or dealers to achieve channel coordination. Past literature has only addressed such channel coordination for one-time inventory sharing using contractual agreements, which unfortunately do not work for frequent inventory sharing. In this study, we consider multiple inventory-sharing opportunities and propose a novel coordinating mechanism: internal inventory trading, enabled by disruptive IT platforms, such as the OneView platform's Inventory Management module (OVIM). On the OVIM, designed and operated by a brand (franchiser), every retailer (franchisee) can frequently access to all brand inventories virtually as they trade (buy or sell) inventory with one another and the brand. Using dynamic multiperiod games, we investigate how the brand should craft the trade rules and how the retailers should respond and trade periodically in equilibrium. We prove that channel coordination can be achieved in equilibrium, and the coordination requires both an internal inventory-trading platform and the brand's proactive involvement in trading as the rule and market maker. Specifically, the coordinating trade rules require the brand to (1) only profit from the royalties (not from trading), (2) set the coordinating trade prices (CTPs) to respond to the real-time channel inventory, and (3) let the buyer and the seller split shipping costs in any proportion, but not offering any subsidy. We provide a detailed characterization of the CTPs for each period, serving multiple purposes beyond simply removing double marginalization. When the channel inventory is high and imbalanced, the CTPs must include a trading reward to prevent retailers from strategically holding more or less inventory than the channel-optimal amount to “manipulate” future trade prices. The good news is that these CTPs are intuitive (constant or market-clearing) and can be automated into the trading platform ex ante. These actionable insights can guide franchise companies toward best utilizing their channel inventory and improving their profit and customer satisfaction.
{"title":"Multiperiod channel coordination in franchise networks: The necessity of internal inventory trading and franchiser involvement","authors":"Rong Li, Liangbin Yang, Xiaohang Yue","doi":"10.1111/poms.14044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14044","url":null,"abstract":"Facing consumers' growing demand for fast order fulfillment, it is important yet challenging for franchise companies to best incentivize frequent inventory sharing among their independent franchise retailers or dealers to achieve channel coordination. Past literature has only addressed such channel coordination for one-time inventory sharing using contractual agreements, which unfortunately do not work for frequent inventory sharing. In this study, we consider multiple inventory-sharing opportunities and propose a novel coordinating mechanism: <i>internal inventory trading</i>, enabled by disruptive IT platforms, such as the OneView platform's Inventory Management module (OVIM). On the OVIM, designed and operated by a brand (franchiser), every retailer (franchisee) can frequently access to all brand inventories virtually as they <i>trade</i> (buy or sell) inventory with one another and the brand. Using dynamic multiperiod games, we investigate how the brand should craft the trade rules and how the retailers should respond and trade periodically in equilibrium. We prove that channel coordination can be achieved in equilibrium, and the coordination <i>requires</i> both an internal inventory-trading platform and the brand's proactive involvement in trading as the rule and market maker. Specifically, the coordinating trade rules <i>require</i> the brand to (1) only profit from the royalties (not from trading), (2) set the coordinating trade prices (CTPs) to respond to the real-time channel inventory, and (3) let the buyer and the seller split shipping costs in any proportion, but not offering any subsidy. We provide a detailed characterization of the CTPs for each period, serving multiple purposes beyond simply removing double marginalization. When the channel inventory is high and imbalanced, the CTPs must include a trading reward to prevent retailers from strategically holding more or less inventory than the channel-optimal amount to “manipulate” future trade prices. The good news is that these CTPs are intuitive (constant or market-clearing) and can be automated into the trading platform ex ante. These actionable insights can guide franchise companies toward best utilizing their channel inventory and improving their profit and customer satisfaction.","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":"195 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138518546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the design of crowdsourcing contests in settings where the outputs of the contestants are quantifiable, for example, a data science challenge. This setting is in contrast to those where the output is only qualitative and cannot be objectively quantified, for example, when the goal of the contest is to design a logo. The literature on crowdsourcing contests focuses largely on ordinal contests, where contestants' outputs are ranked by the designer and awards are based on relative ranks. Such contests are ideally suited for the latter setting, where output is qualitative. For our setting (quantitative output), it is possible to design cardinal contests, where awards could be based on the actual outputs and not on their ranking alone—thus, the family of cardinal contests includes the family of ordinal contests. We study the problem of designing an optimal cardinal contest. We use mechanism design theory to derive an optimal cardinal mechanism and provide a convenient implementation—a decreasing reward-meter mechanism—of the optimal contest. We establish the practicality of our mechanism by showing that it is “Obviously Strategy-Proof,” a recently introduced formal notion of simplicity in the literature. We also compare the optimal cardinal contest with the most popular ordinal contest—namely, the Winner-Takes-All (WTA) contest, along several metrics. In particular, the optimal cardinal mechanism delivers a superior expected best output, whereas the WTA contest yields a greater expected contestant welfare. Furthermore, under a sufficiently large budget, the contest designer's expected net-benefit is higher under the optimal cardinal mechanism than that under the WTA contest, regardless of the number of contestants in the two mechanisms. Our numerical analysis suggests that, for the contest designer, the average improvement provided by the optimal cardinal mechanism over the WTA contest is about 23%. For a given number of contestants, the benefit of the optimal cardinal mechanism is especially appreciable for projects where the ratio of the designer's utility to agents' cost-of-effort falls within a wide practical range. For projects where this ratio is very high, the expected profit of the best WTA contest is reasonably close to that of the optimal cardinal mechanism.
{"title":"Optimal cardinal contests","authors":"Goutham Takasi, Milind Dawande, Ganesh Janakiraman","doi":"10.1111/poms.14043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14043","url":null,"abstract":"We study the design of crowdsourcing contests in settings where the outputs of the contestants are quantifiable, for example, a data science challenge. This setting is in contrast to those where the output is only qualitative and cannot be objectively quantified, for example, when the goal of the contest is to design a logo. The literature on crowdsourcing contests focuses largely on ordinal contests, where contestants' outputs are ranked by the designer and awards are based on relative ranks. Such contests are ideally suited for the latter setting, where output is qualitative. For our setting (quantitative output), it is possible to design cardinal contests, where awards could be based on the actual outputs and not on their ranking alone—thus, the family of cardinal contests includes the family of ordinal contests. We study the problem of designing an optimal cardinal contest. We use mechanism design theory to derive an optimal cardinal mechanism and provide a convenient implementation—a decreasing reward-meter mechanism—of the optimal contest. We establish the practicality of our mechanism by showing that it is “Obviously Strategy-Proof,” a recently introduced formal notion of simplicity in the literature. We also compare the optimal cardinal contest with the most popular ordinal contest—namely, the Winner-Takes-All (WTA) contest, along several metrics. In particular, the optimal cardinal mechanism delivers a superior expected best output, whereas the WTA contest yields a greater expected contestant welfare. Furthermore, under a sufficiently large budget, the contest designer's expected net-benefit is higher under the optimal cardinal mechanism than that under the WTA contest, regardless of the number of contestants in the two mechanisms. Our numerical analysis suggests that, for the contest designer, the average improvement provided by the optimal cardinal mechanism over the WTA contest is about 23%. For a given number of contestants, the benefit of the optimal cardinal mechanism is especially appreciable for projects where the ratio of the designer's utility to agents' cost-of-effort falls within a wide practical range. For projects where this ratio is very high, the expected profit of the best WTA contest is reasonably close to that of the optimal cardinal mechanism.","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138518547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Customer segmentation and ex ante fairness: A queueing perspective","authors":"Jian Liu, Yong-Pin Zhou, Jian Chen","doi":"10.1111/poms.14033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14033","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44838202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A semiparametric Bayesian model for queueing arrival processes: An application to call centers","authors":"Kaan Kuzu, R. Soyer, Murat T. Tarimcilar","doi":"10.1111/poms.14034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14034","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49455317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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