{"title":"Judge me on my losers: Do robo‐advisors outperform human investors during the COVID‐19 financial market crash?","authors":"Che-Wei Liu, Mochen Yang, Ming-Hui Wen","doi":"10.1111/poms.14029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14029","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46869059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Xiaoling Zhang, KEVlN H. Zhang, Shibo Li, Damien Koenitz
{"title":"Effects of store fixture shape at retail checkout: Evidence from field and online studies","authors":"Xiaoling Zhang, KEVlN H. Zhang, Shibo Li, Damien Koenitz","doi":"10.1111/poms.14028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14028","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43343593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Should the fox guard the henhouse? Category captainship arrangement as a strategic information transmission mechanism","authors":"A. Timoumi, Skander Esseghaier, Levent Koçkesen","doi":"10.1111/poms.14020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14020","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63619050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this paper, we study how provision of product information and/or market information affects buyers' and sellers' behavior and the resultant sales in an online marketplace. We first identify the Pareto‐dominant equilibrium for the sellers' pricing decisions. Then, we study the impact of market parameters on the sales of the platform in equilibrium, under various information structures. We find that the platform's sales increase with the size of potential buyers but change nonmonotonically with the size of potential sellers. Next, we analytically characterize the platform's optimal information strategy as a function of the underlying market parameters. We find that while it is always optimal for the platform to reveal some information, it should be strategic about which information to reveal when faced with different supply and demand conditions. In particular, in a seller's market (high ratio of potential buyers to sellers), the platform should provide both product and market information to the sellers and buyers. However, in a buyer's market (low ratio of potential buyers to sellers), it is optimal for the platform to only provide the market information—providing both the product and market information would backfire on the platform by jeopardizing its sales.
{"title":"The role of product and market information in an online marketplace","authors":"Shu Hu, Mike Mingcheng Wei, Shiliang Cui","doi":"10.1111/poms.14025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14025","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, we study how provision of product information and/or market information affects buyers' and sellers' behavior and the resultant sales in an online marketplace. We first identify the Pareto‐dominant equilibrium for the sellers' pricing decisions. Then, we study the impact of market parameters on the sales of the platform in equilibrium, under various information structures. We find that the platform's sales increase with the size of potential buyers but change nonmonotonically with the size of potential sellers. Next, we analytically characterize the platform's optimal information strategy as a function of the underlying market parameters. We find that while it is always optimal for the platform to reveal some information, it should be strategic about which information to reveal when faced with different supply and demand conditions. In particular, in a seller's market (high ratio of potential buyers to sellers), the platform should provide both product and market information to the sellers and buyers. However, in a buyer's market (low ratio of potential buyers to sellers), it is optimal for the platform to only provide the market information—providing both the product and market information would backfire on the platform by jeopardizing its sales.","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135399243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
V. Gaur, Nikolay Osadchiy, S. Seshadri, M. Subrahmanyam
{"title":"Sourcing for online marketplaces with demand and price uncertainty","authors":"V. Gaur, Nikolay Osadchiy, S. Seshadri, M. Subrahmanyam","doi":"10.1111/poms.14023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14023","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43746016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sameer Prasad, H. Borra, Jason Woldt, N. Altay, J. Tata
{"title":"Migrant flows: Humanitarian operational aspects of people in transit","authors":"Sameer Prasad, H. Borra, Jason Woldt, N. Altay, J. Tata","doi":"10.1111/poms.14037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14037","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45078901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Theoretical research in marketing has traditionally focused on centralized brand‐extension strategies where a brand expands its product offerings by controlling the design, production, marketing, and sales of new products “in‐house.” However, luxury brands frequently use “brand licensing” as a decentralized brand‐extension strategy under which a brand licenses its brand name to an “external licensee” that designs, produces, and sells the new product. Licensing is a time‐efficient and cost‐effective brand‐extension strategy for luxury brands to reach out to their aspirational, low‐end consumers (“followers”) who value a brand more when more high‐end consumers (“snobs”) purchase the brand's primary product (i.e., “positive popularity effect”). On the other hand, over‐licensing might dilute the brand for snobs who value brand exclusivity (i.e., “negative popularity effect”). We develop a game‐theoretic model to study luxury brand licensing in a decentralized setting by incorporating these two countervailing forces. First, in the monopoly setting (a benchmark), we find that the monopoly brand should license only when the negative popularity effect is not too high, and it should prefer “royalty licensing” over “fixed‐fee licensing” when the negative popularity effect is intermediate. Second, to explicate our analysis, we study the duopoly setting under fixed‐fee contracts. In contrast to the monopoly setting, we find that fixed‐fee licensing can “soften” price competition between brands so that licensing is “always” profitable for both brands under competition. Interestingly, in equilibrium under fixed‐fee contracts, competing brands face a prisoner's dilemma and both brands prefer not to license in some cases, even though both would be better off if they could commit to fixed‐fee licensing. Finally, we expand our analysis of the duopoly model by incorporating royalty licensing in addition to fixed‐fee licensing. We find that, in contrast to fixed‐fee licensing, royalty licensing can “intensify” price competition so that both brands have to lower their prices. Consequently, when the positive popularity effect is sufficiently strong, fixed‐fee licensing “dominates” royalty licensing. We also show that, under competition, luxury brands should adopt royalty licensing contracts only when the follower market is large and positive and negative popularity effects are small enough.
{"title":"Luxury brand licensing: Competition and reference group effects","authors":"Kenan Arifoğlu, Christopher S. Tang","doi":"10.1111/poms.14032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14032","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Theoretical research in marketing has traditionally focused on centralized brand‐extension strategies where a brand expands its product offerings by controlling the design, production, marketing, and sales of new products “in‐house.” However, luxury brands frequently use “brand licensing” as a decentralized brand‐extension strategy under which a brand licenses its brand name to an “external licensee” that designs, produces, and sells the new product. Licensing is a time‐efficient and cost‐effective brand‐extension strategy for luxury brands to reach out to their aspirational, low‐end consumers (“followers”) who value a brand more when more high‐end consumers (“snobs”) purchase the brand's primary product (i.e., “positive popularity effect”). On the other hand, over‐licensing might dilute the brand for snobs who value brand exclusivity (i.e., “negative popularity effect”). We develop a game‐theoretic model to study luxury brand licensing in a decentralized setting by incorporating these two countervailing forces. First, in the monopoly setting (a benchmark), we find that the monopoly brand should license only when the negative popularity effect is not too high, and it should prefer “royalty licensing” over “fixed‐fee licensing” when the negative popularity effect is intermediate. Second, to explicate our analysis, we study the duopoly setting under fixed‐fee contracts. In contrast to the monopoly setting, we find that fixed‐fee licensing can “soften” price competition between brands so that licensing is “always” profitable for both brands under competition. Interestingly, in equilibrium under fixed‐fee contracts, competing brands face a prisoner's dilemma and both brands prefer not to license in some cases, even though both would be better off if they could commit to fixed‐fee licensing. Finally, we expand our analysis of the duopoly model by incorporating royalty licensing in addition to fixed‐fee licensing. We find that, in contrast to fixed‐fee licensing, royalty licensing can “intensify” price competition so that both brands have to lower their prices. Consequently, when the positive popularity effect is sufficiently strong, fixed‐fee licensing “dominates” royalty licensing. We also show that, under competition, luxury brands should adopt royalty licensing contracts only when the follower market is large and positive and negative popularity effects are small enough.","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135555945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yiwei Wu, Shuaian Wang, Lu Zhen, G. Laporte, Zheyi Tan, Kai Wang
{"title":"How to operate ship fleets under uncertainty","authors":"Yiwei Wu, Shuaian Wang, Lu Zhen, G. Laporte, Zheyi Tan, Kai Wang","doi":"10.1111/poms.14022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14022","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45954733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
T. Niranjan, Narendra K. Ghosalya, Raveen R. Menon, K. Rotaru, S. Gavirneni
{"title":"Unpacking the cognitive processes of the boundedly rational newsvendor","authors":"T. Niranjan, Narendra K. Ghosalya, Raveen R. Menon, K. Rotaru, S. Gavirneni","doi":"10.1111/poms.14027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14027","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47545095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gian-Gabriel P. Garcia, Mariel S. Lavieri, T. McAllister, M. McCrea, S. Broglio
{"title":"Reducing the Price of Naïveté in return‐to‐play from sports‐related concussion","authors":"Gian-Gabriel P. Garcia, Mariel S. Lavieri, T. McAllister, M. McCrea, S. Broglio","doi":"10.1111/poms.14024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14024","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49245945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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