{"title":"Un‐diversity, inequity, and exclusion in supply chains: The unintended fallout of economic sanctions and consumer boycotts","authors":"Timofey Shalpegin, Ajay Kumar, Tyson R. Browning","doi":"10.1111/poms.14001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44812271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Capacity planning with limited information","authors":"Vic Anand, Ramji Balakrishnan, S. Gavirneni","doi":"10.1111/poms.14004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47823818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Investigating the effects of product popularity and time restriction: The moderating role of consumers’ goal specificity","authors":"Cheng Yi, Z. Jiang, Mi Zhou","doi":"10.1111/poms.14003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48311541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Chenguang (Allen) Wu, Chen Jin, Senthil K. Veeraraghavan
{"title":"Designing professional services: Pricing and prioritization","authors":"Chenguang (Allen) Wu, Chen Jin, Senthil K. Veeraraghavan","doi":"10.1111/poms.13996","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13996","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44965136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nagarajan Sethuraman, Ali K. Parlaktürk, Jayashankar M. Swaminathan
Abstract There is a growing interest in the industry around 3D printing. A related phenomenon is personal fabrication (PF) in which a firm sells products' design and lets the customers personalize and manufacture the product using 3D printing services. In this paper, we characterize the market and operational conditions that make PF an attractive operational strategy. We propose a demand market model that captures customer heterogeneity in taste (horizontal) and quality (vertical) dimensions while allowing the market to be skewed with high versus low valuation customers. We quantify three key benefits of PF strategy: (i) the PF strategy enables personalization and improves product fit, (ii) the PF strategy can help the firm through postponement of product configuration, and (iii) the PF strategy enables easier design adjustments and allows design for manufacturability initiatives. Intellectual property and liability risks are significant barriers to the adoption of PF strategy. Furthermore, 3D printing may not be feasible for some parts of the product. In these cases, the firm may pursue the partial PF strategy: delegating only a proportion of the product for customer production. We also identify when partial PF becomes an attractive strategy.
{"title":"Personal fabrication as an operational strategy: Value of delegating production to customer using 3D printing","authors":"Nagarajan Sethuraman, Ali K. Parlaktürk, Jayashankar M. Swaminathan","doi":"10.1111/poms.13981","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13981","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There is a growing interest in the industry around 3D printing. A related phenomenon is personal fabrication (PF) in which a firm sells products' design and lets the customers personalize and manufacture the product using 3D printing services. In this paper, we characterize the market and operational conditions that make PF an attractive operational strategy. We propose a demand market model that captures customer heterogeneity in taste (horizontal) and quality (vertical) dimensions while allowing the market to be skewed with high versus low valuation customers. We quantify three key benefits of PF strategy: (i) the PF strategy enables personalization and improves product fit, (ii) the PF strategy can help the firm through postponement of product configuration, and (iii) the PF strategy enables easier design adjustments and allows design for manufacturability initiatives. Intellectual property and liability risks are significant barriers to the adoption of PF strategy. Furthermore, 3D printing may not be feasible for some parts of the product. In these cases, the firm may pursue the partial PF strategy: delegating only a proportion of the product for customer production. We also identify when partial PF becomes an attractive strategy.","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135778136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Xiaoshuai Fan, Qingye Wu, Ying‐Ju Chen, Christopher S. Tang
Abstract Many companies are under pressure to improve pay transparency; however, its impact on their agents and principals remains unclear. As a way to investigate the upside and downside of pay transparency, we conduct our study based on a scenario in which agents have “cognitive bias” (namely, over‐ or underconfident ). We also capture the notion of “social comparisons” behavior (namely, behind‐averse and ahead‐seeking ) that occurs under pay transparency. By exploring a one‐principal‐two‐agent model, we find that agents' optimal effort decisions are affected by the “intersection” between agents' social comparison behavior and cognitive bias. Specifically, relative to the opaque policy, we find that pay transparency can entice agents to improve their job performance (in general). Our analysis also provides a guideline for principals to implement transparent payment policies properly (including the optimal payment scheme and the recruitment strategy). Specifically, pay transparency could enable the principal to offer a lower merit‐based factor level but a higher base salary level than opaque policy to motivate agents. To obtain high retained earnings, it is profitable for the principal to hire an overconfident agent if the principal chooses to adopt the opaque policy, but hire a mildly underconfident agent if pay transparency is selected. Moreover, we extend the base model to incorporate working capability heterogeneity across agents. We find that the agent's effort incentive and his opponent's working capability move in the same direction when the two agents' working capabilities are comparable under the transparent policy. Finally, by incorporating the environment's relative favoritism into the base model, we observe that when the environment is highly uncertain, the underconfident agent is willing to leverage environment uncertainty but the overconfident agent is willing to exert more effort.
{"title":"The implications of pay transparency in the presence of over‐ and underconfident agents","authors":"Xiaoshuai Fan, Qingye Wu, Ying‐Ju Chen, Christopher S. Tang","doi":"10.1111/poms.13975","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13975","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Many companies are under pressure to improve pay transparency; however, its impact on their agents and principals remains unclear. As a way to investigate the upside and downside of pay transparency, we conduct our study based on a scenario in which agents have “cognitive bias” (namely, over‐ or underconfident ). We also capture the notion of “social comparisons” behavior (namely, behind‐averse and ahead‐seeking ) that occurs under pay transparency. By exploring a one‐principal‐two‐agent model, we find that agents' optimal effort decisions are affected by the “intersection” between agents' social comparison behavior and cognitive bias. Specifically, relative to the opaque policy, we find that pay transparency can entice agents to improve their job performance (in general). Our analysis also provides a guideline for principals to implement transparent payment policies properly (including the optimal payment scheme and the recruitment strategy). Specifically, pay transparency could enable the principal to offer a lower merit‐based factor level but a higher base salary level than opaque policy to motivate agents. To obtain high retained earnings, it is profitable for the principal to hire an overconfident agent if the principal chooses to adopt the opaque policy, but hire a mildly underconfident agent if pay transparency is selected. Moreover, we extend the base model to incorporate working capability heterogeneity across agents. We find that the agent's effort incentive and his opponent's working capability move in the same direction when the two agents' working capabilities are comparable under the transparent policy. Finally, by incorporating the environment's relative favoritism into the base model, we observe that when the environment is highly uncertain, the underconfident agent is willing to leverage environment uncertainty but the overconfident agent is willing to exert more effort.","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135778135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mobile advertisement campaigns for boosting in‐store visits: A design framework and case study","authors":"Kimia Keshanian, Narayan Ramasubbu, K. Dutta","doi":"10.1111/poms.13984","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13984","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47007399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Products approaching the end of their shelf life on retail store shelves are more likely to result in food waste. For this reason, manufacturers establish shipping policies related to the age of the products that leave their warehouses, that is, they set a maximum age beyond which shipping to retail stores is no longer allowed. In practice, most existing policies are simple one‐size‐fits‐all rules that do not accommodate the varying characteristics of the products. We offer a framework that manufacturers can use to determine maximum shipping age thresholds based on a Markov chain model, where the objective is to maximize profit, net of the cost of expiration at the warehouse and retail stores. We derive analytical insights about the impact of a shipping age threshold on food waste in the supply chain and obtain sufficient conditions under which a maximum shipping age threshold is suboptimal within the class of Ship‐Oldest‐First (a.k.a. First‐In‐First‐Out ) issuing policies. We also numerically investigate the relationship between different system parameters (e.g., demand rate, waste cost at warehouse and retail, warehouse inventory, total shelf life) and the optimal shipping age threshold. Using real data from our industry collaborator, we compute the optimal shipping age thresholds at the stock‐keeping‐unit (SKU) level for over 450 products and find that 9–10% of the SKUs currently have suboptimal shipping age thresholds. This presents an opportunity to improve profits by up to 8.7% and reduce food waste by up to 14.7%. These improvements correspond to up to $292,561 savings and 1846 truckloads of waste reduction annually. Our framework can be adopted by any firm and satisfies a much emphasized need in industry to control food waste through shelf life management.
{"title":"Determining maximum shipping age requirements for shelf life and food waste management","authors":"Arzum Akkas, Dorothee Honhon","doi":"10.1111/poms.13963","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13963","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Products approaching the end of their shelf life on retail store shelves are more likely to result in food waste. For this reason, manufacturers establish shipping policies related to the age of the products that leave their warehouses, that is, they set a maximum age beyond which shipping to retail stores is no longer allowed. In practice, most existing policies are simple one‐size‐fits‐all rules that do not accommodate the varying characteristics of the products. We offer a framework that manufacturers can use to determine maximum shipping age thresholds based on a Markov chain model, where the objective is to maximize profit, net of the cost of expiration at the warehouse and retail stores. We derive analytical insights about the impact of a shipping age threshold on food waste in the supply chain and obtain sufficient conditions under which a maximum shipping age threshold is suboptimal within the class of Ship‐Oldest‐First (a.k.a. First‐In‐First‐Out ) issuing policies. We also numerically investigate the relationship between different system parameters (e.g., demand rate, waste cost at warehouse and retail, warehouse inventory, total shelf life) and the optimal shipping age threshold. Using real data from our industry collaborator, we compute the optimal shipping age thresholds at the stock‐keeping‐unit (SKU) level for over 450 products and find that 9–10% of the SKUs currently have suboptimal shipping age thresholds. This presents an opportunity to improve profits by up to 8.7% and reduce food waste by up to 14.7%. These improvements correspond to up to $292,561 savings and 1846 truckloads of waste reduction annually. Our framework can be adopted by any firm and satisfies a much emphasized need in industry to control food waste through shelf life management.","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136178801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Maximilian Burkhardt, F. J. Nitsch, S. Spinler, L. V. Van Wassenhove
{"title":"The effect of acute stress on humanitarian supplies management","authors":"Maximilian Burkhardt, F. J. Nitsch, S. Spinler, L. V. Van Wassenhove","doi":"10.1111/poms.13993","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13993","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43926359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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