Process safety incidents in the oil and gas industry can have serious consequences. In the United States and Malaysia, standards for process safety management (PSM) have been established by US OSHA and PETRONAS, respectively. However, these standards are not always properly understood or followed by employers, resulting in ineffective safety programs and uncontrolled hazards. Plug and abandonment (P&A) activities in the upstream oil and gas industry require high control of well barriers. To assess the gap between PSM industrial standards and crew awareness in P&A activities, a study was conducted throughout one cycle of the project campaign. The study found that 70% of offshore crews had a high awareness level of the health, safety, and environment management system (HSEMS) and PSM, and 96% compliance was achieved from audit activities. However, two proposed PSM elements scored low in the assessment, indicating a need for improvement in site implementation. The study provides valuable information for offshore crews and readers seeking to improve and assess PSM elements in process safety. The results can help identify and control potential hazards related to technical safety, operational safety, and personnel safety. Furthermore, the study aims to support the development and implementation of PSM standards in Malaysia.
{"title":"Improving PSM and HSEMS compliance in Malaysian upstream oil and gas industry: A case study assessment for plug and abandonment activities","authors":"Mohd Shazman Zulkiply, S. A. Hussain","doi":"10.1002/prs.12527","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12527","url":null,"abstract":"Process safety incidents in the oil and gas industry can have serious consequences. In the United States and Malaysia, standards for process safety management (PSM) have been established by US OSHA and PETRONAS, respectively. However, these standards are not always properly understood or followed by employers, resulting in ineffective safety programs and uncontrolled hazards. Plug and abandonment (P&A) activities in the upstream oil and gas industry require high control of well barriers. To assess the gap between PSM industrial standards and crew awareness in P&A activities, a study was conducted throughout one cycle of the project campaign. The study found that 70% of offshore crews had a high awareness level of the health, safety, and environment management system (HSEMS) and PSM, and 96% compliance was achieved from audit activities. However, two proposed PSM elements scored low in the assessment, indicating a need for improvement in site implementation. The study provides valuable information for offshore crews and readers seeking to improve and assess PSM elements in process safety. The results can help identify and control potential hazards related to technical safety, operational safety, and personnel safety. Furthermore, the study aims to support the development and implementation of PSM standards in Malaysia.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47279821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ke Yang, Yue Jia, Hong Ji, Zhixiang Xing, Juncheng Jiang
In order to reduce the power of methane explosion in natural gas pipelines and effectively improve the explosion suppression efficiency of a single explosion suppressant, we carry out the explosion suppression of HFC‐227ea/carbon dioxide mixed gas as well as mixed gas/ultrafine water mist through a self‐built methane explosion suppression experimental platform. Based on the changes in parameters such as explosion overpressure, flame propagation velocity, and flame propagation structure, the coupling mechanism of methane explosion suppression between mixed gases and between mixed gases and ultrafine water mist is revealed, which provides scientific support for promoting the development of methane explosion suppression technology. The experimental results show that when the mixed gas HFC‐227ea/carbon dioxide and ultrafine water mist synergistically suppresses methane explosion, the addition of the mixed gas can effectively improve the suppression effect of ultrafine water mist on methane explosion.
{"title":"Explosion mitigation of methane–air mixture in combined application of HFC‐227ea/CO2 and ultrafine water mist in the pipeline","authors":"Ke Yang, Yue Jia, Hong Ji, Zhixiang Xing, Juncheng Jiang","doi":"10.1002/prs.12519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12519","url":null,"abstract":"In order to reduce the power of methane explosion in natural gas pipelines and effectively improve the explosion suppression efficiency of a single explosion suppressant, we carry out the explosion suppression of HFC‐227ea/carbon dioxide mixed gas as well as mixed gas/ultrafine water mist through a self‐built methane explosion suppression experimental platform. Based on the changes in parameters such as explosion overpressure, flame propagation velocity, and flame propagation structure, the coupling mechanism of methane explosion suppression between mixed gases and between mixed gases and ultrafine water mist is revealed, which provides scientific support for promoting the development of methane explosion suppression technology. The experimental results show that when the mixed gas HFC‐227ea/carbon dioxide and ultrafine water mist synergistically suppresses methane explosion, the addition of the mixed gas can effectively improve the suppression effect of ultrafine water mist on methane explosion.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44294897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Electrostatic discharges are known to cause many industrial fires and explosions each year. Yet it is quite usual to find that before an incident operatives have encountered signs that static electricity is present. These signs—the ‘early warning signs’—had their significance been appreciated, could have prevented many industrial fires or explosions. In this paper, we bring together evidence obtained from investigation of electrostatic incidents and group them by class of ‘manifestation’. We discuss how these classes/manifestations should be interpreted by reference to discharge types and their associated energy ranges. Finally, we discuss how we can go about assessing whether each static manifestation could lead to an electrostatically initiated fire or explosion as well as how they can be eliminated. The early warning signs of static electricity can be as apparently innocuous as dust patterns on plastic or a prickling feeling on the arms. They can also include unexpected corrosion in a glass‐lined vessel or even a pinhole leak from an insulating pipe; these in addition to the well‐recognized sparks and cracking sounds that present themselves as the more obvious face of hazardous static electricity. Waiting for an ‘early warning sign’ can never be a substitute for detailed hazard assessment work that focuses on the identification and elimination of all potential ignition sources. But it is worth noting that electrostatic sources of ignition are often considered to be more complicated to identify and eliminate than others, and consequently, they frequently elude the formal HAZOP or hazard study process. With electrostatic hazards, this makes vigilance by operatives and others that much more important, especially since electrostatic effects can easily be spotted and eliminated—if you know what to look for. A new proposed ‘classification’ that will be discussed in this paper can aid the understanding of hazardous static electricity and thus help reduce the risk of fire and explosion in industry.
{"title":"Electrostatic hazards: Identifying the early warning signs to reduce explosion risk1","authors":"V. Ebadat, P. Cartwright","doi":"10.1002/prs.12525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12525","url":null,"abstract":"Electrostatic discharges are known to cause many industrial fires and explosions each year. Yet it is quite usual to find that before an incident operatives have encountered signs that static electricity is present. These signs—the ‘early warning signs’—had their significance been appreciated, could have prevented many industrial fires or explosions. In this paper, we bring together evidence obtained from investigation of electrostatic incidents and group them by class of ‘manifestation’. We discuss how these classes/manifestations should be interpreted by reference to discharge types and their associated energy ranges. Finally, we discuss how we can go about assessing whether each static manifestation could lead to an electrostatically initiated fire or explosion as well as how they can be eliminated. The early warning signs of static electricity can be as apparently innocuous as dust patterns on plastic or a prickling feeling on the arms. They can also include unexpected corrosion in a glass‐lined vessel or even a pinhole leak from an insulating pipe; these in addition to the well‐recognized sparks and cracking sounds that present themselves as the more obvious face of hazardous static electricity. Waiting for an ‘early warning sign’ can never be a substitute for detailed hazard assessment work that focuses on the identification and elimination of all potential ignition sources. But it is worth noting that electrostatic sources of ignition are often considered to be more complicated to identify and eliminate than others, and consequently, they frequently elude the formal HAZOP or hazard study process. With electrostatic hazards, this makes vigilance by operatives and others that much more important, especially since electrostatic effects can easily be spotted and eliminated—if you know what to look for. A new proposed ‘classification’ that will be discussed in this paper can aid the understanding of hazardous static electricity and thus help reduce the risk of fire and explosion in industry.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44645559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This is the first study to statistically analyze all chemical laboratory accidents in South Korea during 2015–2021 to examine the relationship among accident types and causes, damage types, and damaged areas. The data included accidents with injury requiring treatment for more than three days, following the standards of the Act on the Establishment of Safe Laboratory Environment. Frequency analysis was conducted on the current status of each variable, and a cross‐tabulation analysis identified the associations among them. The results identified 1380 laboratory accidents, with 342 chemistry/chemical engineering accidents. Chemical accidents were categorized as fires, explosions, and spills according to accident type; spills exhibited the highest frequency (69.0%) and were mostly caused by inadequate handling of chemicals (62.5%). Most explosions (62.2%) and fires (52.2%) were caused by abnormal/runaway reactions. Burn damage was high in all accident types, especially spills (76.1%). The face was frequently damaged across all accident types, while explosions damaged multiple areas. Several safety management measures are proposed to prevent/reduce spills, explosions, fires, and damage based on the results. The results can help researchers develop new protective technologies for safety in chemistry/chemical engineering laboratories.
{"title":"Analysis of accidents in chemistry/chemical engineering laboratories in Korea","authors":"Jong Gu Kim, Han Jin Jo, Young-hee Roh","doi":"10.1002/prs.12528","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12528","url":null,"abstract":"This is the first study to statistically analyze all chemical laboratory accidents in South Korea during 2015–2021 to examine the relationship among accident types and causes, damage types, and damaged areas. The data included accidents with injury requiring treatment for more than three days, following the standards of the Act on the Establishment of Safe Laboratory Environment. Frequency analysis was conducted on the current status of each variable, and a cross‐tabulation analysis identified the associations among them. The results identified 1380 laboratory accidents, with 342 chemistry/chemical engineering accidents. Chemical accidents were categorized as fires, explosions, and spills according to accident type; spills exhibited the highest frequency (69.0%) and were mostly caused by inadequate handling of chemicals (62.5%). Most explosions (62.2%) and fires (52.2%) were caused by abnormal/runaway reactions. Burn damage was high in all accident types, especially spills (76.1%). The face was frequently damaged across all accident types, while explosions damaged multiple areas. Several safety management measures are proposed to prevent/reduce spills, explosions, fires, and damage based on the results. The results can help researchers develop new protective technologies for safety in chemistry/chemical engineering laboratories.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48627481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yi Niu, Yunxiao Fan, Xiaobing Liu, Dandan Han, Xing Ju
During the COVID‐19 pandemic, while China blocked the spread of the coronavirus, its process safety status still maintained a positive trend. Hence, an in‐depth exploration of China's experience and lessons in coordinating epidemic control and process safety is an urgent need to exchange knowledge with other countries to prevent similar catastrophes. This paper comprehensively traces China's national strategies in coordinating epidemic control and safety regulation since the end of 2019 through information collection, literature surveys, and investigative interviews. According to the characteristics of these strategies, China's anti‐pandemic process is divided into three stages: outbreak, concentrated resumption of work, and normalization of epidemic prevention. On this basis, the main risks of each stage and the response measures taken by the Chinese government are further subdivided. Furthermore, the changes brought about by COVID‐19 on Chinese safety regulators are also discussed.
{"title":"National strategies for coordinating process safety and COVID‐19 pandemic control in China","authors":"Yi Niu, Yunxiao Fan, Xiaobing Liu, Dandan Han, Xing Ju","doi":"10.1002/prs.12523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12523","url":null,"abstract":"During the COVID‐19 pandemic, while China blocked the spread of the coronavirus, its process safety status still maintained a positive trend. Hence, an in‐depth exploration of China's experience and lessons in coordinating epidemic control and process safety is an urgent need to exchange knowledge with other countries to prevent similar catastrophes. This paper comprehensively traces China's national strategies in coordinating epidemic control and safety regulation since the end of 2019 through information collection, literature surveys, and investigative interviews. According to the characteristics of these strategies, China's anti‐pandemic process is divided into three stages: outbreak, concentrated resumption of work, and normalization of epidemic prevention. On this basis, the main risks of each stage and the response measures taken by the Chinese government are further subdivided. Furthermore, the changes brought about by COVID‐19 on Chinese safety regulators are also discussed.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49033177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jiling Zhou, Limin Liu, Yanna Su, Rujun Liang, Jianzhu Feng, Xin Wang
Special work involves hot work, confined space, blinding‐pipeline operation with stop plate, work at height, lifting work, temporary electricity, excavation work, work for road breaking, and other work, which may cause harm or damage to the operators themselves, surrounding buildings, equipment, and facilities. In this article, we conducted a statistical investigation on 154 large and above hazardous chemical accidents that occurred between 2008 and 2021 in China, and found that there were 58 accidents that occurred in special work alone, accounting for 37.7% of the total number of accidents. However, at present, no statistical analysis has been conducted on the characteristics of special work accidents in China. Therefore, this paper analyzes the special work accidents in terms of six aspects: categories of special work, industry distribution, enterprise scales, provincial location distribution, time‐volatility characteristics, and accident causes. Moreover, this article puts forward countermeasures and suggestions, aiming to provide useful information for the prevention of special work accidents in China.
{"title":"Statistical investigation on the characteristics of hazardous chemical accidents in special work in China from 2008 to 2021","authors":"Jiling Zhou, Limin Liu, Yanna Su, Rujun Liang, Jianzhu Feng, Xin Wang","doi":"10.1002/prs.12526","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12526","url":null,"abstract":"Special work involves hot work, confined space, blinding‐pipeline operation with stop plate, work at height, lifting work, temporary electricity, excavation work, work for road breaking, and other work, which may cause harm or damage to the operators themselves, surrounding buildings, equipment, and facilities. In this article, we conducted a statistical investigation on 154 large and above hazardous chemical accidents that occurred between 2008 and 2021 in China, and found that there were 58 accidents that occurred in special work alone, accounting for 37.7% of the total number of accidents. However, at present, no statistical analysis has been conducted on the characteristics of special work accidents in China. Therefore, this paper analyzes the special work accidents in terms of six aspects: categories of special work, industry distribution, enterprise scales, provincial location distribution, time‐volatility characteristics, and accident causes. Moreover, this article puts forward countermeasures and suggestions, aiming to provide useful information for the prevention of special work accidents in China.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43067374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On April 21, 2021, four workers died because of gas poisoning while attempting to maintain an agitator in a reactor at Heilongjiang Kailunda Technology Co., Anda, Heilongjiang Province, China. The event was characterized as a major incident occurring within a confined space. This article analyzes the incident by comparing China's and the US's safety regulations and standards regarding entry into confined spaces. The article concludes with the lessons learned and puts forward suggestions for the prevention of such incidents and for safety improvements in China.
{"title":"Lessons learned in confined space entry management after a gas poisoning accident in China","authors":"Ping Liu, Xu-qing Ma","doi":"10.1002/prs.12521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12521","url":null,"abstract":"On April 21, 2021, four workers died because of gas poisoning while attempting to maintain an agitator in a reactor at Heilongjiang Kailunda Technology Co., Anda, Heilongjiang Province, China. The event was characterized as a major incident occurring within a confined space. This article analyzes the incident by comparing China's and the US's safety regulations and standards regarding entry into confined spaces. The article concludes with the lessons learned and puts forward suggestions for the prevention of such incidents and for safety improvements in China.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44536023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Accidents in process industry occur frequently with serious casualties and property losses. This paper builds an accident causation model of process industry based on system thinking by dividing the accident causation system into 4 subsystems and 22 factors. A combination of grey relational analysis and correspondence analysis is conducted to carry out a structured analysis of the collected data. The research contains three main parts: (1) Grey relational analysis is used to obtain the significance ranking of 22 cause factors in process industry, and three critical cause factors are identified as “Security inspection,” “Risk identification,” and “Security awareness.” (2) Through correspondence analysis, the correlations between three sets of variables are analyzed and the cause factors requiring focused attention are identified as “Electric spark,” “Temperature,” “Raw material control,” “Punching phenomenon,” “Equipment clogging,” and “Combustible gases.” (3) An intelligent monitoring scheme is developed for the critical factors of each subsystem, which aims to achieve real‐time monitoring and early warning by means of video surveillance and sensor placement for the human, equipment, and environment subsystems. The conclusions obtained from this study can be used to enhance the efficiency of safety management and reduce the probability of accident occurrence in the process industry.
{"title":"Significance ranking and correlation identification of accident causes in process industry based on system thinking and statistical analysis","authors":"Wei Zhang, Huayu Zhong, Yudong Shi, Tingsheng Zhao","doi":"10.1002/prs.12522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12522","url":null,"abstract":"Accidents in process industry occur frequently with serious casualties and property losses. This paper builds an accident causation model of process industry based on system thinking by dividing the accident causation system into 4 subsystems and 22 factors. A combination of grey relational analysis and correspondence analysis is conducted to carry out a structured analysis of the collected data. The research contains three main parts: (1) Grey relational analysis is used to obtain the significance ranking of 22 cause factors in process industry, and three critical cause factors are identified as “Security inspection,” “Risk identification,” and “Security awareness.” (2) Through correspondence analysis, the correlations between three sets of variables are analyzed and the cause factors requiring focused attention are identified as “Electric spark,” “Temperature,” “Raw material control,” “Punching phenomenon,” “Equipment clogging,” and “Combustible gases.” (3) An intelligent monitoring scheme is developed for the critical factors of each subsystem, which aims to achieve real‐time monitoring and early warning by means of video surveillance and sensor placement for the human, equipment, and environment subsystems. The conclusions obtained from this study can be used to enhance the efficiency of safety management and reduce the probability of accident occurrence in the process industry.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46612273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Process Safety ProgressVolume 42, Issue 3 ISSUE INFORMATIONFree Access Info for Authors First published: 09 August 2023 https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12379AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume42, Issue3September 2023 RelatedInformation
进程安全进展第42卷第3期问题信息作者免费访问信息首次发布:2023年8月9日https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12379AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare给予accessShare全文accessShare全文accessShare请查看我们的使用条款和条件，并勾选下面的复选框共享文章的全文版本。我已经阅读并接受了Wiley在线图书馆使用共享链接的条款和条件，请使用下面的链接与您的朋友和同事分享本文的全文版本。学习更多的知识。复制URL共享链接共享一个emailfacebooktwitterlinkedinreddit微信本文无摘要第42卷，第3期2023年9月
{"title":"Info for Authors","authors":"","doi":"10.1002/prs.12379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12379","url":null,"abstract":"Process Safety ProgressVolume 42, Issue 3 ISSUE INFORMATIONFree Access Info for Authors First published: 09 August 2023 https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12379AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume42, Issue3September 2023 RelatedInformation","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135696704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sanghyun Park, Tae Hee Lee, Kwangu Kang, Hyonjeong Noh, Hyungwoo Kim, Jaewon Oh, Kyong-Hwan Kim, Su-gil Cho
The dehydration package system plays an important role in the stable process operation and production of high‐quality liquefied natural gas by removing water, which is essential for natural gas production. However, as this system operates under various conditions with chemicals, there are threats to safety from potential hazards within the system. Therefore, ensuring system safety can significantly impact the reliable operation of process plants. This study aims to assess the risk of the dehydration package system through the safety integrity level (SIL)‐based safety instrumented system (SIS) design approach as suggested in the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 61,508/61511 standards. Fourteen major hazards requiring recommendations were identified for improving safety through the hazard and operability study (HAZOP). The three major hazards were valve malfunction and gas heater/cooler control failure. Twenty‐one safety instrumented functions (SIFs) in all study nodes were suggested as recommendations to improve safety. Using layers of protection analysis (LOPA), the SIL allocation of the 21 SIFs was performed reasonably with process risks and safeguards. The PDS method was adopted for SIS design and verification, with SIL analysis performed for all the SISs. The results showed that SISs of the dehydration package system satisfied the required SILs.
{"title":"Risk assessment of solid desiccant dehydration package system using safety integrity level‐based safety instrumented system design approach","authors":"Sanghyun Park, Tae Hee Lee, Kwangu Kang, Hyonjeong Noh, Hyungwoo Kim, Jaewon Oh, Kyong-Hwan Kim, Su-gil Cho","doi":"10.1002/prs.12518","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12518","url":null,"abstract":"The dehydration package system plays an important role in the stable process operation and production of high‐quality liquefied natural gas by removing water, which is essential for natural gas production. However, as this system operates under various conditions with chemicals, there are threats to safety from potential hazards within the system. Therefore, ensuring system safety can significantly impact the reliable operation of process plants. This study aims to assess the risk of the dehydration package system through the safety integrity level (SIL)‐based safety instrumented system (SIS) design approach as suggested in the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 61,508/61511 standards. Fourteen major hazards requiring recommendations were identified for improving safety through the hazard and operability study (HAZOP). The three major hazards were valve malfunction and gas heater/cooler control failure. Twenty‐one safety instrumented functions (SIFs) in all study nodes were suggested as recommendations to improve safety. Using layers of protection analysis (LOPA), the SIL allocation of the 21 SIFs was performed reasonably with process risks and safeguards. The PDS method was adopted for SIS design and verification, with SIL analysis performed for all the SISs. The results showed that SISs of the dehydration package system satisfied the required SILs.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41923344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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