Abstract Human factors are considered the main cause of accidents involving pipeline explosionf. In order to identify the path of human‐induced explosion accidents, a gas pipeline explosion that occurred in Shiyan city of China is investigated thoroughly in this study. Applying the 24Model, the causes of the accident are classified into two levels: organizational and individual. The organizational level causes are further categorized into two elements, namely safety culture and safety management system. The individual level causes are further categorized into personal abilities and safety behaviors—both unsafe actions and unsafe conditions. The 24Model methodology further refines unsafe actions and unsafe conditions into subcategories for increased clarity. Based on the 24Model, it was determined that the Shinyan City incident was caused by gaps in personal abilities, which included insufficient safety knowledge, low safety awareness, and bad safety habits. Causes related to ability factors, safety management system, and safety culture were also identified. In addition, the relationship between the identified factors was developed according to the roles played by the accident causes, and the propagation path of the accident was established. This clarity helps to strengthen safety measures related to human factors.
{"title":"Human factors analysis of a fatal gas explosion on June 13, 2021 in Shiyan City, China","authors":"Ling Yang, Mengmeng Chen, Weisong Fan","doi":"10.1002/prs.12538","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12538","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Human factors are considered the main cause of accidents involving pipeline explosionf. In order to identify the path of human‐induced explosion accidents, a gas pipeline explosion that occurred in Shiyan city of China is investigated thoroughly in this study. Applying the 24Model, the causes of the accident are classified into two levels: organizational and individual. The organizational level causes are further categorized into two elements, namely safety culture and safety management system. The individual level causes are further categorized into personal abilities and safety behaviors—both unsafe actions and unsafe conditions. The 24Model methodology further refines unsafe actions and unsafe conditions into subcategories for increased clarity. Based on the 24Model, it was determined that the Shinyan City incident was caused by gaps in personal abilities, which included insufficient safety knowledge, low safety awareness, and bad safety habits. Causes related to ability factors, safety management system, and safety culture were also identified. In addition, the relationship between the identified factors was developed according to the roles played by the accident causes, and the propagation path of the accident was established. This clarity helps to strengthen safety measures related to human factors.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135925719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract One of the core elements of fire protection for petrochemical processing plants is the consideration of passive fire protection (PFP). This general category, often referred to as fireproofing, is addressed in the American Petroleum Institute (API)‐recommended practice (RP) 2218. This RP provides guidelines for the selection and application of fireproofing with what is mostly a qualitative risk assessment approach. The logic focuses on predicting pool fires based on rough characterizations of system properties combined with equipment layout. Although pool fire impacts are often localized, jet fires can affect larger areas. API RP 2218 addresses jet fires in an appendix because of their unpredictable nature, leaving pool fire exposures as the default basis for structural fireproofing. To properly account for both fire types, fire exposure can be evaluated with quantitative risk analysis (QRA) tools that incorporate both jet and pool fire impacts for a wide variety of accident scenarios, weather conditions, and release orientations. By evaluating the thermal radiation impacts of fires in relation to the vulnerability of steel structural elements, a QRA‐based approach to placement of PFP can be achieved. This approach has the benefit of applying PFP where it is needed the most, to best protect a company's infrastructure.
摘要:被动防火是石化加工厂防火的核心内容之一。这一一般类别通常被称为防火，在美国石油协会(API)推荐实施细则(RP) 2218中有规定。本RP为防火材料的选择和应用提供了指导方针，主要采用定性风险评估方法。该逻辑侧重于基于系统属性的粗略特征并结合设备布局来预测池火。虽然水池火灾的影响通常是局部的，但喷射火灾可以影响更大的区域。API RP 2218在附录中提到了喷射火灾，因为其不可预测的性质，将水池火灾暴露作为结构防火的默认基础。为了正确考虑这两种火灾类型，可以使用定量风险分析(QRA)工具对火灾暴露进行评估，该工具结合了各种事故场景、天气条件和释放方向的喷射和水池火灾影响。通过评估火灾的热辐射影响与钢结构构件脆弱性的关系，可以实现基于QRA的PFP放置方法。这种方法的好处是将PFP应用于最需要的地方，以最好地保护公司的基础设施。
{"title":"Application of quantitative risk analysis to fireproofing","authors":"Jeffrey D. Marx, Benjamin Ishii","doi":"10.1002/prs.12539","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12539","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract One of the core elements of fire protection for petrochemical processing plants is the consideration of passive fire protection (PFP). This general category, often referred to as fireproofing, is addressed in the American Petroleum Institute (API)‐recommended practice (RP) 2218. This RP provides guidelines for the selection and application of fireproofing with what is mostly a qualitative risk assessment approach. The logic focuses on predicting pool fires based on rough characterizations of system properties combined with equipment layout. Although pool fire impacts are often localized, jet fires can affect larger areas. API RP 2218 addresses jet fires in an appendix because of their unpredictable nature, leaving pool fire exposures as the default basis for structural fireproofing. To properly account for both fire types, fire exposure can be evaluated with quantitative risk analysis (QRA) tools that incorporate both jet and pool fire impacts for a wide variety of accident scenarios, weather conditions, and release orientations. By evaluating the thermal radiation impacts of fires in relation to the vulnerability of steel structural elements, a QRA‐based approach to placement of PFP can be achieved. This approach has the benefit of applying PFP where it is needed the most, to best protect a company's infrastructure.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"2015 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136062023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Sites have implemented process safety management (PSM) systems, initially for Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) PSM and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) risk management program (RMP) compliance. Then later, they adapted those systems for risk‐based process safety (RBPS). They discovered the power of leveraging these foundational systems of procedures, tools, and practices for numerous follow‐on initiatives: for example, action management, API‐1173, SIS/IEC‐61511; cybersecurity/IEC 62443; API‐754/Vision 2020 metrics; ISO 14001. Today, companies are increasingly serious about environmental, social, governance (ESG) issues, and demonstrate progress by leveraging the S&P global corporate sustainability assessment (CSA). Interestingly, 63% of the CSA elements rely on information directly or indirectly produced by PSM systems. The existing PSM systems may require additional data collection, or additional lifecycles, in their business processes to satisfy the ESG/CSA requirements. Process safety professionals have a critically important role in supporting local and corporate ESG initiatives. ESG initiatives are indeed the “new game in town” to promote continuous improvement in process safety.
{"title":"<scp>Environmental, social, governance</scp>: The future of <scp>process safety management</scp> or repeat of the past?","authors":"Rainer Hoff, Kathy Shell","doi":"10.1002/prs.12535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12535","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Sites have implemented process safety management (PSM) systems, initially for Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) PSM and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) risk management program (RMP) compliance. Then later, they adapted those systems for risk‐based process safety (RBPS). They discovered the power of leveraging these foundational systems of procedures, tools, and practices for numerous follow‐on initiatives: for example, action management, API‐1173, SIS/IEC‐61511; cybersecurity/IEC 62443; API‐754/Vision 2020 metrics; ISO 14001. Today, companies are increasingly serious about environmental, social, governance (ESG) issues, and demonstrate progress by leveraging the S&P global corporate sustainability assessment (CSA). Interestingly, 63% of the CSA elements rely on information directly or indirectly produced by PSM systems. The existing PSM systems may require additional data collection, or additional lifecycles, in their business processes to satisfy the ESG/CSA requirements. Process safety professionals have a critically important role in supporting local and corporate ESG initiatives. ESG initiatives are indeed the “new game in town” to promote continuous improvement in process safety.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"233 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135305848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Large‐scale fumigation of grain silos is a strategy to mitigate infestation of the bulk material. A common fumigant precursor for grain processes is aluminum phosphide, which exothermically decomposes in the presence of moisture (from the grain or air) to the toxic fumigant: phosphine gas. To overcome the hazards of exothermic decomposition and phosphine exposure, aluminum phosphide pellets can be metered into the silo's grain feed to distribute them throughout the grain more evenly. This approach decreases the decomposition rate of aluminum phosphide, better distributes heat generation to avoid igniting grain, and sustains a phosphine gas concentration well below the pyrophoric concentration—all while achieving the fumigation objectives. During a fumigation activity, a large explosion occurred within a group of silos at a grain elevator complex. Dust explosions are a common hazard for grain handling facilities, but this incident was caused by the autoignition of a phosphine gas cloud inside the conveyor tunnels. It was only through post‐incident evaluations of the grain flow dynamics and pellet addition activities that a gap between the desired pellet distribution and the incident conditions was identified. As a result, a new insight into bulk grain handling and safe fumigation was developed.
{"title":"An unexpected explosion while fumigating a grain silo: It wasn't the dust","authors":"Trevor Lardinois, Delmar “Trey” Morrison, Daniela Revez","doi":"10.1002/prs.12537","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12537","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Large‐scale fumigation of grain silos is a strategy to mitigate infestation of the bulk material. A common fumigant precursor for grain processes is aluminum phosphide, which exothermically decomposes in the presence of moisture (from the grain or air) to the toxic fumigant: phosphine gas. To overcome the hazards of exothermic decomposition and phosphine exposure, aluminum phosphide pellets can be metered into the silo's grain feed to distribute them throughout the grain more evenly. This approach decreases the decomposition rate of aluminum phosphide, better distributes heat generation to avoid igniting grain, and sustains a phosphine gas concentration well below the pyrophoric concentration—all while achieving the fumigation objectives. During a fumigation activity, a large explosion occurred within a group of silos at a grain elevator complex. Dust explosions are a common hazard for grain handling facilities, but this incident was caused by the autoignition of a phosphine gas cloud inside the conveyor tunnels. It was only through post‐incident evaluations of the grain flow dynamics and pellet addition activities that a gap between the desired pellet distribution and the incident conditions was identified. As a result, a new insight into bulk grain handling and safe fumigation was developed.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135981106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The role of human error is the subject of various case studies on process safety incidents worldwide. To improve the situation and minimize the impact of human error, efforts are widely focused on the external job situation, such as job design, and the rules of rewards and punishments. Furthermore, organizations have opted to improve individual conditions such as job competencies and skills development. It is the aim of human factors engineering to maximize the potential of human performance in preventing process safety incidents. However, little attention is paid to the internal motivational process that occurs in an individual participating in the incident. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to bridge the gap and to highlight the role of motivational behavior in developing human performance or in executing actions that lead to human error. Human behavior and motivation widely vary within organizations. Therefore, organizations may benefit from the motivational theories that are widely used in the study of organizational behavior. The theoretical approach to motivation is separated into two main categories: inner motivation and outer motivation. Moreover, inner motivational theory is also subdivided into rational factors and irrational factors. The theories applied in this paper exemplify and combine the use of motivational theories in improving human performance and preventing process safety incidents. Based on the analysis, key recommendations are generated that can be implemented to improve human performance as part of the process safety management system.
{"title":"The role of motivation in human performance and in minimizing the impact of human error","authors":"Ritche Niño Li","doi":"10.1002/prs.12536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12536","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The role of human error is the subject of various case studies on process safety incidents worldwide. To improve the situation and minimize the impact of human error, efforts are widely focused on the external job situation, such as job design, and the rules of rewards and punishments. Furthermore, organizations have opted to improve individual conditions such as job competencies and skills development. It is the aim of human factors engineering to maximize the potential of human performance in preventing process safety incidents. However, little attention is paid to the internal motivational process that occurs in an individual participating in the incident. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to bridge the gap and to highlight the role of motivational behavior in developing human performance or in executing actions that lead to human error. Human behavior and motivation widely vary within organizations. Therefore, organizations may benefit from the motivational theories that are widely used in the study of organizational behavior. The theoretical approach to motivation is separated into two main categories: inner motivation and outer motivation. Moreover, inner motivational theory is also subdivided into rational factors and irrational factors. The theories applied in this paper exemplify and combine the use of motivational theories in improving human performance and preventing process safety incidents. Based on the analysis, key recommendations are generated that can be implemented to improve human performance as part of the process safety management system.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136073310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Safety instrumented systems (SISs) are generally used against process safety hazards with the potential to severely injure, or even kill, personnel or members of the public. Reactive processes are a common application for SISs due to the potential for significant energy release during the reaction, which tends to cause catastrophic rupture of the vessel. While some applications can address the reactive hazard by closing emergency block valves, others may require blowdowns, kill agents, and other complex response actions. The more that needs to be done to address the reaction, the more complicated the SIS, resulting in the need for more experienced process engineering involvement to get the design right. The protection layers allocated to manage the risk of reactive applications typically focus on the prevention of runaway reactions by ensuring that the temperature or pressure never reach an unsafe state. This seems straightforward, but reactive processes can respond to loss of control in ways that are more difficult to predict, so the specification of trip point, response time, and sensor architecture requires more analysis than typical SIS. This paper discusses some of the unique challenges posed by reactive applications and provides examples to illustrate how to overcome these challenges.
{"title":"Overcome the challenges of implementing <scp>safety instrumented systems</scp> for reactive processes","authors":"Eloise Roche, Angela E. Summers","doi":"10.1002/prs.12534","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12534","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Safety instrumented systems (SISs) are generally used against process safety hazards with the potential to severely injure, or even kill, personnel or members of the public. Reactive processes are a common application for SISs due to the potential for significant energy release during the reaction, which tends to cause catastrophic rupture of the vessel. While some applications can address the reactive hazard by closing emergency block valves, others may require blowdowns, kill agents, and other complex response actions. The more that needs to be done to address the reaction, the more complicated the SIS, resulting in the need for more experienced process engineering involvement to get the design right. The protection layers allocated to manage the risk of reactive applications typically focus on the prevention of runaway reactions by ensuring that the temperature or pressure never reach an unsafe state. This seems straightforward, but reactive processes can respond to loss of control in ways that are more difficult to predict, so the specification of trip point, response time, and sensor architecture requires more analysis than typical SIS. This paper discusses some of the unique challenges posed by reactive applications and provides examples to illustrate how to overcome these challenges.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136071715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J. Zakaria, Che Rosmani Che Hassan, M. D. Hamid, E. H. Sukadarin
In 2022, there were 4514 reported cases of occupational accidents in Malaysian manufacturing industry, which is the highest among the sectors. Although governmental regulations mandate the use of personal protective equipment and safe working procedures, workers still take risks while completing their job. Behavioral‐based safety (BBS) approach has become a reliable way for correcting workers' behavior and improving their safety performance. This article presents findings from the BBS safety intervention program and reports its effectiveness in increasing the number of workers performing safe acts. The developed program, namely BSOP (behavior‐based safety observation program), use four basic principles: (i) goal‐setting, (ii) behavioral observation, (iii) constructive feedback, and (iv) reward and celebration. During execution, behavioral observation was conducted daily by appointed observers for 4 months. Results showed that the program reduced at‐risk behavior (measured by the percent increase of safe acts) from 61% during baseline to 73% and 82% during the first and second behavioral observation cycles toward 14 identified targeted behavior. This study presents a comprehensive and structured process of developing safety interventions. It contributes to our understanding of the significant effects of changes in targeted behavior due to the success of the safety intervention program.
{"title":"The effectiveness of behavior‐based safety observation program (BSOP) in the chemical manufacturing industry","authors":"J. Zakaria, Che Rosmani Che Hassan, M. D. Hamid, E. H. Sukadarin","doi":"10.1002/prs.12533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12533","url":null,"abstract":"In 2022, there were 4514 reported cases of occupational accidents in Malaysian manufacturing industry, which is the highest among the sectors. Although governmental regulations mandate the use of personal protective equipment and safe working procedures, workers still take risks while completing their job. Behavioral‐based safety (BBS) approach has become a reliable way for correcting workers' behavior and improving their safety performance. This article presents findings from the BBS safety intervention program and reports its effectiveness in increasing the number of workers performing safe acts. The developed program, namely BSOP (behavior‐based safety observation program), use four basic principles: (i) goal‐setting, (ii) behavioral observation, (iii) constructive feedback, and (iv) reward and celebration. During execution, behavioral observation was conducted daily by appointed observers for 4 months. Results showed that the program reduced at‐risk behavior (measured by the percent increase of safe acts) from 61% during baseline to 73% and 82% during the first and second behavioral observation cycles toward 14 identified targeted behavior. This study presents a comprehensive and structured process of developing safety interventions. It contributes to our understanding of the significant effects of changes in targeted behavior due to the success of the safety intervention program.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48410344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to Book Review of “Fire Protection Handbook®: National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). Vol 1 and 2. 21st ed. 2023. p. 3800. $749. ISBN: 978‐1‐455929‐1‐39”","authors":"","doi":"10.1002/prs.12532","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12532","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41321852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This study provides a defensible argument for the inclusion of the A2 Pasquill weather parameter in dispersion modeling, in addition to the typical F2 and D5. The A2 parameter conservatively models gas releases that concentrate at ground level, thus allowing for a more robust design of vent heights, surrounding structures/equipment and safety measures. For this investigation, 12 case studies of common hydrocarbon and aromatic gas mixtures were developed in PHAST (Process Hazard Analysis Software Tool) version 8.6. Each case varied in temperature, release pressure (velocity), and molecular weight (MW) to simulate dense gases likely to tend toward ground level. Subsequently, each case study was modeled with the Pasquill Atmospheric Stability Classes, A2, D5, and F2, to visualize the dispersion of dense gases under different weather conditions and evaluate which weather parameter would be most inclusive of high‐severity scenarios. Results demonstrate that dense (colder than dew point, heavy, pressurized) gases yield highest ground‐level concentrations using the A2 atmospheric condition, and the further the release temperature falls below the mixture's dew point, the greater the mixture concentration at ground level. Consequence modeling recommendations are discussed, and specific gas properties are addressed that necessitate using a model that is conservative in its estimation of ground‐level concentrations.
{"title":"Case study: Investigating the effect of the <scp>A2</scp> Pasquill atmospheric condition on the dispersion modeling of heavy gases","authors":"Alia Nathani, Chee Seang Ong","doi":"10.1002/prs.12531","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12531","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This study provides a defensible argument for the inclusion of the A2 Pasquill weather parameter in dispersion modeling, in addition to the typical F2 and D5. The A2 parameter conservatively models gas releases that concentrate at ground level, thus allowing for a more robust design of vent heights, surrounding structures/equipment and safety measures. For this investigation, 12 case studies of common hydrocarbon and aromatic gas mixtures were developed in PHAST (Process Hazard Analysis Software Tool) version 8.6. Each case varied in temperature, release pressure (velocity), and molecular weight (MW) to simulate dense gases likely to tend toward ground level. Subsequently, each case study was modeled with the Pasquill Atmospheric Stability Classes, A2, D5, and F2, to visualize the dispersion of dense gases under different weather conditions and evaluate which weather parameter would be most inclusive of high‐severity scenarios. Results demonstrate that dense (colder than dew point, heavy, pressurized) gases yield highest ground‐level concentrations using the A2 atmospheric condition, and the further the release temperature falls below the mixture's dew point, the greater the mixture concentration at ground level. Consequence modeling recommendations are discussed, and specific gas properties are addressed that necessitate using a model that is conservative in its estimation of ground‐level concentrations.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135033632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Process safety incidents in the oil and gas industry can have serious consequences. In the United States and Malaysia, standards for process safety management (PSM) have been established by US OSHA and PETRONAS, respectively. However, these standards are not always properly understood or followed by employers, resulting in ineffective safety programs and uncontrolled hazards. Plug and abandonment (P&A) activities in the upstream oil and gas industry require high control of well barriers. To assess the gap between PSM industrial standards and crew awareness in P&A activities, a study was conducted throughout one cycle of the project campaign. The study found that 70% of offshore crews had a high awareness level of the health, safety, and environment management system (HSEMS) and PSM, and 96% compliance was achieved from audit activities. However, two proposed PSM elements scored low in the assessment, indicating a need for improvement in site implementation. The study provides valuable information for offshore crews and readers seeking to improve and assess PSM elements in process safety. The results can help identify and control potential hazards related to technical safety, operational safety, and personnel safety. Furthermore, the study aims to support the development and implementation of PSM standards in Malaysia.
{"title":"Improving PSM and HSEMS compliance in Malaysian upstream oil and gas industry: A case study assessment for plug and abandonment activities","authors":"Mohd Shazman Zulkiply, S. A. Hussain","doi":"10.1002/prs.12527","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12527","url":null,"abstract":"Process safety incidents in the oil and gas industry can have serious consequences. In the United States and Malaysia, standards for process safety management (PSM) have been established by US OSHA and PETRONAS, respectively. However, these standards are not always properly understood or followed by employers, resulting in ineffective safety programs and uncontrolled hazards. Plug and abandonment (P&A) activities in the upstream oil and gas industry require high control of well barriers. To assess the gap between PSM industrial standards and crew awareness in P&A activities, a study was conducted throughout one cycle of the project campaign. The study found that 70% of offshore crews had a high awareness level of the health, safety, and environment management system (HSEMS) and PSM, and 96% compliance was achieved from audit activities. However, two proposed PSM elements scored low in the assessment, indicating a need for improvement in site implementation. The study provides valuable information for offshore crews and readers seeking to improve and assess PSM elements in process safety. The results can help identify and control potential hazards related to technical safety, operational safety, and personnel safety. Furthermore, the study aims to support the development and implementation of PSM standards in Malaysia.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47279821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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