Process Safety ProgressEarly View EDITORIAL Our lives as Process Safety Progress editors John F. Murphy, John F. Murphy orcid.org/0000-0002-7119-8566 Process Safety Services, Punta Gorda, FL, USASearch for more papers by this authorRonald J. Willey, Corresponding Author Ronald J. Willey [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0001-8491-9302 Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts, USA Correspondence Ronald J. Willey, Retired, Department of Chemical Engineering, Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02115, USA. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author John F. Murphy, John F. Murphy orcid.org/0000-0002-7119-8566 Process Safety Services, Punta Gorda, FL, USASearch for more papers by this authorRonald J. Willey, Corresponding Author Ronald J. Willey [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0001-8491-9302 Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts, USA Correspondence Ronald J. Willey, Retired, Department of Chemical Engineering, Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02115, USA. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 01 November 2023 https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12549Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Early ViewOnline Version of Record before inclusion in an issue RelatedInformation
过程安全进展早期查看社论我们作为过程安全进展的生活编辑John F. Murphy, John F. Murphy orcid.org/0000-0002-7119-8566过程安全服务，Punta Gorda, FL，美国搜索作者Ronald J. Willey的更多论文，通讯作者Ronald J. Willey [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0001-8491-9302美国马萨诸塞州波士顿东北大学通讯Ronald J. Willey，退休，化学工程系，东北大学，波士顿，马02115，美国电子邮件:[Email protected]搜索本文作者John F. Murphy的更多论文orcid.org/0000-0002-7119-8566过程安全服务，Punta Gorda, FL, USA搜索本文作者Ronald J. Willey的更多论文，通讯作者Ronald J. Willey [Email protected] orcid.org/0000-0001-8491-9302美国马萨诸塞州波士顿东北大学通讯Ronald J. Willey，退休，东北大学化学工程系，Boston, MA 02115, USA。邮箱:[Email protected]搜索本文作者的更多论文首次发表:2023年11月1日https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12549Read全文taboutpdf ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare给予accessShare全文accessShare全文accessShare全文accessShare请查看我们的使用条款和条件，并在下面的复选框中选择分享文章的全文版本。我已经阅读并接受了Wiley在线图书馆使用共享链接的条款和条件，请使用下面的链接与您的朋友和同事分享本文的全文版本。学习更多的知识。复制URL共享链接共享一个emailfacebooktwitterlinkedinreddit微信本文无摘要在包含问题之前的早期视图在线记录版本相关信息
{"title":"Our lives as <i>Process Safety Progress</i> editors","authors":"John F. Murphy, Ronald J. Willey","doi":"10.1002/prs.12549","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12549","url":null,"abstract":"Process Safety ProgressEarly View EDITORIAL Our lives as Process Safety Progress editors John F. Murphy, John F. Murphy orcid.org/0000-0002-7119-8566 Process Safety Services, Punta Gorda, FL, USASearch for more papers by this authorRonald J. Willey, Corresponding Author Ronald J. Willey [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0001-8491-9302 Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts, USA Correspondence Ronald J. Willey, Retired, Department of Chemical Engineering, Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02115, USA. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author John F. Murphy, John F. Murphy orcid.org/0000-0002-7119-8566 Process Safety Services, Punta Gorda, FL, USASearch for more papers by this authorRonald J. Willey, Corresponding Author Ronald J. Willey [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0001-8491-9302 Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts, USA Correspondence Ronald J. Willey, Retired, Department of Chemical Engineering, Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02115, USA. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 01 November 2023 https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12549Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Early ViewOnline Version of Record before inclusion in an issue RelatedInformation","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"179 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135371367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.
数据共享不适用于本文，因为在当前研究期间没有生成或分析数据集。
{"title":"Process Safety Primer","authors":"Michael Snyder","doi":"10.1002/prs.12550","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12550","url":null,"abstract":"Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"106 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135373259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The concepts and applications of cases in human factors (HFs), risk, reliability, and crisis, include the analysis of complex systems and difficult to predict sociotechnical systems. Rules and barriers are designed or revised to achieve better organizational efficiency results. The investigation then valuates the concepts such as the basis, the tests such as confirmation, the algorithms such as methods and tools, and the validation that indicates the certainty of achieving good results. The human elements (HE) are part of the design and can either disable or enable the flow of hazard energy. The intention is that these HEs inside the safety culture and technology design act as safeguards. The HE avoids design deficiencies, social and physical. HE can reduce load over the resistance capacity. The culture, social phenomenon, company project, management and staff, group and worker, operational control, failure control, and accident and disaster are classes of HF that transform hazard energy and need efficient HE barriers. The internal and external regulation after these discussions needs to revise its principles to correct processes of standardization and organizational communication, which would change the procedures for team building and the criteria for the technology project. An improvement program includes investigation of lessons learned and behavior treatment.
{"title":"Organizational control for safety: A challenge in socioeconomic and natural environment","authors":"Salvador Ávila Filho","doi":"10.1002/prs.12530","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12530","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The concepts and applications of cases in human factors (HFs), risk, reliability, and crisis, include the analysis of complex systems and difficult to predict sociotechnical systems. Rules and barriers are designed or revised to achieve better organizational efficiency results. The investigation then valuates the concepts such as the basis, the tests such as confirmation, the algorithms such as methods and tools, and the validation that indicates the certainty of achieving good results. The human elements (HE) are part of the design and can either disable or enable the flow of hazard energy. The intention is that these HEs inside the safety culture and technology design act as safeguards. The HE avoids design deficiencies, social and physical. HE can reduce load over the resistance capacity. The culture, social phenomenon, company project, management and staff, group and worker, operational control, failure control, and accident and disaster are classes of HF that transform hazard energy and need efficient HE barriers. The internal and external regulation after these discussions needs to revise its principles to correct processes of standardization and organizational communication, which would change the procedures for team building and the criteria for the technology project. An improvement program includes investigation of lessons learned and behavior treatment.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"PE-1 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135168226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Josué Eduardo Maia França, Maria Inês Vaz, Brenda Rodrigues Coutinho, Luís Pina
Abstract This study presents a reanalysis of the Imperial Sugar refinery accident that occurred in February 2008, in Georgia, USA, using functional resonance analysis method (FRAM) and based on technical‐scientific materials and the official reports. This explosion was fueled by sugar dust in the packaging building of the refinery, causing 14 fatalities and injuring 38 workers. The purpose of this reanalysis is to seek factors and interactions that could not be well analyzed or evidenced using traditional accident investigation techniques, which are primally designed to analyze linear systems. This reanalysis with FRAM allowed us to perceive the influence of organizational elements, such as culture, in the accidental chain of the event, highlighting the need of a broader approach for accidents involving high‐tech process industries. In this sense, FRAM enabled a more comprehensive analysis of the complex functioning of process plants, for both normal operation and in emergency. It was noticed that the greater the complexity of work systems, the greater the interaction and variability between personnel, equipment, and systems, requiring analysis techniques and methodologies capable of recognizing the real complexities that take place in these sociotechnical systems, especially in high‐tech process plants, such as the sugar refinery in this case.
{"title":"Analyzing organizational gaps in process accidents with <scp>FRAM</scp>: The case of the Imperial Sugar refinery explosion (2008)","authors":"Josué Eduardo Maia França, Maria Inês Vaz, Brenda Rodrigues Coutinho, Luís Pina","doi":"10.1002/prs.12545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12545","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This study presents a reanalysis of the Imperial Sugar refinery accident that occurred in February 2008, in Georgia, USA, using functional resonance analysis method (FRAM) and based on technical‐scientific materials and the official reports. This explosion was fueled by sugar dust in the packaging building of the refinery, causing 14 fatalities and injuring 38 workers. The purpose of this reanalysis is to seek factors and interactions that could not be well analyzed or evidenced using traditional accident investigation techniques, which are primally designed to analyze linear systems. This reanalysis with FRAM allowed us to perceive the influence of organizational elements, such as culture, in the accidental chain of the event, highlighting the need of a broader approach for accidents involving high‐tech process industries. In this sense, FRAM enabled a more comprehensive analysis of the complex functioning of process plants, for both normal operation and in emergency. It was noticed that the greater the complexity of work systems, the greater the interaction and variability between personnel, equipment, and systems, requiring analysis techniques and methodologies capable of recognizing the real complexities that take place in these sociotechnical systems, especially in high‐tech process plants, such as the sugar refinery in this case.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"60 8","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135322547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.
数据共享不适用于本文，因为在当前研究期间没有生成或分析数据集。
{"title":"What is in a name?","authors":"Jerry Forest, Lisa Long","doi":"10.1002/prs.12547","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12547","url":null,"abstract":"Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"48 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135413821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Process Safety ProgressEarly View Safety and Health News Safety and Health News John F. Murphy, Corresponding Author John F. Murphy PE, Editor [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0002-7119-8566 Search for more papers by this author John F. Murphy, Corresponding Author John F. Murphy PE, Editor [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0002-7119-8566 Search for more papers by this author First published: 20 October 2023 https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12546Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Early ViewOnline Version of Record before inclusion in an issue RelatedInformation
{"title":"Safety and Health News","authors":"John F. Murphy","doi":"10.1002/prs.12546","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12546","url":null,"abstract":"Process Safety ProgressEarly View Safety and Health News Safety and Health News John F. Murphy, Corresponding Author John F. Murphy PE, Editor [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0002-7119-8566 Search for more papers by this author John F. Murphy, Corresponding Author John F. Murphy PE, Editor [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0002-7119-8566 Search for more papers by this author First published: 20 October 2023 https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12546Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Early ViewOnline Version of Record before inclusion in an issue RelatedInformation","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135618102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tekin Kunt, Madonna Breen, Seçkin Gökçe, Mike Munsil
Abstract Usually, a gap analysis is conducted to address challenges encountered when building a process safety management (PSM) system from scratch, or for improving an already existing PSM program. Business maturity models, on the other hand, are useful management frameworks used to gauge the maturity of an organization in various disciplines or functions. The purpose of this paper is to introduce an adaptation of business maturity models to the PSM area.
{"title":"Maturity model approach for building effective process safety management systems","authors":"Tekin Kunt, Madonna Breen, Seçkin Gökçe, Mike Munsil","doi":"10.1002/prs.12543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12543","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Usually, a gap analysis is conducted to address challenges encountered when building a process safety management (PSM) system from scratch, or for improving an already existing PSM program. Business maturity models, on the other hand, are useful management frameworks used to gauge the maturity of an organization in various disciplines or functions. The purpose of this paper is to introduce an adaptation of business maturity models to the PSM area.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136142716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract As the world continues to enact progressive climate change targets, renewable energy solutions are needed to achieve these goals. One such solution is large‐scale lithium‐ion battery (LIB) energy storage systems which are at the forefront in ensuring that solar‐ and wind‐generated power is delivered when the grids need it most. However, the perceived hazards of LIBs due to recent events in the United States and Australia pose a risk to their future success. When a battery energy storage system (BESS) has a multilayered approach to safety, the thermal runaway, fire, and explosion hazards can be mitigated. Successful implementation of this approach requires cooperation, collaboration, and education across all stakeholder groups to break down these preconceived notions. Much can be learned from the recent BESS fire and explosion events to inform safer design and operation. These events and their contributing factors share many commonalities with historic losses in the hydrocarbon industry. Fire and process safety engineers who have traditionally worked in the hydrocarbon industry can be of immense value to the BESS industry.
{"title":"Introduction to <scp>grid‐scale</scp> battery energy storage system concepts and fire hazards","authors":"Veronica Goldsmith","doi":"10.1002/prs.12541","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12541","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract As the world continues to enact progressive climate change targets, renewable energy solutions are needed to achieve these goals. One such solution is large‐scale lithium‐ion battery (LIB) energy storage systems which are at the forefront in ensuring that solar‐ and wind‐generated power is delivered when the grids need it most. However, the perceived hazards of LIBs due to recent events in the United States and Australia pose a risk to their future success. When a battery energy storage system (BESS) has a multilayered approach to safety, the thermal runaway, fire, and explosion hazards can be mitigated. Successful implementation of this approach requires cooperation, collaboration, and education across all stakeholder groups to break down these preconceived notions. Much can be learned from the recent BESS fire and explosion events to inform safer design and operation. These events and their contributing factors share many commonalities with historic losses in the hydrocarbon industry. Fire and process safety engineers who have traditionally worked in the hydrocarbon industry can be of immense value to the BESS industry.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135803752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article discusses some accidents and uses consequence analysis as well as layer of protection analysis (LOPA) and bow‐tie to establish the best approach for safely controlling the process to avoid loss of containment due to overfilling. Four accidents and their aftermaths are examined, considering current investigations. Consequence analysis was used with 12 products to demonstrate how to determine the level of protection of the systems to reduce the likelihood of containment loss due to overflow. Finally, LOPA and bow‐tie were used to ensure that the systems have adequate protection at an acceptable level of risk tolerance and will be correctly maintained throughout their life cycle. The analyses indicated that an independent layer of protection with safety integrity level 2 was required to achieve the risk tolerance requirement of <10 −4 /year, which is a known and widely accepted frequency when an accident has the potential to result in a fatality. Furthermore, a study of degradation factors and controls was performed to enhance the reliability of all the components that interfere with the frequency of the top event. This will improve process safety throughout the system's lifecycle, and the results will also be input for safeguards audits.
{"title":"Consequence analysis, layer of protection analysis, and bow‐tie as strategies to prevent accidents","authors":"Elisio Carvalho Silva","doi":"10.1002/prs.12542","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12542","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article discusses some accidents and uses consequence analysis as well as layer of protection analysis (LOPA) and bow‐tie to establish the best approach for safely controlling the process to avoid loss of containment due to overfilling. Four accidents and their aftermaths are examined, considering current investigations. Consequence analysis was used with 12 products to demonstrate how to determine the level of protection of the systems to reduce the likelihood of containment loss due to overflow. Finally, LOPA and bow‐tie were used to ensure that the systems have adequate protection at an acceptable level of risk tolerance and will be correctly maintained throughout their life cycle. The analyses indicated that an independent layer of protection with safety integrity level 2 was required to achieve the risk tolerance requirement of <10 −4 /year, which is a known and widely accepted frequency when an accident has the potential to result in a fatality. Furthermore, a study of degradation factors and controls was performed to enhance the reliability of all the components that interfere with the frequency of the top event. This will improve process safety throughout the system's lifecycle, and the results will also be input for safeguards audits.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135917857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract A review of historic mathematical, risk, and engineering science information was conducted to find the roots of the risk matrix. The objective was to locate and evaluate information surrounding its use. A three‐tiered (low, medium, high) system is historical, if not biologically programmed into human physiology. The Risk Matrix is a Likert preference system that has migrated into engineering and science. No testing or mathematical foundation was found.
{"title":"Retrospective on the risk matrix, part 1","authors":"James A. Moseman","doi":"10.1002/prs.12540","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12540","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A review of historic mathematical, risk, and engineering science information was conducted to find the roots of the risk matrix. The objective was to locate and evaluate information surrounding its use. A three‐tiered (low, medium, high) system is historical, if not biologically programmed into human physiology. The Risk Matrix is a Likert preference system that has migrated into engineering and science. No testing or mathematical foundation was found.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136211202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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