This paper investigates whether minorities always benefit from financial inclusion. We show that the Freedman's Savings Bank, established in 1865 after the Civil War, collected deposits from recently freed enslaved people through an intensive marketing campaign based on coercive language and false claims. The advertising intensified when the bank started offering fraudulent loans to white businessmen, contributing to the bank failure in 1874. Our findings support a predatory view of financial inclusion: the negative effects of the large fraud and abuse of trust at the bank led to significant losses for Black depositors.
{"title":"The Impact of Financial Inclusion on Minorities: Evidence from the Freedman's Savings Bank","authors":"Claire Célérier, Purnoor Tak","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3825143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3825143","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates whether minorities always benefit from financial inclusion. We show that the Freedman's Savings Bank, established in 1865 after the Civil War, collected deposits from recently freed enslaved people through an intensive marketing campaign based on coercive language and false claims. The advertising intensified when the bank started offering fraudulent loans to white businessmen, contributing to the bank failure in 1874. Our findings support a predatory view of financial inclusion: the negative effects of the large fraud and abuse of trust at the bank led to significant losses for Black depositors.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88789018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A. Genovese, V. Falce, Simone Alvaro, Lucia Marzialetti, Davide Tuzzolino, Marco Cassese, G. Colangelo, Oscar Borgogno, A. Manganelli, M. ManzI, Cecilia Sertoli, andrea colaruotolo, Matteo Siragusa
Italian Abstract: Le interferenze e reciproche intersezioni fra regolazione, innovazione finanziaria e innovazione tecnologica si inquadrano a pieno titolo nella quarta rivoluzione digitale. La disruption a cui si assiste è di tipo intersettoriale, si caratterizza per processi di “contaminazione” tra soggetti e mercati, modelli e categorie, architetture e geometrie.
Nella nuova era disintermediata e decentralizzata, operatori, banche, intermediari e soggetti terzi elaborano, definiscono, personalizzano e offrono prodotti e servizi, ricorrendo a tecniche predittive ed intelligenti che usano e riusano dati personali, anonimizzati e commerciali, abbinando quelli “esterni”, estratti dal magma della rete, con quelli propri del patrimonio aziendale, e come tali “interni” all’impresa, in un ciclo continuo.
Muovendo da queste premesse, il Quaderno si propone di analizzare il Data space sotto il profilo dell’oggetto (i dati), dei soggetti (vecchi e nuovi), delle responsabilità e dei diritti, ma solo dopo aver messo a fuoco la cornice regolamentare rilevante, che costituisce il perno essenziale e imprescindibile per mappare e di qui esprimere linee di policy anche in tema di portabilità di dati. Seguendo la predetta linea, nella Prima Parte, il Quaderno si concentra sul quadro normativo. Dall’assunto secondo cui la rapidità della diffusione delle nuove tecnologie, oltre i confini territoriali ed economici, impone un ripensamento delle tradizionali tecniche di regolamentazione, si affrontano i limiti della matrice regolatoria disegnata negli anni‘ 90 e i profili di tecnologia regolatoria necessari per cogliere i cambiamenti e ripensare il quadro normativo in un’ottica di cooperazione tra Autorità nazionali e coordinamento fra i diversi ordinamenti nazionali, e con l’obiettivo chiaro di contemperare gli interessi in gioco e tutelare i diritti fondamentali.
Nella Seconda Parte, invece, le questioni della portabilità e della condivisione dei dati sono analizzate con riferimento ai flussi informativi e ai soggetti coinvolti, sotto il duplice aspetto degli ambiti di responsabilità degli attori e delle ricadute in punto di tutela dei clienti e degli investitori. L’emersione di Third Party Providers insieme al rafforzamento di costitutori di banche dati e titolari dei software getta le basi per una rinnovata competizione incentrata sull’uso delle Smart Technologies nello scenario dell’Open Banking e impone una attenta riflessione su ruoli e funzioni, nonché sulla catena delle eventuali responsabilità.
Attraverso i predetti snodi, il Quaderno propone un solido approccio ricostruttivo e sistematico per inquadrare le nuove sfide e intercettare i rischi associati alla trasformazione digitale con particolare riferimento alla disciplina inerente ai flussi di dati. In tal ambito, infatti, la migrazione dei servizi finanziari verso ambienti sempre più digitali e caratterizzati da una normativa frammentaria e settoriale, rischia di sf
意大利摘要:监管、金融创新和技术创新之间的相互作用是第四次数字革命的一部分。我们所看到的破坏是跨部门的，其特点是参与者和市场、模型和类别、架构和几何之间的“污染”过程。在新时代disintermediata和分散、从业人员、银行、中介机构和第三方拟订、确定、个性化和提供产品和服务,通过智能预测技术和使用个人数据,但riusano anonimizzati和商业,结合外部的“”,摘自网络的岩浆,其内部管理遗产,就像这些“公司”,在一个持续的周期。在这一背景下,本节的目的是分析太空物体的角度来看,(日)、(新老受数据),权利和责任,但只有火了后监管框架至关重要,这是至关重要的核心,并绘制的也在这里表达的方针政策和数据可移植性的问题。在第一部分中，我们将重点放在监管框架上。的前提是,即迅速传播新技术,在领土和经济之外,传统的监管技术,要求改变主意,范围涉及‘90年代和监管矩阵设计方面变化所需的监管技术和重新考虑的国家当局之间的合作框架和国家不同法律制度之间的协调,其明确目标是平衡利害攸关的利益和保护基本权利。然而，在第二部分中，可移植性和数据共享问题是根据信息流动和利益相关者的责任范围以及对客户和投资者的保护影响来分析的。第三个提供者的出现，加上数据库和软件持有者的加强，为在开放银行环境中使用智能技术的重新竞争奠定了基础，并要求仔细考虑角色和职能以及可能的责任链。通过这些节点，它提出了一种强有力的、系统的、重建的方法，以应对新的挑战，并拦截与数字转换相关的风险，特别是与数据流相关的学科。事实上，在这一领域，金融服务向日益数字化、监管支离破碎和部门支离破碎的环境的迁移，有可能导致保护差距，从而破坏人们对金融体系及其稳定的信心。它以重建的明确性、法律的确定性和一般原则为指导，提供了防止这种情况发生的手段，从而保障投资者的保护和市场的完整性。英语摘要:监管、金融创新和技术创新在“第四次数字革命”中完全一体化。我们所目睹的破坏可以被视为部门间的，因为它是由党派和市场之间、模型和类别、建筑和测量之间的污染的非常严格的过程所证明的。在新的分散和分散的时代，运营商、银行、中介和第三方、流程、定义、个人和提供产品和服务、使用预测和智能技术以适应个人、匿名和商业数据的使用和保留。Furthermore，“外部”数据，从网络的岩浆中提取，与公司资产的所有权相结合，与我们可以作为“内部”循环的人相结合。On the of such基础到premises, the Paper proposes更新空间在职权of the object(日期)subjects (old and new)、意大利和人权,但只有之后集中On the或监管框架,该represents the essential and关键pivot for and, hence, expressing policy lines映射,在the field of portability日期。遵循这条线，第一部分，监管框架上的文件。
{"title":"La portabilità dei dati in ambito finanziario (Data Portability in the Financial Sector)","authors":"A. Genovese, V. Falce, Simone Alvaro, Lucia Marzialetti, Davide Tuzzolino, Marco Cassese, G. Colangelo, Oscar Borgogno, A. Manganelli, M. ManzI, Cecilia Sertoli, andrea colaruotolo, Matteo Siragusa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3850553","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3850553","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Italian Abstract:</b> Le interferenze e reciproche intersezioni fra regolazione, innovazione finanziaria e innovazione tecnologica si inquadrano a pieno titolo nella quarta rivoluzione digitale. La disruption a cui si assiste è di tipo intersettoriale, si caratterizza per processi di “contaminazione” tra soggetti e mercati, modelli e categorie, architetture e geometrie.<br><br>Nella nuova era disintermediata e decentralizzata, operatori, banche, intermediari e soggetti terzi elaborano, definiscono, personalizzano e offrono prodotti e servizi, ricorrendo a tecniche predittive ed intelligenti che usano e riusano dati personali, anonimizzati e commerciali, abbinando quelli “esterni”, estratti dal magma della rete, con quelli propri del patrimonio aziendale, e come tali “interni” all’impresa, in un ciclo continuo.<br><br>Muovendo da queste premesse, il Quaderno si propone di analizzare il Data space sotto il profilo dell’oggetto (i dati), dei soggetti (vecchi e nuovi), delle responsabilità e dei diritti, ma solo dopo aver messo a fuoco la cornice regolamentare rilevante, che costituisce il perno essenziale e imprescindibile per mappare e di qui esprimere linee di policy anche in tema di portabilità di dati.<br>Seguendo la predetta linea, nella Prima Parte, il Quaderno si concentra sul quadro normativo. Dall’assunto secondo cui la rapidità della diffusione delle nuove tecnologie, oltre i confini territoriali ed economici, impone un ripensamento delle tradizionali tecniche di regolamentazione, si affrontano i limiti della matrice regolatoria disegnata negli anni‘ 90 e i profili di tecnologia regolatoria necessari per cogliere i cambiamenti e ripensare il quadro normativo in un’ottica di cooperazione tra Autorità nazionali e coordinamento fra i diversi ordinamenti nazionali, e con l’obiettivo chiaro di contemperare gli interessi in gioco e tutelare i diritti fondamentali. <br><br>Nella Seconda Parte, invece, le questioni della portabilità e della condivisione dei dati sono analizzate con riferimento ai flussi informativi e ai soggetti coinvolti, sotto il duplice aspetto degli ambiti di responsabilità degli attori e delle ricadute in punto di tutela dei clienti e degli investitori. L’emersione di Third Party Providers insieme al rafforzamento di costitutori di banche dati e titolari dei software getta le basi per una rinnovata competizione incentrata sull’uso delle Smart Technologies nello scenario dell’Open Banking e impone una attenta riflessione su ruoli e funzioni, nonché sulla catena delle eventuali responsabilità.<br><br>Attraverso i predetti snodi, il Quaderno propone un solido approccio ricostruttivo e sistematico per inquadrare le nuove sfide e intercettare i rischi associati alla trasformazione digitale con particolare riferimento alla disciplina inerente ai flussi di dati. In tal ambito, infatti, la migrazione dei servizi finanziari verso ambienti sempre più digitali e caratterizzati da una normativa frammentaria e settoriale, rischia di sf","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90814766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While not formally a regulator in the strict sense, the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) exercises de facto regulatory powers in retail financial services, as its rules and determinations direct the behaviours of firms. While intended to be independent, the FOS has a close relationship with the Financial Conduct Authority. Ombudsmen, however, have considerable discretion to make determinations of complaints brought to them based on what they consider fair and reasonable in the circumstances and are not bound to follow law, regulation, and good industry practice. This has been described as a disapplication of the rule of law. The FOS has expanded its role from resolving complaints to "preventing detriment", which seems to overstep its statutory function. The formal expansion of its jurisdiction into small- and medium-sized business complaints and the increase in the limit of the amount of compensation it can award seem likely to further increase the complexity of its cases, calling into question the fairness of decisions and highlighting the need for greater transparency on internal decision-making policies. Increasing complexity and the higher amounts of financial compensation that may be awarded in some cases also suggest that there should be a review of the charging structure for FOS cases. While some form of alternative dispute resolution is necessary for consumers in dispute with financial service providers, there are signs that the way the FOS operates has introduced unfairness and uncertainty for firms. There is evidence of anti-competitive effects in lending and advice markets, and limited evidence of improvements in consumer outcomes in financial services generally. The FCA should undertake an investigation into the effect on competition of the FOS and its decisions. A more formal channel for dispute resolution in financial cases involving small and medium sized businesses (previously recommended by the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons) should be considered.
{"title":"Who Regulates the Regulators? The Financial Ombudsman Service","authors":"Institute of Economic Affairs Submitter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3850606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3850606","url":null,"abstract":"While not formally a regulator in the strict sense, the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) exercises de facto regulatory powers in retail financial services, as its rules and determinations direct the behaviours of firms. While intended to be independent, the FOS has a close relationship with the Financial Conduct Authority. Ombudsmen, however, have considerable discretion to make determinations of complaints brought to them based on what they consider fair and reasonable in the circumstances and are not bound to follow law, regulation, and good industry practice. This has been described as a disapplication of the rule of law. The FOS has expanded its role from resolving complaints to \"preventing detriment\", which seems to overstep its statutory function. The formal expansion of its jurisdiction into small- and medium-sized business complaints and the increase in the limit of the amount of compensation it can award seem likely to further increase the complexity of its cases, calling into question the fairness of decisions and highlighting the need for greater transparency on internal decision-making policies. Increasing complexity and the higher amounts of financial compensation that may be awarded in some cases also suggest that there should be a review of the charging structure for FOS cases. While some form of alternative dispute resolution is necessary for consumers in dispute with financial service providers, there are signs that the way the FOS operates has introduced unfairness and uncertainty for firms. There is evidence of anti-competitive effects in lending and advice markets, and limited evidence of improvements in consumer outcomes in financial services generally. The FCA should undertake an investigation into the effect on competition of the FOS and its decisions. A more formal channel for dispute resolution in financial cases involving small and medium sized businesses (previously recommended by the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons) should be considered.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85141645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the effect of an increase in capital requirements for residential mortgages on mortgage rates and house prices. We exploit a unique quasi-experiment in which affected banks faced an increase in risk weights of five percentage points. Using a difference-in-difference estimator we find that treated banks increase their mortgage rates by 18 basis points. Houses near affected banks have a 2.34% lower sale price after the increase in capital requirements. Our results imply a semi-elasticity of house prices to changes in mortgage rates of 13, in line with predictions from a user cost model.
{"title":"Capital Requirements, Mortgage Rates and House Prices","authors":"S. Damen, Stef Schildermans","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3829680","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3829680","url":null,"abstract":"We study the effect of an increase in capital requirements for residential mortgages on mortgage rates and house prices. We exploit a unique quasi-experiment in which affected banks faced an increase in risk weights of five percentage points. Using a difference-in-difference estimator we find that treated banks increase their mortgage rates by 18 basis points. Houses near affected banks have a 2.34% lower sale price after the increase in capital requirements. Our results imply a semi-elasticity of house prices to changes in mortgage rates of 13, in line with predictions from a user cost model.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"89 10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87707001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A short paper that reviews the recent regulatory action taken against Moody's by ESMA.
一篇简短的论文，回顾了ESMA最近对穆迪采取的监管行动。
{"title":"ESMA Fines for Moody’s: A Symptom of 'Big Business'","authors":"D. Cash","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3815691","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3815691","url":null,"abstract":"A short paper that reviews the recent regulatory action taken against Moody's by ESMA.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"263 1-2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78447795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Korean Abstract: 최근 DLF, 라임 및 옵티머스 사태 이후, 금융위와 금감원은 사모 집합투자시장에 제도적 미비점이 있다고 판단하고, 사모펀드의 유동성, 실질적 공모펀드의 형식적 사모펀드로의 탈바꿈 및 기타 투자자의 보호 개선안들을 제안하였다. 그러나 금융감독기관의 이러한 개선안만으로는 사모펀드사태의 재발을 방지할 수 있을지에 대한 의문이 있으며, 좀 더 근본적인 개선책이 필요하다고 보여진다. 추가 개선안으로 펀드의 마감일과 투자자산의 마감일의 미스매치 방지안, 펀드 목표수익율을 펀드광고물에 포함금지, 운용사로부터의 집중투자기구, 특히 일반투자자비율이 높은 사모펀드의 독립성 향상, 금융투자업자의 펀드와 투자자에 대한 주의의무와 충실의무의 정의 및 규제, 금융사기에 대한 금융투자업자의 책임강화, 투자권유자문인력의 실질적 투자적합성 검토 및 판단의무 이행 감독 및 금융사기 사건에서 과실상계원칙 배제 등을 제안한다.
English Abstract: The Korean financial regulators identified, in the wake of the recent hedge fund industry scandals of DLF, Lime Asset Management, and Optimus Asset Management, certain systemic gaps in the market oversight regime and proposed changes to reduce redemption and cash/maturity mismatchs, prevent abuse of private offering exemptions, and provide additional investor protection measures. In spite of the breadth of those policy changes, more fundamental changes may be needed to prevent the recurrence of the recent market misbehaviors – such additional changes may include prohibition of marketing funds with mismatching redemption schedules to the maturity or marketability of their investment assets; prohibition of including target yield rates in marketing; greater fund independence from investment advisors, especially for highly retailized hedge funds; stricter definition of the fiduciary duties of the advisers and sales companies with respect to the funds and investors; stricter reading of the securities fraud section in the Financial Services and Capital Markets Act (§178); stricter enforcement of the investment adviser rules and regulations; and exclusion of the comparative negligence rules in securities fraud cases for the benefit of the investors.
Korean Abstract:最近发生DLF、laime和optimus事件后，金融委员会和金融监督院认为私募集中投资市场存在制度上的不足之处，提出了私募基金的流动性、实际公募基金向形式上的私募基金的转变以及其他投资者的保护改善方案。但是，仅凭金融监督机构的这一改善案，能否防止私募基金事件再次发生还是个疑问，而且还需要更根本的改善对策。追加基金为改善案的最后收尾工作和投资资产的交易日小姐防止搭配方案,包括在基金收益率目标,广告,禁止来自技术机构进行投资运营公司,特别是普通投资者比例较高的私募基金的独立性,提高对金融投资业者的基金和投资者的注意义务,忠实义务的定义和限制,加强对金融诈骗金融投资业者的责任,建议对投资劝诱咨询人力的实质性投资适合性进行研究及监督履行判断义务及在金融诈骗事件中排除过失抵销原则等。english abstract:The Korean financial regulators identified, in The wake of The recent hedge fund industry scandals of DLF, Lime Asset Management, and Optimus Asset Managementcertain systemic gaps in the market oversight regime and proposed changes to reduce redemption and cash/maturity mismatchs, prevent abuse of private offering exemptions，and provide additional investor protection measures。In spite of the breadth of those policy changesmore fundamental changes may be needed to prevent the recurrence of the recent market misbehaviors - such additional changes may include prohibition of marketing funds with mismatching redemptionschedules to the maturity or marketability of their investment assets;prohibition of including target yield in marketing;greater fund independence from investment advisors, especially for highly retailized hedge funds;advisers and sales companies with respect to the funds and investors;金融服务和资本市场法案(§178);stricter enforcement of the investment adviser rules and regulations;and exclusion of the comparative negligence rules in securities fraud cases for the benefit of the investors。
{"title":"라임과 옵티머스 이후 사모펀드 시장 개선 방안 (Hedge Fund Regulatory Change Proposals after Lime and Optimus)","authors":"Myung Suk Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3814488","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3814488","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Korean Abstract:</b> 최근 DLF, 라임 및 옵티머스 사태 이후, 금융위와 금감원은 사모 집합투자시장에 제도적 미비점이 있다고 판단하고, 사모펀드의 유동성, 실질적 공모펀드의 형식적 사모펀드로의 탈바꿈 및 기타 투자자의 보호 개선안들을 제안하였다. 그러나 금융감독기관의 이러한 개선안만으로는 사모펀드사태의 재발을 방지할 수 있을지에 대한 의문이 있으며, 좀 더 근본적인 개선책이 필요하다고 보여진다. 추가 개선안으로 펀드의 마감일과 투자자산의 마감일의 미스매치 방지안, 펀드 목표수익율을 펀드광고물에 포함금지, 운용사로부터의 집중투자기구, 특히 일반투자자비율이 높은 사모펀드의 독립성 향상, 금융투자업자의 펀드와 투자자에 대한 주의의무와 충실의무의 정의 및 규제, 금융사기에 대한 금융투자업자의 책임강화, 투자권유자문인력의 실질적 투자적합성 검토 및 판단의무 이행 감독 및 금융사기 사건에서 과실상계원칙 배제 등을 제안한다.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> The Korean financial regulators identified, in the wake of the recent hedge fund industry scandals of DLF, Lime Asset Management, and Optimus Asset Management, certain systemic gaps in the market oversight regime and proposed changes to reduce redemption and cash/maturity mismatchs, prevent abuse of private offering exemptions, and provide additional investor protection measures. In spite of the breadth of those policy changes, more fundamental changes may be needed to prevent the recurrence of the recent market misbehaviors – such additional changes may include prohibition of marketing funds with mismatching redemption schedules to the maturity or marketability of their investment assets; prohibition of including target yield rates in marketing; greater fund independence from investment advisors, especially for highly retailized hedge funds; stricter definition of the fiduciary duties of the advisers and sales companies with respect to the funds and investors; stricter reading of the securities fraud section in the Financial Services and Capital Markets Act (§178); stricter enforcement of the investment adviser rules and regulations; and exclusion of the comparative negligence rules in securities fraud cases for the benefit of the investors.<br>","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86573935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Heterogeneity of risk aversion parameters of economic agents facilitates risk sharing, as such, is a necessary condition for economic viability of stock markets. This study finds price equilibriums that are outcome of conditioning of homogeneously received information on heterogeneous realizations of risk preferences Pareto dominate alternate comparable equilibriums that are conditioned on the `common' component of heterogeneously received information. Necessity of an information source that is not either of stock prices or stock returns, and that equally is visible to all for feasibility of homogeneously received information establishes necessity of a `market procedural mechanism' for conditioning of rational expectations equilibriums (REE). While stock return volatility has, in context of the `Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM)', structure that is amenable to its characterization as a market procedural mechanism, expectations that are conditioned on stock return volatility explicitly are shown to have character of uninformed gambles. Implicitness of adoption of return volatility as market mechanism suffices then, for inducement of stock markets that are characterized by, `gambles over lotteries'; the `investors trade too much' phenomenon; and intermittency of market correction events. We arrive then at a rational explanation for seeming irrationality or proneness to bias of actions of investors in stock markets, namely absence of a robustly formulated market procedural mechanism for formation of rational expectations equilibriums. In aggregate, we arrive at rescue of concept of REE from undeserved ridicule, that is, infer failings of mechanism design as bane of current workings of stock markets.
{"title":"Rescuing Rational Expectations from Undeserved Ridicule","authors":"Oghenovo A. Obrimah","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3493043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3493043","url":null,"abstract":"Heterogeneity of risk aversion parameters of economic agents facilitates risk sharing, as such, is a necessary condition for economic viability of stock markets. This study finds price equilibriums that are outcome of conditioning of homogeneously received information on heterogeneous realizations of risk preferences Pareto dominate alternate comparable equilibriums that are conditioned on the `common' component of heterogeneously received information. Necessity of an information source that is not either of stock prices or stock returns, and that equally is visible to all for feasibility of homogeneously received information establishes necessity of a `market procedural mechanism' for conditioning of rational expectations equilibriums (REE). While stock return volatility has, in context of the `Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM)', structure that is amenable to its characterization as a market procedural mechanism, expectations that are conditioned on stock return volatility explicitly are shown to have character of uninformed gambles. Implicitness of adoption of return volatility as market mechanism suffices then, for inducement of stock markets that are characterized by, `gambles over lotteries'; the `investors trade too much' phenomenon; and intermittency of market correction events. We arrive then at a rational explanation for seeming irrationality or proneness to bias of actions of investors in stock markets, namely absence of a robustly formulated market procedural mechanism for formation of rational expectations equilibriums. In aggregate, we arrive at rescue of concept of REE from undeserved ridicule, that is, infer failings of mechanism design as bane of current workings of stock markets.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85620807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We show that central banks face a time inconsistency problem when publishing bank stress test results. Before a stress test, they want to appear tough as the threat of letting banks fail the stress test incentivizes prudent behaviour. After the stress test, they want to act soft by releasing only partial information in order to reassure financial markets about bank health. We characterize an institutional design solution to this commitment problem: a social planner sets the framework within which the central bank communicates. We find that a hurdle rate framework, where all banks are judged to pass or fail relative to a common threshold, is optimal in many settings as it generates intermediate levels of both incentives and reassurance. With a hurdle rate framework, stress tests become an informational contagion channel, as changes in the health of one bank affect beliefs about the health of other banks. Thus, informational contagion can be a feature of a socially optimal institutional design in the presence of a time inconsistency problem.
{"title":"Time Inconsistency in Stress Test Design","authors":"Markus Parlasca","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3803876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3803876","url":null,"abstract":"We show that central banks face a time inconsistency problem when publishing bank stress test results. Before a stress test, they want to appear tough as the threat of letting banks fail the stress test incentivizes prudent behaviour. After the stress test, they want to act soft by releasing only partial information in order to reassure financial markets about bank health. We characterize an institutional design solution to this commitment problem: a social planner sets the framework within which the central bank communicates. We find that a hurdle rate framework, where all banks are judged to pass or fail relative to a common threshold, is optimal in many settings as it generates intermediate levels of both incentives and reassurance. With a hurdle rate framework, stress tests become an informational contagion channel, as changes in the health of one bank affect beliefs about the health of other banks. Thus, informational contagion can be a feature of a socially optimal institutional design in the presence of a time inconsistency problem.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"85 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83929856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Regulations introduce significant fixed costs and add to operating leverage. Fixed regulatory costs that contribute to operating leverage should generate a risk premium. To explore whether such a premium exists, we introduce a measure of "regulatory operating leverage" that reflects the importance of fixed regulatory costs in a firm's cost structure. Regulatory operating leverage predicts stock returns in the cross-section, and a zero-cost high-low equal (value)-weighted regulatory operating leverage strategy generates 5.64% (5.28%) annualized risk-adjusted return. Finally, the impact of regulatory operating leverage on returns is due to the (systematic) risk contribution of fixed regulatory costs.
{"title":"Price of Regulations: Regulatory Costs and the Cross-section of Stock Returns","authors":"Barış Ince, H. Ozsoylev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3655823","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3655823","url":null,"abstract":"Regulations introduce significant fixed costs and add to operating leverage. Fixed regulatory costs that contribute to operating leverage should generate a risk premium. To explore whether such a premium exists, we introduce a measure of \"regulatory operating leverage\" that reflects the importance of fixed regulatory costs in a firm's cost structure. Regulatory operating leverage predicts stock returns in the cross-section, and a zero-cost high-low equal (value)-weighted regulatory operating leverage strategy generates 5.64% (5.28%) annualized risk-adjusted return. Finally, the impact of regulatory operating leverage on returns is due to the (systematic) risk contribution of fixed regulatory costs.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79819335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Giulio Cornelli, S. Doerr, L. Gambacorta, Ouarda Merrouche
Over 50 countries have introduced regulatory sandboxes to foster financial innovation. This paper conducts the first evaluation of their ability to improve fintechs’ access to capital and attendant real effects. Exploiting the staggered introduction of the UK sandbox, we establish that firms entering the sandbox see an increase of 15% in capital raised post-entry. Their probability of raising capital increases by 50%. Sandbox entry also has a significant positive effect on survival rates and patenting. Investigating the mechanism, we present evidence consistent with lower asymmetric information and regulatory costs.
{"title":"Regulatory Sandboxes and Fintech Funding: Evidence from the UK","authors":"Giulio Cornelli, S. Doerr, L. Gambacorta, Ouarda Merrouche","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3727816","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3727816","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Over 50 countries have introduced regulatory sandboxes to foster financial innovation. This paper conducts the first evaluation of their ability to improve fintechs’ access to capital and attendant real effects. Exploiting the staggered introduction of the UK sandbox, we establish that firms entering the sandbox see an increase of 15% in capital raised post-entry. Their probability of raising capital increases by 50%. Sandbox entry also has a significant positive effect on survival rates and patenting. Investigating the mechanism, we present evidence consistent with lower asymmetric information and regulatory costs.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81756644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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